The American Political Science Review

Articles by Carl H. Landé, Lawrence A. Scaff, Walter Odajnyk, David W. Brady, John Ferejohn and Talbot Page, Richard M. Merelman

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The American Political Science Review

Vol. LXVII March 1973 No. 1

CONTENTS

11 The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities — Peter K. Eisinger

29 Electoral Participation in the French Fifth Republic — Howard Rosenthal and Subrata Sen

55 The State Political Party and the Policy-Making Process — Sarah McCally Morehouse

73 Images, Process and Feedback in Foreign Policy: Israel's Decisions on German Reparations — Michael Brecher

103 Networks and Groups in Southeast Asia: Some Observations on the Group Theory of Politics — Carl H. Landé

128 Max Weber's Politics and Political Education — Lawrence A. Scaff

142 The Political Ideas of C. G. Jung — Walter Odajnyk

153 A Research Note on the Impact of Inter-Party Competition on Congressional Voting in a Competitive Era — David W. Brady

157 A Note on "Voting or a Price System in a Competitive Market Structure" — John Ferejohn and Talbot Page

161 The Structure of Policy Thinking in Adolescence: A Research Note — Richard M. Merelman

168 APSA Presidential Address
  Introduction — Harold D. Lasswell
  Skill Revolution and Consultative Commonwealth — Heinz Eutau

192 Communications

200 Editorial Comment

202 Book Reviews

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ARTICLES

11 **The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities.** This paper is an exploration of various political environmental conditions associated with the incidence of political protest activities directed toward urban institutions, agencies, and officials in 43 American cities.

Two preliminary questions are considered first. One deals with making explicit the theoretical linkage between elements in the political environment and political behavior. The other is an attempt to define protest technically and to differentiate it from political violence. This effort is made necessary by the facts that violence and protest are not treated in the literature as distinct forms of behavior (but rather as similar acts at different points on a continuum of aggressiveness) and that studies of collective violence in American ghettos indicate no relation between environment and rioting.

Two alternative hypotheses are considered: protest varies negatively with indicators of an open political system (a linear model) and protest is greatest in systems characterized by a mix of open and closed factors (a curvilinear model). Data are drawn from newspaper accounts of protest incidents in 43 cities over a six month period in 1968, producing a sample of 120 protest incidents.

Both the simple incidence of protest and the intensity of protest seem to fit the curvilinear model more closely than the linear one. The incidence of protest, then, seems to signify change not only among previously quiescent or conventionally oriented groups but also in the political system itself as it becomes more open and responsive.

By Peter K. Eisinger, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

29 **Electoral Participation in the French Fifth Republic.** Variations in second ballot abstention and blank and invalid ballot rates (over the cross-section of French election districts) are examined for all four legislative elections of the French Fifth Republic. Analysis was conducted primarily through a heuristic decision-making model and a spatial model developed from the theories of Riker, McKelvey, and Ordeshook, and Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook.

Abstentions appear to be primarily influenced by long-term factors and the competitiveness of the contest. Blank ballots appear to be primarily dependent upon short-term factors, especially nonvoting from the alienation that results when a candidate present on the first ballot is not present on the second. The alienation model and the heuristic model, though partly collinear, make independent contributions to the explanation of the blank ballot variance.

By Howard Rosenthal, Professor of Industrial Administration and Political Science, Carnegie-Mellon University and Subrata Sen, Instructor of Marketing, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.

55 **The State Political Party and the Policy-Making Process.** This research investigated the proposition that variation in the structure of the political party can account for variation in the type of policy produced. The conditions under which legislators of the governor's party supported his legislative requests in sixteen sessions chosen for different degrees of party cohesion were investigated. The findings indicate that there is very little correlation between the legislator's district primary or election competition and his support for the governor's requests. The Democratic governor is supported by legislators from the districts in which he himself has strong party support as measured by his primary vote. The Republican governor's support cannot be geographically located in this manner. With respect to socioeconomic legislation, the pattern of support for a successful governor does not depend upon socioeconomic variables within the legislators' districts, but if the governor cannot control his legislators, socioeconomic variables provide the major basis for the factions which develop.

By Sarah McCally Morehouse, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Manhattanville College.

73 **Images, Process and Feedback in Foreign Policy: Israel's Decisions on German Reparations.** This paper attempts to operationalize the concept of a foreign policy system and to test the utility of one path to empirically oriented theory: The approach is designated "structured empiricism." The research design incorporates some of the recent innovations in political science—the concept of system, the distinction between operational and psychological environment, the notion of issue-area and the attitudinal prism or lens through which decision makers' images are filtered. The focus is on one of the most significant Israeli foreign policy decision clusters—German Reparations 1950–2. Following the designation of the decision-making group, the dissection of their psychological environment, and the analysis of the decision-making process, the critical dimension of feedback is examined. The decision flow and feedback flow illustrate the dynamic character of a foreign

policy system in action. Finally, a selection of hypotheses on the behavior of decision makers is tested, and the findings summarized.

By Michael Brecher, Professor of Political Science, McGill University and Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

103 **Networks and Groups in Southeast Asia: Some Observations on the Group Theory of Politics.** The paper describes a "dyadic" type of political structure which, it is argued, is a necessary supplement to class and interest group models for the analysis of informal political structure in contemporary Southeast Asia, and probably in other developing areas.

Various types of simple and complex dyadic structures are described. The paper then examines four Southeast Asian polities, of different degrees of political development, with attention to the manner in which they combine group and dyadic structures. The examples are the Kalinga, a pagan ethnolinguistic group of Northern Luzon; the Tausug, a Muslim group of the Sulu archipelago; the traditional Thai monarchy; and the present Republic of the Philippines. In each case the effects of structure upon the operation of the system are explored. The paper concludes with a set of paired propositions concerning the characteristics of "trait associations" and "personal followings."

By Carl H. Landé, Professor of Political Science, University of Kansas.

128 **Max Weber's Politics and Political Education.** Max Weber's work has long been considered the property of sociologists. This paper attempts to restore an understanding of the fundamental political nature of his thought and action. Through an examination of Weber's political writings and involvements, beginning with the Freiburg Inaugural Address of 1895, it is demonstrated that Weber developed a political theory which was both critical and empirical, and attempted (unsuccessfully) to put it into practice. The two sides of this attempt are discussed: the critique of Bismarckian and Wilhelmian politics and Weber's own "positive" construction of a new political order. "Bureaucratization" and "democratization" are understood as the key themes of this analysis. Identification with the middle class is stressed as a major determinant of action, transcended only by a profound commitment to political education of the nation. Political education is judged to be the supreme task of theory; it supplies the source of Weber's political and scientific commitments, and the explanation for his ultimate political failure.

By Lawrence A. Scaff, Assistant Professor of Government, University of Arizona.

142 **The Political Ideas of C. G. Jung.** The article examines two of Jung's contributions to the study of politics: his conjectures about the origin of culture and politics and his theory of psychic inflation. Culture arises because man is subjected to a series of opposing tensions that divert a part of his libidinal energy from its natural flow and produce a degree of surplus psychic energy. Symbols, rising from the unconscious, transform this energy into cultural manifestations. Through ornaments and rituals, symbols also play a vital role in differentiating individual consciousness from collective consciousness. The gradually evolving consciousness of both the indivdual and the group leads to the inception of politics—of conscious conflict and harmony.

Psychic inflation is the extension of the ego beyond its natural limits as a result of an identification with the contents of the collective unconscious. It leads to an illusory sense of either superiority or inferiority. The atrophy of conscious development follows. On the other hand, the conscious assimilation of the contents of the collective unconscious produces a charismatic personality or group. But these are rare cases. For the most part, psychic inflation is a natural psychic law that can be partially controlled through an awareness of the forces of the unconscious.

By Walter Odajnyk, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Columbia University.

153 **A Research Note on the Impact of Interparty Competition on Congressional Voting in a Competitive Era.** In the modern House of Representatives party competition for seats is not strongly correlated with or predictive of party voting behavior. The most plausible explanation for this weak relationship is that less than 20 per cent of House seats are competitive from one census to the next. In this study the Hasbrouck-Jones Fluidity Index was applied to House elections in the 1890–1900 period, and almost 50 per cent of House seats in this era were found to have been competitive at that time.

From the 1892–1900 period the 55th and 56th U.S. Houses were selected for analysis. A varimax factor analysis was run on the party votes in these Congresses, and the resultant factor scores formed a unidimensional measure of the number of times a member voted with a party majority. A multiple regression analysis was run, with these party support scores used as the dependent variable and with party competition and occupational composition of the district used as the independent variables. The results showed that in both houses party competition was strongly correlated with and predictive of party support scores. The same analysis on the 89th House yielded much weaker correlations and showed little predictive ability.

By DAVID W. BRADY, Associate Professor, University of Houston.

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157 **A Note on "Voting or a Price System in a Competitive Market Structure:"** The purpose of this note is to contribute to the analysis of various sorts of institutions for distributing goods to members of a society. The paper examines what happens when a society is faced with distributing ordinary private goods to its members. It can utilize three different sorts of institutions: a voting system, a price system, or a fixed proportions sharing rule. We suggest that a fixed proportions sharing rule generally will be found preferable by the society to majority rule. We argue that Shubik's assertion that a price system will dominate majority rule is not true without qualification.

By JOHN FEREJOHN, Assistant Professor of Political Science at California, Institute of Technology.
By TALBOT PAGE, Research Associate, Resources for the Future, Inc., Washington, D.C.

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161 **The Structure of Policy Thinking in Adolescence: A Research Note.** Drawing on findings reported in an earlier issue of this *Review*, the present Note examines the extent to which nine forms of reasoning about the problem of poverty cohere into recognizable structures or cognitive styles among a small sample of eighth and twelfth graders. The degree of structured policy thinking among the respondents is lower than might have been predicted on the basis of cognitive developmental theory. Moreover, a respondent's amount of political interest, activity, motivation, and knowledge is a more accurate guide to his policy-thinking style than is his age. This finding also does not accord with cognitive developmental expectations. When these data are taken together with findings reported in the earlier article, we can conclude only that political involvement and individual maturation interact in complex ways in the development and structuring of policy thinking.

By RICHARD M. MERELMAN, Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin.

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168 **APSA Presidential Address**

Introduction.

By HAROLD D. LASSWELL, Ford Foundation Professor Emeritus of Law and Social Sciences, Yale Law School.

169 **Skill Revolution and Consultative Commonwealth.** The "consultative commonwealth" is a construct of the future that is rooted in the social and technological changes occasioned by the modern skill revolution. The construct is based on the assumption that because of the prominence of old and new professions in policy making and the delivery of human as well as technical services, consultative modes of interaction will be a pervasive feature of governance in the future. Consultation will not be the dominant process but will complement, supplement, and implement other governmental processes. There will be both more bureaucratization and more democratization, but the skill revolution will inject professional ways of doing things into the emerging commonwealth. The construct is built on theoretical considerations and empirical research, taking account of trends and counter-trends in the evolution of the professions as significant skill elites. Its purpose is to aid in orienting political research in terms of past, present, and future; and to link empirical political theory with normative concerns.

By HEINZ EULAU, Professor of Political Science, Stanford University.

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192 COMMUNICATIONS

From Lawrence S. Finkelstein, Robert J. Lieber, Steven A. Peterson, Robert I. Rotberg, Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor, Daniel R. Hoffman, Earl Latham, Robert T. Daland, Lee Sigelman, Wallace C. Koehler, Jr., William D. Coplin and J. Martin Rochester.

---

200 EDITORIAL COMMENT

---

202 BOOK REVIEWS

Political Theory, History of Political Thought and Methodology

Allan Bloom, trans., *The Republic of Plato*. Harry Newmann, p. 202
R. Christie and F. L. Geis, eds., *Studies in Machiavellianism*. Thomas J. Bouchard, Jr. p. 204
Gottfried Dietze, *Youth, University and Democracy*. P. H. Partridge, p. 205
Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*. Randall Collins, p. 207

William L. McBride, *Fundamental Change in Law and Society: Hart and Sartre on Revolution.* Hwa Yol Jung, p. 208
Eugene J. Meehan, *The Foundations of Political Analysis, Empirical and Normative.* Quentin Gibson, p. 210
Bertell Ollman, *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society.* Joseph J. O'Malley, p. 211
P. H. Partridge, *Consent and Consensus.* Sanford A. Lakoff, p. 212
Plato, *The Republic of Plato.* See Allan Bloom.

214 American Government and Politics

Joseph Bensman and Arthur J. Vidich, *The New American Society.* Frank M. Coleman, p. 214
Harry M. Clor, ed., *Censorship and Freedom of Expression: Essays on Obscenity and the Law.* Elliott A. Brown, p. 215
Matthew A. Crenson, *The Un-Politics of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-Decision-making in the Cities.* Richard M. Merelman, p. 216
James V. Cunningham, *Urban Leadership in the Sixties.* Jeffrey L. Pressman, p. 217
Paul T. David, *Party Strength in the United States: 1872–1970.* Walter Dean Burnham, p. 218
Newton Edwards, *The Courts and the Public Schools: The Legal Basis of School Organization and Administration.* Stephen K. Bailey, p. 220
Henry Robert Glick, *Supreme Courts in State Politics: An Investigation of the Judicial Role.* Stephen M. Sachs, p. 221
Werner Z. Hirsch, Phillip E. Vincent, Henry S. Terrell, Donald C. Shoup, and Arthur Rosett, *Fiscal Pressures on the Central City: The Impact of Commuters, Nonwhites and Overlapping Governments.* Frederick C. Mosher and Steven E. Rhoads, p. 222
Joseph Kershaw, *Government Against Poverty.* Rebecca R. Polland, p. 224
John Laslett, *Labor and the Left: A Study of Socialist and Radical Influences in the American Labor Movement, 1881–1924.* J. David Greenstone, p. 225
Lois B. Moreland, *White Racism and the Law.* Ronald Beresford Bailey, p. 226
Kenneth Prewitt, *The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians.* Moshe M. Czudnowski, p. 227
Harry Howe Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment.* Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., p. 228
Eugene V. Rostow, *Is Law Dead?* Walter Berns, p. 230
Wallace S. Sayre and Judith H. Parris, *Voting for President: The Electoral College and the American Political System.* Edward Schneier, p. 231
Glendon Schubert, *Dispassionate Justice: A Synthesis of the Judicial Opinions of Robert H. Jackson.* Alan H. Schechter, p. 233
Duncan W. G. Timms, *The Urban Mosaic: Towards a Theory of Residential Differentiation.* Robert S. Friedman, p. 236
Dale Vinyard, *The Presidency.* David L. Paletz, p. 234
Richard M. Yearwood, *Land Subdivision Regulation: Policy and Legal Considerations for Urban Planning.* Robert S. Friedman, p. 236

237 Comparative Government and Politics

G. Adam, F. Bon, J. Capdevielle, R. Mourioux, *L'Ouvrier français en 1970.* Henry W. Ehrmann, p. 237
Heribert Adam, *Modernizing Racial Domination: The Dynamics of South African Politics.* Amry Vandenbosch, p. 289
Hamid Algar, *Religion and State in Iran: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period.* Fred J. Khouri, p. 239
Bela Balassa and Associates, *The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries.* Raymond Vernon, p. 240
Jack Belden, *China Shakes the World.* John F. Melby, p. 241
Michael Browne, ed., *Ferment in the Ukraine: Documents by V. Chornovil, I. Kandyba, L. Lukyanenko, V. Moroz and Others.* John A. Armstrong, p. 242
O. Edmund Clubb, *China and Russia—The Great Game.* Harold C. Hinton, p. 243
Alexander Dallin and George W. Breslauer, *Political Terror in Communist Systems.* Frederick C. Barghoorn, p. 244
Ralph della Cava, *Miracle at Joaseiro.* Thomas C. Bruneau, p. 245
Ernest Feder, *The Rape of the Peasantry: Latin America's Landholding System.* Merle Kling, p. 246
Edward Feit, *Urban Revolt in South Africa, 1960–1964: A Case Study.* Amry Vandenbosch, p. 289
Irving K. Fox, ed., *Water Resources Law and Policy in the Soviet Union.* John N. Hazard, p. 247
Michael P. Gehlen, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union: A Functional Analysis.* Yaroslav Bilinsky, p. 248
H. D. Harootunian, *Toward Restoration: The Growth of Political Consciousness in Tokugawa Japan.* James H. Buck, p. 249
Donald Hawley, *The Trucial States.* Lorenzo K. Kimball, p. 250
Keith Hopkins, ed., *Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony.* Jack M. Potter, p. 251
Colin A. Hughes, *Images and Issues: The Queensland State Elections of 1963 and 1966.* Neal Blewett, p. 252
Goran Hyden, Robert Jackson and John Okumu, *Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience.* Herbert H. Werlin, p. 253

Leo Jakobson and Ved Prakash, eds., *Urbanization and National Development,* Vol. I. C. Hart Schaaf, p. 255
Richard Johnson, *The French Communist Party Versus the Students: Revolutionary Politics in May-June 1968.* Sidney Tarrow, p. 256
David Joravsky, *The Lysenko Affair.* Conway Zirkle, p. 258
Kenneth Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development. The Case of Romania, 1944–1965.* Melvin Croan, p. 260
Heino Kaack, *Geschichte und Struktur des deutschen Parteiensystems.* Thomas P. Koppel, p. 261
Wilfrid L. Kohl, *French Nuclear Diplomacy.* Patrick W. Murphy, p. 262
Roman Kolkowicz, Matthew P. Gallagher, Benjamin S. Lambeth, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., and Peter W. Colm, *The Soviet Union and Arms Control: A Superpower Dilemma.* Thomas W. Wolfe, p. 263
J. S. La Fontaine, *City Politics: A Study of Leopoldville, 1962–63.* Martin A. Klein, p. 265
Victor T. Le Vine, *The Cameroon Federal Republic.* Willard R. Johnson, p. 265
Seymour Martin Lipset, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Change and Persistence in Social Structures.* Neal Riemer, p. 267
Benita Luckmann, *Politik in einer deutschen Kleinstadt.* Charles R. Foster, p. 268
Leo Marquard, *A Federation of Southern Africa.* Julian R. Friedman, p. 268
William Martin, *Switzerland: From Roman Times to the Present.* Henry H. Kerr, Jr., p. 285
Naboth Mokgatle, *The Autobiography of an Unknown South African.* Amry Vandenbosch, p. 289
Dietrich Orlow, *The History of the Nazi Party: 1919–1933.* Annelise Thimme, p. 270
Maxwell Owusu, *Uses and Abuses of Political Power: A Case Study of Continuity and Change in the Politics of Ghana.* Richard Rathbone, p. 271
Frank Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order: Social Stratification in Capitalist and Communist Societies.* John A. Armstrong, p. 272
Stanley G. Payne, *The Spanish Revolution.* J. Martinez-Alier, p. 273
Jiří Pelikán, ed., *The Czechoslovak Political Trials 1950–1954. The Suppressed Report of the Dubček Government's Commission of Inquiry, 1968.* Ivan Sviták, p. 275
Paul Craig Roberts, *Alienation and the Soviet Economy. Toward a General Theory of Marxian Alienation, Organizational Principles, and the Soviet Economy.* Andrzej Brzeski, p. 277
Thomas W. Robinson, ed., *The Cultural Revolution in China.* Byung-joon Ahn, p. 278
Neville Rubin, *Cameroon: An African Federation.* Willard R. Johnson, p. 265
Geoffrey Sawer, *Australian Federalism in the Courts.* S. Rufus Davis, p. 280
Philippe C. Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil.* Alfred Stepan, p. 281
Alain Schnapp and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *The French Student Uprising, November 1967–June 1968: An Analytical Documentary.* Sidney Tarrow, p. 256
H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics.* Erik P. Hoffmann, p. 283
Jurg Steiner, *Gewaltlose Politik und kulturelle Vielfalt: Hypothesen entwickelt am Beispiel der Schweiz* Henry H. Kerr, Jr., p. 285
John W. Strong, ed., *The Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Kosygin: The Transition Years.* Thomas B. Larson, p. 286
Joan Vincent, *African Elite: The Big Men of a Small Town.* Colin Leys, p. 288
Peter Walshe, *The Rise of African Nationalism: The African National Congress, 1912–1952.* Amry Vandenbosch, p. 289
Albert L. Weeks, *The Other Side of Coexistence: An Analysis of Russian Foreign Policy.* Max Beloff, p. 292
Raanan Weitz, *From Peasant to Farmer: A Revolutionary Strategy for Development.* Elias H. Tuma, p. 292
Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., *Soldier and State in Africa.* Robert M. Price, p. 294
Lawrence Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958–1969.* Hugh Tinker, p. 295

297 International Politics, Law, and Organization

John Carey, *UN Protection of Civil and Political Rights.* Ernst B. Haas, p. 297
Ernst B. Haas, *Human Rights and International Action: The Case of Freedom of Association.* Vernon Van Dyke, p. 298
Henry H. Han, *International Legislation by the United Nations. Legal Provisions, Practice and Prospects.* Alan James, p. 300
Gary R. Hess, *America Encounters India: 1941–1947.* David R. Weaver, p. 301
Kyung-Won Kim, *Revolution and the International System: A Study in the Breakdown of International Stability.* Peter Nailor, p. 301
Kiyoshi Kojima, *Japan and a Pacific Free Trade Area.* Robert Evans, Jr., p. 302
Theodore Morgan and Nyle Spoelstra, eds., *Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia.* J. S. G. Wilson, p. 303
Raymond G. O'Connor, *Diplomacy for Victory: FDR and Unconditional Surrender.* Anne Armstrong, p. 304
William E. O'Connor, *Economic Regulation of the World's Airlines: A Political Analysis.* Oliver J. Lissitzyn, p. 306
Robert E. Osgood, Robert W. Tucker, Herbert S. Dinerstein, Francis E. Rourke, Isaiah Frank, Laurence W. Martin, George Liska, *America and the World: From the Truman Doctrine to Vietnam.* M. Donald Hancock, p. 307
George W. Shepherd, ed., *Racial Influence on American Foreign Policy.* L. Gray Cowan, p. 308

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The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities*

PETER K. EISINGER
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Political Environment and Protest

The complex interrelationship between political environment variables on the one hand and political behavior on the other has been a persistent concern of analysts of urban politics. The purpose of this paper is to begin an exploration of various environmental conditions associated with the incidence of political protest activities directed toward urban institutions, agencies, and officials in American cities.

Political environment is a generic term used variously in the literature of political science to refer to, among other things, aspects of formal political structure, the climate of governmental responsiveness, social structure, and social stability. Scholarly efforts have generally been directed toward examination of the extent to which specific configurations of environmental variables and distinctive patterns of local politics occur together. Treating environmental elements as independent variables,[1] students have shown relationships, for example, between reformed municipal institutions and low voting turnout,[2] reform government and high spending and tax policies,[3] centralization of local power and urban renewal success,[4] and less representative councilmanic institutions and the incidence of race riots.[5]

This type of analysis has depended on the use of data on macro-level, or community, characteristics for its independent variables. The linkages between these diverse characteristics and patterns of political behavior and those among the environmental variables themselves have seldom been made explicit theoretically.

Such research efforts take on theoretical coherence, however, if it is understood in the first instance that the environmental variables are related to one another in the sense that they establish a *context* within which politics takes place.[6] Furthermore, the possible linkages between this context and the patterns of political behavior become evident if the elements of the context are conceived as components of the particular *structure of political opportunities* of a community. That is to say, such factors as the nature of the chief executive, the mode of aldermanic election, the distribution of social skills and status, and the degree of social disintegration, taken individually or collectively, serve in various ways to obstruct or facilitate citizen activity in pursuit of political goals. Other environmental factors, such as the climate of governmental responsiveness and the level of community resources, help to establish the chances of success of citizen political activity. In short, elements in the environment impose certain constraints on political activity or

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[1] It should be noted that a significant body of research, based on similar intellectual assumptions, has also treated governmental structure as a *dependent* variable. These would include John H. Kessel, "Governmental Structure and Political Environment," *American Political Science Review*, 56 (Sept., 1962), 615–620; Leo Schnore and Robert Alford, "Forms of Government and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Suburbs," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 8 (June, 1963), 1–17; Robert Alford and Harry Scoble, "Political and Socio-Economic Characteristics of American Cities," *Municipal Yearbook 1965* (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1965), 82–97; and Raymond Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (June, 1966), 306–326.

[2] Robert Alford and Eugene Lee, "Voting Turnout in American Cities," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (September, 1968), 796–813.

[3] Edgar L. Sherbenou, "Class, Participation, and the Council-Manager Plan," *Public Administration Review*, 21 (Summer, 1961), 131–135.

[4] Amos H. Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (January, 1963), 422–431.

[5] Stanley Lieberson and Arnold R. Silverman, "The Precipitants and Underlying Conditions of Race Riots," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (December, 1965), 887–898.

[6] Robert Lineberry makes a similar point in his essay, "Approaches to the Study of Community Politics," in *Community Politics*, ed. Charles Bonjean, Terry N. Clark, and Robert Lineberry (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 20.

open avenues for it. The manner in which individuals and groups in the political system behave, then, is not simply a function of the resources they command but of the openings, weak spots, barriers, and resources of the political system itself. There is, in this sense, interaction, or linkage, between the environment, understood in terms of the notion of a structure of political opportunities, and political behavior.

By measuring these environmental factors, the analyst develops a means to judge the nature of the biases which groups in a political system must confront. Such judgments lead to conclusions about the ease with which people can get what they want from the political system through collective action. Where the structure of government is potentially more responsive to an electorate by providing opportunities of formal representation for distinct segments of the population (blacks, for example) or where the government is demonstrably responsive to citizen needs and demands, the structure of opportunities is relatively open. There exist chances for diverse groups to exercise influence through delegates on representative bodies and influence appears to elicit government action.

Where formal or informal power appears to be concentrated and where government is not responsive, the opportunities for people to get what they want or need through political action are limited. The opportunity structure is relatively closed.

One of the most explicit efforts to understand elements of the political environment in terms of the structure of opportunities is found in the work of Lineberry and Fowler. In their exploration of the differences in policy making between reformed and unreformed local governments, they conclude that

> The translation of social conflicts into public policy and the responsiveness of political systems to class, racial, and religious cleavages differs markedly with the kind of political structure.... [N]on-partisan elections, at-large constituencies and manager governments are associated with a lessened responsiveness of cities to the enduring conflicts of political life.[7]

Reformed local government structure, whose rationale is to eliminate "politics" and partiality from municipal administration, restricts the opportunities which minority and outgroups have for success through political action. Not only is it likely that minorities will experience difficulty in gaining representation or even access in reform systems, but their needs often cannot be met using the criterion of efficient management. Reform governments attempt to institutionalize efficient management at the expense of recognizing particularistic and often costly interests.[8] This may lead to intense frustration on the part of excluded groups. Lieberson and Silverman find evidence to support their hypothesis that the less direct the relationship between the voter and his alderman (measured on a continuum which ranges from extensive at-large electoral systems to small district ward systems), the more likely it will be that race riots will occur.[9] Small districts provide access for more people and offer the possibility of minority representation, both of which serve to enlarge or open up the structure of opportunities. Similarly, it would seem reasonable to suspect that the incidence of protest, one manifestation of political frustration or impatience, is related to the nature of the opportunity structure.

Several studies, notably those of Downes,[10] Spilerman,[11] and Palley and Palley,[12] have attempted to demonstrate linkages between aspects of what I have called the opportunity structure and the incidence of mass ghetto violence. Their results have been uniformly negative. Downes and Spilerman independently found that the incidence of ghetto riots was essentially related to nothing more than the numerical size of a city's black population, while Palley and Palley discovered that objective indicators of the degree of black social and economic deprivation were unreliable predictors of ghetto violence.

If one were to follow the notion of a number of scholars that ghetto violence is simply a form of protest,[13] a more virulent extension of what is essentially the same political activity, then this inquiry could stop here. There would be little reason to believe that "peaceful" protest and ghetto "revolts" are related to substantially different sets of conditions.

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[7] Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (September, 1967), 715.

[8] This view of reform government is most cogently put in Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard and MIT Presses, 1963), pp. 40 ff.

[9] Lieberson and Silverman, p. 896.

[10] Bryan T. Downes, "Social and Political Characteristics of Riot Cities: A Comparative Study," *Social Science Quarterly*, 49 (December, 1968), 504–520.

[11] Seymour Spilerman, "The Causes of Racial Disturbances: Tests of a Theory," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, 1969.

[12] Marian Lief Palley and Howard A. Palley, "Social Welfare Indicators as Predictors of Racial Disorders in Black Ghettos," a paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, 1969.

[13] See, for example, Robert Fogelson, *Violence as Protest* (New York: Doubleday, 1971); Ralph Turner. "The Public Perception of Protest," *American Sociological Review*, 34 (December, 1969), 816–830; and Edward Banfield, *The Unheavenly City* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1970). Banfield speaks of "demonstrations" as a form of "rioting." See Chapter 9, esp. p. 191.

I would contend, however, that protest against local government targets and collective ghetto violence are two forms of political expression which may be distinguished conceptually and empirically. The conceptual distinctions—which I believe apply to protest directed against *any* target and to most forms of collective political violence—simply suggest that protest and violence are so different in their basic dynamics that the likelihood that the conditions associated with one will also be associated with the other is not a foregone conclusion. Some of the empirical distinctions suggest explicitly that the more narrow categories of behavior with which we are concerned here are reactions to different stimuli. That is, protest against local government targets is likely to be related to the nature of local politics, while ghetto violence is not.

Let us examine some conceptual distinctions first. The term "protest" may be used either generically to refer to any form of verbal or active objection or remonstrance or it may be used technically to refer to a conceptually distinctive set of behaviors. I shall use it in the latter sense.

Protest refers to a host of types of collective manifestations, disruptive in nature, designed to provide "relatively powerless people"[14] with bargaining leverage in the political process.[15] It may be distinguished from other forms of verbal objection[16] and politically inspired collective violence by the following characteristics.

1. Protest is a collective act, carried out by those concerned with the issue and not by their representatives. The vehement congressman who declares that he "protests" an action is not in fact relying on the forces, or resources, which protest, understood in the technical sense, brings into play. While the solitary congressman relies on his status to lend his objection impact, protest is a mass action which relies on the resources which groups of people can command, in this case resources involving the ability of relatively unpredictable masses to disrupt and inspire fear. Only as a mass participatory action are such forces brought into play.

2. Protest is a device by which actors making demands in the political system attempt to maximize the impact of their meager resources while at the same time they strive to minimize the costs which they might incur by such demand making.

Efforts to Control Costs Distinguish Protest from Political Violence. Those who pursue violent political strategies are also attempting to maximize the impact of relatively insubstantial resources, but by their action they are also exposing themselves to the possibility that the costs of such behavior will be maximized, if death, serious physical injury, and loss of freedom and legitimacy are taken as maximum costs. Protestors on the other hand seldom must make such expenditures.

Protest is a product, then, of a cost-benefit calculation; violent actors in contrast have essentially thrown cost considerations to the winds.

3. Political protest may also be distinguished from political violence by the fact that those who pursue the former rely for their impact largely on the *implicit* threat of violence,[17] while those who pursue the latter are *explicit* in their intention to do physical harm in that they either make open threats[18] or actually engage in violence. What is implicitly threatening in a protest is not only the socially unconventional display by crowds of people, which offends and frightens norm-abiding observers, but the visions which bystanders and targets conjure up

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[14] Michael Lipsky uses this phrase in "Protest as Political Resource," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (December, 1968), 1144–1158.

[15] James Q. Wilson was among the first to see protest as a form of bargaining in "The Strategy of Protest: Problems of Negro Civic Action," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 5 (September, 1961), 291–303.

[16] When the solitary politician rises in the legislative chamber to object to some official action, the press and public note that Congressman X *protested* on the floor of the House. This is to use "protest" generically to refer to vehement objection.

[17] Donald Von Eschen and his colleagues argue that the primary element leading to the success of a black protest movement in Maryland which they studied during the days of the civil rights turmoil was the exploitation of elite fear of violence and civil disorder, although the movement never intended violence. Donald Von Eschen, Jerome Kirk, and Maurice Pinard, "The Conditions of Direct Action in a Democratic Society," *Western Political Quarterly*, 22 (June, 1969), 309. Ralph Turner also dwells on the theme of the manipulation of fear of violence as the motive force of protest in "The Public Perception of Protest," p. 816. See also H. L. Nieburg, *Political Violence* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), p. 129; and "The Threat of Violence and Social Change," *American Political Science Review*, 56 (December, 1962), 872.

[18] A theory of violence and protest must somehow confront the problem of classifying verbal violence. i.e., where no physical harm is actually done. I would contend that verbal violence changes the nature of a political action and goes beyond the balance of threat and legitimate appeal struck by protestors. Thus it may be classified with active violent behavior for the purposes of understanding the dynamics of categories of actions.

about what such obviously angry behavior could lead to. Participants, targets, and third-parties have come to understand that the protest confrontation provides a relatively fertile matrix for the outbreak of violence. Indeed, the society may react to protest by resorting to pre-emptive violence. That protest may lead to violence, then, is undeniable; that the latter is simply an extension of the former does not follow, however.

The implicit-explicit dividing line is crucial. Protest harnesses aggressive impulses by controlling and, to some extent, masking them, while violence gives free reign to thse impulses. The strategy of controlling aggression by basing behavior on the unacknowledged threat of violence follows from the cost-benefit calculation. The advantages to the protestors of such a strategy are manifold. Fear is an important motive force, but the costs of acknowledging the manipulation of threat to produce fear are high. Once actors acknowledge the potential violence which underlies their behavior, the goals sought in the action become secondary in the conflict. Target actors—those against whom the protest is directed—may then refuse to debate the issues which gave rise to the protest. They may turn instead to the issue of the legitimacy of the means by which the demand is put.

As long as protestors do not manipulate the threat of violence explicitly, they enjoy a slim legality, even, occasionally, legitimacy. Once they employ their threat openly, however, they open the way for authorities to suppress their movement or action.

Protest, then, is a device by which groups of people manipulate fear of disorder and violence while at the same time they protect themselves from paying the potentially extreme costs of acknowledging such a strategy.

Protest and violence may also be distinguished empirically to some extent. One obvious point is that the ghetto violence of recent years mobilized primarily blacks as demand-makers, while urban protests have appealed to both races.[19] More important, several recent empirical efforts have suggested that the ghetto violence of the last decade can be viewed as a response to certain *national* forces which cut across or transcend city lines: Spilerman cites vacillatory federal action, the development of black consciousness, and the suggestive impact of the national news media, particularly television.[20] Protest against local government targets on the other hand, judging from the present data, is stimulated by specific grievances related to particular local agencies or officials. Whether or not protest occurs in a city, then, is more likely to be a function to some degree of the nature of the local political system, while the likelihood of violence is not (witness the riots in the "model" cities of New Haven and Detroit).

In addition, certain correlates of one form of behavior are not present with the other. For example, while Downes, Spilerman, and the data collected for this present inquiry all show a strong relationship between the incidence of violence and the size of a city's black population, my data show no relationship between the frequency of black protest and the size of the black population. Second, my data indicate that violence, prompted either by the police or the protestors, did not occur in the vast number of cases of protest, leading the observer to suspect that implicit threat manipulation and explicit threat manipulation are two distinct forms of political expression. And finally, a number of scholars argue that recent ghetto violence, while politically motivated, was largely expressive in nature,[21] while some preliminary survey evidence shows that most actors who engage in protest activities, conventionally defined, do so for instrumental purposes.[22]

In short, the study of protest has an integrity all its own. The lessons of the studies of mass violence in the nation's cities are not likely to be fully applicable to this enterprise.

The concern of this study is to explore the notion that the incidence of protest is in part a function of the nature of a city's political opportunity structure.

There appear to be two plausible hypotheses. One is that protest occurs most frequently in unresponsive and unrepresentative political systems—in other words, in cities in which the opportunity structure is relatively closed. Protest may be viewed in this situation primarily as a frustrated response by groups unable to gain access to decision-making councils by conventional means.[23] Groups which find or consider themselves deprived of political representation or which cannot elicit favorable policy decisions from government will resort to the drama of protest to make it appear that some sort of felicitous response is imperative for the preservation of social peace. Protest, then, springs from the inability of certain groups to manipulate the political system to their advantage by conventional means: the incidence of protest will vary negatively with indicators of an open structure of political opportunities. This may be designated the linear model of the conditions of protest.

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[19] The analysis presented here makes an attempt to control for the racial composition of the protest incidents under examination.

[20] Spilerman, pp. 1–2.

[21] See Peter Lupsha, "On Theories of Urban Violence," *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 4 (March, 1969), 275; and Marian Lief Palley and Howard A. Palley, "From Expressive Disorders to Issue-Oriented Politics," a paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, 1970, 5–6.

[22] Peter K. Eisinger, "Protest Behavior and the Integration of Urban Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, 33 (November, 1971), 989–990.

[23] This hypothesis finds support in the vast literature on relative deprivation and psychological response to frustration. For a summary of relevant materials, see Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, New Jersey:

A second hypothesis conceives protest as much a signal of impatience as frustration. According to this model—the curvilinear model—protest occurs as a political system begins to open up.[24] Or to put the hypothesis in such a way as to allow for testing in the absence of time-series data, protest will be most prevalent in systems characterized by a mix of open and closed factors. Protest is not likely to occur in extremely closed (repressive) systems or extremely open (responsive) systems. Hence the relationships of system characteristics and the incidence of protest will be curvilinear. Protest occurs in a mixed system because the pace of change does not keep up with expectations, *even though change is occurring.* As the political opportunity structure becomes more open, previously powerless groups begin to acquire influence. The acquisition and development of influence, however, is likely to come slowly. Conventional strategies of political influence may appear too slow and unwieldy to effect significant gratification. In a system which is opening up, the realization that the system may be vulnerable or responsive to political efforts combined with the persistence of inequities becomes intolerable for some groups. Hence, these groups may resort to protest to express their impatience, even when the system may be viewed in relative terms as a responsive one.

In the following sections I shall examine some data gathered on protest in American cities to determine which model best describes the conditions under which such activity occurs.

Data and Methods

Data on the incidence of protest activities were gathered from the local newspapers of 43 widely scattered cities. To reduce the possible distorting effects of size, the sample was drawn only from those cities with populations between 100,000 and one million. Of the 141 cities which fell in this category in 1968,[25] an original random sample of 56 was chosen. Newspapers in 13 of these cities were not available on microfilm. Hence, the final sample numbered 43.

Newspapers for a six-month period (May-October) in 1968 were read. Where there was more than one major newspaper, an increasingly rare circumstance in American cities, the afternoon journal was selected. This time period was deliberately chosen in order to control for seasonal variations in the likelihood of protest and to enhance the chances of obtaining a large sample of protests. It was assumed that the warm spring through autumn months are most conducive to the pursuit of outdoor political activities such as marches, picketing, or mass gatherings. Despite the relatively short time period, the effort of reading approximately 180 daily editions for each of 43 cities constituted an enormous task.

The decision to use newspapers as the source of the protest data was motivated by two considerations, one practical, the other theoretical. As for the former, there simply is no single official or nonofficial tabulation of protest incidents in existence. Reliance on newspaper accounts, however, has substantial justification in some theoretical writing on the dynamics of protest. According to Lipsky, protest activities create resources for protestors by activating sympathetic third-party interests, to whom the protest target is sensitive, to bring pressure to bear on behalf of the protestors.[26] The critical link between the protestors and their targets' third-party reference publics is the news media. Lipsky writes:

> To the extent that successful protest activity depends upon appealing to and/or threatening other groups in the community, the communications media set the limits of protest action. If protest tactics are not considered significant by the media, or if newspapers and television reporters or editors decide to overlook protest tactics, protest organizations will not succeed. Like the tree falling unheard in the forest, there is no protest unless protest is perceived and projected.[27]

While this conception of protest may be un-

Princeton University Press, 1970), chap. 2, especially pp. 24, 34–35, 38.

[24] This hypothesis represents an amalgam of several classic explanations of the causes of revolution, namely those of Soule and Brinton. As Soule has written, only after the position of desperate people "is somewhat improved and they have sensed the possibility of change, do they revolt effectively against oppression and injustice." Quoted in Gurr, p. 114.

[25] The sample was drawn from the *Municipal Yearbook 1968* (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1968). Population and percentage of blacks were taken from the 1970 census, *1970 Census of Population,* Advance Report, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C.

[26] Lipsky, p. 1146.

[27] Lipsky, p. 1151. Compare Turner's observation that protest cannot be projected as protest unless it conforms to folk-theories of what protest is ("The Public Perception of Protest," p. 818).

necessarily narrow (it is possible to conceive protest incidents in which interaction occurs privately between the protestors and their target), Lipsky's formulation offers a significant rationale for the data source: Newspaper coverage, however dubious the scholar might be about its objectivity of comprehensiveness, is vital in itself to the projection of protest.

In the selection of incidents, the research was guided by conventional definitions of protest. Microfilm readers were instructed to record the details of all marches, sit-ins, demonstrations, pickets, protest meetings or rallies, and any other incidents which might possibly be construed as collective protest. Much depended on how the participants defined their actions.[28] From this collection of incidents only those which were carried out by two or more individuals and directed at local governmental agencies, officials, or institutions were finally coded. The data do not include, then, campus protests or antiwar or antidraft protests. No instances of rioting, ambushes, shootings, assaults, looting or threatened violence were recorded, even if the perpetrators or their victims attributed such behavior to political motivations. If, however, violence broke out at the site of a peaceful protest and was a direct result of it, this was recorded.

A total of 120 protest incidents was finally selected and coded. The characteristics of these protests very widely, providing a multi-faceted portrait of protest in American cities in the late 1960s. Table 1 provides a summary of the distribution of protests by region, and Table 2 shows the range of protest frequency. Protest against city government targets is clearly not a frequent phenomenon. Five of the cities (three of them in the South: Fort Lauderdale, Winston-Salem, and Newport News) had no protest at all during this time period. Only five cities averaged one or more protests per month.[29] In general the cities averaged slightly fewer than three protests.

Table 1. Distribution of Protests by Region

Region	Number of Protests		
	0	1–2	3 or more
Northeast	—	1	3
Midwest	1	5	5
South	3	8	2
West	1	5	9
Totals	5	19	19

Table 2. Range of Protest Frequency

Number of Protests	Number of Cities
0	5
1	11
2	8
3	6
4	4
5	4
6	2
7	1
8	—
9	1
10	—
11	1
	43

Larger cities had a greater tendency to experience protest than smaller ones: while 28 per cent of the cities in the sample have populations over 500,000, 45 per cent of the protests occurred in those cities. City size and incidence of protest are positively correlated ($r = .46$).[30]

Estimates of the number of participants in each protest incident were reported in 96 of the 120 cases. The size of the protests ranged from five to over 2000. Table 3 shows the range of protest participation. A conservative estimate, based on a computation of the median number of protestors in each category times the number of protests, is that over 17,000 people took part in the 96 protests, an average of approximately 180 per incident.[31]

Urban protest is a strategy used predominantly by blacks,[32] a finding substantiated by this body of aggregate data. In those instances in which the race of the protestors was identified (95 out of 120 cases), 49 (52 per cent) protests were composed entirely of blacks, 21

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[28] The case of an American court-martial, held in Britain in the summer of 1971, comes to mind in which the guilt of the defendant hung on the definition of an act he had admittedly committed. The defendant, an army lawyer, had been accused of organizing a demonstration against the war (which is illegal for Americans in uniform overseas) while the lawyer argued that all he had done was to present a petition at the American embassy, which is legal for military personnel. In other words, the defendant refused to define his action as protest.

[29] These were San Francisco, Milwaukee, Sacramento, Boston, and Seattle.

[30] Unless otherwise noted, the correlations reported here are significant at the .05 level.

[31] Some participants may have taken part in more than one protest in a given city during the time span of this study, but there is no way of controlling for multiple participation.

[32] Eisinger, p. 1005.

Table 3. Size of Protest Incidents

Number of Participants	Number of Protests
1–10	3
11–25	10
26–50	18
51–75	5
76–100	18
101–200	15
201–300	10
301–500	9
501–1000	3
1001–2000	3
2001 or more	2
undetermined	24
	120

(22 per cent) were mixed black and white, and 20 (21 per cent) were exclusively white.[33]

More of the protests were directed against the city school system, particular schools, or school officials than other target (39 per cent; N = 47). The city council was the second most frequent target (12 per cent; N = 14), with the police (10 per cent; N = 12) and the welfare department (8 per cent; N = 9) next in order. Other city agencies, the mayor, and the city courts provided the bulk of the remaining targets.

All but seven (6 per cent) of the 120 protest incidents were carried out peacefully. Violence was instigated in several of the instances by the protestors, according to the newspaper accounts. In the vast majority of cases, protestors probably did not explicitly threaten violence; if they had done so, the authorities would likely have taken pre-emptive steps to halt the manifestation.

As a tactic, protest appears effective largely as a means of breaching the political opportunity structure rather than manipulating it for group ends. On the one hand, protestors were successful in a majority of cases in gaining access to their targets to state their demand (Table 4), but in only a fraction of instances were concessions actually made (Table 5).

Table 4. Nature of Target Response at Site of Protest

Met with or spoke to protestors	58%	(69)
Refused to meet with or speak to protestors	35%	(42)
Undetermined	7%	(9)
	100%	(120)

Table 5. Outcome of the Protest

Concessions made to the protestors	15%	(18)
No concessions made	54%	(65)
Action deferred, postponed	24%	(29)
Outcome undetermined	7%	(8)
	100%	(120)

In the next section the protest incidents are treated as identical units of analysis in exploring the basic conditions associated with protest. Since the intensity of individual protest incidents differs, however, depending upon the number of participants, the duration of the protest, and the number of sites at which a single incident occurred, a later section will explore the environmental conditions related to relatively intense protest activity.

Incidence of Protest and Environment

An initial look at the zero-order correlations between incidence of protest and selected environmental variables suggests that what I have called the curvilinear model is more applicable to the American case than is the linear model. Protest occurs most frequently in cities in which the political opportunity structure is characterized by a mix of open and closed variables.

One standard set of variables relates to the formal structure of local government. Scholars have argued that mayor-council governments are more accountable, and hence more available, to citizens than manager-council governments. The mayor is an elected politician and must please a constituency; the manager is a professional, hired by the city council, who maintains his office at their sufferance. Similarly, ward aldermanic elections afford residentially concentrated minorities greater opportunity for representation than at-large electoral systems. In the latter the major groups in the city dominate the electoral arena. Partisan systems seem to offer groups greater access to government than nonpartisan ones by virtue of the fact that parties aggregate diverse interests as a requisite of persistent viability and rely over time on identifiable blocs of voters for whom they supply cues and to whom they must account.[34]

In short, insofar as the particular institutional arrangements which characterize reform governments make access and representation more difficult for minorities to obtain, such governments offer a relatively closed structure of opportunities. Some evidence indicates, in fact, that the impact of reform institutions is cumulative in this regard: that is, the more components of reform a government has—nonpartisanship, manager, and at-large elections—the less responsive it is to minority group demands.[35]

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[33] Mexican-Americans were responsible for the remainder of those protests in which participants were identified by race or ethnicity (4 per cent).

[34] Lineberry and Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," p. 715.

Protest, however, does not appear to be a response to a closed system of opportunities as represented by formal governmental arrangements, taking each institutional form individually. The incidence of protest is positively related to mayor-council forms ($r = .35$).[36] Black protest is even more strongly related to mayoral government ($r = .42$).[37] Protest occurs most freely, then, in political systems in which at least one aspect of formal structure—the nature of the chief executive—has been viewed as most conducive to groups seeking access.

Taken as isolated variables, neither the arrangements for electing aldermen nor the fact of partisanship bears any relation to the incidence of protest. However, combining these two variables with the nature of the chief executive to get a multiple correlation (.41) affords a 40 per cent increase in explained variance over the simple correlation of mayoral government with protest (.35). The three variables taken together explain 17 per cent of the variance, while mayoral government alone explains only 12 per cent.

It would be plausible to suspect that the relationships shown here are not in fact reflective of the impact of formal structure but rather are a function of the type of population found predominantly in mayor-council cities. Since the number of blacks is related to mayor-council government (although not at significant level), we should find that the number of blacks is also related to black protest, if the form of government were simply an intervening variable. However, black protest and black population are not related, lending support to the finding of the association of structure and protest.

Formal institutional arrangements represent one aspect of the political opportunity structure in the sense that they seem to accord advantages in political competition to certain groups and disadvantages to others. The nature of the formal political structure, however, does not necessarily indicate where power lies or how it is distributed in the system.[38] If power is concentrated, then groups without membership in the circle of the select which attempt to enter political competition will neither have many points of access at which to make their case nor a great chance of acquiring significant allies. Indeed, if power is concentrated, then it is likely that the *resources* necessary to wield power are also concentrated, indicating that groups which seek to enter the political arena are likely to be poor in the necessary political currencies, or that there is, in Dahl's terms, little slack in the system.

In the terms of the present argument, one could claim support for the linear model of the relationship between protest and the environment if the incidence of protest rose in cities with a centralized distribution of power. Where power is concentrated, one plausible response for outgroups, low in conventional resources and cut off from regular access to the stations of power, would be to use protest.

On the other hand, if protest were found to increase with the dispersion of power, then the frustration model would be less appropriate. With the possibilities manifest for coalition building, for acquiring allies with significant resources, groups which resort to protest do so in a relatively open system. Such behavior might be viewed in terms of Lipsky's formulation of protest as a device to communicate the need for allies with resources.[39] This formulation *presupposes* a dispersion of power: some actors in the system might be favorable to the protestors and will join the conflict against those who are not. If protestors have potential allies, then the opportunity structure is not fully closed. Protest is a function of impatience in a system marked by some degree of flexibility.

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[35] Lineberry and Fowler, pp. 713–714. The difference between reform and traditional components is illustrated in the present body of data by the fact that blacks are slightly more likely to have nearly proportional representation on the city council under a ward system than under either a combined at-large/ward system or an at-large system. The correlation coefficient between the degree of proportional representation and ward elections is quite small ($r = .16$) but it is in the predicted direction.

[36] This is significant at the .02 level. Form of government was treated as a dichotomized dummy variable with the one commission government in the sample grouped with the manager governments. Robert Alford and Eugene Lee found that grouping commission and manager governments for a procedure identical to the one used here did not alter the correlation in a significant way. See their "Voting Turnout in American Cities," p. 803.

[37] Significant at the .006 level.

[38] Aiken has argued that reform governments and a concentrated distribution of power are positively related, but his relationships are neither strong nor significant. "The Distribution of Community Power: Structural Bases and Social Consequences" in *The Structure of Community Power,* ed. Michael Aiken and Paul Mott (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 499–500. J. David Greenstone and Paul Peterson however, have argued the exact opposite in "Reformers, Machines, and the War on Poverty" in *City Politics and Public Policy,* ed. James Q. Wilson (New York: Wiley, 1968), p. 289. Their examination was based on a study of only four cities.

[39] Lipsky, pp. 1146–1147.

One problem in testing these alternative possibilities is that summary measures of the dispersion of power in a community are difficult to come by. Nevertheless, there have been several creditable attempts, the most influential and controversial of which has been Hawley's MPO ratio, the proportion of managers, proprietors, and officials in the civilian labor force.[40] Hawley argued that a high MPO ratio indicates that power is diffused among different community subsystems, power which rests on managerial skills. Hawley wrote:

> Proceeding from the notion that system power resides in the subsystems or functional units of a community, we can infer that it must be exercised through the managerial functions of the subsystems. For it is those functions that co-ordinate the several other functions in their respective subsystems and articulate the latter with the larger system.[41]

Hawley demonstrated successfully that the greater the proportion of such white collar occupations in a city's work force, the less effective a city was in implementing urban renewal programs. Success, he argued, is a function of the concentration of power.

The need to infer power from occupational status, however, seems to me a serious flaw in the MPO ratio as a measure of the dispersion of power. Nevertheless, the ratio is not a meaningless one. It affords a measure of the distribution of occupational status and skills, two critical resources for the exercise of power. As such it offers one means of estimating the disperison of potential power, or the degree of slack in the system.[42] If the potential for wielding power is limited in a system, then it is still a relatively closed system.

Table 6. Intercorrelations (Pearson's r) of Protest and Selected Political Environment Variables

	All Protest Incidents	Black Protest Incidents
Population of city	.46*	.50*
Percentage black	—	−.02
Number of blacks	—	.14
Model cities grant	.26**	.23
Number of black elected officials	—	.07
Percentage of managers, proprietors, and officials	−.30*	−.28**
Index crimes per 1000 population	.34*	.27**
Percentage of minority police[a]	.20	.03
Mayor-council government	.35*	.42*
Ward aldermanic elections	−.01	.08
Partisanship	.07	.11
Incidence of riots	.23	.22
Black representation ratio[b]	—	.30*

[a] Data for eight cities were not available.

[b] This is a measure of proportional representation of blacks in the city council, computed by dividing the proportion of black aldermen by the proportion of black population.

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .10$.

In the cities selected for this study, the incidence of all protests and of black protests is negatively related to a high MPO ratio ($r = -.30$ and $-.28$, respectively). That is to say, protest occurs more frequently in cities with a small white collar work force, an indication that certain resources for the exercise of power are concentrated.

The MPO ratio is positively related to mayoral government (but not at a significant level), but the relationship between the MPO ratio and protest is not a function of form of government: the MPO ratio is still negatively related to the incidence of protest when form of government is controlled (partial $r = -.25$).[43]

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[40] Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success." Aiken has run the MPO ratio against his own measures of power concentration and comes up with the exactly opposite conclusion from Hawley. Aiken is not entirely sure how to explain the difference and ends up urging caution in the use of the measure. See p. 503.

[41] Hawley, p. 424.

[42] The distinction between potential influence and manifest influence, or influence in repose and influence in use, is germane here. See Robert Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 28–29; and William Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey, 1968), Chapters 4 and 5.

[43] It could be argued that the association of protest with occupational makeup of a population is simply an indication that protest occurs where there are greater numbers of people holding low status occupations. That is, protest is not a response to the systemic characteristic of resource concentration but rather is a function of the existence of large numbers of potential protestors. (This assumes that, at least in the aggregate, protest and lower-class status are related. Survey data I have collected in Milwaukee, to be reported elsewhere, show no relationship at the individual level between low status and protest participation.)

Nevertheless, if this were the case using aggregate rather than survey data, we could explain Hawley's findings by arguing that the larger the percentage of MPO's, the better-off the population, and the fewer would be the policies geared to social welfare programs designed to aid low income groups. However, the findings of Paulson and his colleagues suggest that

Table 7. Form of Government and Frequency of Protest

	0	1–2	3 or more	Totals
Mayor-council	6% (1)	29% (5)	65% (11)	100% (17)
Manager	15% (4)	54% (14)	31% (8)	100% (26)

Thus, protest appears to occur in cities in which the formal political structure provides opportunities while the informal structure, as measured by the distribution of occupational and skill resources, is relatively restricted. Formal attributes of government may have little bearing on the exercise of power. Structure provides a framework within which certain groups are accorded advantages if they are able to seize them. The mayor is more vulnerable than the manager because the former must please an electorate. But this vulnerability, a consequence of formal structure, assumes that the mayor is in a position to please an electorate by being responsive and that organized segments of the electorate can make demands on him. But the realities of the potential distribution of power, symbolized by the MPO ratio, may render the effects of structural biases important.

While this is a plausible argument, evidence indicates that blacks engage in protest *especially* in those cities where they have been able to gain formal proportional representation. Representation in the form of elected officials —limited here to aldermen[44]—does not guarantee blacks real power in a city, but it does indicate that certain types of political opportunities are available. Furthermore, it provides evidence that black spokesmen may speak from a legitimate and official forum. This is not a prerequisite for the exercise of power but it makes the problem of wielding power a lesser one in that access has already been achieved.

The incidence of black protest is not related to the absolute number of black elected officials, including aldermen, school board members, and judges, but it is significantly related to the black representation ratio (r = .30). The representation ratio was calculated by dividing the proportion of aldermen who are black by the proportion of the population which is black. When the figure equals 1.0, then blacks are, numerically speaking, perfectly proportionally represented. When the figure is under 1.0, the typical case, blacks are underrepresented. In a few cases, the ratio exceeds 1.0, indicating that the black population has more than its proportional share of aldermanic representatives.

As the representation ratio approaches zero, we may conclude that the structure of opportunities is less open for blacks. In the case of the cities in our sample, however, protest increases with the degree to which blacks are represented in city government. Protest is associated here with an open structural characteristic. According to the linear model, it would have been reasonable to expect that black protest occurred most frequently in those cities in which blacks had been denied representation. Instead, proportional representation may be viewed either as an invitation to pose demands (through protest, if that is the easiest way to mobilize support) or as a concomitant factor in a black population's coming of political age, a maturation process marked by twin developments in protest and electoral activity.

Table 8. Model Cities and Protest

	Number of Protests			
	0	1–2	3 or more	Totals
Model Cities grant	4% (1)	42% (10)	54% (13)	100% (24)
No Model Cities grant	21% (4)	47% (9)	32% (6)	100% (19)

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the MPO ratio affords more than a simple indicator of the socioeconomic composition of the population and implies a distinctive configuration of power.

Paulson et al. discovered that North Carolina counties with small percentages of MPO's—which would indicate a relatively low level of socioeconomic well-being—had *lower* welfare expenditures than those counties with high proportions of MPO's. They conclude that a high concentration of power can block what elites feel are undesirable programs, despite demonstrable needs of the population. Wayne Paulson, Edgar W. Butler, and Hallowell Pope, "Community Power and Public Welfare," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 28 (January, 1969), 17–27.

[44] Data on black elected officials was drawn from the *National Roster of Black Elected Officials*, compiled by Metropolitan Applied Research Center, Washington, D.C. and Voter Education Project, Southern Regional Council, Atlanta, Georgia, February, 1970.

Table 9. Minority Policemen and Protest

Percentage of Minority Policemen	Number of Protests 0	1–2	3 or more	Totals
0–5%	18% (3)	59% (10)	24% (4)	101% (17)
6–10%	8% (1)	25% (3)	67% (8)	100% (12)
11% or more	—	67% (4)	33% (2)	100% (6)

Note: Data for eight cities were not available.

Formal political structure, the distribution of resources, and the nature of the incumbents in elected office all give indications of the potential various groups might have for wielding political influence. However, none of these indicators supplies any sense of the extent to which a political system is in fact responsive to deeply felt needs. If a government does not demonstrate a willingness to respond to a diversity of demands, then the structure of opportunities cannot be said to be a fully open one, regardless of the opportunities for gaining access and representation.

To test the responsiveness of local governments, two measures of policy outputs were chosen. One was whether a city had received Model Cities planning funds[45] and the other was the percentage of the police force composed of racial minority members.[46] The former may serve as some indication of responsiveness to what is often the most frequently named problem facing the cities—the lack of decent housing.[47] The latter is a response to the animosities which mark the relationship between urban police forces and the black community.

Initial competition for Model Cities funds were intense. Nearly 200 cities submitted applications for the first round of planning grants of which only 75 were chosen during the winter of 1966–67.[48] Of the sample of 43 cities in this study 24 (56 per cent) had received planning grants by the end of 1968, and 19 had not. Because the Model cities program was thought to offer the means for a comprehensive attack on urban ills, the city which gained such funds could be said to have acted responsively to demands that were at the very least implicit in the urban condition.

Similarly, after the ghetto riots in the last decade, one of the major prescriptions for restoring racial peace was to increase minority group representation on the uniformed police force. Most cities sought, unsuccessfully, to recruit blacks for their police deparments.[49] The measure used here—the percentage of the force composed of minority group members—is necessarily a static one. Data do not exist in reliable form prior to 1969. Thus, the measure does not take account of changes in the percentage of blacks. Nevertheless, it may be assumed that simply having at a given point in time a substantial proportion of blacks on the force is an indication that the political system has at some previous time been responsive. And cities with a greater percentage may be said to be more responsive in this regard than cities with a smaller percentage.

Both the existence of a Model Cities program and the percentage of minority group policemen are *positively* related to the incidence of protest (.23 and .20, respectively), but only the former is statistically significant. Black protest is also slightly related to Model Cities, but the coefficient falls just short of our criterion of significance. Black protest is not at all related to the percentage of uniformed minority policemen.

These relationships, while small and in most cases not significant, lend more support to the curvilinear model than to the linear one. That is, protest increases with responsiveness.

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[45] This was set up in terms of a Model Cities grant/no Model Cities grant dummy variable. The source for this information is *1968 HUD Statistical Yearbook* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban Development, Government Printing Office, 1968). There are no data concerning those cities which applied for Model Cities funds but were turned down.

[46] *Municipal Yearbook 1970* (Chicago: International City Management Association, 1970) provided the source for these data.

[47] Survey data I have collected in the city of Milwaukee indicate that housing ranks consistently first for members of both races as "the most important problem facing this city." This is a finding duplicated in other surveys. See, for example, Bernard J. Frieden, "Housing and National Urban Goals: Old Policies and New Realities," in *The Metropolitan Enigma,* ed. James Q. Wilson, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 162.

[48] *The Model Cities Program: A Comparative Analysis of the Planning Process in Eleven Cities* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban Development, Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 7.

[49] Paul Delaney, "Recruiting of Negro Police Is a Failure in Most Cities," *New York Times,* January 25, 1971, p. 1, cols. 2, 3, p. 14, cols. 3–8.

It should be said, however, that a more detailed examination of these two variables would probably reveal that they are complex and ambiguous measures of responsiveness. Some of the cities in this sample which have Model Cities programs were more committed than others to lay involvement in planning.[50] And literature on the tensions experienced by black policemen[51] reveals that the cross-pressures felt by such men may drive them to brutal behavior against other blacks as a way of demonstrating professional loyalty in the face of race demands. Both Model Cities and the black policeman may represent mixed blessings in some sense, at least for the black community. In other words, *no* Model Cities grant and *no* black policemen would be signs of a failure to respond; but having such programs is not necessarily an unambiguous sign of responsiveness.[52] Such programs are likely, then, to represent a mix of responsive and nonresponsive impulses, a mix characteristic apparently of the conditions under which protests take place.

In those cities which did not obtain Model Cities funds, protest was not a frequent occurrence. Several explanations are plausible. One is that the demand for such a program did not exist. This is unlikely, however, since at least seven of the 19 cities experienced mass racial disorders in 1967 or 1968,[53] sufficient indication that conditions in those cities posed at least an implicit demand for massive governmental response.

Another explanation is that in those cities which had neither riots nor Model Cities grants, conditions were such during the time period of this study that the population felt no grievances deeply enough to participate in protests. It is also possible that the population groups from which protestors are generally drawn is simply too small to organize sustained protest actions in these cities. Neither explanation is convincing. Of the twelve cities which had neither a riot nor a Model Cities grant, seven are located in the South. They are characterized by large black populations (potential protest participants) and the usual range of urban ills.

Table 10. Model Cities, Riots, and Average Number of Protests

	Model Cities Grant	No Model Cities Grant
Average Number of protests per city	3.2	2.1
	Model Cities Grant and Riot	**No Model Cities Grant and Riot**
Average Number of protests per city	3.6	2.7

The most plausible explanation is that the political systems in the cities which did not participate in Model Cities are so closed or so unresponsive that protest was either discouraged or felt to be futile. The data tend to support such speculation, even in the case of those cities which experienced riots (Table 10).

The degree to which political opportunity structures are open or closed is not only a function of formal governmental structure, the distribution of certain skills and status, representation, and governmental responsiveness. Opportunity is also related to the social stability of the potentially mobilizable population. Where population groups exhibit high social disorganization, it might be expected that opportunities for elites seeking to mobilize political constituencies would be low. As a measure of social disorganization, this study employed the rate of those crimes reported in the FBI *Uniform Crime Reports 1968* (so-called "index crimes," because they comprise the national crime index) per 1000 population.[54] The incidence of protest, however, is positively related at a significant level to high crime rate ($r = .34$). Black protest is related less strongly to crime rate and the correlation is just short of significance. Gurr cites evidence which indicates that during periods of protest activity, protest displaces aggressive black crime.[55] The aggregate data presented here cannot assess changes in the crime rate which might occur during periods of protest activity, but as a static relationship, crime and protest appear to occur together. Such a finding indicates that the degree of social disorganization reflected at least by crime rates does little to impair the ability of elites to organize protests.

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[50] For example, Milwaukee, Atlanta, and Gary, all cities in our sample, were less likely than some of the other cities to share power over the program with local residents. See *The Model Cities Program*. . . .

[51] Nicholas Alex, *Black in Blue: A Study of the Negro Policeman* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), p. 161.

[52] Naturally, such an argument means that the *open* system cannot be measured by these variables: they only indicate closed and mixed systems. This is true when the variables are treated as gross indicators of responsiveness. If they could be combined with a lay participation index and a black policeman brutality index, for example, then the variables would offer greater discriminatory power.

[53] These included Phoenix, Elizabeth, Sacramento, Long Beach, Rockford, Las Vegas, and Miami.

[54] Variations in reporting practices make interjurisdictional crime rate comparisons a delicate task, yet I have used such a measure in the absence of other readily available summary measures.

[55] F. Solomon et al., "Civil Rights Activity and Reduction in Crime Among Negroes," *Archives of General Psychiatry*, 12 (March, 1965), 227–236, cited in Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, p. 310.

In a similar way the incidence of both protest and black protest is also related to the occurrence of ghetto riots. Cities were coded according to whether they had experienced no riots, one riot, or more than one during the peak years of rioting, 1967 and 1968.[56] The incidence of all protest and—of black protest in particular—is slightly related to riot violence, but neither coefficient (r = .22 and .23, respectively) is significant. To the slight extent that protest and rioting occur together, it would be possible to conclude that the ghetto violence of 1967–68 did not displace protest activity. The time period of this study occurs after the last wave of rioting, which followed Martin Luther King's assassination in April, 1968. The impulses to protest were not exhausted either by that violence or the earlier riots of 1967, for protest continued after the major outbreaks. To the degree that the recent ghetto violence was a form of political expression, it was in all likelihood a mode of expression qualitatively different from protest and not the logical outcome of the latter.

In a speculative way, these findings on the relationship of crime, rioting, and protest are suggestive for characterizing the political system itself: insofar as crime is an individualistic response to poor social conditions and mass violence is a collective response, high crime and riot cities are those with serious problems. Substantial problems indicate relative governmental impotence, even in those cities with the most responsive administrations. Impotent government is one mark of a closed structure of political opportunities: if government is powerless to act, then political action to influence government is futile.

To summarize, this section has shown that protest occurs most frequently in cities whose structure of political opportunities reflects a mix of open and closed characterisitcs. The existence of both a high crime rate and mass violence signifies either a generalized governmental impotence or unresponsiveness in the face of social conditions which breed such deviance. In addition, protest is associated with a concentration of occupational status, which may be construed as one measure of the distribution of potential power resources. The structure of political opportunities cannot be said to be open to the fullest extent under such conditions. Yet the opportunities for gaining access to and formal representation in government, characteristics of an open system, are good in cities which experience protest. And finally protest is moderately associated with certain very specific government responses in the form of Model Cities and the recruitment of minority group policemen, but these responses do not indicate unambiguously that the structure of opportunities is an open one. In short, the curvilinear model describing the conditions of protest seems more accurate than the simple linear model. In the final section an attempt is made to elaborate on this notion and to interpret the considerable gaps left by unexplained variance in the data. Before commencing this effort, however, we must consider the problem of the intensity of protest and the political environment.

Intensity of Protest

Protest incidents differ in the intensity of the concerns they express and the reactions they generate. The participants' and bystanders' passions associated, for example, with the fair housing marches led by Father Groppi or Martin Luther King into working class ethnic neighborhoods represent a quantum leap in intensity over those feelings associated with the small protest delegation which meets with the city welfare commissioner far from the public eye. As a unit of analysis, then, one protest incident is not necessarily strictly comparable to another.

This is not to say that the foregoing exercise has been misguided. In one sense protests may be treated as comparable in assessing the intensity of a city's protest environment. As we shall see presently, the mere number of protests is as good an indicator as any of the general state of tension and challenge wrought by protest behavior in any given city. A city which experienced five protests during the time period of this study had a more intense protest environment than the city which had only one incident. Even if the single protest was large and passionate, it may be possible to view it as an anomaly, after which politics settles down or returns to its more conventional patterns. But five incidents bespeak a relatively consistent state of crisis, an indication that things are more often felt to be wrong and remediable by protest action by more groups of different people than in cities experiencing a single protest.

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[56] For riots in 1967 the list on pages 158–159 of the *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (New York: Bantam Books, 1968) was used. For 1968 riots, the *New York Times Index* supplied the data.

Nevertheless, the mere number of protests tells nothing of the attention any single protest incident might have engaged or the scope of its impact as a focus for mobilization. Conceivably, the conditions which give rise to one extremely intense protest might differ from those which are associated with milder but more numerous protests.

To measure intensity two basis scores were computed. One was an indicator of the intensity of the protest environment, and it was employed largely to test the reliability of the findings using the simple frequency of protest. The second measure was an indicator of the average intensity of individual protest incidents in a city.

Intensity was conceived for measurement purposes as a function of the number of participants in a protest action, the duration in *continuous* days, and the number of separate sites within the city at which the protest simultaneously occurred. The assumption was that as these factors increased, the passions of the principals and observers would grow deeper.[57] For example, a school boycott and picketing which lasted four days and affected three high schools was more intense than one which lasted four days but affected only one school. The scores are crude in that they offer no direct measure of emotional intensity (which must be inferred). Another problem is that they assign the same values to size, duration, and number of sites. Thus no conclusion about relative intensity is possible for two protests of the same size, one of which lasted one day at two sites and the other of which lasted two days at one site.

Protests were scored in the following manner: 1) *duration:* one day, one point; two days, two points; three or more days, three points; 2) *number of sites:* one site, one point; two sites, two points; three or more sites, three points; 3) *size of protest:* 5–75 participants, one point; 76–200 participants, two points; 201 or more participants, three points.[58] A low intensity protest scored a minimum of three points; the maximum score of a high intensity incident was nine points.

The intensity of the protest environment score was calculated by the formula:

$$\frac{\text{duration} + \text{sites} + \text{size}}{\text{number of protests}} + \text{number of protests}\,.$$

The formula for figuring the average intensity of protest incidents was as follows:

$$\frac{\text{duration} + \text{sites} + \text{size}}{\text{number of protests}}$$

The intensity of the protest environment score is, of course, closely related to the number of protests ($r = .90$), but it offers a somewhat finer measure. Average intensity is not so strongly related to the frequency of protests ($r = .41$). The two scores are themselves related ($r = .75$).

The intensity of protest environment correlations tend to corroborate and strengthen the conclusions reached in the previous section. Table 11 provides a comparison of the correlations between simple frequency and environment variables on the one hand and intensity of the protest environment and environment variables on the other.

Using the intensity of the protest environment score instead of frequency does not increase our understanding of the conditions associated with protest in a significant way. The average intensity of protest incidents is of greater interest, however. Whereas most of the relationships between average intensity and the political environment achieve the same levels of association as those between simply frequency and the environment variables, several are different. For example, the frequency of protest is related to population size of the city, but average intensity is not. Frequency is also related to

Table 11. Comparison of Intensity and Frequency Correlations

	Simple Frequency	Intensity of Protest Environment Score
Mayor-council government	.35	.33
Ward aldermanic elections	−.01	−.06
Partisan elections	.07	.02
MPO ratio	−.30	−.32
City size	.46	.41
Model Cities	.26	.38
Riot	.23	.31
Minority policemen	.20	.24
Index crimes per 1000	.34	.31

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[57] There is some point of diminishing returns, after which a long and large protest simply becomes routine, and passions settle down. The measure of intensity used here takes this phenomenon into account in an arbitrary way by scoring equally any duration over three days.

[58] The mean number of participants per protest was 180.

mayoral government, but, again, average intensity shows no such correlation.

On the other hand, the frequency of black protests is unrelated to the percentage or the number of blacks in the city's population, but average intensity shows slight positive relationships with both of these variables. These figures suggest that while the size of the black population has little effect on the likelihood that protests will occur, it does affect the intensity associated with protests. Protests involving blacks are likely to last longer, be larger in scale, and take place at more sites than those involving whites. This finding simply reinforces the notion that urban protest is a tactic more fully exploited by blacks as a major form of political activity, in which the demands for commitment of resources made on individual participants are substantial. White protest is not quite so enduring, nor so broad in its attraction as a focus for mobilization.

Table 12. Comparison of Selected Average Intensity and Frequency Correlations

I.	Simple Frequency of all Protests	Average Intensity of Protests
Population	.46	.14
Mayor-council government	.35	.14
II.	**Simple Frequency of Black Protests**	**Average Intensity of Protests**
Number of Blacks	.14	.25
Percentage of Blacks	−.02	.21

The Conditions of Protest: Some Conclusions

The data support the conclusion that the incidence of protest is mildly related to the nature of a city's political opportunity structure, which I have conceived as a function of the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system. The configuration of those relationships affords a basis for some theoretical speculation concerning the nature of the environmental conditions most fertile for protest, but before turning to that task it is appropriate to sketch some additional explanations of the factors which give rise to protest as a way of interpreting the unexplained variance in the data presented here. These factors are not mutually exclusive of one another, nor of the nature of the political environment. Rather, they are probably all at work to one degree or another, enabling us to understand protest behavior, like voting, as a product of multiple complex causes and stimuli.

One major factor which undoubtedly contributes to the tendency to engage in protest has to do with the capacity of the political system to fulfill value expectations. In other words, deprivation, *a condition which may exist in both open and closed structures of political opportunity,* may give rise to protest.[59]

This explanation assumes that the perception of deprivation, whether objective or subjective, in relation to others in the society is likely to result in aggressive political behavior. The explanation is attractive for the fact that it suggests that socioeconomic status and the propensity to engage in protest do not covary in a linear relationship. Middle-class homeowners threatened by freeway construction may perceive themselves as deprived in relation to those homeowners whose property is not threatened, just as poor blacks see themselves as deprived in the context of an affluent society.

Bowen et al. are able to demonstrate that those blacks who perceive the greatest gap between "the best possible life" and their own position on a Cantril Free Self-Anchoring Scale are those most likely to evince great approval for protest forms of behavior.[60] They do not show, however, that the perception of deprivation and behavior are linked. One attempt to relate relative deprivation of blacks, using objective indicators of social welfare for 49 cities, to the incidence of mass ghetto violence proved fruitless,[61] suggesting that the various causal leaps from objective relative deprivation to the perception of that deprivation to violent behavior in politics need further and more careful charting.[62] Deprivation surely plays a role in the motivations of protestors, yet its nature remains to be explored systematically.

Another explanation which might contribute to an understanding of why groups engage in protest has to do with the particular array of

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[59] The argument of this paper would have it that discontent over deprivation may be expressed more easily through conventional political strategies in an open system, whereas protest is often necessary to communicate discontent in a closed system.

[60] Don R. Bowen, Elinor R. Bowen, Sheldon Gawiser, and Louis H. Masotti, "Deprivation, Mobility, and Orientation Toward Protest of the Urban Poor," *American Behavioral Scientist,* 2 (March-April 1968), 20–24.

[61] Palley and Palley, "Social Welfare Indicators as Predictors of Racial Disorders. . ."

[62] Lupsha, "On Theories of Urban Violence," pp. 285, 288.

Table 13. Partial Correlations of Governmental Form and Protest

Independent variables	Simple r	Partial r	Dependent Variable
Mayor-council government	.35	.41	
Ward elections	−.01	−.21	Frequency of protest
Partisanship	.07	.15	

organizational needs which protest can fulfill. For example, protest action is frequently successful as a strategy for mass mobilization. Protest may often be undertaken primarily as a recruiting activity for organizations, for it is a way of cutting through communal apathy and attracting membership through its sheer excitement. Protest also helps elites to manipulate constituents' understanding of issues, for such mass actions and their associated rhetoric offer participants an easily comprehended Manichean explanation of the political world.[63] The we-they dichotomy between protestors and targets is sharply drawn in protest actions and serves to foster group identity and cohesion. Finally, protest is *action*, a means of demonstrating to group constituents that the organization can do something. By taking such action, the protest may serve to bolster morale and confidence in the organization itself. In short, protest may be employed by elites as a means to sustain and enlarge their organization; pressuring targets for action may be entirely secondary.

Still a third explanation of the factors leading to protest has to do with the types of demands people might make. Insofar as the issues treated in community decision making tend to be limited by the biases and predispositions of those in powerful positions—the setters of the agenda—certain types of demands will not command routine attention.[64] Protest is a means for forcing consideration of the extraordinary, the unpopular, or the nonroutine. Demands for student power in the university or welfare client representation on policy-making boards are apt examples. Protest, then, occurs when certain demands (and indeed demanders) represent such major departures from the conventional mainstream of politics that they are not considered as a routine matter of institutionalized practice.

Discontent over deprivation, organizational needs, and extraordinary demands all occur in and are in some degree shaped by the nature of the political system. What this study has done is to provide some preliminary clues to the nature of those urban political systems most conducive to the development of persistent protest.

The data have suggested in effect that protest flourishes in a system marked by paradox. The paradox of protest is that while on the one hand it appears to be a response to certain closed system characteristics, it only takes place on a persistent basis in systems in which other characteristics are open. The incidence of protest was associated, for example, with a relatively small managerial work force, with a high crime rate, and with the ambiguous variables of Model Cities and minority uniformed police. The former two are indicative of a restricted opportunity structure, while the latter two potentially signify both open and closed characteristics.

On the other hand protest occurred more frequently in mayor-council governments than in manager governments, and black protest took place most frequently where blacks had gained formal representation in proportion to their population. Both of these factors characterize the system as an open one.

The data also showed that violence did not accompany most protests, and that in a majority

Table 14. Partial and Multiple Correlations of Open System Characteristics and Black Protest

Independent cluster	Simple r	Partial r	Multiple r	Dependent Variable
Mayor-council government	.42	.34		
Model Cities grant	.23	.06	.46	Frequency of black protest
Representation ratio	.30	.21		

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[63] Frances Fox Piven has observed that "social protest actions, because they offer simple and dramatic definitions of problems, may penetrate apathy and override puzzled disengagement bred of lack of information." "Participation of Residents in Neighborhood Community Action Programs," *Social Work*, 11 (January, 1966), 78.

[64] This draws on the well-known argument of Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," *American Political Science Review*, 57 (December, 1962), 947–952.

of cases the protestors won at least the right to a hearing for their demands.

Several speculative observations can be based on these findings. Those who pursue protest as an ongoing tactic must in effect gain license from the authorities in the system to do so. That is to say, protest will probably not be used in contemporary American cities where it is suppressed by violence. Violent reactions by the authorities will likely stimulate violence by the potential protest population or will cause withdrawal from aggressively demonstrative politics. Official tolerance, signified by the unwillingness or even inability to suppress protest by force, may serve as the functional equivalent of license to protest. Such license represents an opportunity in the whole structure of opportunities: protest offers a chance to gain a hearing in public councils. The openness of the system, in other words, is conducive to protest.

In a similar way the system which responds to protest is likely by its very responsiveness to encourage protest. Elites who attempt to mobilize people to protest will fail eventually to recruit participants if protests are never successful. Protestors must gain satisfaction through



Figure 1. Scattergram Distribution of Protest Frequency by Form of Government

protest on occasion or they will stop using it as an instrumental tactic. Some survey data indicate that those who take part more often in protest are more likely to believe that protest works than those who take part less frequently.[65] Protest, then feeds on the responsiveness it succeeds in eliciting. System responsiveness is an opportunity in the sense that people are more likely to get what they want in responsive political systems than in unresponsive ones. Protest is more likely to flourish in relatively open systems where it elicits responses.

If the paradox of protest is that it appears to occur in systems exhibiting both open and closed characteristics, then it is possible to argue theoretically that the incidence of protest is related to the openness of the structure of opportunities in a curvilinear fashion.

Consider the scattergram presented in Figure 1. Forms of government combining the nature of the chief executive, aldermanic electoral method, and partisanship are ranged on the left from those which offer the greatest chance for access and representation for minority and outgroups to those which offer the least. The distribution of cities by frequency of protest appears to follow a curvilinear pattern. The most frequent occurrence of protest takes place in cities with mixed open and closed characteristics. The cities with the most incidents have mayors but they also have at-large electoral systems.

This finding is borne out by the partial correlation coefficients obtained when each of three governmental form variables is run against frequency of protest controlling for the other two. While protest is *positively* related to mayoral government, controlling for aldermanic elections and partisanship, it is *negatively* related to ward systems of aldermanic election, when the other two variables are controlled. Both mayoral government and ward election are open characteristics.

Protest is neither a viable nor a fruitful strategy in extremely closed systems. Not only is protest likely to be an inadequate tactic for enhancing political opportunities in a closed system but it is not likely to be tolerated. Protest will not flourish where its use finds neither tolerance nor elicits favorable responses.

In a highly open system, on the other hand, where government is not only responsive but anticipates needs and meets them, if any such urban system exists in America, protest will be unnecessary. In an open system, groups have easy access to decision makers without resort to the drama of protest. Using a cluster of open characteristic variables to predict the incidence of protest indicates at least that the rate of increase in predictive value tails off sharply. If those mayoral governments which procured Model Cities funds and in which blacks have a substantial degree of proportional representation are run against frequency of black protest, the increase in variance explained by the multiple correlation coefficient amounts to less than four per cent over that explained solely by mayoral government.

The data presented here provide a strong basis for rejecting the hypothesis that protest is associated with closed structural characteristics and a moderately suggestive basis for speculating on a theory of protest. The conditions which give rise to protest are many and complex, and the nature of the structure of political opportunities, insofar as this is measurable by aggregate indicators, plays only one small part. Yet it would appear that the incidence of protest does vary with the nature of that structure in a curvilinear fashion.

To conclude, protest seems to be an activity which marks the political life of contemporary American cities at a stage when they are becoming more, not less, responsive to minority demands. Protest is a sign that the opportunity structure is flexible and vulnerable to the political assaults of excluded groups. As such, protest signifies changes not only among previously quiescent or conventionally oriented groups but also in the political system itself.

APPENDIX

City Sample with Number of Protests

Anaheim	4	Miami	2
Atlanta	1	Mobile	3
Boston	9	Newark	4
Bridgeport	1	New Orleans	3
Charlotte	1	Newport News	0
Cincinnati	3	Norfolk	1
Columbus	1	Oakland	5
Dallas	2	Oklahoma City	3
Denver	3	Phoenix	0
Des Moines	2	Raleigh	2
Elizabeth	4	Richmond	1
Evansville	2	Roanoke	2
Fort Lauderdale	0	Rockford	1
Fresno	3	San Francisco	7
Gary	5	Sacramento	6
Grand Rapids	2	Santa Ana	1
Las Vegas	2	Seattle	6
Little Rock	1	South Bend	5
Long Beach	4	Spokane	1
Milwaukee	11	Tuscon	1
Minneapolis	5	Winston-Salem	0
Madison	0		

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[65] Eisinger, "Protest Behavior and the Integration of Urban Political Systems," p. 990.

Electoral Participation in the French Fifth Republic*

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When Pierre Dupont leaves his home on those Sundays when he has the possibility of spending a few civic moments in his *bureau de vote*, he not all so infrequently returns after having marked his ballot *va te faire foutre*, *enculé*, *con*, or some other libertarian expression. These ballots, along with those that are completely blank and those that contain errors in voting, form the category of *blanc et nul* ballots.

Apart from those ballots cast in error, the *blancs et nuls* (what we term the blankety-blank vote) represent a definite refusal to choose among the various candidates in the election. Insofar as this refusal represents *alienation*, the circumstances where no candidate comes close to being compatible with the voter's desires, the analysis of the *blancs et nuls* will interest normative political theorists who look upon alienation as an important beep in the political system—as either a sign of health or a symptom of illness. The same can be said for refusals based on *indifference*, the circumstances where the expected reward (a function of both the differences between the candidates and the voter's feeling that he can influence the outcome) from voting is low. Alienation and indifference are also important to politicians, for whom every nonvote is a potential vote. In the body of the paper we take some steps toward operational definitions of alienation and indifference—and we attempt to unravel their effects on the *blancs et nuls*.

We similarly attack abstentions, i.e., registered voters who don't go to the polls. Since this is a short-term analysis, however, we find that abstentions have a good deal less interest for any political theory of short-term fluctuations in participation.[1] Abstentions should prove more attractive to the political sociologist interested in the study of long-term nonparticipation, the consequence of either inadequate socialization and education, or permanent alienation, or a reasoned decision that Sunday's sexuality is best spent with the mistress rather than in inscribing four-letter words to be read by the *commission de vote*.

The current study of short-term variations in participation is one of the first uses of a large project aimed at the collection, at the canton level, of all French electoral statistics for legislative elections, referenda and presidential elections since 1871.[2] Our analysis only uses data at the *circonscription* (legislative district) level for the four legislative elections of the Fifth Republic, those of 1958, 1962, 1967 and 1968. For each of these elections, we will analyze variations in absentions and blank and invalid ballots between the first ballot and the second ballot of France's two ballot elections.[3]

Among short-term factors, we focus only on those connected with the context of the second ballot compared to the first. We are further limited to considering only changes in the *relative* level of

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[1] We view a political (as against a psychological or sociological) theory as one in which the initial preferences of political actors are known and implications are then drawn as a function of the institutional framework. This viewpoint is akin to that of formal economics, in which "utilities" are taken as given. While the study of preference formation is certainly worthwhile, it is beyond the scope of this essay.

[2] This project is being conducted jointly by a French group headed by Professor Georges Dupeux and by the Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University.

[3] In legislative elections in the French Fifth Republic, deputies are elected from single-member districts. To win on the first ballot, a candidate must obtain a majority of the votes cast (*blancs et nuls* excluded) and the votes of at least one-fourth of the total registered voters. All candidates receiving less than 10 per cent (5 per cent until 1967) are automatically eliminated from the second ballot, if it is necessary. Other candidates may elect to eliminate themselves. No new candidates may enter the contest for the second ballot, which is held one week after the first. Candidates eliminated from the second ballot may, and usually do, counsel their first-ballot supporters about which candidate to support on the second ballot. A plurality wins the second ballot. Our analysis applies to all metropolitan districts with second ballots, Corsica excepted.

participation in the constituencies. In 1962, for example, the average abstention rate decreased, and the average blank ballot rate increased between the two ballots. Part of these changes may have come from voters' perceptions of the first ballot results and the second ballot coalitions. If these perceptions were widely shared throughout France and not distributed differentially in the constituencies, their short-term effects on participation are not identified by our analysis. Similarly, any factors which had identical effects upon participation for both the first and the second ballot are not identified. As abstentions soared, for example, to the near-record level of 31 per cent on the first ballot in 1962, the voters apparently having decided that the previous month's referendum had settled the country's major political issue, these common short-term factors are important given the wide fluctuations in the mean level of nonvoting. Our variables, however, are district specific, based principally on the first ballot results and the number and party affiliations of the candidates remaining on the second ballot.

Although we are thus restricted to analyzing some middle-term, decade-level, variations in short-term coefficients, we intend to pursue this research for longer periods of time. In addition, this study's methodological implications for quantitative political history will be discussed in the conclusion.

The basic methodology employed in the study is to contrast four types of models of increasing complexity, all of which are estimated by ordinary least squares regression.

Formal spatial models of voter behavior represent the most complex type of model. We specify several spatial models of electoral participation for individual voters in the first section. There we also discuss aggregation over individuals in order that we may use multiple regression techniques to test if the French voters collectively behave "as if" they carried out the calculations called for in the models. We make no claim that individual behavior is consistent with these models, but we do claim that if aggregate behavior is consistent, such consistency alone warrants further development of formal models. We conclude the section by indicating how we develop approximations for the critical parameters in these models.

In the second section we investigate three alternative nonspatial models: a simple persistence model, a "fishing expedition" model based on regressing second ballot nonparticipation on the first ballot election results, and a more elaborate and meaningful heuristic description of nonparticipation. The next section investigates the spatial models. The analysis includes the examination of the sensitivity of these models to alternative specifications of the spatial positions of the French political parties. Our basic findings are that blank ballots are heavily influenced by short-term spatial and nonspatial considerations and only weakly related to persistence effects. In contrast, abstentions appear to be predominantly a long-term phenomenon. If nonspatial short-term considerations also influence abstentions, spatial matters appear to have virtually no effect.

Spatial Models of Individual Voter Behavior

The calculus for rational individual decision making with regard to electoral participation in plurality elections has been developed for two-party contests by Riker and Ordeshook, and for n-party contests by McKelvey and Ordeshook.[4] The two-party formulation is represented by the simple equation:

$$R = PB - C + D, \qquad (1.1)$$

where:

R is the total utility reward from voting less the utility of abstaining;

P is the subjective probability that the voter will break or create a tie between the two candidates;

B is the difference between the utility for the voter if his preferred candidate is elected and the utility if the other candidate is elected;

C represents costs incurred in voting independent of the outcome (e.g., lost time); and

D represents benefits that are independent of the outcome.

As one would expect, the n-candidate case is much more complex. The C and D terms remain, but the PB term must be replaced by a complex calculation that takes into account the possibility that the voter may not vote for his most preferred candidate if that candidate is not viable. McKelvey and Ordeshook suggest the following approximation: consider, for each pair of candidates, the product of (1) the probability that the voter can break or create a tie for first place between the candidates and (2) the utility difference between the candidates. The PB term can then be replaced by the maximum of this product, the maximum taken over all pairs of candidates. This approximation is exactly PB for two-candidate contests.

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[4] William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting", *American Political Science Review*, 62 (March, 1968), 25–42; Richard McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A General Theory of the Calculus of Voting," in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science*, VI, ed. J. F. Herndon (forthcoming).

In either the two-candidate or the *n*-candidate case, if benefits exceed costs (i.e., if R is positive), voting occurs.

If only because the McKelvey, Ordeshook, Riker calculus focuses on the simple act of winning and not also on the margin of victory, the calculus is an obvious simplification. Rather than being a deficiency, this theoretical simplification can serve as a starting point for tractable empirical work, provided we can arrive at operational specifications of the terms in the calculus.

Our operationalization is based upon a spatial model of party competition. Since our empirical work concerns only a unidimensional space, we can view the candidates as representing points on the real line. Voters are also represented on this line. The utility that a voter receives from a candidate is a monotonically decreasing function of the distance between the voter and the candidate. It is immediately clear that B, in the spirit of the original Hotelling-Downs spatial model, can be expressed as a function of spatial distances. The D term may also be interpreted spatially.

That D has a spatial interpretation is perhaps surprising if one thinks of D as representing fixed benefits. Indeed, Riker and Ordeshook originally conceived of D in terms of social mores concerning the "citizen's duty" to vote. It is clearly possible, however, that the citizen will derive utility as a function of the "quality" of the contestants, independent of who wins. Consider the case of a prospective judge for a beauty contest. His interest in participating as a judge clearly depends upon the overall quality of the candidates. Who actually wins might well be a matter of secondary importance. Again, we propose to measure the "quality" of any candidate as a monotonically decreasing function of distance.

As for P and C, the remaining terms in the calculus, we regard them as independent of spatial considerations although we later introduce explicit approximations for P and indicate where C is implicitly represented in our model. Our next step will be to provide operational specifications of the PB and D terms.

Nonvoting because of Alienation—A Model of Fixed Benefits, "D." If voting is primarily a function of outcome-independent considerations, a manifestation of "expressive" rather than "instrumental" voting where the D term dominates equation (1.1), then we can express the probability of nonvoting, $\Pr(NV)$ (either abstention or blank ballot), for a voter at spatial location i in election district j as

$$\Pr(NV)_{ij} = \alpha_j + \sum_{k=1}^{K_j} f_i^k(DIS_{ij}^k), \qquad (1.2)^5$$

where

α_j is a general measure associated with all voters in the district,

DIS_{ij}^k is the distance in district j from spatial location i to candidate k,

f_i^k is a monotonically nondecreasing[6] function of DIS, which in turn is a function of the spatial locations of the candidates. Note that although f_i^k is subscripted with an i (to allow for variation with the spatial position of the voter), the form of f_i^k has been assumed constant across all districts (i.e., f_i^k has no j subscript).

k is an index variable for the candidates, $k = 1, 2, \ldots, K_j$.

The fact that the nonvoting probability is an additive function of the f_i^k reflects the assumptions that (1) the nonvoting probability is independent of outcome considerations and (2) there is no interaction of the candidate distances. The fact that the f_i^k are nondecreasing monotone implies that equation (1.2) models nonvoting because of alienation as formalized by Hinich and Ordeshook.[7] That the f_i^k are invariant over districts reflects the hypothesis that the process of spatial calculation is widely shared in the political culture. In contrast, the dependence of the f_i^k on spatial location reflects the hypothesis that "leftists" may have functions different from those of "rightists."

On the other hand, considerations specific to districts are held to be important to the nonspatial aspects represented in α_j. In addition to representing the social norms of the "citizen's duty" aspect of D, α_j can also be thought of as reflecting the cost considerations, C. For example, in mountainous areas where it is hard to get to the polls, we would expect, *ceteris paribus*, large values of α_j. What we describe below as the "heuristic" model can also be thought of as a formulation of α_j.

If all the utility is derived from the candidate

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[5] We omit, to simplify exposition, the addition of a stochastic term to equation (1.2) and later equations for $\Pr(NV)_{ij}$.

[6] In other words, f_i^k, throughout its domain, is either monotonically increasing or constant.

[7] See: Otto A. Davis, Melvin J. Hinich, and Peter C. Ordeshook, "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (June, 1970), 426–448, (contains references to prior work in spatial models); Hinich and Ordeshook, "Abstentions and Equilibrium in the Electoral Process," *Public Choice*, 7 (Fall, 1969), 81–106. For an application of the theoretical structure to empirical data, see Michael J. Shapiro, "Rational Political Man: A Synthesis of Economic and Social Psychological Perspectives," *American Political Science Review*, 53 (December, 1969), 1106–1119.



Figure 1. Nonvoting Probability as a Function of the Position of the Closest Candidate for a Voter at Position i

closest to the voter, equation (1.2) simplifies to

$$\Pr(NV)_{ij} = \alpha_j + f_i(\min_k DIS^k_{ij}),$$

or

$$\Pr(NV)_{ij} = \alpha_j + f_i(DIS_{ij}), \qquad (1.3)$$

where DIS_{ij} now is the distance in district j from location i to the candidate closest to that location. Empirical work, however, requires a specific functional form for f_i. An obvious suggestion is the linear form:

$$\Pr(NV)_{ij} = \alpha_j + \gamma_i(DIS_{ij}) \qquad (1.4)$$

where $0 \leq \alpha_j \leq 1$ and $\gamma_i \geq 0$.

In Figure 1, the function represented by equation (1.4) is illustrated for a voter located at spatial position i. The x-axis of Figure 1 represents the spatial position of the candidate closest to the voter located at i.

This formulation has the disadvantage that, for $\gamma_i(DIS)_{ij}$ sufficiently large, the probability of nonvoting can exceed 1.0. From a theoretical viewpoint, it would be more satisfying to have an "alienation function" that had an asymptote of at most 1.0 as DIS approaches infinity. For example,

$$\Pr(NV)_{ij} = \alpha_j + (1-\alpha_j)(1-e^{-\gamma_i DIS_{ij}}) \qquad (1.5)$$

would have appropriate asymptotic properties. Empirically, however, such nonlinear functions greatly complicate estimation problems. We have a preference for a linear model provided that the estimates of α_j and γ_i are such that the nonvoting probability falls between zero and one for all actual values of DIS_{ij}.

The "closest candidate" alienation model is in fact a powerful model for the explanation of blank ballots. But it might be improved upon by expanding (1.4) to allow for the second closest candidate:

$$\Pr(NV)_{ij} = \alpha_j + \overset{1}{\gamma_i}(DIS^1_{ij}) + \overset{2}{\gamma_i}(DIS^2_{ij}), \qquad (1.6)$$

where

DIS^1_{ij} is now the distance in district j from location i to the candidate closest to that location; and

DIS^2_{ij} is similarly defined with respect to the second closest candidate

Equation (1.6) may be motivated directly from the beauty contest example, where the availability of one exceptional creature may incite a prospective judge to participation but where a second such contestant would have some additional effect. In a political contest, one's utility would be a function of how close the voter was to the first two of the set of candidates that the electoral "system" produced. Equation (1.6) could then be thought of as an abbreviated indication of short-term variations in the electorate's "satisfaction" with the political system.

Another interpretation, however, must be offered, given our specific application. The aggregation procedures we develop below lead to substantial errors in the measurement of DIS_{ij}. Inclusion of two distance measures should, through averaging, reduce these errors. If the closest candidate as measured is not in fact the closest, the second closest is likely to be the closest. Under either interpretation, we would certainly expect a greater effect for the closest candidate. Thus, the following must be satisfied:

$$\overset{1}{\gamma_i} \geq \overset{2}{\gamma_i}.$$

A further model suggesting equation (1.6) is the probabilistic voting model of Hinich, Ledyard, and Ordeshook.[8] If one views the probability of voting for the closest candidate as a linear function of the distance to that candidate and the probability of voting for the second closest candidate also as a linear function of distance, then the probability of nonvoting is given by (1.6).

Aggregation to Regression Models. To simplify exposition, let us return to the closest candidate-only case, that of equation (1.4). Since our data consist of *aggregate* data for election districts, we must investigate how our model of *individual* behavior can be examined with multiple regression analysis. Assume, as is necessary in our application, that the voters occupy only a finite number of points, *I*, on the real line. Denote the proportion of registered voters at point *i* by P_{ij}. Then the expected proportion nonvoting in the *j*th district is given by:

$$E(NV)_j = \sum_{i=1}^{I} P_{ij}[\alpha_j + \gamma_i(DIS_{ij})].$$

Since

$$\sum_{i=1}^{I} P_{ij} = 1,$$

$$E(NV)_j = \alpha_j + \sum_{i=1}^{I} \gamma_i P_{ij}(DIS)_{ij}. \quad (1.7)$$

If we further assume that the $\Pr(NV)_{ij}$ are subject to stochastic disturbances and that certain relationships hold among the disturbances, we can formulate (1.7) as:

$$NV_j = \alpha_j + \sum_{i=1}^{I} \gamma_i P_{ij}(DIS)_{ij} + \epsilon_j \quad (1.8)$$

where NV_j is now the actual proportion nonvoting in district *j* and where ϵ_j is a stochastic variable with mean zero and constant variance for all *j*.[9,10] Then, if we are willing to make the standard assumptions concerning ordinary least squares (*OLS*), we can use *OLS* to estimate the coefficients in (1.8). It should be noted that either $\alpha_j = \alpha$, a constant, or α_j is an expression containing a constant and one or more variables.

Finding acceptable values for the coefficients in (1.8) as well as significant success in terms of explained variance would not indicate that voter decision rules were in fact those of equation (1.4). But the success would indicate that the aggregate behaved "as if" individuals made spatial calculations. "As if" behavior, in turn, is ample encouragement to the pursuit of scientific inquiry.

Since the aggregation for (1.6) is similar to that for (1.4), we proceed directly to the discussion of other forms of voter decision rules, those based upon differential rewards from the candidates.

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[8] Melvin J. Hinich, John O. Ledyard, and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Nonvoting and the Existence of Equilibrium Under Majority Rule," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 4 (April, 1972), 144–153.

[9] For detailed discussions of the assumptions underlying regression estimation of individual behavior parameters from aggregate data, see Leo A. Goodman, "Some Alternatives to Ecological Correlation," *American Journal of Sociology*, 64 (May, 1959), 610–625; Howard Rosenthal, "Aggregate Data," in *Handbook of Communications*, ed. Ithiel de Sola Pool, Wilbur Schramm, Frederick W. Frey, Nathan Maccoby and Edwin B. Parker (Chicago: Rand-McNally, forthcoming); Martin S. Geisel, Naomi Kies, Timothy W. McGuire, and Howard Rosenthal, "A Simultaneous Equations Model of Split Ticket Voting in Israeli Elections," *1970 Proceedings of the Social Statistics Section of the American Statistical Association* (Washington: American Statistical Association, 1971), 71–80.

[10] In using *OLS*, we incur possible costs in bias or inefficiency as consequences of:

a. Spatial (in a geographic sense) autocorrelation in our cross-section (i.e., the "errors" for adjacent geographic areas will be correlated).
b. The correlation of errors from the abstention and blank ballot regressions (although in this case *OLS* will be efficient as long as the two models include the same set of explanatory variables.)
c. Heteroscedasticity of the errors, a condition likely to be present given the "bounded" nature of voting variables.

We intend to consider these limitations in a later paper.



Figure 2. Contours of Pr(NV)$_{ij}$ of the Simple Indifference Model as a Function of the Positions of the Two Candidates in a Two-Candidate Race for a Voter at Position 2.5

Simple Indifference. The concept of simple indifference represents a half-way house between fixed utilities drawn from each of the candidates and the outcome-related utilities represented by the *PB* term in (1.1). For two-candidate races, simple indifference is the *B* term, a comparison of the differences between the candidates. In the *n*-candidate race, the comparison may be made between the two closest candidates. In a spatial model where utilities are linear with distance:

$$B = DIS^2_{ij} - DIS^1_{ij}. \qquad (1.9)$$

As *B* is zero if and only if the voter is equidistant from both candidates, *B* corresponds to the classic concept of "cross-pressures." Since nonvoting should be inversely proportional to the magnitude of *B*, we can represent the (linear) simple indifference model as

$$\Pr(NV)_{ij} = \alpha_j' + \eta_i(-B) \qquad (1.10)$$

where $0 \leq \alpha_j' \leq 1$, $\eta_i \geq 0$, and *B* is defined in equation (1.9). This probability is illustrated in Figure 2. Again, aggregation proceeds along the same lines as in the aggregation of the simple alienation model.

Since the total reward, *R*, is an additive function of *B* and *D*, we can justify combining simple alienation (1.4) with simple indifference (1.10). We then obtain:

$$\Pr(NV)_{ij} = \alpha_j'' + \gamma_i^1(DIS^1_{ij}) + \eta_i(-B). \qquad (1.11)$$

It is not possible, however, to combine the second closest model (1.6) with simple indifference (1.10), for we would have to estimate three sets of parameters $(\gamma_i^1, \gamma_i^2, \eta_i)$ while having only two distance measures (DIS^1_{ij}, DIS^2_{ij}). Consequently, we cannot identify the parameters. Regression results can only inform us as to which if either of the two effects predominates, i.e., second-closest candidate alienation or simple indifference. If neither effect predominates, we cannot distinguish the case in which both effects are present but equal from the case in which both effects are absent.

Another n-candidate model of simple indifference, which can be identified in combination with second-closest candidate alienation, involves an alteration in the definition of B by replacing DIS_{ij}^{2} in (1.9) with DIS_{ij}^{m}, where m denotes the most distant candidate. Insofar as much voting in n-candidate races may be directed toward defeating the least desirable candidate (e.g., a Communist), the furthest candidate model could conceivably prove preferable to (1.10).

Indifference——Calculus of Voting. The final spatial model we present operationalizes the McKelvey-Ordeshook approximation to the *PB* calculus for n-candidate races. We indicated above that this calculus involves utility differences and first-place tie-breaking probabilities. For any pair of candidates, c and k, the utility difference (for the linear model) for a voter at spatial location i in district j can be expressed as:

$$|\,DIS_{ij}^{c} - DIS_{ij}^{k}\,|\,.$$

What about the voter's estimate that a tie can be broken? Presumably, this is related to the closeness of the two candidates' vote proportions.[11] From the first ballot vote proportions, we operationalize the measure of closeness as $(1-|P_c-P_k|)$. But we must also know how close candidates c and k are to the candidate with the most votes. When the vote proportion for the leader on the first ballot is denoted as P_L, closeness to the lead is given as $(1-P_L+\max\,[P_c, P_k])$. The probability of breaking a tie for first place is then taken to be a function of:

$$S_{ck} = S_{kc} = (1 - |\,P_c - P_k\,|)(1 - P_L + \max[P_c, P_k]).$$

This expression has a maximum value of 1.0 when the two candidates are tied (not necessarily exclusive of other candidates) for the lead on the first ballot. It has a value of 0.0 if any candidate has 100 per cent of the vote on the first ballot.

The measure of lack of indifference, finally, is taken as a function of

$$\max_{c,k}\,[S_{ck}\,|\,DIS_{ij}^{c} - DIS_{ij}^{k}\,|].$$

Nonvoting should be negatively related to this quantity. Consequently, the nonvoting probability can be expressed as

$$\Pr(NV_{ij}) = \alpha_{ij}''' - \xi_i \max_{c,k}\,[S_{ck}\,|\,DIS_{ij}^{c} - DIS_{ij}^{k}\,|]. \quad (1.12)$$

In principle, this form may also be estimated in combination with the earlier models.

Approximation Procedures for the Fifth Republic Data. In order to estimate any of the spatial models, we must be able to supply data on the positions of the candidates and the spatial distribution of the electorate in each district.

To establish the spatial position of candidates we use one-dimensional spatial positions of the French political parties supplied by Converse and by Pierce and Barnes from surveys sponsored by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center.[12] These spatial measures are provided in Table 1. The Converse estimates are from a 1958 national sample conducted by the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP). The Pierce and Barnes estimates also come from a national sample, the fieldwork for which was carried out in 1967 by the SOFRES organization. The Converse estimates are the results of a Coombsian unfolding analysis of preference orderings while Pierce and Barnes simply had respondents locate the parties on a 1 to 100 left-right scale. Their "All" estimates are averages over all respondents while their "Self" estimates are averages over party identifiers only. Thus, for example, the *PSU* "Self" estimate reflects only the responses of those voters whose most preferred party is the *PSU*. Under both techniques, a large proportion of the respondents failed to give complete responses. Nonresponse amounted to about 60 per cent for the Converse data while it ranged from a low of 20 per cent for the Communists to a high of 58 per cent for the *PSU* for the Pierce and Barnes (All) data. This missing data problem does not seem critical since those individuals who can respond fully to the polling questions should tend to be those who behave "as if" they were

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[11] We acknowledge that for many voters the relevant proportions will differ, taking into account the expected vote transfers from supporters of eliminated candidates. Unfortunately, we do not have a method to handle these more sophisticated expectations.

[12] Phillip E. Converse, "The Problem of Party Distances in Models of Voting Change," in the *Electoral Process*, ed. M. Kent Jennings and L. H. Ziegler (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 175–207; Roy Pierce and Samuel H. Barnes, "Public Opinion and Political Preferences in France and Italy" (unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan, 1970). For U.S. candidate spaces, see Herbert F. Weisberg and Jerrold Rusk, "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (Dec., 1970), 1167–1185.

Table 1. Spatial Positions of the French Political Parties

	Converse	Pierce and Barnes	
		All	Self
Communists	0.000	0.000	0.000
PSU	1.125[b]	1.230	−0.392
Socialists (1958) and (1962)	2.030	1.557	1.078
Federation of the Left (1967 and 1968)	2.250[b]	1.148	0.686
Radicals (1958) and (1962)	2.460	2.049	1.569
MRP,[a] Centre Démocrate,[c] *PDM*, Mouvement pour la Réforme, Technique et Démocratie	3.380	3.607	2.451
UNR,[ac] *UDR*, Gaullists	3.840	4.670	3.726
Independents,[a] Independent Republicans,[c] Right	4.600	4.180	2.843
Extreme Right, Alliance Républicaine[c]	5.000[b]	5.000	5.000

Note: All measures are normalized so that Communists = 0.0 and Extreme Right = 5.0.
[a] Labels used by Converse.
[b] Not estimated by Converse but assigned by the authors.
[c] Labels used by Pierce and Barnes.

influenced by spatial considerations.

To make use of the spatial measurements we assume that all voters in all districts have identical perceptions of candidates who in turn always occupy spatial positions identical to those of the "average" values for the national parties. This assumption is clearly made to facilitate model construction and does not reflect our view of the complexity of perception. We recall Stokes's warning that "we may . . . have as many perceived spaces as there are perceiving actors."[13] Nonetheless, the resultant error should not be exaggerated. Although, for example, perception of individual Federation candidates may vary, it is rare that a Federation candidate will be perceived as to the left of the Communist. In general, intraparty variation should be small compared to interparty variation. Thus, the approximation should not induce too much distortion. If our approximation contains monumental errors, the explanatory power of our models should be low, but, at least for blank ballots, this is not the case.

Another approximation is required to estimate the preference distribution of the electorate. In each district, the electorate is distributed over the real line by assigning a probability mass to each point represented by a party on the first ballot, the mass being equal to the proportion of the actual votes (*exprimés*) obtained by the party. Figure 3 illustrates a hypothetical distribution and how it is likely to be approximated in our model. The approximation should not be too unbearable given that we generally have five or six points on the first ballot and only two or three on the second. Thus, the approximation gives us enough "smoothing out" relative to the actual second ballot choices.

Substantively, the orderings in the Converse and Pierce and Barnes estimates would all find some supporters among political analysts except the Pierce and Barnes "All" rating that places the Federation to the left of the PSU. The major difference between Converse and Pierce and Barnes is the net left-right polarization in the latter, with the Gaullists moving closer to the extreme right. Since, however, the vast bulk of the electorate is concentrated in the Communist party, the Federation, and the Gaullists, we would not expect large differences in the three sets of regression results obtained by using each of the three sets of estimates, all of which order these three parties in the expected left-right ordering. The sensitivity of the model to the spatial estimates employed is investigated in the section on estimation of spatial models.

Three Nonspatial Models of Electoral Participation

Since it is possible that the nonspatial component (the α_j term) completely dominates the spatial aspects of the models developed in the preceding section, we first investigate three alternative formulations of α_j: the Persistence Model, the Fishing Expedition Model, and the Heuristic Model. The first two formulations serve mainly as null models with which to compare the more complex heuristic and spatial models.

A. The Persistence Model: Abstentions, Yes; Blank Ballots, No. Our first model estimates second ballot nonvoting as a linear function of first-ballot nonvoting. Formally, at the aggregate level, this model takes the form:

$$NV_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 FNV_j + \epsilon_j \qquad (2.1)$$

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[13] Donald Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," *American Political Science Review*, 57 (June, 1963), 368–377.



Figure 3. Discrete Approximation (Using First Ballot Proportion of Votes Cast) of Hypothesized Continuous Distribution of Voter Spatial Positions for Finistère, First District, 1962

where β_0 and β_1 are constants and

FNV_j is the proportion of registered voters not voting on the first ballot.

Equation (2.1) may be interpreted in a number of ways.[14] Three possible interpretations are:

(1) $\Pr(NV)_j=\beta_0+\beta_1 FNV_j$, a constant for all voters in district j;

(2) $\Pr(NV)_j=\beta_0$ for those voters who participated on the first ballot, $=(\beta_0+\beta_1)$ for those who did not participate on the first ballot;

In this case, $0\leq\beta_0\leq 1$ and $0\leq(\beta_0+\beta_1)\leq 1$.

(3) $\Pr(NV_j)=1.0$ for those who did not participate on the first ballot

$$=\beta_0+\frac{(\beta_0+\beta_1-1.0)FNV_j}{(1-FNV_j)}$$

for those who did participate on the first ballot.

This latter case models a "contagion" or "snowball" effect of first-ballot nonparticipants on participants.

Regardless of how one chooses to interpret the persistence model in terms of individual behavior, positive results for the persistence model could be used to argue any of the four following hypotheses:

H0. Short-term *interballot* effects were present at the *district* level, but the population of districts is sufficiently homogeneous that a persistence model holds.

H1. First and second ballot nonvoting were mutually determined by the overall (common to both ballots), short-term context of the election, no short-term *interballot* effects being present.

H2. Short-term *interballot* effects were present, but as these effects were present at the *national* level they were similar (i.e., could be expressed as a linear function of first-ballot results) in all districts.

H3. Nonvoting reflects *long-term* forces such as the habitual high nonvoting rates of the poorest and least educated citizens.

Since we know that our set of districts is highly heterogeneous, we would rule out H0. Consequently, the persistence model is a reasonable benchmark with which to compare models of differential short-term effects. In general, whether we approach the persistence model from the aggregate or individual perspective, we find that it argues for a commonality of social and political circumstances that relate nonvoting rates on the first ballot to those on the second. Such a viewpoint indeed explains part of reality since positive correlations between the first and second ballots are found for both abstentions and blank ballots for all four elections: 1958, 1962, 1967, and 1968.

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[14] See Rosenthal, "Aggregate Data," for further discussion of these alternative models.

In presenting these correlations in Table 2, we are using the natural logarithms rather than the untransformed values of the first and second ballot proportions. We report the results in this manner because, in addition to our interest in "as if" models representing individual behavior, we must also take an interest in the best aggregate descriptors of our data. Logarithms generally proved better aggregate variables, and they will be used throughout except where we wish to interpret the results in "as if" terms.[15]

Despite the positive association between first and second ballots, abstentions and blank ballots clearly represent two radically different behavioral universes. As Table 2 indicates, while the previous ballot accounts for two-thirds to four-fifths of the variation in abstentions, only 1 per cent to 10 per cent of the blank ballot variation is accounted for.

These results indicate clearly that abstentions are predominantly the product of long-term forces or at least forces common to an overall election context that influences both ballots. Lancelot, who has studied abstention variations at the departmental level for all elections since 1871, indicates that although the specific election context influences the mean level of abstentions, the basic pattern of geographic variation is the consequence of long-term forces.[16]

For blank ballots, in contrast, each ballot represents a new situation. Undoubtedly, the low simple correlations are one reason why blank ballots have rarely been studied seriously.[17] Since, in addition, the blank ballots represent a small part of the total vote cast (although as much as the vote for some minor parties like the *PSU*) all the "*va te faire foutres*" usually seem to be rejected as a random collection of *sautes de humeur*. On the contrary, strategic factors heavily influence the blank ballot rates. Our heuristic and spatial models account for well over half of the blank ballot variations.

Table 2. The Persistence Model: Squared Correlations Between the First Ballot and Second Ballot Results Using the Logarithmic Specification

	1958	1962	1967	1968
Abstentions	.74	.82	.66	.65
Blank Ballots	.08	.10	.05	.01
Number of Districts	422	365	396	316

Note: The number of districts listed here applies to all subsequent tables.

Before turning to the "fishing expedition" model, we ought to say that the persistence results pose some questions for historians that are not forthcoming from the simple examination of election statistics. Why, for example, was the interballot situation most stable (highest correlation) in 1962? Perhaps this was the consequence of a relatively low-interest election subsequent to the referendum on direct election of the President. Also, does the general secular decline in the correlation coefficients indicate the presence of learning of sophisticated calculations by the electorate as it gathered experience with the electoral system introduced in 1958? For a better perspective on the variation in the correlations we need longer time-series reaching back into the Third Republic. We also need to develop some multivariate models where we can examine the effect of persistence relative to that of strategic factors. Before doing that, we undertake a fishing expedition to provide a criterion with which to judge the success of our strategic models.

B. The Fishing Expedition or Ordinary Ecological Regression. Our next model involves regressing second ballot nonvoting on the first ballot proportions for abstentions, blank ballots, and the votes for the various parties. One of the parties is purposely omitted from the set of explanatory variables in order to avoid a linearly dependent set of variables.[18] We term this the fishing expedition model since it involves casting out a net of variables without any theoretical support. At least two individual models lead to this regression.

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[15] The logarithmic transformation was used for two reasons: (a) the R^2 values were often substantially higher, especially for blank ballots, (b) denoting y_{pred} and y_{act} as the predicted and actual values for the untransformed dependent variables, $\ln(y)_{\text{pred}}$ and $\ln(y)_{\text{act}}$ as the similar values for the transformed values, then

$$\sum_j[\exp[\ln(y)_{\text{pred}}] - \exp[\ln(y)_{\text{act}}]]^2 = \sum_j[\exp[\ln(y)_{\text{pred}}] - y_{\text{act}}]^2$$

was generally less than $\sum_j[y_{\text{pred}} - y_{\text{act}}]^2$ for blank ballots.

[16] Alain Lancelot, *L'Abstentionnisme Electoral en France* (Paris: Colin, 1968). This book is an excellent introduction to the study of nonvoting in France.

[17] It has been noted, however, that blank ballots take on a definite pattern in referenda in which important provincial newspapers campaign for a blank. See François Goguel, ed., *Le Référendum du 8 avril 1962* (Paris: Colin, 1963), 137–141.

[18] The dependence results from the fact that all proportions must sum to 1.0. Although this condition does not hold when we use the logarithms of the nonvoting proportions, one party is always dropped, since the full set of variables is highly collinear.

The first such model assumes a constant nonvoting probability for all voters in district j:

$$\Pr(NV)_j = \alpha_j = \beta_0 + \sum_{k=1}^{K-1} \beta_k Q_{kj} + \beta_{K+1} ABS_j + \beta_{K+2} BB_j, \tag{2.2}$$

where the β's are coefficients to be estimated;

Q_{kj}	is the first ballot vote for party k proportioned on the basis of *registered voters*;
ABS_j	is the first ballot abstention proportion for district j;
BB_j	is the first ballot blank ballot proportion for district j (proportioned on the basis of *registered voters*); and
K	is the total number of parties.

The second individual model corresponds to the most frequent applications of "ecological regression" techniques.[19] The simplest ecological model assumes that the probability that nonvoting occurs on the second ballot is a constant, given the first-ballot choice (either a nonvote or a party choice):

$$\Pr(NV)_{kj} = \mu_k \tag{2.3}$$

Aggregating for all first-ballot choices over the entire voting population of the district, we find the regression equation:

$$NV_j = \beta_0 + \sum_{k=1}^{K-1} \beta_k Q_{kj} + \beta_{K+1} ABS_j + \beta_{K+2} BB_j + \epsilon_j, \tag{2.4}$$

where

$$\mu_k = \beta_0 + \beta_k,\ k = 1, 2, \ldots, K-1,$$
$$\mu_K = \beta_0,$$
$$\mu_{K+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_{K+1}, \text{ and}$$
$$\mu_{K+2} = \beta_0 + \beta_{K+2}.$$

Therefore, $0 \leq \beta_0 \leq 1$, and $0 \leq \beta_0 + \beta_k \leq 1$, $k = 1, 2, \ldots, K-1, K+1, K+2$.

Whether one prefers (2.2) or (2.3), the fishing expedition is an obvious null model for the various spatial models, since the spatial models use the same information (party votes) in calculating the spatial variables. In fact, a minor modification of (2.4) leads to an absurd alienation model. The modification involves replacing the Q_k by the P_k (where P_k is the first ballot vote proportion for party k computed on the basis of the *vote cast*). We then obtain:

$$NV_j = (\beta_0 + \beta_{K+1} ABS_j + \beta_{K+2} BB_j) + \left(\sum_{k=1}^{K-1} \beta_k P_{kj} \right) + \epsilon_j \tag{2.5}$$

If we further assume (a) that all second ballot candidates have a spatial location of 0.0, (b) that all voters except those at spatial location K, are located at 1.0, (c) and that voters at location K are located at 0.0, we have by (1.8):

$$\alpha_j = \beta_0 + \beta_{K+1} ABS_j + \beta_{K+2} BB_j,$$
$$\gamma_k = \beta_k, \qquad k = 1, 2, \cdots, K-1$$

If such a model gave results as good as an alienation model calculated from the Converse or Pierce and Barnes estimates, we would have to regard the alienation results as spurious. Hence, (2.5) can also play the role of a useful null model.

All variations of the fishing expedition brought home a virtually empty net. The 1967 and 1968 results are examples of what happened. We used the party votes for the Communists, *PSU*, Fed., Independents, Gaullists, and Center groups, omitting the extreme right in order to avoid a set of linearly dependent equations. Table 3 indicates

Table 3. Model Comparisons Using Squared Adjusted Multiple Correlations for the Logarithmic Specification

		Persistence Model	Party Vote Model[a]	Heuristic Model[a]	Party Vote+ Heuristic[a]
1967 N=396	Abstentions Blank Ballots	0.66 0.05	0.69 0.12	0.77 0.63	0.78 0.66
1968 N=316	Abstentions Blank Ballots	0.65 0.01	0.71 0.15	0.80 0.63	0.80 0.66

[a] Persistence term included.

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[19] For French applications, see: B. Mendès-France and L. Laumonier, "Une application des méthodes de l'analyse statistique à l'estimation des déplacements de voix entre les deux tours des élections présidentielles de 1965," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 17 (February, 1967), 110–114; and Alain Lancelot and Pierre Weill, "Les transferts de voix du premier au second tour des élections de Mars 1967; une analyse de regression," in Centre d'Etude de la Vie Politique Française, *Les Elections Législatives de Mars 1967* (Paris: Colin, 1970), pp. 374–388.


CHOICE VARIABLES
LONG TERM Factors (Common to First Ballot)
COMMUNI-CATIONS
First Ballot COMPETITION
OVERALL RESULTS (France as a whole) of 1st ballot
INTEREST Sufficiently high
No
Yes
ABSTAIN
VOTE
ABSENCE OF APPEALS
COMPARE
UNWILLINGNESS TO "WASTE" A VOTE
ABSENCE > WASTE
ABSENCE < WASTE
BLANK BALLOT
VOTE FOR A CANDIDATE

Figure 4. Second Ballot Decision Process for the Heuristic Model

that the party vote variables made only a modest contribution to improving multiple R^2 over the simple persistence regression. Furthermore, this contribution was substantially less than that of the heuristic model presented in the next section. Indeed, when the party vote variables are added to the heuristic model, the R^2 of the abstention regression improves by at most 0.01. Though the blank ballots show a larger increment (from .63 to .66 in both years), this is less than one-third of the increment that results from adding the spatial model to the heuristic model.

For the 1968 data, we also estimated equation (2.5) explicitly, that is, without any logarithmic transformations. Only 14 per cent of the variance in blank ballots was explained by this model as against 47 per cent for an estimate of the simple alienation model (1.8 with α_j a constant) using the Pierce and Barnes (Self) spatial estimates. We emphasize that both the fishing expedition model and the spatial model use exactly the same information—first ballot results—as input data. Clearly, then, reasonable spatial estimates make a difference vis-à-vis the absurd model implied by (2.5). The 1968 results for equation (2.5) are also generally indicative of what we found when we ran both the logarithmic and straight proportions model. The logarithmic R^2 (0.15 in this case) is usually slightly greater than that for proportions (.14 here), although occasionally higher values of R^2 occur for proportions models.

As one would expect from the foregoing results, the ecological regression version represented by equation (2.4) also fails for 1968. In addition to once again obtaining a low R^2 value, we also found unacceptable negative nonvoting proportions estimated for two parties: the *PSU* and the Federation. This further failure of the fishing expedition again demonstrates the need for models more attuned to the strategic situation represented by the second ballot.

C. An Heuristic Model of Electoral Participation.

Unlike the persistence and fishing-expedition models, the heuristic model attempts to take into account the changed strategic situation of the second ballot as compared to the first. These changes are that some of the candidates may no longer be present and that the first ballot results give voters further information about the chances of the various candidates. The heuristic model was originally developed independently of the work of Hinich and Ordeshook on spatial models that permit nonvoting and of the work of McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Riker on expected value calculations in voting. In the context of the formal development of the first section, however, we can regard the heuristic model as the specification of α_j, the nonspatial component.

Developed from a cursory inspection of the 1962 data,[20] the heuristic model was originally estimated for that year.[21] Here we apply it without change to the 1958, 1967, and 1968 data. The heuristic variables do account for a large chunk of the blank ballot variance in all four years. Unlike the variables in the final model, which are based on precise definitions of alienation and indifference, the heuristic variables only attempt to capture commonly perceived features of the electoral environment.[22] Briefly, we hypothesize that participation is primarily affected by two factors: availability of choice and competition. Choice is crudely captured by the number of candidates, and competition is similarly reduced to the ratio of the first-ballot vote of the first-ballot leader and the vote of the candidate in second place. The types of choices available are to some degree indicated by dummy variables describing the types of leftist candidates. While the best overall model is obtained by combining this model with the spatial model, the heuristic model by itself is superior to the spatial model. Taken alone, the heuristic model explains more of the variance, and it presents a handsome interest for historical studies where the data requirements (spatial estimates) of the spatial model cannot be met.

The heuristic model, as well as the spatial models, is based on the framework provided by Anthony Downs in *An Economic Theory of Democracy*.[23] Following Downs, we may divide voters into two classes: (1) Some voters, barring "forced" nonparticipation, will always vote because the "citizenship" value of voting itself outweighs any costs in lost time, transportation, etc.; this class will only be of interest with regard to blank ballots. (2) The remainder will only vote if the perceived *expected value* of their vote as it influences government policies outweighs the *cost* of voting.

In the heuristic model, we hypothesize that the electorate behaves as if it replaced a precise expected value calculation with two heuristic decision rules. The first of these rules involves the evaluation of the level of interest in the campaign. Interest, in turn, is largely a function of the degree of competition. Consequently, we hypothesize:

H4. Abstentions will decrease with the level of competition.

The second decision rule involves the search for an acceptable and sufficiently distinctive choice. No choice may be acceptable if the voter is sufficiently "alienated," i.e., if no candidate seems likely to further the policies he prefers. This, essentially, is the Hinich-Ordeshook definition of alienation.

The voter may also fail to vote if he is indifferent between two or more candidates even though their proposed policies are in reasonably close agreement with his own preferences. With respect to abstentions, interest in the empirical study of "indifference" has grown from the well-known "cross-pressures" concept put forth by Lazarsfeld and his associates.[24] Even though indifference may well be operative among long-term factors, the Pool-Abelson-Popkin study suggested that "cross-pressure" effects on turnout are minimal, especially if overall interest in the election is high.[25] The Pool et al. finding is supported by Lancelot's study which indicates that the first ballot-second ballot effects of the "spectrum of available options" are very small.[26] Lancelot's results (although not based on multivariate analysis), would also suggest that alienation plays a small role with respect to abstentions. Apparently, abstentions are rarely the result of short-term evaluations. Hence, we did not expect to find second-ballot abstentions heavily influenced by *modifications in the available choices:*

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[20] Howard Rosenthal, "Political Coalition: Elements of a Model and the Study of French Legislative Elections" in *Calcul et Formalisation dans le Sciences de l'Homme* (Proceedings of the 1966 Rome Conference on Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences), (Paris; Editions du C.N.R.S., 1968), pp. 269–282, esp. 281–282.

[21] Howard Rosenthal and Subrata Sen, "Participation électorale et conjoncture politique," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 20 (June, 1970), 545–556. The 1962 results here differ slightly from those published earlier because the earlier publication eliminated some districts for *ad hoc* reasons.

[22] In formulating the heuristic model, we owe much to the viewpoints of James G. March and Herbert Simon, *Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1958), and Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1960).

[23] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957).

[24] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1944).

[25] Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert Abelson, and Samuel Popkin, *Candidates, Issues, and Strategies: A Computer Simulation of the 1960 Presidential Election* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1964).

[26] Lancelot, *L'Abstentionnisme Electoral en France*. pp. 95–119.

H5. Variables describing the set of available choices will not have an appreciable effect on abstention rates.

Blank ballots are another matter. The *FY* voters (apart from those who unwittingly void their ballot) deliberately refuse to choose between the candidates even though they are sufficiently motivated to go to the polls. While the sources of this motivation are undoubtedly several (such as interest in the contest, civic superego, and social pressures in such environments as small villages), what is critical is the deliberate refusal of freely available alternatives. We hypothesize that modifications in the available choices should heavily affect blank ballot rates:

H6. Variables describing the set of available choices will have an appreciable effect on blank ballot rates.

Competition will also have a moderate effect, since voters will be less inclined to "waste" votes in competitive situations:

H7. Blank ballots will decrease with the level of competition.

The short-term effects of both the choice and competition variables may be influenced by other factors. Subcultural differences may affect the short-term responses of voters. Furthermore, short-run participation may witness differential rates of mobilization built up through differential exposures to mass media systems and other forms of communication.

It would thus be wise to include a number of sociological measures such as urbanization and media exposure as controls in order to isolate the effects of the political variables. At this writing, we have only included regional variables; these nonetheless are related to both sub-cultural differences and communications systems. Furthermore, the first ballot abstention and blank ballot figures (which are included in the model) are effective proxies for long-term sociological effects on participation. We now list the total set of variables: competition, availability of choice, and regional descriptors. This listing provides an operational definition of the dimensions we think are important in describing the choice situation.

Definition of the Variables

a. *Voting Variables*

A_1, A_2	First- and second-ballot abstentions as percentages of the registered voters (*inscrits*).
B_1, B_2	First- and second-ballot blank ballots as percentages of the votes cast (*suffrages exprimés*). We have computed percentages on the basis of votes cast because the heuristic model (see below) views the decision process as sequential. First, the voter decides whether or not to go to the polls. Only then does he decide whether or not to cast a valid vote. Thus, we are interested first in what proportion of eligible voters vote, and then, of those who vote, what proportion effectively exercise a choice. In the formal models of the first section of this paper, B_1 and B_2 obviously should be computed on the basis of registered voters. We follow this procedure in the following section on spatial models.

b. *Choice and Competition Variables*

N_2	The number of candidates on the second ballot. We employ N_2 as an indicator of the amount of choice on the second ballot. In the regression, we used $1/N_2$. This, as one would want, gives a greater interval between 2 and 3 candidates than between 3 and 4 candidates. Specifically, we hypothesize:

H6. Blank ballots will be an increasing linear function of $1/N_2$.

For the 1962 data, we ran regressions based on a wide variety of other measures involving the number of candidates and the distribution of the vote on the first ballot, including measures of statistical information. Although some measures gave results almost as good as those available from N_2, none bettered N_2, and we have adopted it for parsimony.

The success of N_2 alone appears puzzling. We had assumed, for example, that districts with many candidates on the first ballot would, *ceteris paribus*, have more blank ballots on the second ballot than constituencies with few first-ballot candidates since they would have more "disappointed" voters. The spatial models framework, however, may indicate why N_2 is successful. If all candidates maintain their positions in the policy space, it is clear that eliminating some candidates will definitely increase alienation (it may or may not increase indifference). Thus, N_2 serves as an approximation to alienation.[27] It will be a useful variable in historical studies, in which spatial information is not available. On the other hand, N_1 is much less clearly related to the second-ballot situation. A small N_1 may not only reflect fewer "disappointed" voters on the second ballot. It may also indicate a distribution of voters with a few widely separated modes. If a candidate representing one of the modes is eliminated, his voters will be relatively distant from the remaining candidates. Thus, there can be a relatively large number of "disappointed" voters even if N_1 is small. Following our argument for N_2, however, N_1 ought to indicate first-ballot alienation. Future research should explore the relationship between N_1 and first-ballot blank ballots.

CT CT, a measure of competition, is defined as the ratio:

$$\frac{\text{Votes of second leading candidate, first ballot}}{\text{Votes of leading candidate, first ballot}}$$

The maximum value of CT is 1.0, indicating the highest degree of competition possible. The minimum value is 0.

We investigated alternative definitions of competition where the total "left" or "right" (both defined in a variety of ways) vote was treated as a single candidate. None of these gave better results than the simple ratio of second-to-first, a finding that lends some support to the basic assumption of a heuristic voting calculus using very simple decision rules.

In an effort to approximate the Riker-Ordeshook PB term, we also computed interactions between CT and various choice variables. None of these made important contributions to the regression equation.

c. *Competing Parties Variables*[28]

PC 1, if Communist but no Socialist (Fed. in 1967 and 1968) or *PSU* candidate, second ballot
0, otherwise.

CS 1, if both Communist and Socialist (Fed. in 1967 and 1968) or *PSU* candidate, second ballot
0, otherwise.

SF 1, if Socialist (Fed. in 1967 and 1968) or *PSU* but no Communist candidate, second ballot
0, otherwise.

d. *Regional Variables*

RE_1 1, if South (Haute-Savoie, Ain, Rhône, Loire, Allier, Creuse, Haute-Vienne, Charente, Charente-Maritime, and all departments south of these, except Corsica).
0, otherwise.

RE_2 1, if Northeast (Somme, Oise, Aisne, Marne, Aube, Yonne, Nièvre, and all departments east of these not in the South).
0, otherwise.

RE_3 1, if Northwest (all other departments except Seine-et-Marne and the former Seine and Seine-et-Oise).
0, otherwise.

Metropolitan Paris (former Seine, former Seine-et-Oise, Seine-et-Marne) is a fourth region.[29] Although it is not denoted by a variable in order to avoid a linearly dependent set of equations, the relative influence of this region is indicated by the regressions.

Results of the Analysis. The set of variables given above represents a selection that was developed after considerable experimentation with the 1962 data. The results for this model were published earlier in the *Revue Française de Science Politique*.[30] The model was then applied to the 1958, 1967, and 1968 data without change, these years becoming tests as to the generality of the heuristic model.

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[27] For large values of N_2, although alienation is low, simple indifference is large. The indifference could promote large numbers of blank ballots. Thus, blank ballots may be a monotonic function of N_2 only for small values of N_2. As N_2 is only 2, 3, or 4 for our data, this condition is satisfied. We note that in computing N_2 we excluded those rare "candidates" who obtained less than a thousand votes on the second ballot. These "candidates" nearly always are individuals who have withdrawn, but too late to eliminate their ballots from the polling places.

[28] The particular classifications used were those found in the 1962, 1967, and 1968 *Elections Legislatives* publications of the French government. The 1958 classifications are those of the SOFRES polling organization. Both classifications are subject to question, but we wished to use an independent source for the initial estimates. Future analysis could attempt to use other classifications, split the 1967 *F.G.D.S.* into its constituent parties, etc.

[29] The reasons for the choice of these particular regions are stated in an earlier study which shows the importance of these regions to the analysis of public opinion regarding General de Gaulle in the 18 months preceding the 1962 elections. Cf. Howard Rosenthal, "The Popularity of Charles de Gaulle: Findings from Archive-Based Research," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 31 (Fall, 1967), 381–398.

[30] Rosenthal and Sen, "Participation électorale et conjoncture politique," pp. 549–552.

Table 4. Abstention Regressions for the Heuristic Model Using the Logarithmic Specification

Explanatory Variables	Coefficients				t-Statistics			
	1958	1962	1967	1968	1958	1962	1967	1968
Constant	0.608	−0.200	0.171	0.281	7.99	−1.95	3.12	3.73
Ln (A_1)	0.890	1.079	0.863	0.988	37.55	38.94	28.97	25.65
CT	−0.252	−0.191	−0.190	−0.209	−11.41	−7.99	−5.99	−5.90
$1/N_2$	**	**	**	0.291	**	**	**	2.98
PC	0.009	0.005	−0.128	−0.110	0.47	0.37	−5.87	−4.18
CS	−0.029	0.006	−0.155	−0.078*	−1.48	0.24	−6.87	−1.33*
SF	−0.021	0.019	−0.143	−0.181	−0.79	1.35	−5.21	−6.74
RE_1	−0.063	−0.077	−0.126	−0.109	−4.97	−5.62	−7.55	−6.16
RE_2	−0.069	−0.069	−0.115	−0.116	−5.50	−4.80	−6.79	−5.90
RE_3	−0.004	−0.109	−0.055	−0.074	−0.26	−7.08	−3.14	−3.67
R^2 adj	0.832	0.868	0.775	0.796				

* Applies to only 4 districts in 1968.
** Not included in the model.

Note: If standard normality assumptions are met, for all tables in this paper, a t-value of 1.645 or greater indicates a .05 significance level for a one-tail test, .10 for a two-tail test; 2.33 is the value for the .01 one-tail level, .02 two-tail level. The one-tail test would apply to the coefficients of Ln (A_1), Ln (B_1), CT, and $1/N_2$ in the heuristic model and to the alienation coefficients in the spatial model, for the sign of these coefficients was specified a priori. A two-tail test would apply to all other coefficients. However, given the large N's, most coefficients are "significant." The magnitudes and standard errors of the coefficients are of more interest. The t-statistic is, of course, the estimated coefficient divided by its estimated standard error.

For all four years, the analysis was conducted for all metropolitan second-ballot districts except those in Corsica, where election results have had low reliability. The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The estimated coefficient for each independent variable indicates its estimated effect on the dependent variable, if all other variables were held constant. For example, in Table 4, the coefficient −.109 for RE_3 in 1962 indicates that *ceteris paribus*, Ln(A_2) will be .109 units less in the Northwest than in the residual region, Metropolitan Paris.

a. *Abstentions*

Participation in terms of abstentions was largely (especially in 1962) immune from short-term political factors that are differentially distributed among the constituencies. (Compare Tables 2 and 4.) We previously indicated the high persistence correlations between the two ballots. Now, we can add that the heuristic model explains less than half of the remaining variance—as against 1/2 to 3/5 in the case of blank ballots. Furthermore, much of the variance picked up by the heuristic model for abstentions comes from the

Table 5. Blank Ballot Regressions for the Heuristic Model Using the Logarithmic Specification

Explanatory Variables	Coefficients				t-Statistics			
	1958	1962	1967	1968	1958	1962	1967	1968
Constant	−0.025	−0.548	−2.320	−4.230	−0.18	−4.11	−9.76	−11.48
Ln (B_1)	0.525	0.510	0.603	0.300	11.67	10.99	12.18	5.03
CT	−0.624	−0.513	−0.430	−0.641	−7.97	−5.97	−5.00	−6.13
$1/N_2$	2.580	3.605	4.387	5.414	13.20	18.61	17.69	17.80
PC	−0.049	0.325	−0.261	−0.010	−0.69	6.86	−4.09	−0.12
CS	−0.177	0.321	−0.266	−0.309*	−2.44	4.04	−2.86	−1.67*
SF	−0.052	0.019	−0.639	−0.589	−0.56	2.02	−9.93	−7.03
RE_1	0.021	−0.101	−0.047	−0.144	0.51	−2.04	−3.60	−0.76
RE_2	0.036	−0.198	−0.047	−0.267	0.80	−3.81	−4.91	−2.28
RE_3	0.060	−0.220	−0.050	−0.640	1.22	−3.87	−4.02	−4.10
R^2 adj	0.542	0.594	0.630	0.631				

* Applies to only 4 districts in 1968.

regional variables, which, we suggest later, may reflect differential communications exposures rather than political factors. Except for the RE_3 coefficient for 1958, the coefficients of the three regional variables have high t-values for all four years.

Variables other than the first-ballot abstentions have an extremely marginal influence. The choice variables are, as we hypothesized, the least important. Only in 1968 does the basic choice variable, $1/N_2$, pass even the .05 level for the standard t-test. Even in this year, its magnitude, 0.291, was only 1/18 of the value (5.414) found for the same variable in the blank ballot regression (compare Tables 4 and 5).

We conjecture that the appearance of a significant $1/N_2$ term in 1968 reflects a learning process in the electorate. As experience is acquired with the electoral system introduced in 1958, one can expect greater sophistication. Supporting evidence comes from the blank-ballot regression in which the value of the $1/N_2$ coefficient rises steadily from 1958 to 1968, the electorate apparently becoming increasingly sensitive to the differences between duels and truels. To the extent that $1/N_2$ captures alienation, the pattern for both blank ballots and abstentions alternatively suggests increasing polarization in the electorate, a phenomenon we have already noticed in comparing the Converse (1958) space to that of Pierce and Barnes (1967). In the latter, the Gaullists and the left are more sharply separated. This polarization might well be the temporary result of the crisis conditions of 1968. The significant $1/N_2$ coefficient in the 1968 abstention regression could thus reflect these special circumstances, a point we return to shortly.

The dummy variables, *PC*, *CS*, and *SF* were included because the electorate's reactions to Communist candidacies are generally thought to be a key factor. We were also interested in how the changing coalition relationships between the non-Communist left and the Communist party influenced participation rates. The dummy variables permit a categorization of the major types of contests between the left and the Gaullist majority.

The nature of these contests has changed during the course of the Fifth Republic. In 1958, the Socialist party supported de Gaulle, and Communists and Socialists were frequently in opposition on the second ballot. By 1962, except in districts where there was no serious competition from the right, the Communists and Socialists generally withdrew in favor of one another so that the left had a unique candidate on the second ballot. In districts where the left was weak, it sometimes happened that all leftist candidates withdrew in favor of an anti-Gaullist Radical, Christian Democrat, or *Modéré*. In 1967 and 1968, the 1962 strategy was largely repeated, except that the Socialists, the Radicals, and the Convention of Republican Institutions had combined into the Federation of the Left (*F.G.D.S*). In 1967, the Communists withdrew for Federation candidates not only where the Federation led them on the first ballot, but also in a number of closely contested districts where it was thought that only a Federation candidate could win even though a Communist led the *Fédéré* on the first ballot.

Having described the contests, we turn to the results. For both 1958 and 1962, the party dummy variables have virtually no impact on the level of abstentions, despite the switch from intra-left competition in 1958 to intra-left coalition in 1962. In 1967, since the three coefficients are confined to a narrow range (-0.128 to -0.155) we can say that abstentions were generally fewer whenever the left was represented, be it by the Communists, the *PSU*, the Federation, or any combination of them. Furthermore, since the *PC* coefficient as well as the *CS* and *SF* coefficients changed from 1962, we cannot ascribe the change wholly to the fact that in 1967, Radical and other center-left candidates were included in the *CS* and *SF* categories.

The significant coefficients for 1967 can be clarified by identifying the 24 districts that were not in the *PC*, *CS*, or *SF* categories that year. These were all from fiefdoms of the right, five being in Alsace-Lorraine, ten in the West (Calvados, Ille-et-Villaine, Finistère, Loire-Atlantique, Manche, Vendée), and another six in the bourgeois neighborhoods of Paris (6th, 7th, 8th, 16th, and 17th arrondissements), while only three were in the South. In 8 of the 24 districts the left had done so poorly that the electoral law eliminated all its candidates. In the other districts, decisions were made to support a nonleftist against the Gaullist. Given the characteristics of these districts where participation was relatively low, we might interpret the 1967 results by arguing that in 1967 the leftist electorate saw the Communist-Federation coalition as a viable enterprise (which, in fact, came very close to victory), while in 1962 the coalition was perceived as a purely defensive collection of opponents to de Gaulle. Thus, in 1967 it became important to leftist voters, whatever their party, to vote whenever some member of the coalition had a chance of victory. In the absence of a leftist candidate, the left tended to abstain.

The elections of 1968 basically followed the pattern of those of 1967 but with a special twist. The 1968 elections were the final act of the great crisis, known as *les événements*, initiated by the student and, later, student-worker demonstrations of May. *Les événements* began with the student demonstrations, went on to a general strike by the workers, and ended in the frightened mass electorate giving the Gaullists a landslide at the polls. In that election, there were only 19 districts where the left had no candidate on the second ballot and, in contrast to 1967, these tended to be in highly urban environments, (Paris, Lyons, Bordeaux) rather than in rural, Catholic districts, most of which the Gaullists had already carried on the first ballot. Moreover, the defeat of the left was so clear after the first ballot that the Communist-Federation coalitions could no longer be regarded as viable. Therefore, it appears that the relatively high abstention rate in these districts should be attributed either to the expectation that the left was not viable (perhaps more so nationally than locally) or to heightened alienation of the urban left, unwilling to support any "bourgeois" candidate in the bitterness brought on by *les événements*.

That alienation was at work is further suggested by the fact that in 1968, for the first time, there is a significant, if weak, difference between the *PC* and *SF* coefficients.[31] (We omit discussion of the *CS* coefficient for 1968 since it applies to only 4 districts.) Abstentions were relatively higher in districts with Communist candidates than in those with Federation candidates, suggesting that the old anti-Communist reflex of a portion of the non-Communist left had been reawakened by fears of a potential revolution. Alternatively, heightened anti-Communist sentiment may have convinced some voters that Communists were not viable candidates.

All the dummy variable effects on abstentions, including the Communist-Federation difference in 1968, are nonetheless small in importance albeit "statistically significant." Furthermore, the effects are limited either to a small set of districts (the 20-odd without leftist candidates in 1967 and 1968) or to the very unusual circumstances of the 1968 elections. We thus conclude: *Abstention rates were not substantially influenced by the coalition choices of parties and candidates* (H5). In particular, there was never a truly major difference between the *PC* and *SF* coefficients. This conclusion will surprise some observers. We emphasize that the conclusion is limited to differential effects. The overall pattern of Communist-Socialist *désistements* may, for example, have had a general effect on public opinion that was evenly distributed across France. Our analysis cannot discover such an effect.

In contrast, *competition has a moderate influence on abstention rates* (H4). How much? Consider the case where the ratio of the second candidate to the first candidate changes from 30/30 to 20/30. Working back through the logarithms, *ceteris paribus* calculations show that the change in 1962, 1967, and 1968 for typical values of A_2 (say 25 per cent) is on the order of $\frac{1}{2}$ of 1 per cent of the *inscrits*. This is a significant but not a major change.

Significant effects were also found for the regional variables. Their magnitude, however, is small, being on the same order as that found for competition. Other things being equal, Metropolitan Paris always showed the smallest drop in abstentions from one ballot to the other. Perhaps these differences represent short-term political factors that our other variables have not captured. An alternative, if speculative, hypothesis can be advanced: abstentions will show, *ceteris paribus*, a greater relative decrease between the two ballots in regions in which campaign mobilization (through the mass media, etc.) is slowest. Of the four regions, surely Metropolitan Paris is most exposed to media sources. Indeed, in our earlier paper we report a correlation between per capita television figures and abstention residuals.[32] The order of the regional coefficients and the behavior of the other variables as well, however, differ sharply for the case of blank ballots.

b. *Blank and Null Ballots*

One is struck by the exceedingly weak relationship between the first and second ballots. The former account for only 1 per cent to 10 per cent of the variance of the latter. It seems the second ballot blank ballots are almost entirely the result of short-term influences. As the heuristic model regressions account for 54 to 63 per cent of the variation, over one-half of the variance is accounted for by adding short-term elements to the model. Of course, large portions of the variance remain "unexplained." Although it must be granted that the model thus leaves room for improvement (partly brought about by adding the spatial model), it should be remembered that some blank ballots result from errors in voting rather than from deliberate intention; hence, we might expect a large stochastic element. The larger portions of the variance explained in the later elections suggests that learning may reduce the element of error.

Of all the short-term measures, it is clearly the simple *choice* measure, $1/N_2$, that is most closely related to blank ballots. *Ceteris paribus*, in two-way contests, Ln (B_2) is .4 to .7 units greater than in triangular contests. These differences even exceed the standard deviations of Ln (B_2). Even the simple regression of $1/N_2$ accounts for 25 to 40 per cent of the variance of the second ballot blank ballots.

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[31] If the standard normal test is used, the null hypothesis that the difference between the two coefficients is zero is rejected at the .0005 level. The *t*-statistic is 5.02.

[32] Rosenthal and Sen, pp. 553–554.

As seen in Table 5, the short-term factors connected with the specific party affiliations of the candidates were also far more important to blank ballots than they were to abstentions.

The coalition effects are clearly evident. In 1958, the *PC* and *SF* coefficients are about equal and are greater than the *CS* coefficient. In the absence of coalitions, Communists and Socialists would not support one another. In 1962, 1967, and 1968, the *PC* and *CS* coefficients are about equal and are greater than the *SF* coefficient. (As mentioned earlier, the *CS* coefficient should be ignored in 1968.) From the viewpoint of alienation, one would suggest that the Communists were loyal to the coalition, but the Socialist voter frequently told the Communist candidate to *se faire foutre*. Why, then, the relatively high value for the *CS* coefficient? *CS* districts were cases where the right generally had no chance. We expect the epithets were from the right. A viability interpretation can, of course, also be given to the higher rates of blank ballots in districts where the left was represented by a Communist.

In addition to contrasting the *PC*, *CS*, and *SF* coefficients, we also note that, in line with the abstention results, all three coefficients were far less in 1967 and 1968 than in 1962. If our interpretation of this change for abstentions is valid, it should also apply to blank ballots.

Nonetheless, whether there were blank ballots from the left in districts that were neither *PC*, nor *CS*, nor *SF*, blank ballots from the right in *CS* districts, etc., all classes of voters seem affected by choice reduction, since $1/N_2$ has far greater effects than any of the party-related variables.

As for the other variables, even *competition* influences blank ballots (coefficients ranging from −0.43 to −0.64) more than it does abstentions (coefficients ranging from −0.19 to −0.25). There are also significant regional differences in 1962, 1967, and 1968 which are not readily interpretable.

A more direct insight on the impact of each variable on blank ballot rates is available from Table 6 where, for 1968, the model specifying a logarithmic proportion of votes cast is compared with a straight proportion of registered voters model. In this year, the R^2 values for the two specifications were virtually identical, a similar ordering occurred for the magnitudes of the *t*-statistics, and the same substantive interpretations would be drawn from each equation.

From the straight proportion model we estimate that, *ceteris paribus*, 2 per cent more $[(\frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{3})(0.117)]$ of the registered electorate cast blank ballots in *duels* than in *truels*. In contrast, only three-quarters of one per cent more blank ballots would be cast if the first candidate had twice the vote of the second candidate on the first ballot as compared to a tie for first place. The largest party dummy variable difference was 1.21 per cent, between *SF* and *PC* districts while the largest regional difference was 1.52 per cent (Northwest vs. South). Finally, a two standard deviation increase in first ballot blank ballots would, other things being equal, increase the second ballot blank ballots by only 0.34 per cent. These results indicate the extent to which $1/N_2$ dominates the blank-ballot phenomenon as seen by the heuristic model.

The difficult interpretation of the regional results is one indication that our current regression

Table 6. 1968 Heuristic Model for Blank Ballots, Comparison of Two Specifications

Explanatory Variables	B_1, B_2: Logarithm of Proportion of Votes Cast		B_1, B_2: Proportion of Registered Voters	
	Coefficient	*t*-Statistic	Coefficient	*t*-Statistic
Constant	−4.230	−11.48	−0.025	−6.80
B_1	0.300	5.03	0.378	3.74
CT	−0.641	−6.13	−0.015	−6.71
$1/N_2$	5.414	17.80	0.117	18.41
PC	−0.010	−0.12	0.001	0.86
CS	−0.309	−1.67	−0.005	−1.16
SF	−0.589	−7.03	−0.012	−6.80
RE_1	−0.144	−0.76	0.002	1.58
RE_2	−0.267	−2.28	0.000	0.10
RE_3	−0.640	−4.10	−0.015	−6.70
R^2 adj	0.631		0.633	

models are only partial models of the short-term phenomena. A more complete model could easily include a number of other variables. For example, we suggested earlier from an examination of the regional coefficients for abstentions that abstentions should be linked to the rate of mobilization of interest in the campaign. Those areas that were mobilized most slowly should have high relative increases in voting between the two ballots. Thus, higher rates of voting were observed, *ceteris paribus*, for the provinces than for Paris where mass communications operate most intensely.

Blank ballots, as indicated earlier, ought not to respond to the stimulation of interest through the mass media. The residuals from the blank-ballot regressions plotted against television per capita did not show positive correlation. On the other hand, some groups may have particularly strong reactions to the change in the choice situation. One group that would resent candidates other than those deeply committed to their cause was the French repatriated from Algeria after Algerian independence in 1962. In 1962, these had concentrated in the three Mediterranean departments of Alpes-Maritimes, Var, and Bouches-du-Rhône. For blank ballots, 15 of the 18 second-ballot constituencies show positive residuals there. The average residual in these constituencies, .295, is slightly larger than the standard deviation of all the residuals, .285. Even in 1967, when the *rapatriés* were more integrated in the political system, the average residual for these departments was .122 (overall standard deviation, .283). (By the assumptions of the regression model, the average of all residuals is zero.) Thus, the analysis of residuals provides another indication that preferences control blank ballots while abstentions respond to interest in the contest.

Summary of the Heuristic Model. If preference related variables did indeed have more effect on blank ballots than the competition measure (H6. and H7.), our major result must nonetheless be the finding that *both choice and competition had stronger effects on blank ballots than on abstentions*. Consequently, it was only blank ballots that were strongly affected by short-term factors in all four years.

The current state of affairs might be summed up in the decision process pictured in Figure 4. This figure does not depict the multiple regression model but represents a conjecture as to how the heuristic decision process operates for individual voters. The voter will vote or abstain as a function of his interest in the ballot. Interest is determined both by competition and by communications variables. Those who vote will cast blank ballots only if the absence of appeals, related to the choice variables, outweighs the perception that the vote will be wasted, related to competition. The spatial models will refine this extension of the Downsian framework.

Estimates of Spatial Models

Of all the spatial models, the simple alienation model of equation (1.4) was clearly the most successful in terms of our empirical analysis and will warrant most of our attention. Before presenting the results for the model in conjunction with the heuristic model, we consider a "pure" spatial model for blank ballots with constant α_j. The results for 1968 are presented in Table 7. This table gives results for all three measures of party spatial positions displayed in Table 1. Results are also presented for a "distorted" measure identical to the Pierce and Barnes (All) measure except that

Table 7. Simple Alienation Model for 1968 Blank Ballots, Estimation of Equation (1.4) for Constant α

Explanatory Variables	Coefficients				t-Statistics			
	Converse	Pierce and Barnes			Converse	Pierce and Barnes		
		All	Self	Distorted		All	Self	Distorted
Constant (α)	0.006	0.009	0.010	0.014	3.84	8.82	10.66	8.73
γ: Communist	0.011	0.007	−0.001	−0.006	3.14	1.76	−0.18	−0.35
PSU	0.060	0.032	0.030	0.019	4.89	3.50	2.39	2.92
Fed.	0.055	0.053	0.089	0.020	9.42	10.31	11.42	5.94
Center	0.147	0.155	0.090	0.025	10.16	11.24	11.80	1.84
Gaullist	0.035	0.021	0.027	0.046	2.84	2.79	4.14	1.69
Right	0.067	0.048	0.041	0.050	6.51	6.58	6.76	4.80
Extreme Right	0.069	0.173	0.042	0.286	1.75	1.33	1.24	1.82
R^2 adj	0.408	0.452	0.468	0.211				

the Communists are placed at 4.20, just to the right of the Independents.

One immediately observes that, although the older Converse estimates appear slightly less effective, the results are not very sensitive to the three spatial measures. This result is not surprising, given the "clumping" involved in our approximation procedures. On the other hand, "reasonable" spatial estimates give clearly superior results to nonsensical ones such as the distorted measure of Table 7 or any of the fishing expedition models. For both the Converse and Pierce and Barnes (All) measures, the signs of all coefficients are correct. In the Pierce and Barnes (Self) model, only the Communist sign is incorrect.

The 1962 results for the same model are similar. Of the three spatial measures, the Pierce and Barnes (Self) gave the best results since all the coefficients had correct signs and the highest adjusted R^2 of 0.341 was obtained. The Converse and Pierce and Barnes (All) measures each had one coefficient with the wrong sign (-0.004 for the Converse Gaullist coefficient and -0.032 for the Pierce and Barnes [All] Extreme Right coefficient). However, both negative coefficients were not significantly different from zero, having t-statistics of -0.51 and -0.64, respectively. The adjusted R^2 values were 0.300 for Converse and 0.296 for Pierce and Barnes (All). Again, the distorted Pierce and Barnes (All) measure provided inferior results (adjusted $R^2 = 0.26$).

The simple alienation model was also examined for 1958, using the Converse and Pierce and Barnes (All) measures. The signs of all the coefficients were correct for both measures. The adjusted R^2 was 0.360 for the Converse measure and 0.367 for the Pierce and Barnes (All) measure. These results and those for the later years are indicative of the explanatory power of a "spatial" approach when one cannot control for nonspatial effects.

In addition to the signs of the coefficients being correct, their magnitudes are appropriate in that all of the $\Pr(NV)_{ij}$ are estimated in the interval [0, 1]. Even in the most extreme case that we can imagine for 1968, that of an Extreme-Right voter faced with a Communist-Federation duel, for the Pierce and Barnes (All) measurements, the blank-ballot probability is estimated to be 0.675.[33] For a more normal case, that of a Federation voter faced with a Communist-Gaullist duel, the probability is estimated to be 0.07. It should be further noted that, in all models, for both 1962 and 1968, the alienation coefficient γ is very low for the Communists, reflecting, in our view, the party's ability to "discipline" its electorate when it is supporting a coalition candidate. In contrast, the 1958 Communist γ is relatively large, reflecting the disappointment of voters where Communist candidates were eliminated after the first ballot. These findings are consistent with our earlier interpretation of the dummy variable results in the heuristic model.

Alienation with Variable α_j (Alienation plus Heuristic Model). The alienation model clearly ought to be compared with the heuristic model. We conducted this comparison for all four years through regressions models using the Converse measurements and the logarithm of proportion of votes cast.

As can be seen from Table 8, the alienation model by itself is quite inferior to the heuristic model (although, for blank ballots, it is definitely to be preferred to the straight party votes fishing expedition model, which uses the same voting data as the alienation model). The interesting question, then, is whether the alienation model develops additional explanatory power when added to the heuristic model.

For abstentions, it is clear that the alienation model has no payoff. Adjusted R^2 rises very little. While we would expect all alienation coefficients to be positive, they are an even mixture of posi-

Table 8. Adjusted Squared Multiple Correlations for the Comparison of Models Using the Logarithmic Specification and the Converse Measurements

		Pure Alienation with Persistence	Heuristic	Heuristic plus Alienation
Abstentions	1958	0.76	0.83	0.83
	1962	0.83	0.87	0.88
	1967	0.67	0.77	0.78
	1968	0.72	0.80	0.80
Blank Ballots	1958	0.46	0.53	0.59
	1962	0.42	0.59	0.64
	1967	0.52	0.63	0.73
	1968	0.58	0.63	0.73

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[33] The blank ballot probability will be equal to [0.009 + (0.173) (5.000 − 1.148)] = 0.675.

Table 9. Blank-Ballot Regression Coefficients for the Heuristic-Alienation Model Using the Logarithmic Specification and the Converse Measurements

Explanatory Variables	Coefficients			
	1958	1962	1967	1968
Constant	0.108	−0.575	−1.729	−3.308
Ln (B_1)	0.537	0.564	0.622	0.425
CT	−0.630	−0.437	−0.351	−0.503
$1/N_2$	1.532	2.764	2.180	3.493
PC	−0.152	0.390	−0.348	−0.059
CS	−0.118	0.486	−0.350	−0.313
SF	−0.084	0.134	−0.721	−0.714
RE_1	0.049	−0.123	−0.187	−0.056
RE_2	0.070	−0.224	−0.186	−0.071
RE_3	0.090	−0.210	−0.202	−0.237
Alienations				
Communist	0.846	0.579	0.779	0.867
PSU	1.434	0.877	1.430	1.494
Socialist Fed. in	1.408	0.709	1.422	0.894
Radical 1967 and 1968	1.145	0.983		
MRP—Center	0.354	1.712	5.061	5.670
Gaullists	1.018	−0.172	1.836	0.607
Independents	0.543	1.656	2.594	1.600
Extreme Right	0.277	−0.000	2.005	3.430
R^2 adj	0.590	0.645	0.726	0.731

tives and negatives. Clearly these results reinforce our contention that abstentions are not heavily influenced by short-term forces.

Blank ballots behave entirely differently. For 1958, the addition of the alienation variables increases adjusted R^2 from 0.53 to 0.59. For 1962, the increase is from 0.59 to 0.64 while for both 1967 and 1968, adjusted R^2 jumps from .63 to .73. All seven coefficients for 1967 and 1968 are significant, under the conventional t-test, at the 0.01 level or better. (See Table 9.) Four of the eight 1958 spatial coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level or better, six of eight at the 0.05 level or better. The two 1962 negative coefficients are not significant.

If the overall results strongly suggest that the alienation assumptions of the Hinich-Ordeshook theory are relevant for political life, at least at aggregate levels (i.e., that an FY vote indeed occurs), the two negative results in 1962 are disappointing. The breaking of the pattern may reflect the fact that 1962 may have been a multi-issue election somewhat beyond the scope of our single-issue model, while 1958, 1967 and 1968 may have been fought basically along the right-left dimension. Although the Algerian issue was more salient in both 1958 and 1962 than in the late 'sixties, in 1958, in contrast to 1962, Gaullists and Extreme Rightists were not opposed on Algeria. As for the Extreme Right, in 1962, it rarely had its own candidate on the second ballot and was likely to be highly negative toward any of the remaining candidates. If it is less clear substantively why a negative coefficient is obtained for the Gaullists, the multi-issue versus single-issue interpretation would be consistent with the generally smaller coefficients for 1962.

There is also a statistical interpretation of the negative results. The mean of the Gaullist alienation variable for 1962 is .012, its standard deviation, .070, almost six times as large as the mean. Since the minimum value for the variable is zero, these figures indicate considerable skewness in its distribution. In fact, the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean for the Gaullists in 1962 is the largest such ratio for the alienation variables for all four years. For the 1962 Gaullists, then, a very small number of districts, those where the Gaullists had no second-ballot candidate even though they did fairly well on the first ballot, are wagging the tail of the distribution. If these districts have some other characteristics leading to relatively high rates of voting, any alienation effect would be lost.

The pattern for the Gaullists is echoed by that for the Extreme Right in 1962, which also had a high standard deviation-to mean ratio.

Finally, the 1962 negative results and the lower t-values for 1958 vis-à-vis 1967–1968 could be interpreted in terms of our earlier comments regarding learning, with more sophisticated spatial behavior expected in later years.

In addition to the results for the spatial coefficients, the behavior of the coefficients for other variables is of interest. For all four years, the magnitude of the $1/N_2$ coefficient drops with respect to the purely heuristic model (refer to Tables 5 and 9), strengthening our contention that $1/N_2$ is a marker for alienation. This result also shows that we were conservative in our comparison of the heuristic and alienation models. As a marker for alienation, $1/N_2$ clearly does not entirely represent a nonspatial component belonging to α_j. A comparison between the alienation model and the heuristic model without $1/N_2$ would be much more favorable to the alienation model.

There are no major changes for the competition, *PC*, *CS*, or *SF*, coefficients. Thus, the party dummy variables appear to operate independently of alienation effects, a result that argues that the dummy variable results reflect differential expectations about the efficacy of voting rather than alienation effects. The results suggest that the "*PB*" effects of (1.1) may be present but inadequately treated by the model (1.12) which does not add to the variance explained by the heuristic-alienation model. Since the regional results also do not differ sharply from those for the heuristic model the interpretation of the pattern of regional variation remains elusive.

The heuristic-alienation blank-ballot model was also estimated using simple proportions of the registered voters. The results for 1967 and 1968 are presented in Table 10 for the two Pierce and Barnes spatial measures. (The Converse and "distorted" estimates have lower R^2 values and have been omitted.) For 1968, the weakness of the proportions specification with respect to the logarithmic specification is not just a matter of the slightly lower value of adjusted R^2. More important, (1) the decrease in the magnitude of $1/N_2$'s coefficient from the pure heuristic to the full spatial model is less in the proportions model than in the logarithmic model; (2) the value of the coefficient for the *PC* dummy variable changes substantially from the pure heuristic to the full spatial; (3) the Communist spatial coefficient is now one of the largest, whereas we would expect it to be relatively small.

The latter two problems, however, can be treated as a multicollinearity problem. Obviously, when the Communists have a candidate ($PC = 1$),

Table 10. Alienation Model for Blank Ballots—Estimation of Equation (1.4) for Variable α_j (Heuristic Model)

Explanatory Variables	Coefficient				*t*-Statistics			
	1967		1968		1967		1968	
	PBA[a]	*PBS*[b]	*PBA*	*PBS*	*PBA*	*PBS*	*PBA*	*PBS*
α_j:								
Constant	−0.004	0.027	−0.025	−0.027	−0.89	2.40	−6.02	−6.18
B_1	0.599	0.651	0.623	0.655	8.94	9.48	6.69	7.09
C	−0.010	−0.013	−0.014	−0.013	−4.27	−4.60	−6.61	−6.28
$1/N_2$	0.043	0.032	0.082	0.075	4.88	−1.23	12.01	10.80
PC	−0.002	−0.014	0.008	0.011	−0.67	−2.22	2.89	3.42
CS	0.000	−0.015	0.002	0.003	0.07	−2.36	0.65	0.84
SF	−0.006	−0.021	0.009	−0.005	−2.41	−4.07	−3.22	−1.80
RE_1	−0.003	−0.004	0.002	0.001	−1.93	−2.61	1.72	1.15
RE_2	−0.002	−0.002	0.002	0.001	−1.51	−1.83	1.49	1.26
RE_3	−0.004	−0.005	−0.001	−0.002	−2.60	−3.12	−1.17	−1.39
γ:								
Communist	0.028	0.039	0.033	0.050	3.34	2.67	4.53	4.38
PSU	0.059	0.046	0.007	0.015	5.48	2.87	0.69	1.40
Fed.	0.055	0.080	0.008	0.023	8.12	7.39	1.24	2.41
Center	0.054	0.061	0.107	0.065	7.22	7.65	9.04	9.72
Gaullist	0.023	0.059	0.005	0.016	4.30	4.61	0.87	2.99
Right	0.104	0.083	0.029	0.027	5.19	5.84	5.03	5.58
Extreme Right	0.081	0.021	0.150	0.041	1.35	1.48	1.56	1.65
R^2 adj	0.609	0.602	0.720	0.728				

[a] Pierce and Barnes (All).
[b] Pierce and Barnes (Self).

alienation is minimal for the Communist voters. Because of this negative correlation (e.g., −.82 for the 1968 Pierce and Barnes [All] data), the high γ value for the Communists is compensated for by the relatively high *PC* dummy variable coefficient.

The 1967 results in Table 10 follow the same pattern as the 1967 results for the logarithmic model in Table 9. The adjusted R^2 values in Table 10, however, are substantially less than the adjusted R^2 for the logarithmic model. The 1962 results (not presented in Table 10) are similar to the results presented for 1962 in Table 9. As before, the alienation coefficients for the Gaullists and the Extreme Right are negative though not significantly different from zero. As in the case of the 1967 results, the adjusted R^2 (0.579 for Converse, 0.589 for Pierce and Barnes (All), and 0.595 for Pierce and Barnes (Self)) is considerably less than that (0.645) for the logarithmic model. The contrast between the results for the different specifications attests to the limitations of the use of aggregate data in understanding participation phenomena.

Other Spatial Models. Nowhere are problems of understanding more evident than when we come to consider the alternative spatial models developed in the first section: "second-order" alienation (Eq. 1.6), simple indifference (Eq. 1.10), and McKelvey-Ordeshook expected value (Eq. 1.12). None of these models compete favorably with the alienation model. Not only are the R^2 values less, but the coefficient signs follow inconsistent patterns.

Despite these failings, when we combine one of these models, simple indifference or "second-order" alienation (the two being identical from the viewpoint of regression), with the combined alienation and heuristic model, a significant por-

Table 11. Blank Ballot Regressions for the Alienation-Indifference-Heuristic Model (Equation 1.11) Using the Pierce and Barnes (All) Spatial Measure

Explanatory Variables	Coefficients			*t*-Statistics		
	1958	1962	1968	1958	1962	1968
α_j:						
Constant	−0.001	0.000	−0.044	−0.29	0.12	−7.54
B_1	0.497	0.508	0.715	12.79	9.62	8.12
CT	−0.008	−0.008	−0.007	−5.99	−3.77	−2.89
$1/N_2$	0.024	0.005	0.096	3.15	0.44	9.15
PC	0.001	0.004	0.024	0.33	2.08	5.72
CS	0.002	0.007	0.018	1.04	2.30	3.54
SF	0.002	0.003	0.004	0.90	1.52	1.10
RE_1	0.000	−0.000	0.001	0.22	−0.43	0.57
RE_2	0.002	−0.004	0.001	1.80	−2.74	0.63
RE_3	0.001	0.003	−0.003	0.99	−2.57	−2.71
γ:						
Communist	0.030	0.022	0.046	3.53	4.30	6.46
PSU	0.023	0.052	0.008	1.45	4.84	0.74
Socialist } Fed. in 1968	0.047	0.023	0.019	10.31	4.58	2.92
Radical	0.023	0.021		7.73	4.77	
MRP (Center in 1968)	0.010	0.036	0.070	2.46	5.11	5.62
Gaullist	0.016	0.018	−0.007	3.06	3.56	−1.00
Right	0.012	0.035	0.028	3.34	3.46	4.36
Extreme Right	0.017	−0.088	−0.103	1.42	−1.88	−0.38
η:						
Communist	0.006	−0.002	0.007	4.76	−1.17	4.83
PSU	−0.005	0.003	0.002	−0.93	0.74	0.43
Socialist } Fed. in 1968	0.000	−0.002	0.004	0.15	−1.27	2.01
Radical	−0.002	−0.001		−1.18	−0.69	
MRP (Center in 1968)	−0.003	−0.001	−0.000	−1.90	−0.47	−3.99
Gaullist	−0.002	−0.007	0.001	−3.22	−8.40	−0.23
Right	−0.003	−0.007	−0.006	−4.45	−3.61	0.83
Extreme Right	0.002	−0.011	−0.021	0.88	−1.70	−0.86
R^2 adj	0.652	0.663	0.765			

tion (from 3 per cent to 8 per cent, depending upon the year and spatial estimates used) of additional variance is "explained" in all four years. Yet, the signs of the coefficients (and, hence, our interpretations), vary widely depending upon the specification of the model as logarithmic or straight proportion. For illustrative purposes, the results for a combined alienation-simple indifference-heuristic model for 1958, 1962 and 1968 are presented in Table 11 for the Pierce and Barnes (All) spatial measure.

Inspection of the Pierce and Barnes (All) results shows that 5 of 8 indifference coefficients are negative in 1958, 7 of 8 in 1962, and 3 of 7 in 1968. Simple indifference theory would lead us to expect positive coefficients. While there is no strong pattern, the results tend to support the double alienation model (Eq. 1.6) rather than the simple indifference model.

A good deal of the problem of the interpretation of the signs of the spatial coefficients and the magnitudes of the heuristic coefficients is a consequence of the collinearity between the set of alienation variables and the set of simple indifference variables (e.g., a correlation of $-.96$ between Extreme Right alienation and Center indifference for the Pierce and Barnes [All] measure in 1968). The lack of a consistent pattern may have other explanations than that of multicollinearity. For one thing, it is possible that our model is misspecified and that the indifference variables correlate with some omitted variables or that the indifference variables are confounded with the errors inherent in our approximations for the spatial positions of candidates and voters. For another, it is quite possible that *both* indifference and double alienation are important in voter behavior. The aggregate data we are using do not permit us to explore these various possibilities.

Conclusion

Our uncertainties about indifference effects should not make us miss the main point of the analysis: the alienation framework is important to the understanding of participation rates. Since the spatial theory investigates the existence of societal (and thus aggregate) equilibria, it is clear that aggregate empirical studies are relevant for evaluating the assumptions of the theory. Consequently, the Hinich-Ordeshook paper on alienation appears to be an appropriate starting point for further developments in formal theory. One can now say that the formal theory is based on a realistic simplification of the complexities of (at least French) political life. Thus, one can expect that the theory contains relevant prescriptions for candidates.

This particular piece of empirical research also appears to contain some suggestions for candidates. Abstention at the local level may well be influenced by what the parties do there. For example, spending money, unpaid canvassing by party militants, an attractive candidate—all these activities may account for our residuals. But abstentions do not seem to respond to coalition decisions—should the candidate be Communist or Socialist—that touch the main dimension of the policy space. Blank ballots do. Thus, the parties should not dwell on getting the voters of eliminated candidates to participate on the second ballot, but they should aim their communications at avoiding the blank ballot or a vote for an opposing candidate. In particular, they should try to reduce the alienation that will result for voters of eliminated candidates.

The success of the alienation model has thus lent further interest to the development of spatial models. This success should not cause us to lose interest in the heuristic model, which is more powerful than a simple alienation model and not terribly inferior to the most sophisticated joint heuristic-spatial model currently available. Since historical data can further increase our understanding of participation, but since we have no Converse measurements for 1880, the heuristic model is likely to continue to be useful. In turn, our experience should illustrate to historians that there are often good engineering methods for getting back into the past, even when the (most desired) data is not available. If we want to study the effect of alienation but can't measure it, the results presented here suggest that $1/N_2$ is a very efficient approximation for the alienation variables.

The present study is one of the few cumulative pieces of political research in which the results of past studies (the Converse and Pierce and Barnes measurements) become the parameters of a new study. The study further looks at the theory of voting in terms of actual voting behavior rather than survey results. The foregoing elements should not keep us from realizing that the relationship of empirical matters to theory is always tenuous and that we ought to look more intensively at the data on hand in addition to going back further into the past.

In particular, one would want to examine further the sensitivity of our results to the party spatial measurements. Can we stretch or shrink various parts of the space? If a sensitivity analysis showed that the best results were obtained for a fairly sharply defined and substantively meaningful subset of points then we could suggest an interesting strategy to historians. This strategy would be to assume the correctness of the alienation model and subsequently to estimate the past spatial configurations of the French parties by selecting that space which best describes blank ballot casting.

What we are advocating can be seen as a synthesis of simulation and econometric techniques. It is clear that the econometric aspect can be improved. Rather than analyzing each year separately, we could treat a pooled cross-section and time series. Furthermore, we could consider abstentions, blank ballots, and the votes for the various parties as a set of jointly determined variables, taking advantage of their interdependencies in the estimation process. The present results appear to merit the effort of greater sophistication.

The State Political Party and the Policy-Making Process*

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The role of the political party in the policy-making process has been minimized recently by scholars who find that socioeconomic variables control the outcomes. Parties are set up as straw men only to be knocked down and left to wither. The socioeconomic variables are infinitely more measurable than the elusive coalitions of office-holders who frequent the state house and the legislature. Even the measurement of party strength—usually as the two-party division of the vote—has been dehumanized. If we could eliminate the consideration of party effort from the policy-making process, we would be relieved of many scholarly headaches, and the politicians would be grateful to be left alone to pursue their careers free from the investigation of scholars if not from the control of unseen economic forces.

This article is based on the assumption that the efforts of politicians are independent variables and that policy outcomes can be shaped for better or for worse by the type of party they operate.[1] Policies as important as welfare and education, which consume approximately 50 per cent of the general expenditures and government employment in state and local governments, are proposed by popularly elected governors to state legislatures in which sit friends or foes—the number of each depending upon the internal structure of each party. The fate of the legislation depends upon more than the money available and the political inclinations of the voters.

This article attempts to:

(1) Review the literature on policy making and question the variables which have been used to measure the efforts of the political party.
(2) Introduce several measures of party strength and policy output.
(3) Make a very modest test-boring into the relationship between the internal strength of a party and its policy-making potential in selected state legislatures.
(4) Suggest that many socioeconomic variables which have been quantified to date could be correlated with measures of party *structure* to determine significant relationships.
(5) Suggest that previous measures of public policy could be correlated with gubernatorial leadership and party strength.

Policy Output: Some Causal Factors

The policy output of the state political process has been analyzed on two levels. The first level compares the interests and demands of the statewide constituency and its translation into certain types of policy output. The second level of analysis is concerned with the individual legislator's reaction to the needs and demands of his constituency in order to explain the collective response to certain types of policy.

Figure 1 presents a summary of the linkages between policy output and constituency variables which have been analyzed in the literature. The fifty states have been compared by various researchers on the basis of the variables presented in the figure, and different conclusions have been reached about their relative contributions toward the dependent variable of policy output. One school of thought makes a direct link between the degree of socioeconomic development and the major public services adopted by the state.[2] Several studies

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* This paper is a revision of a chapter in my *The Effects of Competition Upon The Structure and Function of State Political Parties* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Yale University, 1964). I am indebted to a Danforth Fellowship from Wellesley College for 1960–1961 and to the Yale Computer Center where the calculations presented here were performed.

[1] The past two years have produced others sympathetic to this position: Duane Lockard, "State Party Systems and Policy Outputs," in *Political Research and Political Theory,* ed. Oliver Garceau (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 190–220; Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics and Public Policy," *American Political Science Review,* 63 (September, 1969), 867–879.

[2] Thomas R. Dye, *Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States, American Politics Research Series* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966). Dye also considers highway, educational and tax policies and morality regulation and concludes that party competition does not have a measurable impact on these policy outcomes once socioeconomic variables are controlled. In a later work Dye finds an association between income inequalities and degree of centralization of governmental spending and services at the state level: "Income Inequality and American State Politics," *American Political Science Review,* 63 (March, 1969), 161. See also Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," *Journal of Politics,* 25 (May, 1963), 281–289; Richard I. Hoffer-



Figure 1. Linkages between the State-Wide Constituency and Policy Output

which consider the effects of statewide economic development as well as statewide competition conclude on the other hand that two-party competiton does indeed influence the degree to which governmental programs are aimed at providing a more equal distribution of goods and services.[3] While he has no statistical measures of party strength except for interparty competition, Ira Sharkansky observes considerable opportunity for the interest of the electorate and the strength of the majority party to exert influences on the nature of innovation and change in expenditures.[4]

With the exception of John Fenton, the authors mentioned measure party influence by the division of the voters of a state between the parties. The close partisan division of the voters of a state will not of itself bring about liberal

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bert, "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (March, 1966), 73–82.

[3] T. W. Casstevens and C. Press, "The Context of Democratic Competition in American State Politics," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (March, 1963), 542–543. See also John Crittenden, "Dimensions of Modernization in the American States," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (December, 1967), 989–1001. Crittenden suggests that differences in taxing, spending and employing between the states may connote levels of effort in the attempt to provide a uniform level of services. John H. Fenton, *People and Parties in Politics, American Government Series* (Glenview, Illinois: Scott. Foresman and Company, 1966), p. 44. Multiple correlations showed that 55 per cent of the variations in aid to dependent children from state to state were related to two-party competition plus urbanism plus the per-capita income of the state, and the partial regression coefficients indicated that 75 per cent of the total relationship was attributable to the two-party competition variable. Per-pupil expenditures and total welfare expenditures also correlated significantly with two-party competition.

[4] Ira Sharkansky. *Spending in the American States, American Politics Research Series* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968). Sharkansky does not use the combined expenditures of state and local governments used by the previous writers, but considers state expenditures alone. He finds that a combination of three variables: previous expenditures, the state percentage of state-local expenditures, and total local government expenditures per capita can account for 95 per cent of the interstate differences in total state spending per capita for 1962. He finds, however, that the most powerful correlates of the percentage of change in total expenditures per capita from 1962–1965 account for only 50 per cent of interstate variation. I believe that many of the variables Sharkansky calls independent are in effect dependent variables. In this category are his "government measures": federal aid, taxes, state-local financial relationships, state employees, as well as his measure of previous expenditure. None of these can adequately explain expenditure change which, I maintain, is where the activity of political parties comes in. In his *Regionalism in American Politics* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1970), he comes to the same conclusions with respect to current expenditures but does not consider change. In another article, Sharkansky finds that a favorable recommendation from the governor seems essential for agency budget success in the legislature: "Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support and Budget Success in State Legislatures," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (December, 1968), 1224–1231. It is assumed by all the above writers that socioeconomic variables indicate policy preferences of the electorate. A study by Leon D. Epstein indicates the difficulty of making any assumptions about the policy preferences of the statewide electorate even in an election in which the major issue was tax policy. See Leon D. Epstein, "Electoral Decision and Policy Mandate: An Empirical Example," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 28 (Winter, 1964), 564–572.

welfare policies. The underlying assumption is that the parties in a competitive system will be forced to transform the demands and needs of their supporters into policy outputs through the legislative process in order to win elections. This takes a degree of organization and cohesion which is not found in many competitive states. The fact that this underlying assumption is questionable can explain the weak correlations between party competition and public policies. We would expect that more disciplined parties would be better able to direct the state's wealth into areas of need than would ephemeral coalitions of office-seeking groups.

The path which runs from the needs of the statewide electorate to policy output via the political party (C-P-O in the model) has greater explanatory power than that which runs directly from the statewide constituency to output (C-O), according to writers such as V. O. Key, W. Duane Lockard, Malcolm Jewell, John H. Fenton, James D. Barber, Samuel Patterson, and Sarah Morehouse.[5] These authors hold that variations in the internal cohesion of the parties affect variations in the extent and direction of welfare policies. They consider party cohesion as unity which can be forged either by organization and leadership or by identity of economic interest.

The route from the statewide constituency through the structural variables to policy has received much acclaim in the form of arguments justifying the apportionment decisions (C-S-O). These arguments center about the size and composition of legislative districts and the question of who gains and loses from the variation. Malapportionment has been claimed to have a direct effect on policy making because of the underrepresentation of the urban areas; it has also been regarded as having a direct effect on the political party whose strength is concentrated in urban areas.[6] This last relationship is represented by a link going from the constituency through the structural variables to party and thence to policy (C-S-P-O). Although this thesis is a common one, it has been increasingly attacked in recent studies. Neither Herbert Jacob nor Richard I. Hofferbert nor Thomas Dye discovered any direct relationship between malapportionment and party competition, or between malapportionment and the specific policy choices of legislatures.[7] Malapportionment might be expected to affect policy if it affects the balance of party strength in the legislature (or legislative-executive balance), but this is only likely to affect policy if the parties are relatively cohesive. Thus the route which runs from the constituency through the structural variables to public policy fails to explain enough of the variation in policy output to be considered a major connection.

The party emerges from this review of statewide factors which contribute to policy making as a major determinant of the kind of policy output. The organization of the party, then, is of vital importance in the policy-making process. A study of the individuals and groups making up the political party is thus a starting point in any explanation of the party's contribution to policy making.

But while measures of party cohesion on the state level can explain a degree of policy output, much is left unexplained by statewide analysis alone. Parties, after all, are made up of leg-

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[5] V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 5th edition (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1964), pp. 295–304; Duane Lockard, *New England State Politics*, 2nd edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 320–340; *The Politics of State and Local Government* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), p. 179; and Malcolm E. Jewell, "Party Voting in American State Legislatures," *American Political Science Review*, 49 (September, 1955), 773–791. See also Jewell's discussion of this same finding in his book *The State Legislature: Politics and Practice* (New York: Random House, 1959), pp. 112–117, and John H. Fenton, *Midwest Politics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966). Fenton uses a measure of "effort" in order to prove that issue-oriented state parties are more responsible than job-oriented state parties. "Effort" is measured by the percentage of per-capita income collected as per-capita state and local tax revenue from own sources. This is based solely on personal income and does not reflect other indices of a state's financial resources (i.e., corporate income and wealth, property valuations), which, if available in addition to personal income data, would be a more accurate measure of a state's financial ability. See James D. Barber, "Leadership Strategies for Legislative Party Cohesion," *Journal of Politics*, 28 (May, 1966), 347–367; Samuel C. Patterson, "Legislative Leadership and Political Ideology," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27 (Fall, 1963), 407; Sarah P. McCally, "The Governor and his Legislative Party," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (December, 1966), 923–942.

[6] Lockard, "State Party Systems and Policy Outputs," p. 207. See the review of the literature on apportionment in Thomas R. Dye, "State Legislative Politics," in *Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis*, ed. Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), pp. 157–165. See also Allan C. Pulsipher and James L. Weatherby, Jr., "Malapportionment, Party Competition and the Functional Distribution of Governmental Expenditures," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (December, 1968), 1207–1219, and the "Communications to the Editor" on the subject, *American Political Science Review*, 63 (June, 1969), 528–530.

[7] Herbert Jacob, "The Consequences of Malapportionment: A Note of Caution," *Social Forces*, 43 (December, 1964), 256–261; Richard I. Hofferbert, "Relation Between Public Policy and Structural and Environmental Variables," pp. 73–82, and Dye, *Politics, Economics, and The Public*, pp. 270–281.



Figure 2. Linkages between the Legislator's Constituency and his Voting Behavior

islators pulled by the needs of their constituencies as well as by the demands for party conformity imposed by the state leaders.

Figure 2 presents a summary of the linkage between the legislator's voting behavior and the demographic character of his constituency which has been the subject of previous studies.

Most studies of the links between a legislator and his district have based the relationship upon district socioeconomic and electoral characteristics, under the assumption that district opinion could be inferred from these variables. The initial assumption of researchers who have studied the relationship of the legislator to his district has been that the legislator voted according to the interests of his district and that policy represented the majority interests of a majority of the districts. Thus the urban legislators voted together in favor of urban interests, and so on. In this case, the path ran directly from the constituency to policy output (C-O). Party washed out in this hypothesis unless the researcher could show, as Lewis A. Froman tried to show, that Democrats and Republicans tend to represent different kinds of constituencies.[8] This assumption was soon modified when it was seen that legislators from similar constituencies did not vote together as a bloc but were more likely to follow the leadership of their party.[9] Thus the connection between the interests of the constituency and output is not direct, it is modified by the intervening variable of the party membership of the legislator (C-P-O).

In the attempt to explore the contest between party and constituency for the legislator's allegiance, studies in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts find more party regularity among those legislators whose constituencies were most typical of those represented by their party. In those states the Republican and Democratic legislative districts are clearly differentiated by socioeconomic variables. Those elected from districts typical of the other party's and atypical of their own were more likely to cross party lines to woo voters normally disposed by general socioeconomic characteristics to support candidates of the other party (C-Per.-O).[10]

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[8] Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *Congressmen and Their Constituencies* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1963), pp. 85–97.

[9] David R. Derge, "Metropolitan and Outstate Alignments in Illinois and Missouri Legislative Delegations," *American Political Science Review*, 52 (December, 1958), 1051–1065. Since this study, it has been acknowledged that party is a more important determinant than rural-urban conflict, and subsequent studies have dealt with the presumed relationship between similarity of district and degree of ideological cohesion within the party contingent. Thomas Flinn also tested this theory of party unity based on similarity of district in the Ohio Assembly of 1949–1959. He concluded that differences in constituency do relate to intraparty differences with members from districts typical of the party supporting the party position more often than other members. However, constituency characteristics will not account for all the variance or even most of it. Thomas A. Flinn, "Party Responsibility in the States: Some Casual Factors," *American Political Science Review*, 58 (March, 1964), 61–66.

[10] Thomas R. Dye, "A Comparison of Constituency Influences in the Upper and Lower Chambers of a State Legislature," *Western Political Quarterly*, 14 (June, 1961), 473–481; Frank J. Sorauf, *Party and Representation: Legislative Politics in Pennsylvania* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 141–144. Both writers used all party opposition votes, whether or not the issues were economic. See also Duncan MacRae, "The Relationship Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies

The degree of competition in a constituency measured singly or in conbination with economic characteristics has been offered as an additional variable affecting the extremes in legislative voting loyalty. It is assumed that members with comfortable margins are a more loyal group than those from competitive districts because they are freed from constituency pressures and hence can vote the party line without fear of voter retribution. On the other hand, the legislators running close races will reflect the interests of their constituencies—be they for or against the party line. Thus the most deviant legislators are to be found from competitive, atypical districts.[11] This theory has been disproved by studies made in Congress and in Pennsylvania and Michigan. Becker et al. in a study of the Michigan legislature concluded that the degree of interparty competition reflected in the general elections did not seem to affect the liberal-conservative voting behavior of the representatives. Becker also discovered that the competitiveness or noncompetitiveness of the primary elections did not affect the liberal-conservative voting behavior of legislators.[12] Sorauf observed little correlation between the competitiveness of the district in the legislative race and party loyalty in the Pennsylvania legislature.[13] Froman found the proposition that representatives from competitive districts vote less often with their party than representatives from safe districts to be partially false for Republicans and completely false for Democrats in the House of Representatives for 1961.[14]

Figure 1 and Figure 2 representing the routes to policy output on the state and constituency levels are, of course, interconnected in practice. The influence of party is an important causal link at the state level, measurable in a variety of ways. The constituency influence model indicates that there is a link between constituency needs and legislative behavior but that this link may be partially explained by statewide party position which would correspond to that of a majority of the constituencies and thus provide no conflict for the legislator. The legislator's perceptions may be independent of party or constituency and hence a very elusive variable. Different issues may present different variations of all these factors. Party position was a major variable against which deviations were measured by the authors mentioned. I suspect that political survival is at the base of a legislator's calculations, and that most of the time survival is linked with the demands of the party.

Measures of the Governor's Influence, Party Structure, and Constituency Influence

The political party has been declared a major independent contributor to policy making in both the statewide model and the constituency-influence model. In the statewide model, the kind of party organization was shown to be a major intervening variable between the needs of the statewide constituency and the satisfaction of those needs. In the constituency-influence model, party emerged as the major variable allied with or opposed to the needs of the constituency and the perceptions of the legislator. In order to test for the relative influence of statewide and local factors upon the legislators' actions, we need measures of the influence of the statewide party as well as measures of the influential variables in the legislators' constituencies.

Measures of the Governor's Influence, Over his Party's Legislators

The most satisfactory way to test the influence of the governor would be to examine votes on administration bills—those bills which the governor wants passed. If the administration bills could be identified, the roll-call votes on this legislation would provide a clear indication of the party support on issues of major importance. For the bulk of the states, however, no

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in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review,* 46 (December, 1952), 1046–1055. We do not know whether the roll calls selected by MacRae to reflect class differences were administration supported measures or whether deviations were sizable enough to prevent passage.

[11] MacRae, pp. 1046–1055; Dye, "A Comparison of Constituency Influences," p. 477; Flinn, "Party Responsibility in the States," p. 67; Samuel C. Patterson, "The Role of the Deviant in the State Legislative System: The Wisconsin Assembly," *The Western Political Quarterly,* 14 (June, 1961), 460–472.

[12] Robert W. Becker, Frieda L. Foote, Mathias Lubega and Stephen V. Mosma, "Correlates of Legislative Voting: Michigan House of Representatives, 1954–1961," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 6 (November, 1962), 384–396. The number of members from districts classified as close was so small as to make the finding doubtful. With respect to primary competition, the hypothesis that a member would support the state party position if he won in a close primary is open to question. He would probably support the ideological position of the wing of the party from which he received help. This might not be the state-party position.

[13] Sorauf, p. 141. Sorauf discovered a correlation between the results of the gubernatorial race in a legislative district and party loyalty. This may indicate a degree of state party organization and support in the district which does influence the behavior of a legislator.

[14] Froman, pp. 110–121.

foolproof procedures exist for the identification of bills in the governor's program. In a previous article, I used roll-call votes on gubernatorial vetoes to indicate the degree of influence the governor had over his legislative party. The use of vetoes as a substitute for administration bills could be justified because, as with administration bills, (1) the position of the governor is clearly stated, and (2) the governor's party leaders would exert maximum influence to see that the veto was sustained. The veto calls for a vote of confidence in the governor. In most cases he uses it sparingly, more as a threat than an actuality, so that when a veto does come before the legislature, the greatest amount of party activity attends it. Two measures of influence were used: support, the percentage of the governor's party that voted to sustain his veto; and success, the percentage of the votes he received of those he needed from his party to sustain the veto.[15]

Measures of Party Structure

Several independent variables were used to measure state party structure. The traditional measures of electoral competition for governor were used to indicate party cohesion. The percentage of seats held by the governor's party indicated the possibility of control over the legislature. Gubernatorial primary results measured the strength of the governor's intraparty support. Primary election votes have been used to measure the strength of factions within the party by the late V. O. Key and Joseph A. Schlesinger.[16] Any party with a chance of winning has a flock of hopefuls. A primary offers a quantitative record of the strengths of the factions and the unanimity of the truces. The ability of the dominant faction to convince others to accept the candidate of its choice is recorded in a primary with little contest.

Correlations between the Governor's Influence and Party Structure

Measures of party structure were correlated with measures of gubernatorial influence to determine what factors affect the ability of the governor to build a cohesive legislative following. The results indicated that statewide electoral competition does not appear to be a major explanatory factor in legislative discipline. Electoral competition may be a rough indicator of party cohesion and can measure the difference between northern and southern party systems, but it cannot indicate the different degrees of cohesion within the parties in the North. The variable which correlated most highly with the influence of the governor over his legislators was his ability to compete successfully for the primary nomination. One can conclude that the strong governor directs and influences both the legislative party and the electoral party. Since it is the primary following the session which correlates most highly with the legislative success of the governor, influence must build upon future reward rather than past success. Another indicator of the ability of the governor to garner legislative support is the percentage of seats his party holds in the legislature. It is to his advantage to hold a majority of the seats because he can organize its procedures. However, extra seats over a comfortable majority appear to be a disadvantage to him. As the proportion of his party's seats in the legislature rises, rivalries are generated which the governor cannot control. Gubernatorial support falls as the size of his majority increases.[17]

Multiple regression analysis performed on the variables from selected house sessions yielded an R of .66 between the support which a governor was able to achieve from his legislators and the political variables on the state level which helped to explain this influence.[18] These statewide factors, however, could explain only 44 per cent of the variance in the governor's support in a linear model. Many additional variables on the statewide level may account for more of the variance—e.g., the set of attitudes and beliefs that pervade a state's political life, the traditional rivalry between the executive and legislative branches, the structure of existing political opportunities, and so on. Using veto votes as surrogate for votes on substantive program bills may lower the explanatory power of the individual variables. It is equally possible that factors in the legislator's constituency or the attitudes and perceptions of the legislator himself may account for some of the unexplained variance. It is the constituency's political and economic variables and their presumed impact upon the legislator's loyalty to his party's position which will be the focus of this analysis.

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[15] This research was performed on 140 legislative sessions in thirty-four northern states during 1946–1960. (Nebraska and Minnesota were excluded because their legislatures were elected on a nonpartisan basis. New Mexico did not publish a record of the legislative proceedings during this period). See the discussion justifying the use of veto votes to measure gubernatorial policy influence. In the present study two indices were used to measure the degree to which the governor's party supported him on the veto vote: the *Index of Administration Support,* which measures the degree to which the governor's party members support him and is obtained by dividing the number of votes cast by party members who voted for the governor by the total number of party members who voted; and the *Index of Administration Success,* which indicates the degree to which the governor was successful in obtaining enough votes from his party to uphold his veto, and is obtained by dividing the *percentage* of those who voted in favor of the governor by the *percentage* of his party votes he needed in order to sustain his veto (McCally, "The Governor and his Legislative Party," pp. 926–930).

[16] V. O. Key, *American State Politics: An Introduction* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 109–118; and Joseph A. Schlesinger, *How They Became Governor* (East Lansing: Governmental Research Bureau, Michigan State University, 1957), p. 27. For the measures for each factor, see McCally, p. 931.

[17] This finding is confirmed by Wayne L. Francis, *Legislative Issues in the Fifty States: A Comparative Analysis,* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1967), p. 35. Francis also discovered that factional conflict must be viewed in relation to the size of the majority and minority parties. Within majority parties, the degree of factional conflict is lowest when the party has between 60 and 69.9 per cent of the seats and highest when the party has between 80 and 89.9 per cent of the seats.

Selection of Sixteen Sessions to Test the Governor's Party Influence vs. Constituency Influence

Fifty-eight house sessions drawn from northern states during the period 1946–1960 provided the information for the regression analysis in the previous study. These were legislatures elected concurrently with the governor. (The 11 southern states were not included because they did not offer sufficient two-party competition to be directly comparable with the northern states.) From these 58 sessions, 16 were selected to test the relative strengths of the statewide party and various constituency factors which might affect a legislator's loyalty. The selection depended upon several factors, including the availability of primary and election votes for each legislator in a session. (The number of states which report primary and general election returns for members of the legislature is small.) From this group of states for which legislative district data were available, the following criteria were considered:

(1) The need to have as many Democratic as Republican governors.
(2) The need to fill the cells in Table 1 which represent maximum, intermediate, and minimum conditions for gubernatorial influence based on the predictions of the regression equation.
(3) The need to include sessions in which the governor's influence was closely predicted by the regression analysis using statewide variables as well as those which were not predicted within 30 per cent of the actual influence.

The sessions selected were each allocated to one of the four cells of Table 1 on the basis of two major political variables on the state level which best explain the influence of the governor: his electoral control over his party as measured by his primary vote, and the percentage of seats his party holds in the legislature. The cell in the upper left represents the maximum conditions; the cell in the lower right represents

Table 1. Predicted Gubernatorial Influence in Sixteen House Sessions

		Governor's Post-session Primary Vote			
		High Support 70–100%		Low Support 0–69.9%	
Size of Legislative Party (Percentage of House Seats)	Small 45–58.9%	Kansas	1959-D	Utah	1955-R
		Mass.	1949-D	Illinois	1957-R
		Mass.	1957-D		
		Michigan	1957-D		
		Mass.	1955-R		
		Oregon	1959-R		
	Large 59–100%	Colorado	1957-D		
		Ohio	1947-R	Arizona	1949-D
				Oklahoma	1953-D
				Arizona	1947-D
				Iowa	1953-R
				Ohio	1957-R
				Maine	1951-R

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[18] An R of .55 was obtained between the *success* of a governor and the above independent variables (McCally, pp. 935–940).

Table 2. Actual and Predicted Values for Gubernatorial Support and Success for Sixteen House Sessions

State	Session	Governor's Party	Support			Success		
			Actual Per cent	Predicted Per cent [a]	Percentage Error [c]	Actual Per cent	Predicted Per cent [b]	Percentage Error [c]
Sessions With Maximum Predicted Support (High Primary Support 70–100%; Small Legislative Party 45–58.9%)								
Kansas	1959	D	100	85	+17	133	103	+29
Massachusetts	1955	R	88	83.4	+07	119	106	+12
Massachusetts	1949	D	96	83	+16	144	127	+14
Massachusetts	1957	D	90	80	+12	153	130	+18
Michigan	1957	D	100	76.5	+31*	112	78	+44*
Oregon	1959	R	78	74	+06	100	71	+42*
Sessions With Moderate Predicted Support (One favorable variable; one unfavorable variable)								
Colorado	1957	D	38	77	−51*	66	127	−47*
Illinois	1957	R	42	56	−23	65	79	−18
Ohio	1947	R	36	52	−31*	67	113	−41*
Utah	1955	R	53	45	+12	84	51	+52*
Sessions With Minimum Predicted Support (Low Primary Support 0–69.9%; Large Legislative Party 59–100%)								
Ohio	1957	R	29	47.4	−39*	45	80	−44*
Maine	1951	R	64	47.3	+35*	244	129	+88*
Arizona	1947	D	27	46	−41*	72	124	−42*
Iowa	1953	R	41	36	+13	113	106	+07
Oklahoma	1953	D	22	27	−18	48	46	+03
Arizona	1949	D	17	20	−17	44	47	+07

[a] For each session with the exception of those underlined the following formula for support was applied:

$$\widetilde{\text{Support}} = 58.6 - .13x^1 + .66x^2 - .71x^3 + 1.9x^4$$

The incumbent governor did not run again following the underlined sessions and the following formula was used:

$$\widetilde{\text{Support}} = 65.6 + .42x^1 + .39x^2 - .87x^3 + 7.4x^4$$

[b] For each session with the exception of those underlined, the following formula for success was used:

$$\widetilde{\text{Success}} = 1.2 - .57x^1 + 1.44x^2 - .38x^3 + 38.2x^4$$

The incumbent governor did not run again following the underlined sessions and the following formula was used:

$$\widetilde{\text{Success}} = 69.6 + 2.7x^1 + .66x^2 - .37x^3 + 28.3x^4$$

In the above formulae: x^1 Gubernatorial post-session election vote
x^2 Gubernatorial post-session primary vote
x^3 Per cent of the house seats of the governor's party
x^4 Presence of a majority for governor's party

[c] The formula for the percentage error is:

$$\frac{\text{actual value} - \text{predicted value}}{\text{predicted value}} \times 100$$

The sessions under or overpredicted by more than 30 per cent are indicated by an asterisk.

minimum conditions for gubernatorial influence. Unfortunately it was not possible to find many sessions to fill in the intermediate cells in the table. In the 58 sessions from which these were drawn, 18, or about 31 per cent, fell in the intermediate category. From casual inspection it would appear that the states in the lower right were traditional one-party states with large legislative contingents as yet unreapportioned to conform with the more competitive electoral conditions outside the state house. The traditional majority party was split into factions as revealed by the fact that the governor received less than 70 per cent of the primary vote. In the upper left, the states were competitive between the parties, and this competition was reflected in the legislature. The parties in this cell were cohesive enough to give the incumbent governor high support in the primary. The intermediate cells, i.e., those high in one attribute and low in another, appear to be filled by states in transition in which the traditional majority party was challenged and was cohesive enough to give a nominee high support, as in the lower left cell; or by states in which the picture is even less clear, as in the upper right.

An analysis of Table 2 reveals that the regression equation based on statewide factors alone was able to predict within 30 per cent the governor's support and success in eight out of sixteen sessions. (The predictions were within 30 per cent for ten of sixteen support cases and eight of sixteen success cases.) It also appears that the equation can predict extremes of support and success with greater accuracy than those cases which fall in the middle.

Measures of Constituency Influence

In order to discover what constituency factors are related to the legislator's support for the governor's request legislation as a way of explaining the deviant cases, district electoral and socioeconomic variables were found for each legislator in the governor's party from each of the sixteen sessions (see Appendix A). The measurement of constituency needs by means of demographic and electoral variables is indirect, and actual needs can only be inferred from these characteristics. Bearing this caution in mind, let us examine the relationship between the legislator's support of his governor and those previously mentioned constituency characteristics which presumably exert an influence over his behavior. This study differs from others that have measured roll-call behavior in that it measures voting loyalty on administration requests (upholding vetoes), whereas other studies use all party votes or issues selected to reflect class differences. This study tests the governor's influence over his legislators on issues which are important to him.

Under what conditions would a legislator support his governor when under pressure to do so? If the legislator faces significant competition in his district, he would support the governor when he needs help in:

(1) The next election. The legislator sees his chances bound up with his party so that policy support of the governor's program will increase his own votes.

(2) The next primary. If he represents the same faction as the governor, he will support his policies when he needs his help in winning the primary nomination in his district.

If the legislator represents a different faction from the governor and faces severe competition, he will need the help of rival leaders in winning the primary nomination and possibly the general election in his district, and hence would not support the governor's legislation. Socioeconomic variables can help explain whether or not a legislator comes from a different faction. If the interests of his constituency differ from those of the governor's he may assess his election chances as better if he opposed him. Thus the most deviant legislators would come from competitive, atypical districts.

The behavior of those legislators who do not need the governor for electoral purposes cannot be explained by the above hypotheses, although I assume that legislators with more comfortable margins are freed from constituency pressures and can vote as they please. Because they are more likely to represent districts typical of the majority of those in the party, they would be loyal to the governor.

Party Discipline in the Legislature

The Influence of District Electoral Variables. The results of the analysis in Table 3, in which there was no attempt to categorize districts into loyal or disloyal, indicate that there is very little correlation between the magnitude of the legislator's primary or election vote and the degree of his support for the governor's legislative requests. My hypotheses anticipate this result, since a low vote indicates competition and under competitive conditions the legislator may or may not give the governor his support. We would expect, however, that a legislator with a comfortable margin (high vote) would support the governor (high positive correlation) and that this might be reflected in the overall correlations. This is not the case.

The correlations which are greater than .35 are those for the Democratic party only between the gubernatorial post-session primary vote in the constituency and the legislator's support. This is not the same as saying that the overall success of a governor in a state primary affects his legislative support, which is equally true for both parties. In this analysis, the Democratic legislator's support of the governor is affected to a significant extent by the local popularity of the governor in his district as measured by the post-session gubernatorial pri-

Table 3. Product-Moment Correlations between District Electoral Variables and Gubernatorial Support by the Governor's Party Legislators from 16 House Sessions

District Elections	Both Parties		Democrats		Republicans	
	No. of Districts	Correlation (r)	No. of Districts	Correlation (r)	No. of Districts	Correlation (r)
Pre-session:						
Legislator's election	1302	−.06[a,b]	585	−.21[a,b]	717	.02[a,b]
Legislator's primary	1300	−.01	585	−.08	715	.09
Governor's district primary	1316	+.23	600	.27	716	.24
Post-session:						
Legislator's election-incumbent	930	−.01	435	−.02	495	.06
Legislative election-party[c]	1293	−.02	577	−.25	716	.07
Legislator's primary-incumbent	1018	−.08	478	−.05	540	−.04
Legislative primary-party[c]	1299	−.09	582	−.06	717	−.08
Incumbent governor's district primary	821	.42	488	.49	373	.02
Gubernatorial district primary[c]	1215	.39	535	.57	716	.18

[a] For all correlations higher than .30, $p \leq .01$ for a two-tailed test. Tests of significance will be reported for these correlations, although the group of 1300 legislators does not represent a random sample of all state legislators during the time period. The legislative sessions were not picked at random but were selected to fill all cells in a four-cell table. The legislators could be said to be drawn from a hypothetical universe of legislators past and present who come from states which display the stated conditions of political competition.

[b] Correlations above .35 in magnitude are underlined for convenience.

[c] The party vote for the post-session is the vote for the incumbent or his replacement.

mary vote. Within the Republican party, the governor's legislative support cannot be explained by his primary popularity at the constituency level. There is one possible explanation for the difference between the parties in this respect. It may be that the party support for a Democratic governor can be located geographically. Frank Sorauf maintains that party structural types appear to be related to the population density of the constituency. Although the relationship exists independently of party label, it is the Democratic party which is dominant in the urban areas and hence is subject to more intense organization.[19] A city organization may support the governor and work for him in the primary, and the legislators from that area reflect this organizational interdependence with a degree of loyalty higher than that from other areas. The incumbent governor *also* draws legislative support from areas in which his successor makes a good showing. This indicates that both may be party organization men and receive legislative and electoral support on the basis of a strong party organization as distinguished from a personal following.

My hypothesis states that legislators from the same faction as the governor would vote differently from those of an opposing faction. Legislators from the governor's faction would be more likely to support him if they faced competition in a primary or general election and needed help from his organization. If they were from a faction that opposed the governor, they might seek support from the leaders of the competing faction when their primary was in doubt, and therefore the more competitive the primary they faced, the greater would be their opposition to the governor and the greater their support of the opposite faction. (One would surmise that if they faced competition in a legislative election, they would either support or oppose the governor depending upon how they assessed their election chances.)

A way to test these hypotheses would be to control for governors' factions to see if there is any difference in the behavior of the legislators as a result of the primary and general election competition they face within the pro-governor and anti-governor districts. A pro-governor district is arbitrarily defined here as one in which the governor received more than 60 per cent of the primary vote. This definition is based on the assumptions that it takes a certain degree of organization to get out the vote and that if the district primary vote is high, the governor or the state party organization or his friends must have bestirred themselves on his behalf. Areas in which his vote is lower indicate less organization or popularity and probable efforts on the part of rival candidates for the nomination.

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[19] Sorauf, *Party and Representation,* pp. 43–62.

Table 4. Product-Moment Correlations between the Legislator's Primary and General Election Vote and His Support of the Governor by Party Faction in Eleven House Sessions

	Democrats[a]				Republicans[b]			
Election	Pro-governor[c]		Anti-governor[c]		Pro-governor[c]		Anti-governor[c]	
	No.	Correlation (*r*)	No.	Correlation (*r*)	No.	Correlation (*r*)	No.	Correlation (*r*)
Pre-session:								
Election	84	-.38[d]	88	-.20[d]	364	-.03[d]	239	.07[d]
Primary	85	-.19	87	-.04	364	-.02	237	.22
Post-session:								
Election-incumbent	67	-.07	55	-.24	260	.03	148	.15
Election party[e]	83	-.13	86	-.20	364	.04	238	.12
Primary-incumbent	77	-.17	68	-.19	289	-.08	162	-.03
Primary-party[e]	85	-.29	88	-.15	364	-.06	239	-.10
Gubernatorial primary by legislative district[e]	93	.62	94	-.00	364	-.07	239	.07

[a] The sessions are: Michigan, 1957; Oklahoma, 1953; Arizona, 1947 and 1949. (Four Democratic governors were not challenged in a primary.)

[b] The sessions are: Illinois, 1957; Iowa, 1953; Utah, 1955; Oregon, 1959; Maine, 1951; Ohio, 1947 and 1957. (The governor of Massachusetts was not challenged in 1956.)

[c] Progovernor districts are those giving the gubernatorial nominee 60 per cent or more in his primary. Anti-governor districts are those giving him less than 60 per cent in his primary.

[d] The three correlations greater than .25 are significant at $p \leq .05$ for a two-tailed test.

[e] The vote for the postsession is the vote for the incumbent or his replacement.

Table 4 indicates little correlation again between the magnitude of the primary or election in a legislator's district and his individual support of the governor. In the pro-governor column we would expect negative correlations between the legislator's primary and election vote and his support of the governor (low electoral margin—high support). While this is true of the Democrats, the correlations are so low as to be unconvincing. The legislator's presession election and the party postsession primary are the only correlations of any magnitude with his support of the governor. In the anti-governor column, we would expect positive correlations to exist between gubernatorial support and legislator's primary, because the lower the legislator's primary vote in an anti-governor district, the lower will be his support of the governor, since he must seek aid for his primary contest among leaders of the governor's opposition. The low negative primary correlations of the legislators from the anti-governor districts do not confirm the theory, but none of the correlations are of sufficient magnitude to be noteworthy. Again we can say that the electoral background of a legislator has very little bearing on his vote to support the governor's legislation.

The one high correlation in this table is a further confirmation of the finding in Table 3 that the Democratic legislators coming from pro-governor areas will support the governor with a loyalty which is positively related to the strength of the state party organization as measured by the primary vote. Those legislators from anti-governor areas show no pattern to the support which they give the governor. A comparison of the mean support index for legislators from the pro-governor areas and the anti-governor areas is equally meaningful. Those Democratic legislators coming from areas of high gubernatorial primary support have a mean support score of 50.5. Those legislators coming from low primary areas have a mean support score of 25.5. Thus there is little doubt that the extent of the support of a Democratic governor can be located by his gubernatorial primary vote within the legislators' constituencies. The causal connection between this post-session primary vote and the legislator's support is provided by the governor through his efforts to consolidate a winning coalition to assure his own nomination (or that of a member of his faction). This coalition, it is hypothesized, included members of the legislature who come from areas where the governor has organization support.

For the Republican governor, the pro-governor and anti-governor areas cannot be located by the measure of support given the gubernatorial candidate in a primary. For pro-governor areas as defined by a 60 per cent or more primary vote, the mean support score is 43.7; for anti-governor areas in which the governor receives less than 60 per cent in the primary, the mean support score is 46.5. While the Republican and Democratic governors are subject to the same generalization that a high statewide primary vote indicates a party with more gubernatorial discipline in the legislature, the location of the Republican legislator's support cannot be predicted from the success of the governor in the district gubernatorial primary. Apparently the linkage between the Republican state party organization and the local areas is not based on joint electoral effort but on factors which are harder to measure. In general, for both parties, the legislator does not base his support of the governor on his own electoral needs.

The Influence of Socioeconomic Variables. Intensive probings into the causes behind the individual legislator's support of his governor are outside the scope of this study, but the influence of certain district socioeconomic variables on a legislator's voting pattern can be investigated on issues which are "economic" in themselves. Wayne L. Francis discovered that factional conflict is aggravated by issues in the policy areas of liquor, constitutional revision, agriculture, civil rights, business, apportionment, gambling and taxation.[20] In many cases the veto bills which have been used to test the influence of the governor are not economic issues and could not be used to test the influence of socioeconomic variables found at the constituency level upon the vote of the legislator. In the 1957 session in Illinois, for example, Governor Stratton vetoed a bill which would have amended the Probate Act by abolishing the prerogatives of the public administrator to administer estates when no blood relative of the decedent resided in the state. This was a "hot" political patronage issue, and it was felt that when the bill passed over the governor's veto it would eliminate several prize appointments to reward the faithful. This was not an economic issue, i.e., one that could be used to test the force of socioeconomic variables. For the purpose of this second analysis, economic issues were separated from the others in the twelve states in which this was possible, and the index of administration support was tabulated on them alone. It is interesting to note that in four sessions with the highest degree of governor support (see Table 2), the votes were all on economic issues. This finding indicates that economic issues do not have to split a party (Kansas, 1959-D, Massachusetts, 1949-D and 1957-D and Massachusetts, 1955-R).[21]

District socioeconomic variables were obtained which, by indicating the rural-urban split within the respective state parties, could be used to examine the relative influence of socioeconomic variables and electoral competition. If MacRae's thesis that socioeconomic background and electoral competition are interrelated, that is if legislators from competitive districts tend to reflect the character of their districts rather than the demands of a party program when the two are in disagreement, the previously cited electoral statistics which are unrelated to socioeconomic factors might have disguised the contribution of those factors.[22]

Assuming a linear model for explaining a single dependent variable such as gubernatorial support (see Appendix A) as the sum of separate effects from several independent economic and electoral variables, multiple regression analysis helps estimate the magnitude of such

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[20] Francis, *Legislative Issues in the Fifty States: A Comparative Analysis,* p. 23.

[21] Four states were eliminated because there were no economic issues among the vetoes: Illinois, 1957; Ohio, 1957; Michigan, 1957; Oklahoma, 1953. Typical of the vetoes used were: rent control, sales tax, income tax, property tax, labor union control, public welfare, old age assistance. The four high support sessions were also eliminated because the support for the governor was so high that divisions among the legislators could not be measured. The sessions eliminated in this way were: Kansas, 1959-D; Massachusetts, 1949-D and 1957-D and Massachusetts 1955-R. In all of them the governor was over 100 per cent successful in receiving the required support of his party and garnered over 82 per cent of the members. Not enough of Utah's thirty-three legislators ran again to make an analysis meaningful.

[22] MacRae, "Relation Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies," p. 1051. In all of the sessions there was a negative correlation between per cent urban and owner-occupancy of over .45 except for Oregon and Iowa where it was negative but lower. The generalization may be made that within both parties, a high per cent owner-occupancy represents the rural end of a scale and a high degree of a "city" variable such as population or per cent urban represents the urban extreme. In this research, two economic variables were used for each legislator, one an urban variable and the other the per cent owner-occupancy. I tried not to use any independent variable which was intercorrelated with another independent variable at higher than .50 because highly inter-correlated independent variables lead to coefficient estimates (in a sampling sense) biased away from their true value (if an underlying population could be assumed) toward zero. The following exception to this rule had to be made: In Arizona, 1947 and 1949, per cent urban and per cent owner-occupancy correlate at −.58 and −.57 respectively; for Colorado, population correlates −.61 with owner-occupancy, −.58 with legislator's election and −.72 with legislator's primary; also for Colorado, owner-occupancy correlates .76 with legislator's primary.

Table 5. Coefficients and their Standard Errors for Variables in the Regression Equation for the Legislator's Support of the Governor[a]

State	Governor's Party	Session	No. of Legislators of Gov. Party	Index of Success[b]	R	Constant		Population		% Urban		% Owner Occupancy		Post-election Legislator		Post-primary Legislator		Post-primary Governor	
						Coef.	Stan. Error	Coef.	Stan. Error	Coef.	Stan. Error	Coef.	Stan. Error	Coef.	Stan. Error	Coef.	Stan. Error	Coef.	Stan. Error
								High Support Sessions Session Closely Predicted by the Statewide Model											
Iowa	R	1953	67	113	.23	204.5	106.7			−.08	.25	−2.5	1.4	−.44	.67	.00	.32	.28	.37
								Sessions Underpredicted by the Statewide Model											
Oregon	R	1959	21	100	.32	123.5	269.6			.08	.60	1.20	1.60	−.50	.73	.35	.72	−1.70	3.50
Maine	R	1951	58	244	.32	73.9	63.8	−1.61	.71			.04	.48	.05	.27	−.24	.28	.28	.95
								Low Support Sessions Session Closely Predicted by the Statewide Model											
Arizona	D	1949	32	44	.57	105.0	116.1			.27	.30	−.61	1.60	−.13	.32	−.78	.32	.11	.37
								Sessions Overpredicted by the Statewide Model											
Ohio	R	1947	84	67	.46	108.9	130.7	.74	.21			.15	.67	−.14	.22	.21	.25	−1.40	1.20
Colorado	D	1957	30	66	.42	138.7	170.0	−4.20	2.70			1.40	2.20	.14	.93	−1.40	.68		
Arizona	D	1947	29	72	.67	121.1	129.7			.42	.24	−2.20	1.70	−.23	.35	.02	.33	.58	.46

[a] Tests of significance were not used either in the selection of the variables to make up the regression equations or in the analysis of the regression equations themselves. Tests of significance are based on the assumption that the data come from a random sample of the population which is analyzed. These data do not fit this description in many ways. The sessions picked for the regression equations were chosen because they were deviants from the predictions of the statewide model. Only two sessions which had been predicted to within 30 per cent of the correct value were included and these only to provide a contrast to the others. In addition the data included only the legislators of the governor's party who ran again, thus making the data less random.

[b] This is the Index of Administration Success discussed in footnote 15.

effects. For each legislator, the residual difference between the actual and predicted value of his gubernatorial support index can be calculated and subjected to further analysis; for the legislative session as a whole, the squared multiple correlation coefficient indicates the percentage of variance in gubernatorial support which can be explained by the model: the nonsquared multiple correlation coefficient (R) indicates the correlation between the support predicted by applying the regression equation to the individual legislator's constituency variables and the actual support given by the legislator. The b-coefficient before each independent variable in the regression equation indicates the direction and amount of change in gubernatorial support associated with a unit change in only that one variable.[23]

Table 5 gives the regression estimates for support for each of the sessions used. In each of these equations, the coefficients indicate the relative weight of the variable being considered in predicting the voting support of the individual legislator. For each session, the nonsquared multiple correlation R is given.[24] The coefficients and the multiple correlation coefficients serve to test a number of hypotheses and answer a number of questions about the relative contribution of socioeconomic and electoral variables to gubernatorial support both within a state and among the states tested.

A comparison of the multiple correlations among the three sessions in which the governor received more than 100 per cent success, i.e., well over what he needed (Iowa, 1953, Oregon, 1959 and Maine, 1951) and the remaining ses- legislators of the first group have a loyalty sions where he was far short of the necessary votes to uphold his vetoes, indicates that the which is not greatly affected by socioeconomic or electoral conditions in the districts. The factors on the state level are better able to explain the loyalty the governor receives. In those three cases, the multiple correlation between predicted support based on constituency variables and the support which the legislators gave the governor is not more than .32. In other words, the support the successful governor receives is relatively independent of socioeconomic variables. There is no evidence of factions based on district economic or electoral variables. These sessions are all Republican sessions where the local-based structural dependence upon a governor is not typical as it is in the Democratic party. (Recall that the loyalty of the Democratic legislators toward a successful governor was too unified to permit measuring any difference among the legislators on political or economic issues.)

The second group of sessions are those in which the governor did not succeed in getting the necessary support to sustain his veto. Only one of these sessions, Arizona's in 1949, was predicted closely by the statewide model based on statewide factors alone. Within this group, the governor did not achieve more than 72 per cent success. There is a noticeable difference in the ability of district factors to predict the behavior of legislators in this group. The multiple correlations range from .42 to .67. From these results it appears that, in the sessions in which the governor's influence over this legislative party is low, divisions based on economic and political variables exist and can be measured by my socioeconomic data. The measures are not very sensitive to the existing socioeconomic needs, but they can indicate that there is some relationship between a legislator's constituency characteristics and his behavior when the party is not united under a strong governor. This finding is interesting because of its implications. One might suppose that legislative loyalty followed the same pattern in the cohesive as well as noncohesive parties. In other words, we would expect to discover that even in parties which supported the governor with sufficient loyalty to pass his legislation or uphold his veto, the loyal legislators would come from districts typical of the party in an economic sense as McRae suggests, and correspondingly, the deviant legislators would come from districts atypical of the party. This appears to be the case only in low-support sessions.

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[23] A good explanation of the technique appears in Hubert M. Blalock, *Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), chaps. 17–19. For two applications see Donald E. Stokes, Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "Components of Electoral Decision," *American Political Science Review*, 52 (June, 1958), 367–387; and Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," *American Political Science Review*, 58 (September, 1964), 642–657.

[24] The regression equation for explaining a legislator's index of support (Sup.) is:

$$\widetilde{\text{Sup.}}_i = K + (b_1\text{Pop.}_i) \text{ or } (b_1\text{Urb.}_i) + b_2\text{Own}_i + b_3\text{L.E.}_i + b_4\text{L.P.}_i + b_5\text{G.P.}_i$$

In this equation the i subscript may indicate any legislative district being analyzed. K is an appropriate constant; Pop._i is the population in thousands represented by the legislator; Urb._i is per cent urban in the legislator's district; Own_i is the per cent owner-occupancy in the legislator's district; L.E._i is the legislator's per cent of the postsession election vote; L.P._i is the legislator's per cent of the postsession primary vote: G.P._i is the Governor's per cent of the postsession gubernatorial primary vote in the legislator's district.

A careful look at Table 3 suggests certain generalizations. The direction of the influence of the socioeconomic variables and support differs within the different state parties as one would predict. All of the sessions show the influence of one or two economic variables to be greater than the legislator's election variable. For instance, in the equation for Colorado, an increase of a thousand people in the legislator's district causes a 4.2 per cent loss of support for the governor; a 1 per cent increase in owner-occupancy causes a 1.4 per cent increase in support for the governor; a 1 per cent increase in the legislator's election vote causes only a .14 per cent increase in his support for the governor. In the case of Colorado and Arizona in 1949, the legislator's primary exerts a sizable effect on the index of support. This finding would seem to conflict with these of Table 4, but it should be remembered that these are low-support sessions in which economic and political factors combine to exert a greater influence over the legislator.

In two of the Republican sessions tested, those in Oregon and Ohio, the governor's district primary results correlated highly and negatively with the legislators' actions. (The results of the governor's primary cannot provide a good test in the Democratic sessions tested, because in one case, Colorado, the governor was not challenged, and the incumbent did not run again following the Arizona sessions.) The conclusions one might draw from these equations are that socioeconomic variables and statewide intraparty electoral variables affect the loyalty of a legislator more than does local competition between the parties.

The Impact of District Characteristics on the Legislators in Four Low-Support Sessions. These observations can be elaborated by a closer look at four of the sessions for which the multiple correlations were large enough to provide evidence that local variables were indeed influencing the vote of the legislator. Three of these were the sessions which could not be explained by statewide variables of party structure and legislative majority. The b-coefficients for the independent variables in the regression equation were converted to beta weights to correct for the fact that there were differences in range and variability involved in measuring the variables.[25]

Figure 3 compares the degree of change affecting the Arizona legislator's vote brought about by each of the five constituency variables for 1947 and 1949. Inspection of the economic variables confirms that the party was split into conservative and liberal factions. The Democratic party had more than 87 per cent of the legislature in both of these sessions, but the governors received very little support from the Democratic legislators in upholding their vetoes. (It was the conservative "majority" among the Arizona Democrats which cooperated in passing a substantial portion of Republican Governor Pyle's program in 1951 and 1953.) In 1947 Governor Osborn was supported in his veto by the urban legislators and opposed by those from rural districts.

Figure 3 also reveals that the 1949 legislator's primary has the greatest explanatory power of all the variables. In 1949, the higher his primary vote, the more he opposed the governor. In the same primary election, incumbent Governor Garvey lost the nomination of his party. One can surmise that the core of party regulars were conservatives who could manage to get themselves nominated by large margins in their respective primaries. They opposed the liberal-oriented governor in the preceding legislative session, and then helped defeat him in the primary.

In Colorado (Figure 4), we observe that again the legislator's primary race affected his vote more than the other variables, with the urban variable of population second. A high primary vote and high degree of population density indicated that the legislator did not support the governor. Since Governor McNichols was unopposed in the state primary, we have no way to correlate his local popularity with his primary support. The governor received an average of only 39 per cent support from his party, which held 59 per cent of the seats in the legislature. There was little party discipline within either of the two major parties in Colorado. The rural areas dominated the General Assembly rather thoroughly and, insofar as state action and support were concerned, the metropolitan areas suffered. Because of the rurally-inclined character of the General Assembly, Colorado, like many other states, has been prone to adopt the type of tax that redistributes wealth from the cities to the countryside. The real difficulty arose from the fact that no indi-

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[25] This makes the comparison between the variables more equitable. Changes in the dependent variable are measured in terms of standard deviation units for each of the other variables, a method which assures the same variability for each of these variables. Beta weights are obtained by multiplying a concrete b-coefficient times the standard deviation of its independent variable and dividing by the standard deviation of the dependent varable. (K equals zero when the independent variables are standardized.)



Figure 3. Effect of Five Constituency Variables upon the Democratic Legislator's Support of the Governor of Arizona, 1947, 1949
(Beta Weights)

vidual or group could speak for the party. The esprit de corps that developed in each house of the General Assembly was more significant than, and in many cases overrode, the demands of party.[26] This may explain why legislators who were firmly entrenched as indicated by their primary margin, could be independent of party and leaders of the institutional opposition to the executive.

For the 1947 session of the Ohio legislature, the urban index of population explained the legislator's support for the governor more than did any other single variable in the regression equation, as Figure 5 indicates. In this session

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[26] Curtis Martin, *Colorado Politics* (Denver: Big Mountain Press, 1960), p. 16.



Figure 4. Effect of Four Constituency Variables on the Democratic Legislator's Support of the Governor of Colorado, 1957
(Beta Weights)



Figure 5. Effect of Five Constituency Variables on the Republican Legislator's Support of the Governor of Ohio, 1947
(Beta Weights)

of 1947, the last one before the Lausche Democrats took over for eight years, the Republicans held 88 per cent of the legislature. Administration support was low. Thomas Flinn indicated that Republican House groups were invariably more rural than the Republican vote statewide, resulting in the traditional conflict between the governor and many of the Republican legislators.[27] The governor was supported in his vetoes by his party's urban contingent, as Figure 5 indicates, but he received the support of only 35 per cent of his party members.

Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research

This research is based on the previous findings that variation in the structure of the party can account for variation in the quality and type of policy produced. The imprecision of interparty competition as a measure of party structure can account for its weak correlation with policy output. Questions such as who the governor can count on to vote for his legislation and how he builds up a coalition large enough to pass his bills have been overlooked in the effort to explain policy making in terms of more impersonal variables such as per-capita income, urbanization, population density, and voter turnout.

This study examined the conditions under which the legislators supported the governor's requests in 16 sessions chosen for different degrees of party cohesion. Votes on gubernatorial vetoes were used as an index of the governor's influence over his legislative party. This measure is surrogate for votes on legislation in major substantive areas of state policy (such as welfare, education, and highways) which the governor would include in his program. The major findings are:

(1) There is very little correlation between the legislator's district primary or election competition and his support for the governor's legislative requests. Apparently his response to the governor's demand for obedience is not based on his primary or election competition.

(2) In the Democratic party, the governor receives high support from the legislators in those areas in which he himself has strong party support as measured by his primary vote. This indicates that the governor provides the link between the electoral and the legislative party by building a coalition in order to guarantee victory in the primary and hence control over the party. In the Democratic party, the loyal legislators come from these areas of high party strength. In the Republican party, the governor's support cannot be geographically located in this manner. Both Republican and Democratic governors are subject to the same generalization that control over the party's nominating organization brings legislative discipline.

(3) With respect to socioeconomic legislation, the control which a governor exerts over his legislators is subject to the following generalizations:

   (a) The pattern of support for a successful governor does not depend upon socioeco-

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[27] Thomas A. Flinn, "The Outline of Ohio Politics," *Western Political Quarterly,* 13 (September, 1960), 709–710.

nomic or electoral variables within the legislators' districts.
(b) If the governor cannot control his legislators, socioeconomic variables provide the major bases for the factions which develop.

These findings suggest the need for further research to determine the structure of state political parties. The kinds of opportunities for political office within the individual states may be a major determinant of the party's integration or fragmentation in the policy-making process. Joseph Schlesinger has observed from the perspective of ambition theory that even when the legislative-executive link exists, the precise way in which legislators improve their chances to advance may vary. Whereas in one instance cooperation with the executive may be the course, in another, open conflict may be the choice.[28] The present findings suggest that these rival coalitions are formed from socioeconomic bases which differ from the governor's.

The relationship between the degree of party cohesion and the kind of policy output, including the groups that benefit or suffer, and the ability to innovate or adapt is indicated by this research. Robert Salisbury states that integrated demand patterns are associated with redistributive policies, and fragmented demand patterns are associated with distributive policies.[29] Sharkansky has found that different types of economic and political factors are associated with different policies.[30]

Whether or not the governor's program reflects the state's needs, he clearly has a greater chance of getting it passed if he controls the electoral party outside the legislature. A governor with a strong electoral coalition can get support for his policies. The different types of party coalitions can explain the differences in state policy outcomes. While this paper does not provide the necessary link between the strength of the party and the types of socioeconomic policies produced, the findings suggest that this link is important in understanding the differences in policy outcomes.

Appendix A

For each of the 1319 legislative districts represented in the sixteen sessions, the following information was collected and punched on data processing cards:

I. Independent Variables
  A. Legislator's Electoral Competition
    1. The legislator's per cent of the vote for himself and his closest competitor in both presession and postsession primaries. (When the incumbent did not run again, his successor's primary per cent was tabulated.)
    2. The legislator's per cent of the general election vote, both presession and postsession. (When the incumbent did not run again, his successor's election per cent was tabulated.)
  B. Gubernatorial Primary Support in the Legislator's District
  The governor's per cent of the district primary vote, both presession and postsession. (When the incumbent did not run, his successor's primary results were used.)
    1. Population in thousands (Number of persons represented by each legislator).
    2. Per cent urban (all incorporated and unincorporated places of 2,500 inhabitants or more).
    3. Per cent owner-occupancy (per cent of dwelling units occupied by owners).
    It was possible to use the *County and City Data Book for 1956* for all the states in the group with the exception of Maine and Massachusetts, in which legislative districts are based on towns or combinations of towns rather than on counties. For Detroit, Chicago, Phoenix, Portland, Maine, Boston, and several other Massachusetts cities, Census Tract and Block statistics were used.

II. Dependent Variable—Gubernatorial Support Index
The vote of each legislator on each roll call was scored accordingly:

Voted to support the governor	100
Absent or not voting	50
Voted against the governor	0

The *Index of administration support* for each man was the mean of his individual scores for the session.

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[28] Joseph A. Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States, American Politics Research Series* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966), pp. 86–88.

[29] Robert H. Salisbury, "The Analysis of Public Policy: A Search for Theories and Roles," in *Political Science and Public Policy*, ed. Austin Ranney (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 163–174.

[30] Sharkansky and Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," pp. 876–879. See also Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (September, 1969), 858–866.

Images, Process and Feedback in Foreign Policy: Israel's Decisions on German Reparations*

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This study has two purposes—to operationalize the concept of a Foreign Policy System and to demonstrate the value of one path to empirically-oriented theory in international relations. The research design has been set out elsewhere.[1] (See Figure 1.) It will be applied here in its totality. The focus of inquiry is Israel's historic and controversial decisions relating to German reparations (1950–2).

The analysis begins with the setting for Israel's strategic and tactical decisions, indicating the relevant components of the operational environment. It proceeds with a designation of the decision-making group and a dissection of their psychological environment: this comprises both their attitudinal prism or lens through which data were filtered, and the content of their images pertaining to Germany in 1950–2, the perceptions which shaped their decisions. The decision-making process is then explored in depth, from predecisional events and inputs through the strategic and tactical decisions to the intricacies of implementation, culminating in the Luxembourg Agreement on Reparations in September 1952. The decision flow is specified and charted. The critical dimension of feedback is examined, that is, the multiple consequences of reparations decisions on Israel's Foreign Policy System.[2] And relevant hypotheses on state behavior are tested.

Introduction

Foreign *relations* have long been an object of historical inquiry. Foreign *policy*, by contrast, has emerged only recently as a branch of social science. In the past fifteen years, models, frameworks, approaches, theories, and hypotheses have proliferated. Yet it is a commentary on the state of the field that many books which are devoted to the analysis of foreign policy do not contain a single explicit reference to the meaning of *decision,* the motor force of state behavior in international systems. The concept of decision is assumed but not defined; or it is used as a synonym for policy and is not regarded as essential to the inquiry.

A foreign policy decision may be defined as the selection, among perceived alternatives, of one option leading to a course of action in the international system. A decision is made by an individual or individuals or a group authorized by the political system to act within a prescribed sphere of external behavior. *A decision is an explicit act of choice which can be located precisely in time and space.* It has definable sources within a setting. There are related perceptions which predispose decision makers to select a particular option. And it is aimed at a specific target or targets—state(s), bloc(s), organization(s), and/or region(s). A decision, therefore, can be described and explained; that is, it is researchable. Moreover, consequences can be identified. The resultant data can be collated to test hypotheses about foreign policy behavior, providing a potential for prediction—the ultimate goal of International Relations.

Decisions may be scaled into three categories along the dimensions of importance: *Strategic* decisions are irrevocable policy choices, measured by significance for a foreign policy system as a whole. "Significance" refers to the number of environmental components which receive feedback from the decision, the intensity of those consequences, and the length of time in which the "fall out" from the decision affects the behavior of decision makers or institutions; that is, the scope and duration of impact. *Tactical* decisions are indissolubly linked to strategic (high-policy) decisions. They may precede, and serve as pre-decisional stages for, a strategic decision. They may follow strategic decisions, from which they logically derive and without which they could not have occurred. The continuous flow of day-to-day foreign policy choices to execute strategic and tactical decisions may be designated *Implementing* decisions. They comprise the bulk of behavior-creating choices in the on-going process of action-reaction-interaction which, in its totality, constitutes Foreign Policy for any designated period.

This framework for analyzing foreign policy

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* Research for this paper was made possible by an Isaac Walton Killam Award of the Canada Council.

[1] M. Brecher, B. Steinberg and J. Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 13, no. 1 (March 1969), 75–101.

[2] For a macro-analysis of that system during the first two decades of independence see the author's *The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process* (New Haven: Yale University Press, and London: Oxford University Press, 1972).


THE RESEARCH DESIGN
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
external
G
S
SO
DB
B
internal
M
E
PS
IG
CE
COMMUNICATIONS
DECISION-MAKING ELITE
PSYCHOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT
Attitudinal Prism
external
G
S
SO
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B
Elite Images
internal
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PS
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CE
M-S
P-D
E-D
C-S
FORMULATION
IMPLEMENTATION

behavior will now be applied to one of Israel's most tortured, complex, and consequential foreign policy decisions. The Holocaust was an unparalleled human and national tragedy: six million persons, one-third of the Jewish People, perished in a conscious plan of collective destruction by Nazi Germany. The "Final Solution" was not attained, but most of the great centers of Jewish culture in central and eastern Europe were expunged between 1939 and 1945. The trauma experienced by Jews everywhere created a vast and seemingly unbridgeable gulf between Jewry and the Germans. Yet within a few years Israel made the first of several strategic decisions concerning Germany, which were to create, however painfully, a setting for conciliation and cooperation:

On 3 January 1951 the Government of Israel made a high-policy (strategic) decision (S) to seek German reparations for plundered Jewish property in Europe. Simultaneously it decided to pursue that objective *indirectly,* through the Four Occupying Powers;

on 30 December 1951, after this approach had failed, a tactical decision (T) was made—to accept an invitation to enter into *direct* negotiations with the West German Government.

There was also an array of implementing decisions, culminating in the Luxembourg Agreement of 10 September 1952.[3] That decision

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[3] This analysis of Israel's decisions on reparations (1950–2) is based upon both written and oral sources.

The Research Design

Inputs		
Operational Environment		
External	Global System	(G)
	Subordinate System	(S)
	Other Subordinate Systems	(SO)
	Dominant Bilateral Relations	(DB)
	Bilateral Relations	(B)
Internal	Military Capability	(M)
	Economic Capability	(E)
	Political Structure	(PS)
	Interest Groups	(IG)
	Competing Elites	(CE)
Communications	The transmission of data about the operational environment by mass media, internal bureaucratic reports, face-to-face contact, etc.	
Psychological Environment		
Attitudinal Prism	Ideology, Historical Legacy, Personality Predispositions	
Elite Images	of the operational environment including competing elites' advocacy and pressure potential	
Process		
Formulation	of Strategic and Tactical decisions in 4 ISSUE AREAS:	
	Military-Security	(M-S)
	Political-Diplomatic	(P-D)
	Economic-Developmental	(E-D)
	Cultural-Status	(C-S)
Implementation	of decisions by various structures: Head of State, Head of Government, Foreign Office, etc.	
Outputs	The substance of acts or decisions	

flow will be analyzed in depth after exploring the operational environment, the decision-making group, and the images which shaped their decisions.

Operational Environment

The setting for Israel's strategic and tactical decisions was inauspicious in almost all respects.

External Dimension. The *global system* (G) was in the grip of increasingly tight bipolarity towards the end of 1950, as war enveloped Korea. Indeed the danger of direct confrontation between the two superpowers was intensified by a dramatic two-step escalation of that conflict: First, the UN-sanctioned crossing of the 38th Parallel by US-led United Nations forces, in October; and second, the massive response of Chinese "Volunteers" in December. And while the Soviet Union was not formally involved in the war, her sympathy and material support for North Korea and the People's Republic of China were unconcealed.

For Israel the consequence of a sharpening global bifurcation was the abandonment of nonidentification. With it came the certainty of a hostile response—or none at all—from one of the two German regimes which would, it was hoped, provide reparations. Moreover, Israel's alignment with the United States on the Korea issue during the autumn of 1950 was not likely to induce Soviet pressure on East Germany in the matter of reparations.[4] Thus the unique constellation of global forces which had led to American and Soviet support for Israel's independence no longer existed to her advantage. As partial compensation she had received a verbal security commitment from the US, UK, and France, in the form of the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950.

Written material will be cited in the notes. Oral sources will be cited as the name of the person interviewed; the date (year) will be indicated as well. A list of all persons interviewed appears in the Appendix following this paper. The formal post indicated beside the names of persons interviewed refers to the 1951 Strategic decision. Unless otherwise indicated, the empirical data cited in this paper are based upon reports in *Ha'aretz* and *Jerusalem Post*. The dates and substance of the two basic government decisions (3 January and 30 December 1951) were made known to the author by participants.

[4] An analysis of Israel's response to the Korean War is contained in another paper on images, process and feedback in Israel's foreign policy towards China, pending publication.

The *subordinate system* (S) was more tranquil than the global environment. This was partly because of the attitude of the Western Powers—the Soviets had not yet established a Middle East presence—and partly because of the reality and the image of Israel's victory in the 1948 War. Arab hostility was a constant, as was the perceived threat of annihilation. But the danger to Israel was less urgent in the autumn of 1950 than at many other periods in the protracted conflict.

As for the most significant *bilateral relations* (B) variable in the reparations equation, there were no objective grounds for Israeli optimism. Partitioned and occupied since 1945, West Germany had not revealed evidence of a capacity to pay large-scale reparations; the "economic miracle" lay in the future. Further, there were competing claims upon that truncated economic capability from the victor-creditors in the Second World War. And no German leader had yet publicly admitted his nation's guilt for the heinous crimes of the Nazi regime—or offered to make amends by massive reparations to the Jewish People and to Israel. In short, the external environment for a decision on reparations late in 1950 was partly *negative* (Soviet and East German attitudes to Israel's claims) and partly *uncertain* (West German and Western attitudes, as well as Bonn's capacity to pay). The regional setting was inconsequential.

Internal Dimension. The internal dimension of the operational environment was much more significant in the decisions, serving as both obstacle and inducement. The Holocaust and the very name, "Germany" evoked the most powerful feelings of revulsion among Israelis, crossing ideological lines. In fact, no other issue in Israel's foreign policy throughout the period of independence was as explosive as relations with Germany—economic, military, cultural, and diplomatic.

There was no sustained outcry when Israel made known her claims in the Notes of 16 January and 12 March 1951 to the Four Powers, because that strategy avoided the substance and even the appearance of direct contact with a German government.[5] The Western Powers, however, declined to serve as intermediaries with Bonn. And Chancellor Adenauer's Declaration before the *Bundestag* on 27 September 1951 posed the issue of direct talks starkly. It was only then that opposition parties and pressure groups mounted a campaign, which was to reach its peak in the violent demonstrations outside the Knesset during the debate of 7–9 January 1952.

The amount of attention devoted to the reparations issue by Israel's *competing elites* (CE) exceeds all foreign policy advocacy on a single issue except that relating to the Rogers Proposals and the Jarring Talks in 1969–72. And furthermore, Israeli images of Germany and the policies they advocated reveal a highly-consistent pattern during 1950–2. *Herut*, representing the nationalist Right, and *Maki*, then Stalinist, manifested a simple, direct, and unqualified perception of the Adenauer regime as dominated by neo-Nazis. The related advocacy was total rejection of any offer of reparations, indeed, of any contact with West Germany. The Left-socialist *Mapam* (which included at the time the Left-nationalist *Ahdut Ha'avoda*), shared their harsh perception and firm advocacy but emphasized a global strand as well—Bonn as a danger to international peace. The religious party, *Ha-po'el Ha-mizrahi* also perceived the resurgence of Nazism in West Germany but did not attack the Adenauer Government directly; it urged permanent remembrance of the German nation's iniquity to the Jews—but in policy terms it followed the lead of *Mapai*, the repository of institutionalized political power in Israel. So did the Progressives. The General Zionists did not, and they expressed distrust of West Germany's *bona fides*.

Among *interest groups* (IG), many of the highly vocal and militant associations of partisans and ghetto fighters merged their demand, their activism, and their tactics with the *Mapam* campaign against the Government. Right-nationalist groups within the wartime Jewish underground found a no less congenial framework within the ideologically-akin *Herut*. A large number of persons who would benefit materially from any reparations agreement performed as a supportive interest group, pressing their views through party and other affiliations—though many were absolutely opposed to any deal with Germany and have to this day refused to submit claims. Institutional interest groups, such as the higher army officer corps or the senior cadres of the bureaucracy, did not participate as such in the tempestuous struggle over reparations, but few, if any, were immune from the controversy. Among the formally non-party newspapers, *Ha'aretz* and the *Jerusalem Post* supported the decisions; *Ma'ariv* and *Yedi'ot Aharonot* were opposed.[6]

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[5] The great majority of speakers following Foreign Minister Sharett's presentation of the 12 March Note to the Knesset supported the government's approach to the Four Powers, though some doubted its practicality. The main criticism, by Rabbi Mordekhai Nurock and others, was that Israel had waited too long in asserting her claim. *Divrei Ha-knesset* (Official Records of the Knesset) (Jerusalem/Tel Aviv: Government Printer), VIII, pp. 953–6.

As for the *political structure* (PS), the characteristics most relevant to the decision process were the multiparty system of Israel and the centrality of coalition politics. *Mapai* alone did not command a Knesset majority for its reparations policy: It held only 45 seats—and even with its Arab allies, only 50—in a House of 120. Furthermore, its coalition partners (the Progressives and the Religious Front, comprising *Mizrahi, Ha-po'el Ha-mizrahi,* and *Agudat Yisrael*) were in turmoil over the first great foreign policy issue of conscience. Yet their support, even if only in part, was the *sine qua non* to parliamentary approval. Thus the internal fragmentation of parties imposed severe strains on the coalition and on each member.

Israel's *military capability* (M) at the end of 1950 was relatively reassuring in the short run. *Tzahal* (Israel Defence Forces) was still heavily dependent on external sources for weapons; and none of the Powers was then prepared to perform the patron function. Yet Egypt was in the same position, and other Arab states in the Near East Core were too weak, alone or even in concert, to pose an immediate threat. Rather, the balance of forces created by Israel's triumph in 1948 remained essentially unchanged. Thus the military component of the environment was not a compelling source of pressure, though any improvement in Israel's economy was bound to have spillover effects on her defensive capability.

The *economic* (E) situation of Israel was harsh in the last months of 1950, graver, perhaps, than at any other period in the state's independent existence. All the indicators were negative as a result of the mass immigration that predominantly characterized that austerity period: From May 1948 to the end of 1951 Israel's Jewish population more than doubled, from 650,000 to 1,324,000. The major tasks were to provide food, clothing, and shelter to the impoverished survivors of the displaced persons camps in Europe and Cyprus, and to the underprivileged immigrants from Iraq and Yemen, as well as employment for immigrants and demobilized soldiers. Yet that economic challenge had to be met by an underdeveloped economy without reserves of capital or foreign exchange.

The austerity program, through stringent price controls and rationing of food, raw materials, and other basic necessities, ensured minimum standards of consumption for the entire population. The Israeli economy, however, was precarious and insecure, and external sources of aid were grossly inadequate—a total of $118 million in unilateral transfers in 1949, and $90 million in 1950, all of it from world Jewry.[7] This was hardly sufficient to cover a rising import surplus: Exports barely increased from a minuscule $43 million in 1949 to $45.8 million in 1950, while imports rose from $263 million to $327.6 million. Although Israel was to be faced twenty years later with a massive deficit of more than $1 billion in her balance of payments, her economy was much less capable of coping with deficits of $220 million in 1949 and of $281.8 million in 1950.[8]

Other indicators were also disturbing. The Gross National Product in 1950 was less than half a billion Israeli pounds (IL458 million) for a population of 1.4 million: The annual per capita output of IL340 was tiny, compared to the rapid growth of ensuing years. Moreover, unemployment in 1950 was at its peak—an official estimate of 11.5 per cent, representing 52,000 persons; and even this "seems low," remarked Professor Patinkin, in the light of the 50,000 added to the labor force that year through immigration and the 80,000 the preceding year, along with thousands more demobilized soldiers. The living conditions of the 420,000 persons who poured into Israel in 1949 and 1950 were grim; there was overcrowding in immigrant centers and transit camps, scarcity of employment, inadequate educational facilities. And finally there was a drought in 1950–1, which imposed even more stringent austerity measures.[9] Those components that formed part of the decision makers' psychological environment, to which we now turn, were not perceived with equal intensity.

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[6] *Ha'aretz* was at that time closely associated with the Progressives; its editor was to become a member of the third Knesset on that party's list. The *Post* has always reflected *Mapai* views. And the two evening newspapers were staffed overwhelmingly by *Herut* members, in fact, the editor of *Yedi'ot Aharonot* signed the Declaration of Independence for the Revisionists.

[7] Appendix Table 9, "Unilateral Transfers: 1949–65," in N. Halevi, and R. Klinov-Malul, *The Economic Development of Israel* (New York: Praeger, 1968) pp. 294–5.

[8] Appendix Table 50, "Balance of Payments on Current Account: 1949–65," Halevi and Klinov-Malul, p. 141.

[9] D. Patinkin, *The Israel Economy: The First Decade* (Falk Project for Economic Research in Israel) (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post Press, 1960), p. 31. Israel's economic plight during the gestation period of her strategic and tactical decisions on reparations is described in detail in N. Balabkins, *West German Reparations to Israel* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1971), Ch. 5.

Decision Makers and their Images

The decision to seek German reparations, by an approach to the Four Occupying Powers, was taken by Israel's government at a meeting on 3 January 1951, after a debate extending over three Cabinet sessions. At that time the coalition comprised the following parties and persons:[10]

Mapai	
David Ben Gurion	Prime Minister and Defense
Dov Joseph	Transport
Eliezer Kaplan	Finance
Pinhas Lubianiker (Lavon)	Agriculture
Golda Meyerson (Meir)	Labor and National Insurance
David Remez	Education and Culture
Moshe Sharett	Foreign Affairs
Behor-Shalom Shitreet (*Sepharadim*)	Police
Religious Front *Agudat Yisrael*	
Rabbi Yitzhak Meir Levin	Welfare
Ha-po'el Ha-mizrahi	
Moshe Haim Shapira	Immigration and Health, and Interior
Mizrahi	
Rabbi Yehuda Leib Fishman (Maimon)	Religious Affairs and War Victims
Progressives	
Pinhas Rosen	Justice
NonParty	
Jack Myer Geri	Commerce and Industry

Mapai held a decisive majority (8 of 13 Ministers).[11] And, given internal party cohesion, it could secure government approval for any foreign policy proposal, except when Prime Minister Ben Gurion and Foreign Minister Sharett disagreed. Thus, while all 13 ministers were formally equal as high-policy decision makers, preponderant *influence* lay with the Big Three of *Mapai*—Ben Gurion, Sharett, and Kaplan. The view of three minor party ministers—Rosen, Shapira, and Maimon—commanded respect on this as on many other issues. And Joseph, by the forcefulness of his advocacy, was a central figure in the debate.

Among the principal decision makers, Sharett was more responsive to the idea at the outset. Ben Gurion became central to the drama when it developed into an issue of national controversy, and *Herut* mobilized the opposition forces. That clash between parties (*Mapai* and *Herut*) was accentuated by the bitter personal rivalry between Ben Gurion and Begin. A negative vote in the Knesset in January 1952 would have been construed as a victory for Begin, which Ben Gurion was unwilling to tolerate, even if the decision on reparations had had lesser significance for Israel's "national interests." The result was Ben Gurion's total commitment.

The preeminent role of the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister was acknowledged by several persons who participated in some stage of the decision process on German reparations.[12] Avner observed: "Ben Gurion swung it in the Party and the Knesset—but Sharett never wavered." Shinnar concurred: "Ben Gurion was the only Israeli leader who could have pushed the decision through. Sharett favored it but he needed the initiative." Sharett's role, said Horowitz, was "very important, because he gave full support at the beginning and guided us through the negotiations." Kaplan did not speak in the Knesset debate. He could have vetoed the idea at an early stage but "he was enough of a realist to know that it had to be done." As Mrs. Meir put it succinctly, in reply to a question about who were the key actors: "Sharett in Israel; Ben Gurion supported it, as did Kaplan."

None was enthusiastic about reparations; all clearly preferred *indirect* arrangements. Thus it was decided to approach the US, UK, France, and the USSR, in the hope that Israel's claim could be met without the need for any contact whatsoever with Germany or Germans. When that hope proved illusory, the ministers remained publicly united, that is, in the Knesset vote to accept Adenauer's invitation to enter into *direct* negotiations. It was Goldmann who secured Adenauer's agreement to negotiate on the basis of Israel's claim and thereby made possible the tactical decision to enter into direct talks. He had little to do with the initial high-policy decision.[13]

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[10] This, the second government of Israel, was a short-lived one—from 1 November 1950 to 14 February 1951, when it resigned; it continued until 7 October 1951 as a caretaker government. Not all ministers were present at the Cabinet meetings when discussions took place and decisions were taken on the issue of reparations. The participants in crucial meetings will be specified later.

[11] It did so in all governments from 1948 to 1965. In 1966, after the Alignment was formed, *Mapai* and *Ahdut Ha'avoda* held a combined majority of 11 out of 18 ministers. After 5 June 1967 they comprised 12 of 21 members of the "National Unity Government." In the 16th government, formed after the Seventh Knesset elections in October 1969, the Labour Alignment (including 2 from *Mapam*) comprised 15 of 24. And in August 1970, with the departure of *Gahal* from the government, 13 of 18 ministers represented the Labour Alignment.

[12] The following five extracts are from Avner, Shinnar, Horowitz, Eytan and Meir interviews.

How did the decision makers perceive the setting for decision on a controversial and emotion-filled issue in Israel's foreign policy? Stated schematically, what components of the operational environment did they regard as relevant, and in what order of importance? There was no substantive Knesset discussion of reparations preceding the first basic decision and the dispatch of the first Notes to the Powers, on 16 January 1951, dealing with personal restitution, and on 12 March 1951, concerning reparations to the Jewish People.[14] Nor are Cabinet minutes of that period available for research. Thus the evidence concerning images of decision makers at that time is drawn from contemporary speeches, memoirs of participants, written and oral, and eyewitness accounts.

Ben Gurion, in one of his published memoirs, recalled:[15]

> If you want the overall reason in a single sentence, it was the final injunction of the inarticulate six million, the victims of Nazism whose every murder was a ringing cry for Israel to rise, to be *strong* and *prosperous,* to safeguard her peace and *security,* and so prevent such a disaster from ever again overwhelming the *Jewish people.* . . . I was proposing neither forgiveness nor wiping the slate clean when I presented the demand for reparations from West Germany at the Knesset session in January 1952.

This refers to the tactical decision. There is no evidence to suggest that Ben Gurion's view of the world and, specifically, of Germany, of Israel's need, and of her historic obligations, changed during the 12 months between the decision to seek reparations indirectly, and the decision to seek them directly. Nor does the long-term consistency of Ben Gurion's images suggest the probability of a change. Ministerial colleagues at the time confirm his consistent view. For example, Rosen remarked: *"Right from the beginning* he put forward the view of 'the other Germany,' first, that Germany had ceased to be a real danger, and secondly, that Germany had learned her lesson."[16]

The preeminence of the Jewish prism is striking in Ben Gurion's memoir—his sense of historical continuity, the obligation to the six million, the concept of Israel as the territorial base and political bastion of the Jewish People. Within that prism the focus was on "strong" and "security" (military capability [M]), and on "prosperous" (economic capability [E]): These were the two most relevant environmental variables, as well, of course, as Germany (bilateral relations [B]), as the source of Jewry's tragedy and of Israel's demand. The M component, in the form of a preoccupation with security, is central to his general view of the world and is ubiquitous in his words and deeds. The E and B components, as stimuli to the reparations' decisions, were expressed by Ben Gurion with convincing simplicity after his retirement: "The economic factor was important, but it was not the only thing. There was also the moral obligation of Germany to pay for the crimes it had committed."[17]

These image-components are also evident in the most important articulation of Ben Gurion's image at the time—his statement to the Knesset on 7 January 1952, introducing the government's motion on the issue of direct negotiations. Other perceptual elements are also apparent, namely, (dominant bilateral [DB])—the attitudes of Washington and Moscow, (other bilateral relationships [B])—the reaction of London and Paris, and his dual view of Germany, with the emphasis on her never-to-be forgotten or forgiven crimes against Jewry. And all this demonstrates what I have called the Jewish prism—a focus for Jewish attitudes, values, etc. Thus, in surveying the developments of the preceding year, from the Notes of 16 March 1951 to the Powers onward, the Prime Minister declared:[18]

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[13] In his memoirs Goldmann wrote: "In all the campaigns I have participated in . . . I never had a chance *to plan and lead one so definitely from its very start. . . .*" N. Goldmann, *The Autobiography of Nahum Goldmann: Sixty Years of Jewish Life* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 277 (emphasis added).

[14] There were, however, numerous earlier and concurrent discussions in the Knesset pertaining to Germany, especially the debate on the rearming of Germany, in October 1950, and again, by way of approving a resolution of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, on 10 January, 1951, a week before the dispatch of the first Note. Nothing was then said on the Note and no Cabinet member participated. See *Divrei Ha-knesset,* vols. I-VII.

[15] M. Pearlman, *Ben Gurion Looks Back in Talks with Moshe Pearlman* (London: Weidenfeld and (Nicolson, 1965) p. 162 (emphasis added).

[16] Rosen interview, 1971 (emphasis added). Ben Gurion's closest aides, like Navon and Peres, confirmed this consistent perception. Interviews 1965–6.

[17] Ben Gurion interview, 1966.

> The State of Israel took upon itself the great effort, and there is no precedent for this . . . , to absorb and to settle quickly hundreds of thousands of immigrants. . . . This enormous burden was accepted by a State without capital and is greater than her capacity . . . [E]
>
> [The Soviet Union did not bother to answer Israel's Notes.] The Three [Western Powers] do not feel they can demand any more from Germany at this time, neither for themselves nor for others . . . [but they influenced Bonn to offer reparations to Israel.] [DB and B]
>
> There is no precedent for this action because the State of Israel did not exist in the days of the Holocaust. . . . But . . . there has been no precedent for the massacre and slaughter in such enormous proportions like that which the German people committed under Hitler's leadership against the Jews of Europe. More than six million Jews were tormented to death, hunger, murder, asphyxiation of millions. Many were buried alive; no mercy was given to the aged, to women and children; babies were torn from their mothers' arms and thrown into the ovens. Before, during, and after this planned murder of millions, despoliation took place, and this too in immense proportions without precedent. . . . Crimes of these enormous proportions cannot be absolved in material terms. . . .
>
> But the *German people, all of whom are responsible for the destruction wrought by their government under Hitler,* continue to benefit, both in the East and the West, from this slaughter and the shame of the robbery of the murdered Jews. . . . These atrocities will never be forgotten. . . . *Let not the murderers of our people be their inheritors as well!* [B]

The Jewish *Weltanschauung* was certainly pervasive in Ben Gurion's view of Germany. But which of the specific image-components dominated his thought—and decisions—on reparations remains a topic of controversy. Like all other persons in the decision-making group, he was aware of Israel's grave economic condition in 1950–1, and he was persuaded that massive foreign aid was imperative to cover the mounting import surplus. Thus he perceived the immediate economic value of reparations. He himself acknowledged this, as noted. Yet, like many charismatic figures, especially those cast in the role of "Father of the Nation," he revealed a certain disdain for the economic dimension of public policy. He never attended meetings of the Cabinet's Economic Affairs Committee, he proudly recalled. "I left this to Kaplan and, later, to Eshkol."[19] According to his long-time Political Secretary, "it is incorrect to see Ben Gurion's motive in the reparations issue as purely or even primarily economic. Whatever Ben Gurion has done at any time is dominated by concern with security and the survival of the state."[20] And Rosen recalled: "Ben Gurion was not indifferent to the Holocaust—but he was able to forget. Other things were more important to him, especially the building of Israel. The Holocaust was like a lost war for him." Moreover, "Ben Gurion was fond of prophecies. The whole trend of his thinking would indicate his awareness of political implications from the beginning."[21] Stated differently, Ben Gurion felt that Germany was one of the few areas where Israel could pursue an independent policy, because of the uniqueness of the issue.

That concern with Israel's future is evident in his reported remarks to Haim Yahil the day the Luxembourg Agreements were signed: "This is an historic day, though I do not think the Germans will pay." Its significance, he explained, was twofold: the first formal international recognition of Israel as the address of the Jewish People, and the involvement of Germany on Israel's side in her struggle for survival.[22] Yet there is contrary testimony of other participants: that Ben Gurion was not ardently responsive to the idea of reparations at the outset, that he did not assert his leadership in the Cabinet meetings, when the issue was debated and decided; and that he did not intimate his political-security calculus *at that time*. This was to come later, from about 1957 on, they concluded.[23] Perhaps the simplest explanation was that offered by a non-*Mapai* Cabinet colleague whom Ben Gurion respected:[24] "He was primarily interested in the future of the state, and he knew we needed financial aid."

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[18] The original text is in *Divrei Ha-knesset*, X (2), 1951–2, 38th Sitting, 2nd Knesset, Jan. 7, 1952, pp. 895–6, and in State of Israel, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Documents Relating to the Agreement Between the Government of Israel and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1953) pp. 57–60 (emphasis added), (hereafter cited as *Documents*. . .).

[19] Ben Gurion interview, 1966.

[20] Navon interview, 1965.

[21] Rosen interview, 1971.

[22] Yahil interviews, 1966, 1971. The belief that Bonn would not fulfil its obligation was deeprooted in Israel's high-policy and technical elites: It stemmed from experience with German default on debts in the interwar period—another striking illustration of the effect of historical legacy on the psychological environment of decision makers.

[23] Avner, Eytan, Horowitz, Shinnar interviews, 1966–71.

[24] Rosen interview, 1971.

From these diverse strands there emerges a Ben Gurion image with constant and variable elements:

> The fixed *Attitudinal Prism* was Jewishness in its broadest meaning—historic past, continuity, responsibility for the future;
>
> the short-term environmental factor most directly perceived by Ben Gurion (and all other decision makers) was the compelling need of Israel's economy (E);
>
> while E was the catalyst to the decisions, it was perceived as an instrumental goal to achieve a higher value, the survival and security of Israel (M);
>
> when the reparations decisions were consummated (the Luxembourg Agreement), regional and global components (S and G) replaced the economic stimulus in the hierarchy of Ben Gurion's images, partly because of skepticism about West Germany's fulfilment of her obligations, but mainly because of his recognition of Germany's revival as a Power and the symbolic international sanction which he perceived for the legitimate unity of Israel and world Jewry.

Stated in schematic and simple quantitative terms—ordinal ranking of image-components—Ben Gurion's articulated image may be designated for the three crucial dates in the decision flow—within a constant attitudinal prism of Jewishness.

Ranking of Ben Gurion's Image-Components Relating to German Reparations 1951–1952

	S(trategic)			*T(actical)*			*De Facto I(mplementation)*	
	(3 January 1951)			(30 December 1951)			(10 September 1952)	
M	(Israel's security)	10	M	(Israel's security)	10	S M	(German support for Israel's security in regional conflict)	10
E	(Israel's economy)	9	E	(Israel's economy)	9	G	(International recognition of Israel-Jewry link)	9
B	(Germany's crimes against Jewry)	8	B	(Germany's crimes against Jewry)	8	E	(Israel's economy)	8
						B	(Germany's crimes against Jewry)	7

Other components of the environment were marginal in Ben Gurion's image: The attitudes of the Four Powers (DB and B_2, B_3—i.e., France, and the UK) were of possible instrumental relevance only; and the vocal opposition of parties and pressure groups in Israeli society (CE and IG) were perceived as legitimate and deserving of a hearing but they were rejected by him as *the* basis for making a high-policy decision.

The Jewish prism was no less pronounced in Foreign Minister Sharett's image of German reparations. In September 1950 he advocated one exception to the principle of universal membership in the United Nations. "The people of Israel and Jews throughout the world," he told the General Assembly, "view with consternation and distress the progressive readmission of Germany to the family of nations, with her revolting record intact, her guilt unexpiated, and her heart unchanged."[25] Moreover, after reading Israel's second Note to the Powers, he declared before the Knesset:

> . . . The Government of Israel cannot imagine that the gates of the cultured and peace-loving world will be opened to the German people, not only because their hands are still smeared with blood, but also when their plunder is still under their cloak. There is a day of reckoning—and this day has arrived.[26]

The same theme is evident in his defense of Government policy during the January 1952 Knesset debate.[27] Any successor to Nazi Germany, he noted, would be considered by Israel "the heir to the reign of blood, violence and destruction which preceded it." Yet there was a fundamental *moral duty* of Jewry:

> Is it not our sacred duty to rescue whatever is still obtainable, to bring it here and turn it to creative uses? . . . And if there is no other way of recovering this property except by negotiation with the heirs of the robbers, or even with the robbers themselves, then it is not merely permissible but our bounden duty to enter into such negotiations.

Sharett's attitudinal prism thus reflected Jewishness and Jewry as a nation, its past tragedy and its inherent rights. An important image-component was clearly Germany's iniquity

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[25] *General Assembly Official Records,* 5th Session, 286th Plenary Mtg., 27 Sept. 1950, p. 136. The same theme was reiterated in GAOR, 6th Session, 341st Plenary Mtg., 13 Nov. 1951, p. 87, and in the *ad hoc* Political Committee, 15th–16th Mtgs., 4 Dec. 1951, pp. 77, 86.

[26] Statement on 13 March 1951, in *Documents* . . . , 6, p. 28.

[27] *Divrei Ha-knesset,* X (2), 1951–2, 40th Sitting of the 2nd Knesset, Jan. 9, 1952, pp. 953–6. The following four extracts are taken from Sharett, pp. 7, 20–1, 12, 30.

(B). The attitude of the Four Powers (DB and B_2,B_3) was marginal for him, as for Ben Gurion. "You cannot demand of other people to do the dirty work for you," he chided the critics, "while you keep your hands lily-white and retire into the rarified atmosphere of an exalted morality." Like Ben Gurion, too, he was aware of Israel's long-term security obligation as an independent actor in international politics (M), for which reparations were essential:

> A scattered and defenceless people can and, perhaps, must live only in the memories of the past.... But a people which exercises political sovereignty over a territory of its own is in a very different category. It knows that its land is part of a larger world and that it cannot escape contact with other nations. . . . It must follow every shift in the balance of forces around it and in the world at large; it dare not neglect any opportunity of increasing its strength.

And even more than Ben Gurion he was conscious of the economic dimension. Sharett acknowledged this with candor on the eve of the Wassenaar negotiations with West Germany: "The crux of our problem is production. Our balance of trade is staggeringly adverse. . . . The inordinately wide gap between imports and exports creates a state of high economic tension characterized by acute shortage and strict rationing."[28] In short, the same three components are evident in the perceptions held by Ben Gurion and Sharett—E, B, and M. Indeed, this confirms the consensus among participants that, on the reparations issue, the two men thought and acted alike.

Kaplan, the Finance Minister, perceived reparations in utilitarian (E) terms, as necessary to Israel's economic growth in a period of peril. That was natural for, as a Cabinet colleague remarked: "He was Treasurer—he needed the money."[29] Yet he was skeptical, as in most things, that anything would emerge from an indirect approach to the Powers. To Horowitz, his Director-General, he said late in 1950: "You think you can do this through the Powers alone. You are wrong. The only way will be direct talks with Germany—and for that the country is not ready."[30]

Mrs. Meir, who was Minister of Labor at the time strongly opposed negotiations with Germany during the preliminary discussions; and she hesitated long whether to approve. But when she was won over, mainly by Ben Gurion's arguments, she became a forceful advocate. During the January 1952 debate she used symbols of Jewish survival and national pride in defending the Government's proposal of direct negotiations:[31]

> Why was it placed upon us, a small people, to bear such a large part of the terrible cruelties that have befallen the world? There is only one answer. We were weak, we had no independence, we had no state. . . . We must make ourselves stronger in every way in order to save quickly . . . Jews from all over the world. . . .
>
> We are going to demand what is coming to us; and the responsible people of the Government of Israel . . . know how to speak to the enemy with pride, Jewish pride . . . in a manner which will add to the strength and honour of *Am Yisrael.*

In retrospect, fifteen years later, she perceived three other environmental components—economic need (E), security (M), and international recognition of Israel's organic links with the Jewish People (G), all within a Jewish attitudinal prism:[32]

> The economic factor was clearly pre-eminent. . . . We wanted reparations because we needed enormous funds for development. We had to develop the country, to absorb large numbers of refugees.
>
> There was another reason. This would be the first time the Jews received reparations for atrocities committed against them. And it would be the first time that a Power would deal with Jews as a nation and with a Jewish state.
>
> [And third] why should we have attached a higher value to the million children killed by the Nazis than to the million who had to be rehabilitated in Israel? The only thing to do was to establish Israel on such firm foundations that this could never happen again.

The most forceful critic within the Government was *Mapai*'s Dov Joseph, who held a number of economic portfolios in the early years. A decade later, he expressed the mood of 1950 thus: "We were consumed by anger and grief at the Holocaust." Within that Jewish prism he referred to two components: E—"We needed foreign currency," "we felt entitled to get restitution for German Jewish property—to absorb refugees"; and B—"The Germans could not be left with vast stolen property; we had a moral duty to recover part of the enormous plunder."[33] Twenty years after the events, with the aid of notes to recall specific dates, he added fresh light to his advocacy at the outset:

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[28] *Yediot Ha-Netziguyot* (News to Representatives) (Jerusalem: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, no. 473, 14 March 1952), p. 1. Horowitz, Shinnar and others recalled to the writer how important was the economic component in Sharett's image.

[29] Rosen interview, 1971.

[30] Horowitz interview, 1971.

[31] *Divrei Ha-knesset* . . . , Jan. 8, 1952, p. 941.

[32] Meir interview, 1966.

[33] Joseph interview, 1960.

> "No one will object to the Jewish People claiming compensation from the German People," I said at the time. My objection was to the method of dealing with the matter. I said two things basically. First, I objected to direct contact with the Germans. I thought we should use the good offices of friendly Powers. Secondly, I objected to German goods being brought into Israel. My idea was to take them elsewhere and sell them, even if at a loss. "We should take compensation," I said, "but not through direct talks."[34]

Among the lesser coalition partners, *Ha-po'el Ha-mizrahi*'s leader, Haim Moshe Shaira, recalled: "The economic situation was grave, but that was not the only reason; on principle, the Germans stole billions from the Jews, and whatever we could reclaim, we simply had to do."[35] The Progressive Party leader, Pinhas Rosen, spoke in a similar vein during the Knesset debate of January 1952:

> We cannot be content with the expression of our feelings of hate and revenge. . . . Who gave you [*Herut* leader, Begin] the right to give up the debts that we all agree are coming to us. . . . I would say to *Mapam* leader, Hazan—*davka* [just] because they are Nazis we must claim from them. . . . Gentlemen! A state must take a rational course. . . . As a people we could be an exception but not as a state. . . . We must build the country and gather all the funds we are entitled to. We must not give them up.[36]

Among those involved in the negotiations with Bonn and other implementing decisions, E was designated as the dominant image-component of Israel's decision makers *at the time*.[37] Goldmann observed: "The main consideration was economic—the need to absorb half a million refugees." Shinnar, Co-Head of Israel's delegation to the Wassenaar Conference, remarked: "The main stimulus was definitely economic, and rightly so, in view of the difficult situation of the state in its initial period and in view of general public opinion, which refused to think of any other aspect in Israel-German relations." Eytan, then Director-General of the Foreign Office, recalled: "The motive for demanding reparations was financial—Israel needed the money; we were taking in hundreds of thousands of displaced persons." Avner, who was Head of the West European Department in the Foreign Ministry and a member of the negotiating team, referred to "economic distress as one factor; the other was a feeling that we must get something from the Germans—it is something the Jews should do." Bartur, Assistant Head of the Foreign Ministry's Economic Department, noted "the overriding economic consideration; there was a desperate need of funds for immigration absorption and economic development." But the most graphic portrait of the pervasive E image came from Horowitz: "We were in desperate economic straits. We looked into the face of possible collapse. Foreign exchange reserves were practically exhausted. Every ship was important, for the reserve of bread in the country [1950–1951] was sufficient for one week only."

The view that E was the preeminent image-component was shared by many others—academicians, journalist-commentators, and civil servants.[38] Even those who perceived a "political motive" acknowledged the immediacy of the economic peril facing Israel in 1950 and 1951, stimulating a foreign policy initiative. Indeed, like the high-policy decision of 11 December 1949 to make Jerusalem the seat of government, the strategic and tactical decisions concerning reparations were precipitated by one component in the psychological environment. In the former it was external pressure from the international system through the United Nations (G). In the latter it was internal pressure, in the form of demands of immigrant absorption and economic growth (E). For both the attitudinal prism focussed on Jewishness.

The Decision Process

The cluster of decisions relating to reparations extended over a period of 29 months, from October 1950 to March 1953. Four distinct stages are evident:

(1) From 30 October 1950 (the first substantive reference to reparations in the Cabinet) to 18 February 1952 (Israel's formal decision to enter *direct* negotiations with West Germany);

(2) From 21 March 1952 (the opening of the Wassenaar Conference) to 10 June 1952 (the agreement on substance);

(3) From 28 June 1952 (the resumption of formal negotiations) to 10 September 1952 (the signing of the Luxembourg Agreements);

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[34] Joseph interview, 1971.

[35] Shapira interview, 1968. He added in retrospect: "I don't know whether Ben Gurion thought that Germany would be an important Power with consequences for Israel in the future. He did so later."

[36] *Divrei Ha-knesset* . . . , Jan. 8, 1952, p. 913.

[37] The following half dozen extracts are taken from Goldmann, Shinnar, Eytan, Avner, Bartur, and Horowitz interviews, 1965–71.

[38] Interviews in Israel in 1960, 1965–66, 1968, 1969–71.

FIGURE 2

DECISION FLOW: GERMAN REPARATIONS


PRE-DECISIONAL EVENTS
DECISIVE INPUTS INTO STRATEGIC DECISION
STRATEGIC DECISION
IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGIC DECISION
DECISIVE INPUTS INTO TACTICAL DECISION
TACTICAL DECISION
IMPLEMENTATION OF TACTICAL DECISION
WJ 1 Goldmann repar. reference
WJ 2 WJC repar. demand
WJ 3 Landauer-Moses submissions
WJ 4 Weizmann Big Four letter
WG 5 Adenauer 1st offer
WG, WJ 6 Barou-Blankenhorn talks
WJ 7 van Dam Memorandum
Is 8 Grave Economic situation
Is 9 Horowitz Initiative
Is 10 Cabinet discussions
Is 11 Reparations Claim
Is 12 [AD] Approach Four Powers
Is 13 General note
Is 14 Specific note
Is 15 Grave economic situation
Is WG 16 Horowitz-Adenauer mtg.
WG 17 Adenauer Declaration
WG, WJ 18 Letter to Goldmann
WP 19 Refuse to intervene
Is 20 Direct Negotiations
Is 21 Knesset vote
Is 22 Committee authorization
Is 23 Government approval
Is, WG, WJ 24 Wassenaar conference
Is, WG, WJ 25 Negotiations suspended
Is, WG, 26 Offer rejected
Is, WG, WJ 27 Tentative agreement
Is, WG, WJ 28 De facto agreement
Is, WG, WJ 29 Conference resumed
Is, WG, WJ 30 Luxembourg Agreements
WG 31 Ratification
Is 32 Ratification
CODE
AD Abortive Decision
Is Israel
WG West Germany
WJ World Jewry
WJC World Jewish Congress
WP Western Powers

Appendix to German Reparations

(List of Persons Interviewed)

Interviews (all were conducted in Israel)	*Date of Interview(s)*	*Formal Post at the Time of the 1951 Decisions on Reparations*
Gershon Avner	July 1968	Head, Western Europe Department, Foreign Ministry; later, member, Israel Delegation to the Wassenaar Conference
Moshe Bartur	April 1966	Assistant Head, Economics Department, Foreign Ministry
David Ben Gurion	June 1966 May 1971	Prime Minister and Minister of Defense
Walter Eytan	January 1971	Director-General, Foreign Ministry
Nahum Goldmann	April 1966	President, Conference of Jewish Material Claims Against Germany
David Horowitz	March 1966 February 1971	Director-General, Finance Ministry
Dov Joseph	July 1960 February 1971	Minister of Transport, later, of Commerce and Industry
Golda Meir	August 1966	Minister of Labor
Yitzhak Navon	December 1965	Private Secretary to the Foreign Minister
Pinhas Rosen	February 1971	Minister of Justice
Haim Moshe Shapira	August 1968	Minister of Immigration and Health, and Interior, later, of Religious Affairs
Ze'ev Sharef	March 1966 February 1971	Secretary to the Government
Felix A. Shinnar	December 1965	Adviser to Foreign Ministry on Reparations; later, Co-Head, Israel Delegation to the Wassenaar Conference
Haim Yahil	April 1966 February 1971	Ex-Consul of Israel in Munich

(4) From 10 September 1952 to 22 March 1953 (the ratification process).[39]

There was, too, a predecisional stage of thought and action lasting almost a decade. Only the first stage will be explored in detail; the others, which constitute the implementation of Israel's strategic and tactical decisions will be noted in Figure 2, which schematizes the decision flow.

Nahum Goldmann raised the issue in public as early as 1941: "If reparations are to be paid [by Germany], we are the first to have a claim to them," he told a meeting of the World Jewish Congress (WJC) in Baltimore. That claim was given concrete form two years later by the WJC Legal Adviser, Dr. Nehemia Robinson, and was approved at an international Jewish conference in Atlantic City: The resolution demanded restitution for losses suffered by Jewish communities and individuals, along with recognition of the principle that the Jewish People has a right to collective compensation.[40] In 1944 the value of Jewish property seized or destroyed by the Nazi regime was estimated at more than $6 billion.[41] That same year Dr.

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[39] Ratification by Israel was a formality. The six-month struggle for German ratification, which culminated in that act by the *Bundesrat* on 20 March 1953, was a *German* foreign policy decision—though not without the pressure of Israeli inputs. On this point see note 95 below.

[40] N. Goldmann, *The Autobiography of Nahum Goldmann*, p. 250.

[41] N. Robinson, *Indemnification and Reparations* (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1944), p. 83, as cited in *Documents . . .*, 5, p. 20.

Siegfried Moses, who was later to be Israel's State Comptroller, published a booklet setting out the moral nature of future claims to restitution. His proposals, based upon a memorandum prepared in 1943 by Dr. Georg Landauer of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, dealt mainly with community property without known heirs; they were, to a large extent, embodied in the final agreement.[42]

Soon after the end of the Second World War the Jewish claim was formally presented on behalf of the Jewish Agency by Dr. Weizmann. The principles laid down in his letter to the four victorious allies were to form the basis and to set the tone of all subsequent claims by the State of Israel in her Notes and during the negotiations with West Germany:

(a) That with regard to the problem of Jewish property . . . , so far as the individual or communal owners of such property cannot be traced, the title should pass to the representatives of the Jewish people, the realizable assets to be employed for the rehabilitation of Jewish men, women and children.
(b) That . . . such assets . . . should be entrusted to the Jewish Agency for this purpose. [and]
(c) That the Jewish people should be allotted a proper percentage of reparations . . .[43]

Within Germany the idea of reparations received its earliest expression at the highest governmental level on 11 November 1949. Just two months after his election as Chancellor of the Federal German Republic, Konrad Adenauer told the editor of a German-Jewish weekly: "The German people are resolved to make good the wrong done to the Jews in their name by a criminal regime, so far as this is still possible now that millions of human beings have been destroyed beyond recall. This reparation we regard as our duty. Far too little has been done . . . since 1945. The Federal Government is determined to take the appropriate steps." He acknowledged that "the State of Israel is the outwardly visible concentration of the Jews of all nationalities." And then, in a premature and insensitive gesture of intended goodwill, he offered, "as a first direct sign" of that intent to make amends, a gift to Israel of goods to the value of DM 10 million (less than $3 *million*). Apart from the fact that this offer was premature, the amount suggested was perceived as ridiculously inadequate: The value of Jewish property plundered or destroyed by the Nazi regime was, as noted, estimated as at least $6 *billion*.[44] There was an indirect response from the World Jewish Congress, in the form of a five-point declaration issued in December 1949: It called for: (a) acceptance by the German parliament of moral and political responsibility for Nazi deeds towards Jews; (b) material indemnification; (c) legislation against anti-Semitism; (d) reeducation of German youth; and (e) a check upon nationalistic tendencies in the West German government.[45]

A major personal influence in the German quest for conciliation was Herbert Blankenhorn, a foreign policy confidant of Adenauer from the outset and later West German Ambassador to London and Paris. At the Chancellor's request, he began informal talks in London early in 1950 with the European representative of the World Jewish Congress, Noah Barou. Like others to follow, Barou emphasized two preconditions of Jewish contact with the Bonn regime: A solemn public declaration by the Chancellor acknowledging Germany's national responsibility for the horrible deeds committed against the Jews of Europe during the Second World War; and an expressed willingness to compensate Jewry for material losses.[46] Adenauer, too, recalled in his memoirs: "The first feelers . . . began already in early 1950; but they did not lead to practical results."[47]

Among those contacts were conversations between Jakob Altmaier, a Jewish Social Democratic member of the *Bundestag*, and Dr. Eliyahu Livneh, Israel's Consul in Munich from 1949 to 1953.[48] Livneh came to Israel in the spring of 1950 to consult Sharett and Kaplan as to how to proceed: He was told that it was not yet appropriate to enter into direct contact with the German authorities concerning *reparations*.[49] An elaborate memorandum on "The Problems of Reparations and Restitution for Israel" was submitted to Israel's Finance Ministry on 1 July 1950 by Hendrik van Dam, Secretary-General of the Central Council of German Jews. Its essential proposal was that Israel "dispatch a 'Reparation and Indemnification Mission' with authority to negotiate with German government agencies [regarding individual compensation] . . . and . . . also make preparations for the general reparation claim."[50] Still another person who attempted to persuade Israeli leaders to enter into *direct* talks with Bonn was Robert M. W. Kempner, the Deputy United States Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials, during his visit to Israel late in 1950. But the idea of negotiating directly with the successor to Nazi Germany was still anathema, as the deliberations and initial decisions of Israel's government were to demonstrate. By that time, too, the idea of seeking substantial German reparations *indirectly* offered a viable solution to the dilemma of Israel's decision makers.

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[42] See S. Moses, *Die Judischen Nachkriegsforderungen* (Tel Aviv: Bita'on Verlag, 1944) and G. Landauer, *Der Zionismus in Wandel Dreier Jahrzeiten* (Tel Aviv: Bita'on Verlag, 1957). Among others who suggested a claim to compensation for German material destruction and plunder was Shalom Adler-Rudell, also of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem (F. A. Shinnar, Letter to the Author, 24 January 1966).

[43] *Documents* . . . , 1, pp. 9–12

[44] Adenauer's interview with Karl Marx first appeared in the *Allgemeine Wochenzeitung der Juden in Deutschland*, Issue 33, 25 Nov., 1949. An English version, from which the above extracts are taken, is in *The German Path to Israel*, ed. R. Vogel (London: Oswald Wolff, 1969), pp. 17–18. See also I. Deutschkron. *Israel und die Deutschen: Zwischen Ressentiment und Ratio* (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970), pp. 33–34.

[45] Noted by Balabkins, *West German Reparations to Israel*, p. 86, from an unpublished account by Noah Barou.

[46] Blankenhorn interview with Deutschkron, 8 March 1958. Deutschkron, pp. 36–37. Goldmann also noted Barou's role in bringing him into contact with German officials in 1950. Goldmann interview, 1966 and *The Autobiography of Nahum Goldmann*, p. 254.

[47] K. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen, 1953–1955* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966), Ch. III.

[48] Livneh, like his predecessor, Haim Hoffmann (Yahil), was accredited to the United States Military Government in Munich, not to a German governmental authority. Altmaier was one of Adenauer's key links to the opposition Social Democratic Party, to world Jewry, and to Israeli officials.

The idea of making an indirect claim to German reparations, as a concrete, operational policy act by the Government of Israel, was mooted by David Horowitz in September 1950. Then in London on one of his frequent foreign currency search missions as Director-General of the Finance Ministry, he phoned Sharett, who was attending the UN General Assembly in New York and warned him of a potential economic collapse. "I have ideas for a radical departure," he said: "They involve Germany." A skeptical Sharett met with Horowitz at the Hotel Rafael in Paris and was persuaded of the merits of the proposal—to approach the Four Occupying Powers on the basis of a precise claim: Half a million Jewish refugees were being absorbed by Israel, at a cost of $3,000 per person, justifying a claim to $1.5 billion from the successor governments to Nazi Germany. Horowitz, upon his return to Israel some weeks later, convinced Ben Gurion of its necessity and feasibility. Kaplan's approval had already been given though, as noted, with doubts about its practicability.[51]

The reparations issue came before the Cabinet on 30 October 1950, in the context of a general discussion about Germany prompted by information that the three Western Powers intended to end the state of war with the Federal German Republic. Sharett opened "a very brief debate." As Joseph recalled, "it was said that the time has come—and we will have to take a decision; although stated in general terms, the obvious intent was direct contact with the Germans. I was alone in my dissent."[52] No substantive decision was taken.[53]

The issue was debated at greater length on 27 December. Eytan spoke about the desirability of taking the matter up with Germany, and Joseph proclaimed his emphatic opposition to direct contact. Eytan recalled the scene vividly. " 'If a German official walked in here today and placed $10 million on the table,' said Joseph, 'I would reject it as dirty money.' "[54] Joseph added that, at this meeting, he was joined in dissent by others, notably Rabbi Maimon.[55] The forcefulness of his plea led to a further postponement of a decision, and to rejection of the premature proposal for direct talks.[56] A week later, on 3 January 1951, a high-policy decision was taken: To seek and to accept reparations for Jewish property plundered by Nazi Germany. This would be done through an approach to the Four Powers occupying Germany.[57]

That decision took the form of two Notes to the Powers, dated 16 January and 12 March 1951.[58] Both were drafted by Dr. Leo Kohn, Political Adviser to the Foreign Minister (from 1948 until his death in 1961), and by Horowitz. Kohn contributed the rationale of the historical continuity of Jewry and the legitimacy of the claim to reparations. Horowitz provided the economic formula for the claim to $1.5 billion.[59]

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[49] Yahil interview, 1971.

[50] As cited in Vogel, pp. 21–26. The extract is from pp. 25–26.

[51] Horowitz interviews, 1966 and 1971.

[52] Joseph interview, 1971.

[53] Nine of the 12 ministers were present: Kaplan and Meir were abroad; Rosen was absent. Secretary to the Government, Ze'ev Sharef, and Horowitz also attended the meeting.

[54] Interview, 1971.

[55] Interview, 1971.

[56] In the interim (November), Shazar left the Cabinet, while Lavon and Geri became ministers forming a Cabinet of 13, which made the first basic decision. Of the 13 ministers, three were absent—Kaplan, Rosen and Sharett. Sharef and the Head of the Foreign Ministry's Economic Department, Gershon Meron, were also present.

[57] Present at that formally decisive meeting were 12 of the 13 ministers (Sharett was abroad), Sharef, Attorney-General Haim Cohen, and Foreign Office legal specialist, Eli Nathan.

[58] Identical Notes were sent to the US, UK, and France, and a similar one to the Soviet Union, on 16 January, those to France and the USSR in French. Identical Notes were later sent to the Four Powers, to France on 11 March, to the others the following day. *Documents* . . . , 3–5, pp. 13–24.

There were two types of claim set forth in the January Note. The first pertained to dispossessed *individuals* and urged upon the Powers:

(a) The retention of control over restitution and indemnification among the powers reserved to the Allied Occupation Authorities. . . .
(b) The improvement of the existing indemnification laws—in particular, the adoption of a General Claim Law for the whole of the Federal Republic of Germany.
(c) The immediate assumption by the Government of the German Federal Republic of financial liability under the indemnification laws, jointly and severally with the Laender.
(d) The speeding up of actual restitution and payment of compensation claims.
(e) The urgent solution of the transfer problem between the parties concerned.

The second was a general claim in respect of the wholesale destruction of European Jewry, stating that, "The Government of Israel cannot reconcile itself to the enjoyment by Germany of the fruit of its rapine and murder, while the victims of an unholy regime are denied all comfort and redress."

That specific claim was to form the subject of the March 1951 Note, stating that the value "of the Jewish property confiscated and plundered by the Germans . . . is authoritatively estimated to aggregate over six billion dollars." But the basis of the claim was the cost of absorbing 500,000 refugees from Nazi-decimated Europe, "which would involve an overall expenditure of one and a half billion dollars. This figure corresponds approximately to the value of exports from Western Germany alone in 1950. . . ."[60] Israel sought acceptance of "the justice of its claim" and "an early expression of views . . . concerning the practical steps . . . towards implementing the proposals. . . ." The following day, 13 March 1951, Sharett read the second note to the Knesset and concluded with the pungent reference to—"German . . . hands . . . still smeared with blood . . . , their plunder . . . still under their cloak."

The formal response of the Powers was disappointing. Moscow acknowledged Israel's Notes but never answered them. The Western Powers were sympathetic but declined to intervene. The British, for example, wrote on 5 July: "His Majesty's Government regret that they cannot see their way to impose upon the Federal Government the task of making reparation to the Government of Israel as a condition" to the normalization of relations. Washington and Paris echoed this sentiment.[61] Later Sharett referred to these replies "as an attempt to force us into the Procrustean frame of a request for war reparations," which would have "obliterated the unique nature of our cause. . . . But, unlike East Germany, they were at least frank in telling us what they thought of our claim."[62]

The issue which had been avoided now began to emerge: Whether or not to accept the idea of direct negotiations with West Germany. There were as yet no formal bids from Bonn, though several signals had been transmitted. One came on 8 April 1951, when "Adenauer sent someone to our people to say that he had considered our Note and had come to the conclusion that Germany should pay substantial compensation."[63] Another took the form of a remark by West German President Heuss in mid-July that Germany was ready for talks with Israel on all outstanding problems.[64] The most important, however, was the first high-level contact between Israeli and West German officials.

The meeting was held at the Hotel Bristol in Paris on 6 May 1951, "a cloak and dagger affair," recalled Horowitz, one of the four persons present: The others were Adenauer, Blankenhorn, and Maurice Fischer, Israel's Minister (later, Ambassador) to France. Horowitz began by describing Nazi persecution of the Jews as the greatest crime in human history, which could neither be forgiven nor forgotten: "You owe it to yourselves to make amends." At Sharett's behest he emphasized two points: (a) Germany must issue a "guilt declaration" before financial negotiations began (Adenauer remarked, "I always condemned those crimes and was a friend of the Jews;" Horowitz insisted that the declaration be a solemn act of state; Adenauer was reluctant but he agreed); (b) "If reparations are to be paid, they must be of the order of our claim," though there could be minor changes ("Adenauer tried to avoid a commitment but he finally yielded on this too"). They agreed to deny the meeting had taken place but to inform, respectively, the US State Department and the US High Commissioner in Germany.[65] How significant this confrontation was in the decision flow is difficult to measure. Shinnar sheds some light on this point:

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[59] Many persons confirmed Kohn's primary drafting role—Ben Gurion, Eytan, Horowitz, Meir, Shinnar, etc.

[60] *Documents* . . . , 5, p. 24.

[61] The Western Powers' replies to Israel's Notes of 16 January and 12 March 1951 are in *Documents* . . . , 7–12, pp. 28–41. The extract is from p. 37.

[62] M. Sharett, *Problems of the State: German Reparations* (Jerusalem: Government Information Services, 1952), pp. 8–9.

[63] Joseph interview, 1971.

[64] He added, in an interview with the New York Jewish magazine, *Aufbau*, that "it will take a long time," but he was confident that "love between one human being and another will form a bridge between the two groups. . . ." Reported in *Jerusalem Post*, 20 July 1951.

> David Horowitz expressed his views forcefully and with great emotion. In July 1958 I visited Chancellor Adenauer with Maurice Fischer, and he remembered the meeting that took place seven years ago and the persuasive content of Horowitz' words. He even remembered with what passion and stormy feelings these words resounded in his ears. . . .[66]

There were other encounters, notably one between Israeli and West German delegates to the Congress of the Inter-Parliamentary Union at Istanbul at the beginning of September 1951. Carlo Schmid, who later served as Vice-President of the *Diet*, recalled the protest of Yitzhak Ben Zvi against the German presence at the Congress as "a terrible and dreadful philippic . . . , a fearful speech. I have seldom heard anyone speak with such passion." Yet the two delegations met, and an "agreement" reportedly emerged that the Israelis would inquire whether a Bonn offer to negotiate reparations would be acceptable.[67]

All of these contacts, along with continued prodding by the United States, led to Adenauer's solemn Declaration of 27 September before the *Bundestag*. Guilt was acknowledged by the Chancellor, but he made a precise distinction between the German nation and the Nazi regime: "The great majority of the *German people* abhorred the crimes committed against the Jews and had no part in them. . . . Many Germans . . . were prepared to help their Jewish compatriots. . . ." And he cited "the immense destruction of Jewish valuables by *National Socialism*." Even the operative passage absolved Germany from collective guilt, while assuming responsibility for restitution:

> But unspeakable crimes were perpetrated *in the name of the German people,* which impose upon them the obligation to make moral and material amends . . . first steps have already been taken, but *much remains to be done.*
>
> Thus the Federal Government is prepared, jointly with representatives of Jewry and the State of Israel, which has admitted so many homeless Jewish refugees, *to bring about a solution of the material reparation problem. . . .*[68]

The Government of Israel's initial reaction was cautiously positive: "The Chancellor's declaration appears to represent an attempt on the part of the Government of the German Federal Republic at last to face this great issue and to initiate some measure of moral and material reparation to the Jewish people." It added, pointedly: "No such acknowledgement of 'unspeakable crimes' has come from the East German Republic, which is under an equal obligation."[69]

Adenauer's declaration "did not come as a surprise to us," said Shinnar; in fact, the draft was scrutinized by Jewish and Israeli representatives, including Barou, Goldmann and Shinnar. The first draft was prepared by the West Germans in July 1951. It took almost three months of negotiations to agree upon a text which met justified Jewish demands. And it was Barou, generally credited with a vital role in the predecision phase, who convinced Adenauer that Israel must be the principal beneficiary of collective compensation.[70] Adenauer himself referred to these consultations: "I had previously enquired whether my offer would not be declined in Israel and by the Jewish world organizations. I received favourable answers."[71] Yet he had not acknowledged German national guilt.[72] Nor had he accepted the amount of the Israeli claim as the basis for a settlement. And he had intruded a bargaining element into a solemn act: "With regard to the extent of reparations . . . the limits must be considered which are set by the German ability to pay. . ." Thus it was accepted only as a first step.

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[65] Horowitz interview, 1966. His written account, in unpublished memoirs of the period, 1948–70, which was shown to the author in 1971, is substantially the same but more detailed. The Horowitz-Adenauer meeting, a vital input into the decision process for the tactical decision, was first recorded in F. A. Shinnar, *Be'ol Kora Ouregashot: Yahasei Yisrael-Germania 1951–1966* (Tel Aviv: Schocken Publishing House, 1967) p. 18.

[66] Shinnar, p. 18.

[67] Schmid's tape-recorded account is in Vogel, *The German Path to Israel,* pp. 19–20.

[68] For the German text and Hebrew translation see *Documents . . . ,* 13, pp. 41–43. An English version, from which the above extracts are taken, is in K. R. Grossmann, *Germany's Moral Debt: The German-Israel Agreement* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1954), Appendix IV, pp. 59–60 (emphasis added). A somewhat different English translation, along with statements by representatives of all German parties, is contained in Vogel, pp. 32–35. Adenauer, in his memoirs, devoted a paragraph to this development, *Erinnerungen, 1953–1955,* p. 136.

[69] Government of Israel Statement, 27 Sept. 1951, in *Documents . . . ,* 14, p. 45.

[70] Shinnar interview, 1965: N. Barou, "The Origin of the German Agreement," *Congress Weekly,* 19, 24, (13 October, 1952) pp. 6, 7; Goldmann, p. 56. On Barou's role see Fraenkel and Goldmann in *Essays in Jewish Sociology, Labor and Cooperation in Memory of Dr. Noah Barou, 1889–1955,* ed. M. F. Infield (London: Yoseloff, 1962), pp. 7, 11. Goldmann also recalled (interview, 1966) that Jacob Altmaier brought the Adenauer draft to him for approval and that some of his proposed changes were accepted.

[71] Adenauer, p. 136.

[72] Goldmann sought only an acknowledgement of

It was one of Goldmann's major achievements to ease Israel's path to the highly controversial tactical decision. This he accomplished during his first meeting with Adenauer, at the Claridge Hotel in London on 6 December 1951. After a 25-minute peroration (Barou and Blankenhorn were the only others present), Goldmann indicated that Ben Gurion would not take the issue of direct talks to the Knesset unless he could be assured that Adenauer accepted the $1 billion claim as the basis for negotiations. "You do not know me," replied the Chancellor, "but people who do, know that I am a man of few words. While you spoke, I felt the winds of world history about me." Then and there he offered a commitment and asked Goldmann to prepare a draft. The letter was brought to Adenauer the same day at Chatham House, where he was to deliver a lecture, and was signed at once. The operative clause read: "The Federal Government is ready to accept the claims which the Government of the State of Israel has formulated in its note of 12 March 1951 as the basis for these negotiations."[73]

That letter was written to Goldmann as Chairman of a newly established Conference of Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, an umbrella organization of 22 Jewish groups to speak for world Jewry in negotiations with Germany. It was convened by Goldmann at Sharett's suggestion and held its inaugural meeting in New York on 25–26 October 1951. The Conference extended "its wholehearted support of the [Israeli] claim . . . ," demanded "satisfaction of all other Jewish claims against Germany . . . ," and called for "immediate steps to improve existing restitution and indemnification legislation and procedures," to enact further laws, and "to speed up the settlement of claims." The Conference also established an Executive Committee of 13, headed by Goldmann, and "authorized [it] to take such practical steps as developments may necessitate."[74]

Just before that conclave "a stormy discussion" took place at Kaplan's home in Jerusalem over the issue of coordination between Israel and the Claims Conference; the protagonists were Goldmann and Georg Landauer, a highly-respected figure in the Zionist Movement. A formula prepared by Shinnar "in good faith . . . was accepted by Kaplan and Sharett but was forcefully opposed by . . . Goldmann: In his opinion I emphasized too much—out of naiveté and lack of knowledge ('what a nest of wasps I was getting into')—the special right of the State of Israel as representative of the Jewish People. . ." The disagreement was quickly resolved.[75]

With Bonn's acceptance of the Israeli claim as the basis of negotiations, Israel's decision

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the German people's "responsibility for Nazi crimes," not of "guilt." Goldmann interview, 1966.

[73] The Chancellor mistakenly identified Barou as Israel's Ambassador to the UK, present under an assumed name. For his account of the meeting and the German text of his letter see Adenauer, pp. 137–9. An English translation of Adenauer's letter, from which the above extract is taken, is in Grossmann, Appendix V, p. 61. The English version in Vogel, *The German Path to Israel,* is slightly different. More significant and unsubstantiated is Vogel's remark that "Konrad Adenauer's generous offer . . . was made against the will of the Allied powers"; p. 36.

In perspective, Israel had committed a major error in directing her original claim to both German states—in a 2:1 ratio—$1 billion from West Germany and $.5 billion from East Germany, for Bonn claimed to represent *all* of Germany in *all* foreign policy issues. It was the only time that Bonn acquiesced in representing part of Germany! And East Germany peremptorily rejected Israel's claim.

Before the meeting, Goldmann demanded full authority from Ben Gurion to speak in the name of Israel, as well as of world Jewry. Goldmann believed he had received such authority. This point and the above account of their meeting is based upon the Goldmann interview, 1966. Adenauer, too, perceived Goldmann's dual representative role. In his letter to Finance Minister Schäffer on 29 February 1952, urging that "negotiations be prepared and conducted in a spirit appropriate to the moral and political weight and uniqueness of our obligations," the Chancellor referred to Goldmann as "chairman of the Conference on Jewish Claims against Germany and delegate of the government of the State of Israel . . ." Vogel, pp. 37–38. Adenauer had conferred with his financial adviser, the prominent banker, Hermann Abs, in London on 3 December, just before his scheduled meeting with Goldmann. Abs urged the Chancellor not to incur any new obligations. Abs later declared that he did not know of Adenauer's 6 December commitment to Goldmann until 29 February 1952, when an Israeli diplomat mentioned it to him. Only on 8 March was he informed, in Bonn, of the forthcoming Wassenaar talks. He wished to resign but was dissuaded by Adenauer. (Abs interview with Balabkins, 21 July 1966; Balabkins, p. 126.)

[74] The text of the main Claims Conference resolution is in Grossmann, p. 17.

[75] Shinnar, pp. 19–20. Shinnar had served in several economic posts in the Israeli bureaucracy from 1948 to 1951. On 1 July 1951 he became Adviser to the Foreign Ministry on the reparations issue.

about direct talks could no longer be delayed. Thus the period 6 December 1951 to 9 January 1952 was to see an increasingly tense political battle which split the nation and caused agony across the land. Ranged on one side were diverse parties, interest groups, and individuals who were repelled by the idea of direct contact with the successor to Nazi Germany. On the other were the "realists," mostly in *Mapai*.

The issue was debated by *Mapai's* leadership at a tense evening session on 28 November. Ben Gurion led off with a résumé of informal contacts and proposed approval of direct negotiations. He emphasized Israel's "right" to reparations, the unwillingness of Western Powers to act as intermediaries, the necessity of direct talks, and the economic importance of restitution funds. Sharett followed with a similar line of argument. Sprinzak, the first Speaker of the Knesset, was strongly opposed, emphasizing the moral standing of Jewry: "This dictated," he said, "that Israel *not* meet with the present generation of Germans." Dvorjhetsky, a partisan leader in Nazi-occupied Europe, spoke in the same vein, provoking the Prime Minister to term this a *"Galut"* view, that is, a view of Jewry in exile; further, "a free people has a right to decide."

There were other clashes, notably one between Mrs. Meyerson (Meir) and Peretz Naftali, then Minister without Portfolio. Mrs. Meir, the future Prime Minister, recalled: "My own view was, by all means, yes, but this did not imply forgiveness. At a party meeting I said, 'It must be clear that we are demanding what is ours by right and that we are not making up with the Germans.' "[76] Naftali dissented, urging that Israel not go to the talks with this "racist" attitude. Despite these and other critical voices, there was a clear majority in favor of direct negotiations.[77] That decision was to determine the voting behavior of *Mapai* ministers in the Cabinet session which followed two other discussions—one by the Directorate of the Jewish Agency, on 10 December, and one by the Knesset Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, on 17 December.

By that time there were changes in the composition of Israel's government, both among parties and persons. After the Second Knesset elections on 30 July 1951 the Progressives had refused to join a narrow coalition, leaving a four-party government of 13 ministers with even greater *Mapai* domination: *Mapai* (9); *Ha-po'el Ha-mizrahi* (2); *Mizrahi* (1); and *Agudat Yisrael* (1). There was also a turnover of five ministers: Geri, Lavon, Maimon, Remez, and Rosen were replaced by Dinaburg (Dinur), Eshkol, and Naftali of *Mapai*, Burg of *Ha-po'el Ha-mizrahi*, and Pinkas of *Mizrahi*.

The issue of direct negotiations was discussed and decided by the Cabinet on 30 December 1951. As Mrs. Meir recalled: "Within the Cabinet many sat on the fence, but we [*Mapai*] took a stand."[78] Joseph himself had become reconciled to the inevitable: "No one in the Government doubted the desirability of making the Germans pay; but it became clear after a while that it had to be negotiated directly."[79] The decision, one of the most controversial in Israel's foreign policy, provided for a *Government Statement to the Knesset on 2 January 1952, requesting authority to act in the best interests of Israel.*[80] Sharett was initially designated to present the Statement; but under the impact of events, that task was assumed by Ben Gurion. The appointed date was postponed to the 7th, and ten hours were allocated to parliamentary debate.

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[76] Meir interview, 1966.

[77] This account is based upon a participant's recollection; Yahil interview, 1971. Zalman Aranne, then a member of the Knesset Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, was also reportedly opposed to direct talks, Shinnar, Letter to the Author, 24 January 1966. Three days earlier the issue was discussed before the Young *Mapai* Circle. The party newspaper reported that emotional objections were strongly voiced, but that "correct information . . . [provided by speakers Yahil and Shinnar] will do much to cancel unbiased suspicions." *Ha-dor*, 26 November 1951.

A reading of the *Mapai* press which reported all party meetings of any consequence, indicates that the reparations issue was not a topic of frequent discussion and debate in party organs. During the entire period of the decision process, the daily *Ha-dor* carried three editorials (17 Jan., 28 Sept., and 9 Dec. 1951) and three articles (13 July and 5, 16 Oct. 1951). The party weekly, *Ha-po'el Ha-tza'ir*, carried only one editorial on reparations (30 Oct. 1951) and two advocacy articles (18 Dec. 1951 and 15 Jan. 1952).

[78] Meir interview, 1966. All of the 13 ministers except Pinkas were present at the 30 December 1951 meeting, along with Sharef, and Abba Eban, then Ambassador to the US and Permanent Representative to the UN.

[79] Joseph interview, 1971.

[80] It can be argued that the de facto decision to enter into direct talks with Bonn was taken before Adenauer's Declaration of 27 September 1951, on the grounds that he would not have made it without an advance, though informal, positive response from Israel. Adenauer and others, as noted, confirmed these consultations. Yet in terms of the decision flow this was a predecisional act. The decision itself was not taken by the Government until 30 December (the date was explicitly foreshadowed by the *Mapai* newspaper, *Ha-dor*, 26 Dec. 1951); and it was not confirmed until after the Knesset and its Foreign Affairs and Security Committee authorized the Government to act, in mid-January 1952. Moreover, as late as 30

The first nine days of January 1952 were among the most tempestuous in Israel's history. The contending political coalitions marshalled their forces, and the rising crescendo of bitterness and hate was felt all across the land. In political terms the choice was simple—an Israeli initiative or allowing the matter to fade away through inaction.

On 1 January Members of the Knesset (MKs) from coalition parties met in Jerusalem to debate the government proposal. *Open* dissent was limited to the religious parties, and after a three-hour discussion the Cabinet stand was approved. Three days later the executive of *Ha-po'el Ha-mizrahi* decided to support direct negotiations but to allow its dissenting MKs to abstain in the Knesset vote; (it was known that 6 would support the Government and 2 would abstain). Another religious faction within the coalition, *Mizrahi,* decided to treat the issue as a matter of conscience; (Communications Minister Pinkas was committed to vote for direct talks, while Rabbi Nurock would oppose).

The two extremes of the legitimate political spectrum—*Herut* and *Mapam*—held protest meetings at Mograbi Hall in Tel Aviv on the 4th and 5th.[81] Begin, an advocate of nationalist purity down through the years, called for active dissent, in the form of an open letter to all Israelis to volunteer in this "hour of emergency" to save Israel's honor.[82] This was echoed the following day by the editor of *Ma'ariv,* E. Karlebach, who attacked the government stand on material and moral grounds. *Yedi'ot Aharonot,* too, was strongly opposed to direct talks, in its editorials on the 6th.

Constitutionally, the government of Israel is not bound by Knesset directives unless they are embodied in a legislative act. On the issue of direct talks with West Germany, however, the Cabinet sought Knesset approval because of the gravity of the act. This had been pledged at the previous parliamentary debate on foreign affairs. Thus the matter was brought to the House as a Statement, not a proposal.

The three-day debate (7, 8, and 9 January) took place in an atmosphere of violence unprecedented in Israeli parliamentary life. The Opposition—*Herut,* General Zionists, *Mapam,* and *Maki*—were known to control 51 certain votes in a House of 120. When Prime Minister Ben Gurion rose to present his government's Statement on the evening of the 7th, the scene outside the Knesset building on King George Street in Jerusalem was one of mounting tension, with angry demonstrators in the thousands, the sirens of police cars and ambulances, and sporadic explosions of grenades. Window panes were splintered by rocks, while the fumes of tear-gas bombs entered from the streets. In the two-hour melee, 92 policemen and 36 civilians were reported injured. At 7 p.m. an army detachment arrived, and by 7:30 order was restored. A few blocks away, in Zion Square, Begin, with the venerable Professor Joseph Klausner by his side, had roused passions even further by charging that the police were using gas grenades made in Germany!

The debate began with Ben Gurion's moving statement. His concluding remarks, already cited, were not easily stilled: "Let not the murderers of our people be their inheritors as well!" This was followed by three passionately critical speeches by Elimeleh Rimalt (General Zionists), Ya'acov Hazan, the second-ranking leader of *Mapam,* and Begin. "We are torn between the rational and logical, and the emotional, in this debate," Rimalt began. "Compensation will ease the conscience of the Germans, but this is something we should not do. How will we educate our youth that materialism cannot substitute for moral qualities? What will happen to our moral uniqueness . . . ?"

Hazan attacked Adenauer's Germany as unrepentant, and he ridiculed the *Mapai* illusion of confining relations to reparations: ". . . this is impossible. Negotiations mean recognition of a neo-Nazi Government, managed mostly by ex-Nazis, whose Military [Establishment] is already Nazi today." Furthermore, "we cannot be on the same side as the Nazis in the Cold War." In the midst of Hazan's speech *Herut*'s Yohanan Bader entered the Knesset yelling, "Gas against the Jews; with that you will win!" *Maki* leaders Meir Wilner and Esther Wilenska entered and cried out: "People are being mur-

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November 1951 Israel had approached the three Western Powers once more, seeking their intervention to "impress on the . . . Federal Republic of Germany the urgent and compelling necessity to give effective satisfaction to its claims . . ." (Note to the United Kingdom). The text of the three similar Notes is in *Documents* . . . , 16–18, pp. 47-56. Only *after* Adenauer's letter to Goldmann on 6 December and *after* the Western Powers reaffirmed their policy in favor of direct negotiations (their replies were sent in mid- and late January, after the Israeli decision was made (*Documents* . . . , 23–24, pp. 62–3), but their view was communicated informally in December 1951) were all of the external inputs present in Israel's foreign policy system. It then proceeded to generate the tactical decision

[81] *Maki,* the Communist Party of Israel, was a legal organization, but being outspokenly anti-Zionist it was beyond *political legitimacy* in Israel. That pariah status changed in 1965 when *Maki* split into two, and Dr. Moshe Sneh led the Jewish remnant to a nationalist stance. See M. Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* . . . , pp. 166–8.

[82] *Herut,* 5 Jan. 1952.

dered outside, they are shooting." Stones came crashing through the window, and then gas where *Mapam* members were sitting. Some sought safety, others remained in their seats.

The stoning continued when Begin rose to address the House. A gifted orator with a demagogic capacity to sway a crowd, he carried his rage from Zion Square to the floor of the Knesset. He attacked the Bonn regime as Nazi and asked rhetorically about Adenauer: "In which concentration camp did he sit during the Nazi era . . . And who are his aides . . . ?" Charging that Israel would receive at most $300 million (of $6 billion in plundered property), he demanded: "Who gave you the right to take only 5 per cent and leave 95 per cent to the murderer?" He added, "You will be sellers of German goods produced by Nazi factories." Turning to the Prime Minister, he implored: "I ask Mr. Ben Gurion, as a son of an orphaned nation to a son of an orphaned nation—don't! Go to the nation. Hold a referendum. Actually, I think this referendum was already rejected by those killed at Auschwitz, Treblinka, etc. I ask the members of the House to take no part in the vote." He even appealed to Arab MKs to abstain, on moral grounds, this being something for Jews to decide. (Had they heeded this call, the Government's majority would have been reduced to 3 or 4 votes.). Then, taunted by the Prime Minister who, from his seat, referred to a petition against reparations signed by distinguished men, who "are not identified with your hooligans in the street," Begin accused Ben Gurion of being a "murderer." Deputy Speaker Yosef Serlin called on Begin to retract, but he refused until BG did so. Ordered to leave the rostrum, Begin raged: "If I don't speak, nobody will speak." And finally, in a typical Begin flourish, he waived his parliamentary immunity, said it would be his last Knesset appearance, and exclaimed: "I know we will be dragged to the concentration camps. . . . We will die together."

The meeting was adjourned at 6:45 p.m. amidst disorder and was reconvened three hours later, after Begin had retracted his epithet. Lavon concluded the debate on the 7th with an attack on Begin's threat of rebellion: "The *Herut* leader speaks in the name of the Six Million. Who gave you a monopoly on their ideas? Those who are alive must decide, according to their responsibility to the future of this nation."

The debate continued the next day in a tense but quieter atmosphere. Rosen led off and supported direct talks. "We cannot hate and seek revenge now," he said; "we are responsible for the building up of our country." He was followed by *Mapai*'s Zalman Shazar, later President of Israel, who proclaimed, "The restitution money is ours, it belongs to us, it's Jewish money;" *Maki's* Mikunis, who emphasized US pressure and accused the Government of treason; and *Mizrahi's* Nurock, who referred to talks with Germany as "a spiritual and moral catastrophe." Then, with varying degrees of intensity and with different arguments, came supporting speeches by *Mapai's* Aranne and Meyerson (Meir), *Ha-po'el Ha-mizrahi's* Michael Hazani, and *Mizrahi's* Pinkas, interspersed with opposing speeches by General Zionist Yosef Saphir, *Mapam's* Yisrael Bar-Yehuda (from the *Ahdut Ha'avoda* wing), and the Progressive Ishar Harari, among others.

The debate was closed by Sharett on the 9th with a speech revealing much about his own image, as noted. He dismissed Begin's words and *Herut's* deeds as "throes of death . . . , the pangs accompanying the death of a political party and the decline of one who aspired to leadership . . . [by] a return to a technique of blood-letting. . . ." He chided Nurock for his descent to the level of expediency and he paid respect to Harari's principled opposition and prescience. The main thrust of his remarks, however, was directed to the criticisms levelled by *Mapam* and General Zionist speakers. Patiently, in the manner of a schoolteacher, he explained why Israel ought to enter into direct talks with Bonn. And he reminded his listeners that direct contact with the Germans by private Jewish organizations had been the norm for some years. Yet to forestall any misunderstanding among his friends and foes in Israel, among the Germans, and among people elsewhere, the Foreign Minister read out a three-point statement as the Israel Government's formal reply to Adenauer's Declaration before the *Bundestag:*

> First, the Government adheres steadfastly to the view that the *entire German people* bears responsibility for the mass murder of European Jewry.
>
> Secondly, the Government sees no convincing signs that, since the conclusion of the War, anti-Semitism has been eliminated from the German people either in Eastern or Western Germany.
>
> Thirdly, we do not consider that the mere payment of reparations constitutes a complete settlement of this grave account . . . [It] cannot wipe out the fearful crimes committed by the Nazis and the stain they left on the German people.[83]

Two proposals were before the House: The government motion read:

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[83] M. Sharett, *Problems of the State: German Reparations,* pp. 3, 4, 12, 22–24, 25, 31 (emphasis added).

> The Knesset, after hearing the Government's Statement on the demand for reparations from Germany, for plundered Jewish property, empowers the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security to determine finally the action in accordance with the circumstances and conditions.[84]

The opposition motion, proposed by Yosef Saphir and four other MKs, read:

> The Knesset does not agree to negotiations between the Government of Israel and Germany concerning reparations.

The government proposal was approved by 60 to 51, with 5 abstentions and 4 members absent: The narrow majority comprised *Mapai's* 45 MKs, 5 Arabs belonging to affiliated parties, 6 from *Ha-po'el Ha-mizrahi,* 3 Progressives, and 1 from *Agudat Yisrael;* the opposition parties voted *en bloc;* and 5 MKs from religious parties abstained.[85]

It remained for the Knesset Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security to authorize direct negotiations. This was done on 15 January 1952 by a vote of 8 to 6, with a *Mapam* member absent. The operative clause read:

> . . . the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security decides to authorize the Government to act in the matter of reparations from Germany including the possibility of direct negotiations, according to the needs of the issue and the hour. . . .[86]

Thus ended the decision-making process on the tactical decision, the most agonizing and controversial act in the drama of German reparations.[87]

The transfer of authority from the Government to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee was one noteworthy feature of the decision. Another was that, although a foreign policy issue in the strict sense, the government Statement was, at the last moment, presented to the Knesset by the Prime Minister, not by the Foreign Minister. As Ben Gurion remarked many years later, "we knew it would be a stormy debate."[88] Moreover, as Mrs. Meir recalled, "it was a matter of national importance, not just a foreign policy issue;"[89] and, as many added, they wanted to provide the sanction of full support by the highest governmental authority.

To classify all acts of Israel (and world Jewry) in the decision flow after 15 January 1952 as of the Implementing type is not to denigrate their importance. Yet the first Note (16 January 1951) may be regarded as irrevocable; that is, "from then on our energy was geared to making it a success; the decisions thereafter were self-propelled."[90] Adenauer had accepted the Israeli claim for $1 billion as "the basis for negotiations," but the path to agreement was strewn with obstacles. In overcoming them, those who negotiated with West Germany performed an invaluable function, especially the "crisis intervener" for both delegations, Goldmann, and the Joint Heads of the Israeli team, Giora Josephthal (political) and Shinnar (economic).

There were four separate but related agreements. In the first, the Reparations Agreement proper, the Federal Republic of Germany undertook to pay DM 3 billion ($715 million) to the Government of Israel over a period of twelve to fourteen years. In Protocol Number One, Bonn pledged itself to enact new legislation for individual compensation. Protocol Number Two provided for the payment of DM 450 million ($107 million) to the Jewish Claims Conference to cover Jewish property without known heirs. Israel was to receive the full amount of DM 3.45 billion ($822 million) and to transfer to the Claims Conference its share in goods. And in Protocol Number Three Israel undertook to refund the value of the property of the German Templars in Israel, which had been nationalized.[91]

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[84] That motion was unique in the annals of Israel's parliamentary history: The Plenary was not to decide anything on substance except to leave everything in the hands of its Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. This was designed to evade another expected storm in the House. Of course, the party composition of that Committee assured the government motion a majority.

[85] This account was based upon *Divrei Ha-knesset,* X (2), 38th, 39th, and 40th Meetings of the 2nd Knesset, pp. 895–964, supplemented by the detailed reports in *Ha'aretz* and *Jerusalem Post,* 8–10 Jan. 1952.

[86] The Hebrew text is in *Documents* . . . , 22, p. 61.

[87] Ben Gurion later wrote that "the request for and acceptance of [direct negotiations] created a tremendous storm in the Knesset and the newspapers, the like of which had never before been seen in Israel." Further, ". . . this stormy debate [7–9 Jan.] 1952 . . . had no precedent in the annals of the Knesset . . ." D. Ben Gurion, *Medinat Yisrael Ha-mehudeshet* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1969), pp. 421–3. A slightly different English translation is contained in D. Ben Gurion, *Israel: A Personal History* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1971), pp. 399–400.

[88] Ben Gurion interview, 1966. The tension did not abate quickly. On 19 January 1952, after the decision was authorized, Begin threatened to advocate nonpayment of taxes if German money were accepted. The following day he was suspended by the Knesset (56 to 47) for the rest of the session for "threatening the Knesset with acts of violence." *Jerusalem Post,* 22 Jan. 1952.

[89] Meir interview, 1966.

[90] Bartur interview, 1966. Many other observers and participants agreed.

The agreements between West Germany and Israel were signed by Adenauer and Sharett, and those relating to the Claims Conference by Adenauer and Goldmann—at a solemn, simple ceremony in Luxembourg's City Hall on 10 September 1952. There were no speeches, not even a perfunctory handshake among the principals.[92] However else Israel reacted, it was a distortion of reality to say, as Goldmann did, that "the signing of the agreement was greeted with . . . joy . . ."[93] The more sober judgment of Shinnar was closer to the truth:

> I believe one may say that public opinion and the prevailing opinion in parliament welcomed this treaty . . . as a serious contribution to reparations for the material wrong done and the resulting damage; at least a clear difference was apparent as against the reception by public opinion at the beginning of the negotiations.[94]

It remained to ratify the agreements. The process took six months, largely because massive Arab pressure was directed toward the Bonn regime, political parties and MPs, and toward German firms with an interest in the Middle East. Egypt went so far as to demand equal compensation. But Arab pressure was rebuffed, and the *Bundestag* approved the agreements on 18 March 1953 with *Bundesrat* ratification on 20 March.[95] Two days later the Government of Israel ratified the agreements. Thus ended a two-year process of foreign policy decision making by Israel on the issue of reparations.

Feedback

Several components of Israel's foreign policy system received feedback in the course of the decisions on reparations (1950–2). The spillover to later decisions can also be discerned. All of these effects may be analyzed within the framework of the two environments. It should be emphasized that the concept of feedback applied here does not imply a one-to-one mechanical relationship between the initial high-policy decision (concerning reparations) and all subsequent decisions within a designated issue (relating to Germany). Rather, the contention is that the strategic decision of 1951 was the *necessary, but not sufficient,* condition for later Israeli strategic decisions on Germany.

In the *external* sphere, a cumulative impact is evident in two components: Relations with Germany (B); and, partly as a consequence of that relationship, Israel's growing association with a regional system other than the Middle East, that is, Western Europe (SO). As a former Director-General of the Foreign Ministry observed: "The reparations decision made it easier for us to take later decisions about Germany—to reconcile to the reality of a 'new Germany.' "[96] The evidence bears this out. For one thing the tension during the decision crises of 1957–8 (arms purchased from Germany), 1959 (arms sales to Germany), and 1965 (diplomatic relations), while greater than for most other foreign policy decisions, was less in duration and intensity than the initial explosion of 1951–2. Further, each successive act, including the Ben Gurion-Adenauer meeting of 1960 and the (secret) arms aid agreement of that year, eased the way to *rapprochement,* forged closer links, and broadened support for Israel from a re-emerging Great Power in the conflict with her Arab adversaries. Stated briefly, the reparations decisions were the first step not only on West Germany's path to Israel but, in terms of her foreign policy capability, on Israel's path to West Germany.

Although the relationship never attained the status of a formal alliance or even, as with

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[91] The official name of the Agreement was "Agreement Between the State of Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed on 10 September 1952, at Luxembourg." *Documents* . . . , pp. 125–72. The basic text is also in Grossmann, *Germany's Moral Debt: The German-Israel Agreement,* Appendix II, pp. 37–57, and in Vogel, *The German Path to Israel,* pp. 56–68. See also Balabkins, *West German Reparations to Israel,* pp. 143–7. On the legal aspects see F. Honig, "The Reparations Agreement Between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany," *American Journal of International Law,* 48 (1954, pp. 564–78). For a cursory general analysis see also P. Giniewski, "Germany and Israel: The Reparations Treaty of September 10, 1952," *World Affairs Quarterly,* 30 (1959–60), pp. 169–85, and T. Prittie, *Konrad Adenauer 1876–1967* (London: Tom Stacey, 1972), pp. 203–8.

[92] On the signing ceremony see Adenauer, pp. 155–6; Goldmann, pp. 273–4; Shinnar, pp. 43–46; and Balabkins, pp. 137–8.

[93] Goldmann, p. 274.

[94] A comment in 1962. Vogel, p. 87.

[95] The vote was 239 to 35, with 86 abstentions. There was a marked dissent in Adenauer's own party (for example Finance Minister Schäfer voted against the Christian Democrats) in contrast to the overwhelming support by the Social Democrats. Ratification by the *Bundesrat* (Upper House) on 20 March came just before the end of the parliamentary session. Any further delay would have meant the loss of a year (1953 to 1954) in the beginning of the flow of reparations payments—at a time of grave economic distress for Israel. The struggle for ratification in West Germany is discussed at length in Balabkins, pp. 147–50; Goldmann, pp. 275–6; Grossmann, pp. 27–29, 31–35; Shinnar, pp. 49–56; and Vogel, pp. 69–87.

[96] Eytan interview, 1971.

Figure 3 FEEDBACK: GERMAN REPARATIONS


OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
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Attitudinal Prism
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M–S
P–D
E–D
C–S
FORMULATION
IMPLEMENTATION
T+S

France, a de facto alliance, Germany was to become an increasingly valuable bilateral component in Israel's foreign policy system. It was to contribute economic aid (to the value of $35–40 million per annum) after the conclusion of reparations payments in 1965; military assistance (approximately $50 million a year from 1960–5); and political support in Israel's prolonged efforts to secure a viable association with "Europe."

From 1960 on, Israel was engaged in a massive campaign to obtain entry into the European Common Market. Her principal supporter within the Community was the Benelux group, especially Holland. France was not unfriendly. But Italy used influence to prevent any relationship beyond a preferential trade agreement. Even that minimal form of association was achieved (in 1964) only after an intense struggle. West Germany's role was vital, not only as one of the most powerful members of the Market, but also through her pressure on the other important state in the EEC, France. Thus, reparations, by reopening the door to West Ger-

Feedback: German Reparations*

	Operational Environment	*Psychological Environment and Policy Derivatives*
	External	*External*
SO	Strengthened Israel's ties with West Germany and thereby facilitated Israel's later (1960 ff) quest for association with "Europe"	Perception of "Israel as part of Europe" from late 1950s, with Germany as complementary (to France) path to "Europe": Policy derivative was goal of link with European Common Market, realized in part with Preferential Trade Agreement, 1964 (E-D)
B	Created precedent for multiple ties to West Germany by easing psycho-political barriers to normal bilateral relations	Image of "new" Germany as economic, political, and military support for Israel, both on Common Market issue and in conflict with Arab adversaries: Notable policy derivatives were (secret) arms agreements (1957-58, 1960) and diplomatic relations (1965), as well as economic aid (post-1965) (M-S, P-D, E-D)
	Internal	*Internal*
M	Broadened and deepened material underpinning of military capability; also stimulated expansion of arms production industry	Sense of greater security arising from massive infusion of foreign aid—its contribution to Israel's self-reliance and to a firmer base for defense capability: Policy derivatives were arms sales agreement of 1959 with Bonn to sustain and expand "Rafael"—the Israel armament authority—and the arms agreement (1960) (M-S)
E	Contributed critical input to economic growth in period 1953–65	Awareness of economic dependence upon annual infusion of unilateral transfers from Germany: Policy derivative was attempt to perpetuate West German economic aid (Ben Gurion-Adenauer meeting 1960) and annual foreign aid agreements since 1965 (E-D)
PS CE	Destabilized political structure (1957, 1959 crises over arms relations); also made more rigid the exclusion of *Herut* from role as coalition partner	Intensification of personal and party resentments in leaders' images: Policy derivatives were internal only: (a) delayed unification of *Mapai* with *Mapam* and *Ahdut Ha'avoda;* and (b) continued treatment of *Herut* as permanent opposition party (to 1967)

* All feedback flowed from the combination of strategic and tactical decisions on reparations; the tactical decision repersents an integral second-level policy decision, a direct extension from the fundamental decision to accept reparations at all.

many, eased the (limited) entry of Israel to "Europe," with the economic and, indirectly, the political and diplomatic benefits that ensued.

These objective changes, which can be traced partly to the reparations decisions, were accompanied by a fundamental shift in the perceptions of Germany held by Ben Gurion and his closest aides. Undoubtedly a mutual interaction was operating in the two environments.

From 1957 onward, Ben Gurion was to give continuous public expression to his images of: (a) a basic difference between Nazi Germany and Adenauer's Germany; (b) the importance of Bonn to Israel, both as a direct source of economic and military assistance and as a friend within Europe, particularly vis-à-vis France; and (c) Israel as part of Europe. All of these images were also articulated by Shimon Peres, then at the height of his influence as Director-General of the Defence Ministry and, from 1959, as Deputy Minister of Defence.[97]

How important Adenauer's Germany had become, in Ben Gurion's psychological environment, is evident in his speeches and writings during the late 1950s and early 1960s. None is more revealing than the following remarks to the Knesset in 1959:[98]

> When I say that the Germany of today, the Germany of Adenauer and the Social Democrats, is not the Germany of Hitler, I am referring not only to the new régime . . . but also to the geo-political transformation that has taken place in Western Europe and in the world.
>
> . . . especially friends who are able and willing to equip the Israel Defence Forces in order to ensure our survival. . . . But if we regard Germany, or any other country—as Satan, we shall not receive arms.

Whether Ben Gurion perceived Germany's re-emergence as a Power in 1951–2 as lucidly as he did in 1959 is subject to controversy. There can be no doubt, however, that his iron-willed insistence on forging ever stronger links with Bonn via the arms decisions of 1957, 1959 and 1960, was the logical policy consequence of the image he so starkly portrayed before the Knesset and elsewhere at the time. And that image, in turn, derived from a judgment which appeared to be confirmed by the Israeli decisions on reparations in 1950–2 and by West Germany's subsequent behavior.

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[97] Interview, 1960.

[98] "Address by the Prime Minister, Mr. David Ben Gurion, in the Knesset, July 1, 1959." (Jerusalem: Government Press Office, 1959), p. 14.

The establishment of *diplomatic* relations between Bonn and Jerusalem was consummated by Ben Gurion's successor in 1965. Yet that formal act of "normalization" must be viewed as the logical end-product of Israeli decisions in 1950–2 to seek and accept reparations from the successor to Nazi Germany. The process began with economic ties (1952); then came the purchase and sale of arms (1957, 1959 and 1960); cultural links (1962); and finally, as the climax to an intercontinental political crisis, diplomatic relations. In fact, there is some evidence that "Adenauer tentatively offered Israel diplomatic relations . . . at the time of the Luxembourg Agreement."[99]

There was a significant effect of the time lag and the disharmony in Israeli and German attitudes. At the time of the Luxembourg Agreement, West Germany was eager for diplomatic relations; but Israel was not ready, for internal reasons. More than a decade later the roles were reversed: Bonn hesitated because of formidable Arab pressure, which led to the severance of ties with many Arab states from 1965 until 1972. Thus "a mortgage" on Israel-German and German-Arab relations was taken out in the early 1950s because of Israel's reluctance then to establish full diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic.

An incidental (and incomplete) feedback from the reparations decisions to the perceptions of Israel's decision makers concerned Spain:[100]

> If we could deal with Germany, which had killed six million Jews, how could we refuse to deal with Franco Spain, which though Fascist, saved many Jews. The anti-Franco feeling [which was responsible for Israel's rejection of Madrid's overtures in 1949 for diplomatic relations] would have faded anyway. But our decision on German reparations made it easier to accept the idea of relations with Franco Spain. Then it was too late—Spain was no longer interested.

The feedback from reparations to the *internal* environment was more dramatic and had, perhaps, more durable effects on the political structure and economic capability. The demonstrations before the Knesset in January 1952 and the atmosphere of invective, hostility, and hate illuminated the conflict that enveloped both Israel's political elite and her mass public. The mutual disdain of Ben Gurion and Begin was fortified. And the more basic institutional hostility between *Mapai* and *Herut,* with its roots in the *Yishuv,* was given a sharp infusion of rancor not to be forgotten by both parties. Indeed, the violence of the January street riots revived the specter of *Herut* as a *"putschist"* party which had not outgrown its origins in the *Irgun Tzv'ai Le'umi,* or *Etzel.* And it was that image of *Herut* as an antidemocratic threat to Israel's parliamentary system, which sustained the *Mapai*-inspired animosity towards the party of the nationalist Right. In terms of Israel's *political structure,* the consequence was more rigid exclusion of *Herut* from the role of possible coalition partner. Certainly its inclusion in the Cabinet was unthinkable for Ben Gurion, whose hostility and distrust of Revisionists became even deeper. In fact, that fissure was widened by other controversies relating to Germany in 1957–8, 1959, and 1965. Indeed it required the enormity of the May 1967 crisis to heal the wounds sufficiently to enable *Herut* to enter a *Mapai*-dominated "National Unity Government." To the leaders of both parties Germany was an insuperable obstacle to political cooperation: and the conflict over reparations heightened the hostility.

Interparty (*competing elite*) conflict was more extensive. *Mapam* and *Ahdut Ha'avoda,* then united, had opposed direct talks with Bonn just as vigorously as *Herut* had, though less violently. And in 1957–8 and 1959, as coalition partners of *Mapai,* they contributed to the dissolution of the Government over decisions about arms relations with West Germany.[101] On those occasions, too, Israel's political structure was destabilized by the fallout from her decisions on reparations. There were also serious consequences for the psychological environment. Mistrust escalated, especially among leaders: Ben Gurion in particular, perceived the two smaller Labor parties as unreliable and opportunistic; they reciprocated this image. Those personal and party animosities were periodically rekindled by the German question, which thereby contributed to the delay in the reunification of *Mapai, Ahdut Ha'avoda,* and *Rafi.* That event (1968), which was to signal a basic shift in Israel's political structure, was unthinkable so long as Ben Gurion remained at the helm.

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[99] T. Prittie, *Konrad Adenauer 1876–1967,* p. 207, based upon a conversation with Hans Globke, then one of the Chancellor's closest political confidants. Prittie also reported that Adenauer asked US Ambassador David Bruce to sound out Washington's attitude. "American advice was allegedly against this proposal." A knowledgeable Israeli source, too, related to this writer the German offer of diplomatic relations in 1953. Yahil interview, 1966.

[100] Eytan interview, 1971.

[101] These decisions were analyzed in the author's *The Foreign Policy System of Israel,* Ch. 16.

The impact of reparations on Israel's *economic capability* is the most susceptible to precise measurement. The flow of goods and services began in 1953, a critical time in Israel's struggle for economic viability. Other sources of foreign exchange were inadequate and insecure. For a period of 12 years the infusion of unilateral transfers in German goods to the value of $715 million helped to propel the Israeli economy on the path to rapid growth. Imported goods consisted of ships and equipment (38 per cent), fuel (30 per cent), and raw materials (24 per cent); the balance was for services abroad. Israel's largest bank summed up the effects on Israel's economy—and on the multi-faceted Israel-German relationship—as follows:[102]

> There can be no doubt that the past nine years (1953–62) have seen a revolution in the Israel economy, brought about in large part by reparation goods. Over 1,300 Israel firms received new equipment under the Agreement. Reparation goods were largely instrumental in the development of such basic plants as the Timna Copper Works . . . and several electric power stations.
>
> The larger part of Israel's new merchant marine of some 50 ships of 450,000 tons deadweight was purchased under the Agreement.

Shinnar, who supervised the implementation of the Reparations Agreement as Head of the Israel Purchasing Mission in Cologne, proudly remarked:[103]

> Some 80 per cent of the Agreement [was] accepted in shipments of capital goods of all kinds, and accordingly . . . were a visible, lasting constituent of the building-up of industry in Israel in those first years, so decisive for the economic consolidation of Israel.

Whether Israel's economy could have achieved one of the most impressive performances in the contemporary era without such an infusion of foreign aid is a matter of conjecture. And whether the moral standard of Israel would have been more pure without German reparations is a matter of individual conscience. There can be no doubt, however, that the inflow of almost $5 billion to the end of 1965 greatly strengthened Israel's economic capacity to support her foreign policy decisions throughout the period 1953–65.[104]

The spillover benefits to Israel's *military capability,* as the underpinning to her security, are also unmistakable. The stimulus to economic growth also affected that large and important segment of the economy devoted to arms production. Israel was conspicuously deficient in this sphere in 1953. She achieved a sophisticated level in military technology by the end of the 1960s, partly because of the infusion of reparations and related West German payments.

Israel's decision makers were acutely conscious of their significance. Sharett put it succinctly:

> The signing of the reparation treaty . . . was a political fact of enormous international significance, something quite unprecedented, which has taken a most momentous place in the history of Israel and of Germany. This was an historic act that brought honour to free post-war Germany, and became for Israel a force of most important constructive aid.[105]

Ben Gurion, as noted, perceived the reparation decisions in no less historic terms. This image was instrumental in shaping some of Israel's strategic decisions in the two decades that followed.

Hypothesis Testing

The objective of hypothesis testing is generalization or theory building. We seek to discover, affirm or confirm a relationship of general validity, that is, one which obtains for a

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[102] "Review of Economic Conditions," *Bank Leumi Le-Israel,* No. 36–37 (May, 1962).

[103] Taped comments in 1962. Vogel, p. 88.

[104] According to the Federal German Finance Ministry, reparations payments to the end of 1966 comprised the following:

Federal Indemnity Law	DM 21,400 million
Federal Restitution Law	DM 2,750 million
Reparations Agreement	DM 3,450 million
General treaties with 12 German States	DM 1,000 million
Other payments (public service, etc.)	DM 2,700 million
Total	DM 31,300 million

Of this approximately DM 19,500 million was allocated through the Federal Budget. Not all of these payments went to Israel or Israelis. The sum of $5 billion is an estimate. (As cited in Vogel, p. 99.) On the implementation of the Luxembourg Agreements see Balabkins, *West German Reparations to Israel,* pp. 169–88, 256–69, and Chs. 10, 11. See also the report of the delivery of goods under the agreement by the Federal Minister of Economic Affairs, Bonn, March 1966, in Vogel, *The German Path to Israel,* pp. 89–99.

[105] Comment to Vogel, p. 55.

number of non-identical occurrences, phenomena, processes, etc. Thus, in foreign policy analysis it must be possible to predict the probable outcome of decision processes which have not yet been investigated—or which have not yet occurred—but which clearly fall within the scope of definition of the given universe of data. In short, the method used here requires that hypothesis tests with Israeli data (in this case, the decisions to seek and accept German reparations) be applied to comparable decisions—strategic or tactical—of other states. Only then can these hypotheses be regarded as valid building blocks for a theory of state behavior.

Many of the hypotheses about state behavior are not relevant to Israel's decisions on reparations. There are, nonetheless, five types of hypotheses in foreign policy analysis which may be tested with the data generated in this inquiry:

A. The first concerns *rationality and nonrationality*.[106]

A1. "The greater the [emotional] involvement of an individual in a situation, the greater will be the effect of nonlogical and predispositional influences."

This hypothesis is not supported, neither for the strategic nor for the tactical decision. All Israeli decision makers were deeply involved in the German issue. In the behavior of a few, notably Joseph and Maimon, the predispositional element—not to have any contact with Germany—was intense and overriding. The others, including the three principal figures, Ben Gurion, Sharett and Kaplan, were also negatively predisposed towards "dirty money;" but they decided to seek and accept reparations—the strategic decision; hence the assessment—not supported. It was the first *implementing* act, to approach the Four Powers and to avoid direct contact with Germany, which was the result of predisposition. By December 1951, when the three Western Powers reaffirmed their unwillingness to put pressure on Bonn to pay reparations indirectly, Israeli decision makers were faced with a clear choice: The predisposition was still to avoid direct links with the successor of the Nazi regime; rational considerations triumphed. The tactical decision was to negotiate directly with the West German Government.

B. Another type of relevant hypothesis relates to *flexibility and intensity of image*.

B1. "The flexibility of an image seems to be an inverse function of the level of intensity."[107]

This hypothesis is not supported. In 1950–2 Israeli decision makers evinced an intensely hostile image of Germany and the German people for the unparalleled atrocities committed by them against European Jewry: "Let not the murderers of our people be also their inheritors," said Ben Gurion. Sharett, Meir, and others were no less forceful in expressing their negative image of Germany at the time. Yet in subsequent years, most of these high-policy decision makers demonstrated a striking flexibility in perception—Ben Gurion more than any other, but not excluding the most intensely hostile Mrs. Meir.

A closely-related hypothesis deals with the *flexibility potential of decision makers and their publics*.

B2. "The rigidity of the image of the decision-making élite and the time lag will be greater than in the case of the attentive and mass publics."[108]

This hypothesis is not supported. Ben Gurion, Sharett, and other high-policy decision makers in the reparations issue adapted much more quickly to the challenge posed by a Bonn offer of reparations. Some sections of the attentive and mass public did so as well—but more haltingly, less decisively, and largely in response to the flexibility displayed by Israel's political leadership. In this case the hostile image of Germany was retained more rigidly by the public than by the high policy elite.

C. A third kind of testable hypothesis posits a relationship between *information and images*.

C1. "The evidence from both psychology and history overwhelmingly supports the view that decision makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images. . . . In other words, actors tend to perceive what they expect."[109]

This hypothesis is supported. Ben Gurion absorbed the cumulative flow of information about West Germany's willingness to pay reparations (from April 1951 onward) into his image of Israel's rightful claim, Germany's historic obligation, the compulsions of Israel's economic condition, the demands of the "Six Million," and the primacy of Israel's security needs. All these components led him to submerge the competing image of Germany as "the devil nation" and enabled him to respond positively to this information. The other principal decision makers, Sharett and Kaplan, also fit information about Germany's attitude to their existing perceptions.

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[106] Hypothesis A₁ is from S. Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System," *World Politics*, 14 (Oct., 1961), 99.

[107] D. G. Pruitt, "Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action," in *International Behavior*, ed. H. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 411.

[108] M. Brecher, "Elite Images and Foreign Policy Choices: Krishna Menon's View of the World," *Pacific Affairs*, 40 (Spring-Summer, 1967), 91.

[109] R. Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics*, XX, 3 (April, 1968), p. 455.

D. Some hypotheses about *interest groups and the decision-making process* in foreign policy are also pertinent to this inquiry.

D1. "Decisions on foreign policies that involve direct, visible (usually economic) rewards and/or punishments to different sectors of the society generally tend to be shared by [the Legislature] and [the Executive], to be social rather than intellective in process, and to stimulate more lobbying activities by groups. . . . Consequently, such decisions tend to resemble domestic policy issues. . . ."[110]

This hypothesis is supported by Israel's reparations decisions, which involved, *inter alia,* direct, visible economic rewards to various groups of society. The role of the Knesset and of its Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security was very important (January 1952); in fact, the Executive delegated authority to the Legislature to make the final decision. Intense, continuous lobbying by interest groups and competing elites was an important part of the process. And the behavior patterns were more akin to domestic policy cleavages in Israel's political system.

D2. "Decisions allowed to gestate over a period of several months are more open to [interest] group influence than decisions that must be made in a few days."

This hypothesis, too, is supported. The decision process on reparations lasted more than a year and witnessed massive pressures from diverse groups in the polity. It was incomparably more intense than attempted group influence in the Jerusalem decision (December 1949), the Korean War decision (July 1950), or the Rogers "A" Plan decision (December 1969), all of which were made in a few days.

E. The fifth and most numerous set of relevant hypotheses concern the *image and behavior patterns* of decision makers of middle powers, both in the Economic-Developmental issue area and across foreign policy issue areas as a whole.

Economic-Developmental Issue Area[111]

E1. "The economic variable is preeminent for both developed and developing states."

This hypothesis is supported. For Ben Gurion, Sharett, Kaplan, Meir, Rosen and others, the grave economic condition of Israel in 1950–1 was the preeminent (short-term) image component: It shaped both their strategic and tactical decisions to seek and accept German reparations.

E2. "There is one notable disparity in élite images within this issue area: Decision makers of developed states are acutely conscious of interest group demands; decision makers of developing states are not."

This hypothesis, too, is supported. In the reparations issue, Ben Gurion, Sharett and other high-policy decision makers of Israel, a developed state, acknowledged both the legitimacy and the genuineness of demands articulated by interest groups, especially those opposing direct talks with West Germany—even though they did not acquiesce in their demands. Sharett's speech to the Knesset on 9 January 1952 devoted special attention to these interest group views.

E3. "Decision makers of developed states are more aware of pressure from interest groups than from competing elites."

This hypothesis is not supported. In fact, the distinction between these two institutional types of advocacy was blurred in the reparations case: Parties and pressure groups of both persuasions united into two coalitions struggling for majority support.

E4. "Four environmental variables are marginal or non-existent in élite images within this issue area: political structure, subordinate other, military capability, and bilateral."

This hypothesis is not supported: All but the second were highly salient in the images of Ben Gurion, Sharett, et al.

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[110] Hypotheses D_1 and D_2 are from L. W. Milbrath, "Interest Groups and Foreign Policy," in *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy,* ed. J. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 249, 250.

[111] Hypotheses E_{1-4} are from Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," pp. 92–93.

F. *Cross-Area*[112]

F1. "The distinction between articulation and aggregation is far less meaningful in the foreign policy system than in the domestic policy system. "Advocacy" in a foreign policy system is performed without functional distinction by interest groups and competing elites."

This hypothesis is overwhelmingly supported. As noted in Hypothesis E_3, the two institutional carriers of group demands coalesced on the reparations issue and performed an identical advocacy function—to accept or to reject West Germany's offer of reparations.

F2. "Decision makers of middle powers will be marginally influenced by their own political structure and by other subordinate systems."

This hypothesis is not supported by Israel's behavior with regard to reparations. Her decision makers were *acutely conscious* of the importance assumed by the Knesset in the light of the massive division of opinion on this issue. The consequences of proportional representation made such awareness inevitable. They were not *at all* influenced by other regional (subordinate) systems; that factor was to emerge in later Israel decisions on Germany.

F3. "The much-publicized view that the maximization of power, defined as military and economic capability, is the chief motivating factor in state behavior is invalid for middle powers."

This hypothesis is not supported. Israel's decision makers perceived reparations in the short run as a means of easing grave economic problems. Their decisions were dominated by: a) The Prism of Jewishness, that is, the sense of Israel as territorial legatee of the Jewish People; and b) the recognition that economic growth was a precondition to national security.

F4. "The former colonial power will occupy a disproportionately important position in the foreign policy image of decision makers of new states."[113]

This hypothesis is not supported. Israel's decision makers did dispatch notes to the UK, along with the other three occupying powers in Germany. But they did not attach special—or even equal—importance to London's response.

It remains to note that, of the 14 hypotheses tested with the evidence uncovered in Israel's decisions on German reparations, 6 were supported and 8 were not supported.

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[112] Hypotheses $F_{1\text{-}3}$ are from Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," pp. 92–93.

[113] Hypothesis F_4 is from Stein, J., *Elite Images and Foreign Policy: Nehru, Menon, and India's Policies* (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertaton, McGill University, 1969), p. 408.

Networks and Groups in Southeast Asia: Some Observations on the Group Theory of Politics

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Fifteen years ago the Committee on Comparative Politics, in the course of its grand design for the cross-national study of politics along the lines outlined in Gabriel Almond's classic introductory essay in *The Politics of the Developing Areas,* commissioned a series of investigations of "Interest Groups and the Political Process." I was one of the Committee's grantees.

One of our main tasks was to perform censuses of interest groups and to describe their work. On the whole the results were disappointing. The conclusion of most of those who examined developing polities was that "interest groups" do not play as important a part in the political process as had been expected. This conclusion is reflected in the fact that the Princeton series of Studies in Political Development, the major compilation of the product of the Committee and its grantees, includes as yet no volume on "Interest Groups and Political Development." And it seems unlikely that such a volume will appear in the near future.

But if Almond's list of conversion functions remains sound, and I think it does, then "interest articulation" must take place in any political system in which political decision making is a specialized task, and there must be structures to perform it. Almond and Powell, in their 1966 work, ammended the theory to take account of the disappointing performance of the four types of groups listed in Almond's 1960 essay, i.e., institutional, non-associational, anomic, and associational interest groups, by drawing attention to the importance of individuals as "articulators of their own interests."[1] But they added that individual self-representation is "commonly cast in the guise of the articulation of more general societal or group interests." This missed a crucial point: That in many developing polities the great bulk of individual self-representation is self-representation pure and simple, without any pretense of a concern for the categorical interests of any collectivity, be it society as a whole or a subgroup within it. The purpose of this paper is to explore the structural basis and the consequences of pure and impure self-representation in several Southeast Asian political systems, and to suggest some propositions and models which, it is hoped, will explain some of their peculiar features.

At the outset, it may be useful to review the essentials of the "group theory" of politics, as well as some criticism of that theory. Stated in its broadest terms, the theory assumes that individuals act in politics largely as members of groups. A group is a set of individuals who share an attitude. They act together because they perceive that by doing so they are most likely to attain objectives consistent with the attitude which they share, and thus to gain similar individual rewards. Groups often, though not invariably, consist of persons whose common attitude stems from the fact that they have some similar "background" characteristic such as sex, age, religion, occupation or social class. For this reason, much theorizing and research by political scientists in modern Western countries has focused on the assumed interrelationship among the socioeconomic background attributes of political actors, their political attitudes, and their political behavior.

The American version of the group theory comes to us from Arthur Bentley by way of David Truman and Earl Latham.[2] Marxist theory makes a similar assumption, that men who have something in common, in this case social class, will and should act in unison in their collective interest. The now largely forgotten theorists of the fascist corporate state also maintained that individuals who are alike do and should act in unison, though in their view the various "corporations" composed in each case of a functionally specialized sector of the economy should not clash but, like the organs of a living organism, work in harmony for the higher purposes of the corporate state.[3]

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[1] Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), p. 75. For Almond's earlier formulation, see *The Politics of the Developing Areas,* ed. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 3–64. For the paper which guided the research of the Committee's grantees, see Gabriel A. Almond, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," *American Political Science Review,* 52 (March, 1958), 270–82.

[2] Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908); David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951); Earl Latham, *The Group Basis of Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952).

In all versions of the theory, individuals who become aware of their similar attitudes and/or background are assumed to find it to their advantage to create formal organizations of some sort, the better to advance their shared goals or interests, or to perform their organic functions. But formal organization is not essential to the theory in its broadest form. The essential feature is that individuals who are alike in some respect are more likely to act together than individuals who are not.

As a prescription for self-interested action, the group theory has grave shortcomings. Mancur Olson, an economist, has pointed out that if the purpose of group action is merely to achieve categorical goals through which all members of a category will derive benefits, an individual member has no great incentive to contribute to the common effort. For even if he does not, he can expect to share in the fruits of that effort simply by being a member of that category.[4] The theory has another serious weakness: It assumes that governmental action must take a categorical form: that government, or at least modern government, proceeds according to the rule of law, that is, that laws will be *enforced* rigidly and impersonally whatever their content, and that individuals can benefit only through the operation of laws which provide similar benefits for all others similar to themselves. Only if this is assumed—and in many developing countries it is a highly dubious assumption—need individuals resort to the cumbersome method of advancing their private interests by working for the similar interests of countless others. These criticisms of the group theory lead to some alternative conceptualizations of political structure, including interest articulation structure: those of the dyad and the dyadically structured system.[5]

The Nature of Dyads

A standard anthropological dictionary defines a "dyadic group" as "a pair of human beings in a social relationship."[6] This simple definition fits almost any two-person group. For the purposes of this discussion, however, some distinctions between different types of dyads are needed.

First, it is useful to distinguish between *corporate dyads* and *exchange dyads*. The former consist of two persons who, in matters that interest the analyst, behave as one. The latter consist of two persons who maintain their separate identities, but are engaged in relationships of exchange. Typically in exchange dyads the two members give or lend property to each other. But its ownership at any point in time, is individual, not joint.

Exchange dyads in turn can be subdivided into *supportive* and *antagonistic* ones. In the former, the two members trade things of value. In the latter they trade injuries.

In actual dyadic relationships, of course, these analytically distinct forms can be mixed. The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, for example, now involves both supportive and antagonistic exchanges. And a marriage involves both the pooling and the exchange of resources.

For political scientists, exchange dyads, especially supportive ones, are of primary interest. In the remainder of this paper, when I use the term "dyad" I shall mean supportive exchange dyads unless another type is specified. Some characteristics of dyads, other than those mentioned above, follow:

Dyads may bind together persons who are alike or unalike. The ease with which dyads cut across occupational and class lines makes them of particular importance to political scientists interested in the processes of national integration and conflict resolution.

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[3] See Giovanni Gentile, "The Philosophical Basis of Fascism," and Alfredo Rocco, "The Political Doctrine of Fascism," in *Readings on Fascism and National Socialism*, Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago (Denver: Allan Swallow, n.d.). For a discussion of the corporate state in practice, see Michael T. Florinsky, *Fascism and National Socialism: A Study of Economic and Social Policies of the Totalitarian State* (New York: Macmillan, 1938), pp. 86–100.

[4] Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

[5] A more rudimentary version of the dyadic model, developed here, may be found in Carl H. Landé, *Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics,* Yale Southeast Asia Studies Monograph Series, No. 6 (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1965), Appendix II, "Group Politics and Dyadic Politics: Notes for a Theory." An earlier statement is found in "Politics in the Philippines," Diss. Harvard University, 1958. The relationship between dyadic political structure and cognatic kinship is discussed at greater length in a paper, "Kinship and Politics in Pre-Modern and Non-Western Societies," which was submitted to the *American Political Science Review* in 1961. While not published at the time, it now appears in *Southeast Asia: The Politics of National Integration*, ed. John T. McAlister, Jr. (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 219–233. These writings owe a heavy debt to the late Robert N. Pehrson, whose classic study, *The Bilateral Network of Social Relationships in Könkämä Lapp District,* Indiana University Publications, Slavic and East European Series, Vol. 5 (Bloomington: Indiana University Research Center in Anthropology, Folklore, and Linguistics, 1957) introduced me to the peculiarities of dyadic structure.

[6] Charles Winick, *Dictionary of Anthropology* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 242.

Benefits obtained through dyadic exchanges tend to be particular rather than categorical. Each partner must reward the other, but need not support the goals of the whole category to which the other belongs.

Dyadic exchanges tend to involve some degree of reciprocity, but need not achieve exact reciprocity. Reciprocity is most likely to be approximated when the relationship is voluntary for both partners, when both must compete freely with other suppliers of the same rewards, when both control resources of roughly equal value, and when the relationship involves a minimum of antagonism. The achievement of exact reciprocity at any point in time, however, facilitates the termination of the dyad, and thus may be avoided.

Dyads usually are linked to other dyads in larger structures, or are capable of being so linked. All the dyadic ties within a society or subsociety constitute its dyadic *network.*

Each member of a dyadically structured system has a personal combination of dyadic partners which is uniquely his own. The personal alliance systems of different individuals may overlap and intersect, but are rarely identical. An individual's personal set of dyadic relationships constitute his dyadic *web.* As in a spider web, the structurally most important strands are those which extend outward from the central individual by whom or in whose behalf various of his allies, plus some of *their* allies, are brought into action. As in a spider web, the concentric circles of connecting links are of less importance. They represent the cooperation among the central individual's allies that takes place in their common effort to assist him. Insofar as a system is structured dyadically, i.e., as a network, organized action involving many persons tends to begin with the effort of one individual to mobilize members of his web, and then of their webs, in support of what he regards as desirable goals.

Personal webs, like individual dyads, can be subdivided analytically into vertically and horizontally structured ones. *Vertical webs* are those whose central individual has greater status, resources or power than his various dyadic partners have. As a general designation for most vertical webs of a political nature, I suggest the term "personal following." A specific subtype of this general type are patron-client systems. The distinguishing feature of archetypal patron-client relationships is a broad but imprecise spectrum of mutual obligations consistent with the belief that the patron should display an almost parental concern for and responsiveness to the needs of his client, and that the latter should display almost filial loyalty to his patron—beliefs reflected by the tendency for familial appellations to be employed in the relationship. The operation of patron-client systems in politics has been the subject of three recent articles in the *American Political Science Review.* They are characteristic of traditional societies, and appear to be on the decline. Other types of personal followings, however, are likely to be with us for some time to come.

Horizontal webs are those whose central individual has status, resources or power roughly equal to those of his various partners. For these, when they are political, the term "personal alliance system" seems appropriate. An example is an individual congressman's log-rolling arrangements with various of his fellows. All the log-rolling arrangements in Congress constitute a network.

The various dyadic ties within an individual's web may differ in the quality and quantity of their exchanges. Where this is the case, graded favoritism in the treatment of different partners usually is made explicit.

The dyadic webs of individuals may differ in size. The number of one's alliances tends to be limited by one's material resources, and to be positively related to one's status and power.

Dyadic structures tend to be most important, or most noticeable, where discrete structures are in short supply. That is to say, in systems which are small and premodern. Anthropologists therefore have been interested in them for some time. But political scientists, whose models are mainly of modern Western derivation, until recently have given them little attention.[7]

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[7] There is a growing body of literature dealing with dyadic structures and in particular with patron-client relationships. Some seminal studies which are not mentioned elsewhere in this paper include the following: For *Southeast Asia:* James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," *American Political Science Review,* 66 (March, 1972), 81–113. For *South Asia* see Frederik Barth, *Political Leadership among Swat Pathans,* London School of Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology No. 19 (London: The Athlone Press, 1965), pp. 71–126. For *Northern Europe* see Otto Blehr, "Action Groups in a Society with Bilateral Kinship: A Case Study of the Faroe Islands," *Ethnology,* 3 (July, 1963), 269–275. For the *Mediterranean* area see Jeremy Boissevain, "Factions, Parties and Politics in a Maltese Village," *American Anthropologist,* 66 (December, 1964), 1275–1287; and by the same author, "Patronage in Sicily," *Man,* New Series 1 (March, 1966), 18–33. For *Latin America* see George M. Foster, "The Dyadic Contract: A Model for the Social Structure of a Mexican Peasant Village," *American Anthropologist* 63 (December, 1961), 1142–

With a view to exploring various forms which dyadic structure can take and various tasks which they can perform, I shall describe certain elements of four Southeast Asian political systems, each at a different point along a rough scale of modernization, and each imbedded in a different religious tradition. These systems are: the pagan Kalinga of Northern Luzon in the Philippines; the Tausug, a Muslim society in the Southern Philippines; the Theravada Buddhist monarchy of Thailand during the Ayudhya and Bangkok periods; and the predominantly Catholic Republic of the Philippines.

The Kalinga

The first and most "primitive" example of a Southeast Asian polity is that of the Kalinga, one among several pagan peoples who inhabit the mountain region of Northern Luzon. During the period of American colonial rule, the Kalinga, or at least those of them who live near the several roads which have been built through the mountains by the colonial administration, have come increasingly under the influence of the outside world. But many of their traditional institutions survive, or survived long enough to be observed by anthropologists.

The following description of Kalinga political structure is based on studies by Roy Franklin Barton and Edward P. Dozier.[8] From them one learns that like many primitive societies, Kalinga society until recently was organized almost wholly on the basis of kinship ties. Kalinga kinship structure, like that of the other Southeast Asian societies described here, as well as of those of Northern Europe, is a type which anthropologists call "cognatic" or "bilateral."

The interesting characteristic of cognatic kinship, from the point of view of this paper, is that outside the bounds of the immediate or "conjugal" family, its structure is essentially dyadic. In cognatic systems each individual, when he looks beyond his conjugal family, finds himself surrounded by a circle of relatives, a collection of individuals whom anthropologists call the "personal kindred." It is made up of the descendants of all his ancestors of a certain earlier generation without regard to sex or the side of his family tree. In Kalinga, the personal kindred consists for each individual, of all descendants of his eight pairs of great-grandparents.

The main features of cognatic kindreds in Kalinga and elsewhere are as follows:

Kindreds are individual-centered. That is to say, each individual's kindred is defined with reference to himself, and exists primarily to serve his needs. After his death, it disappears as a distinctive entity.

Kindreds lack discrete external boundaries. Like the ripples from a stone dropped into a pool, the strength of kinship ties gradually declines as the genealogical and affective distance of kinsmen from ego increases.

The size and precise membership of each kindred depends largely upon the person at its core. It does so because he alone can decide how wide a circle of kinsmen he will attempt to cultivate, and which specific kinsmen he wishes to include among the functioning (as distinguished from purely nominal) members of his kindred. It does not depend exclusively upon his wishes, however, for each of those kinsmen with whom he wishes to maintain active ties must in turn be willing to maintain ties with him, i.e., must wish to count him as a member of his own personal kindred.

No two individuals other than siblings have identical kindreds. The kindreds of close relatives other than siblings overlap, but do not coincide. Further, as the kinsmen with whom an individual maintains effective ties depend in large part upon his choice, the effective kindreds of even siblings are not necessarily identical.

Thus a person's kindred is an outwardly radiating collection of dyads with one individual at its core. A community so structured—and this is the case with Kalinga communities—may be conceived of as a dyadic network of

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1173; and by the same author "The Dyadic Contract in Tzintzuntzan, II: Patron-Client Relationship," *American Anthropologist* 65 (December, 1963), 1280–1294. For *Africa* see C. W. Gutkind, "Network Analysis and Urbanism in Africa: The Use of Micro and Macro Analysis," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 2 (May, 1965), 123–131. For theoretical works which are not limited to specific countries or regions see John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups* (New York: Wiley, 1959), especially Part I, "Dyadic Relationships," pp. 9–187; John A. Barnes, "Networks and Political Process," in *Social Networks in Urban Situations*, ed. J. Clyde Mitchell (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969); John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientist Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (June, 1970), 411–425; René Lemarchand, and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development," *Comparative Politics*, 4 (January, 1972), 149–178; and Norman E. Whitten, Jr. and Alvin W. Wolfe, "Network Analysis," prepared for Chap. 3, *The Handbook of Social and Cultural Anthropology*, ed. John J. Honigmann (Chicago: Rand-McNally, in press) which includes an extensive bibliography.

[8] Roy Franklin Barton, *The Kalingas: Their Institutions and Custom Law* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949); and Edward P. Dozier, *Mountain Arbiters: The Changing Life of a Philippine Hill People* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966).

what George Peter Murdock describes as "interlacing and overlapping" kinship ties.[9]

Kalinga political culture is of a sort appropriate to an essentially anarchic society characterized by endemic feuding. Fighting skill and bellicosity are highly valued among men, being essential to survival. Contentiousness in litigation, a major preoccupation of the Kalinga, provides less dangerous opportunities for the display of truculence. Egocentrism and family centrism are characteristic of the society, being modified only by the personal loyalty to more distant kinsmen that is necessary for personal survival in a dangerous environment. Similar cultural traits will be noted in connection with some of the other Southeast Asian societies. Because there were in the Kalinga region until American times no "public" functionaries charged with the punishment of murderers or other offenders, the most important function of the kindred was, and to a large degree still is, to support the individual in conflicts over property or personal affronts which might lead to killing, or in case of actual killing to take vengeance through counter-killing against the killer or one of his kinsmen.[10]

While rallying to his support or avenging his death, the personal kindred of an individual, is in a sense, a "group." But it is an ephemeral group, and the willingness of an individual kinsman to participate depends largely upon the way he has been treated in the past by the individual at the kindred's core. In short it depends upon dyadic reciprocity.

It may be asked whether traditional Kalinga society contains any discrete groups of a corporate type. There are a few. One such group, found among the Kalinga as among other peoples, is the conjugal family consisting of a set of parents and their unmarried children. But the family is a temporary group, which disappears with the death of the parents and is replaced by the separate newly formed conjugal families of the children. Furthermore, the Kalinga family begins as a rather uncertain alliance, subject to fission under the stress of rival claims for loyalty from the parental families of each marital partner. Only with the birth of the first child—i.e., with the appearance of an individual related by blood to both parental kindreds, does the marriage become a really stable one.

Among some neighboring and otherwise similar tribes, the people of Sagada and the Ifugao, there are to be found in addition to conjugal families and personal kindreds some cognatic descent groups. These consist of all the descendants, through both males and female links, of some prominent founding ancestor.[11] Such groups, sometimes called "conical clans," are discrete. Their usefulness for the organization of society is limited, however, by the fact that, unlike unilineal descent groups, they overlap so that an individual, through different ancestral lines, may be a member of many such groups. In Sagada, conical clans since the introduction of electoral politics in American times, form the bases of political factions. In addition there are in Sagada clearly demarcated "wards" within which councils of old men settle disputes and organize rituals. But neither of these types of discrete structure are present to a significant degree in Kalinga. They are mentioned here because they remind one of the advantages which lie in discrete groups, and show how discrete groups can be created in simple cognatic societies.

The nature of the terrain inhabited by the Kalinga divides them geographically into a number of distinct settlements. These however had little that could be called local government prior to that which is now imposed by the lowland state. Nowhere in Kalinga, even in very small settlements where all regarded each other as kinsmen, was there a single identifiable "headman." Nowhere was there a body whose members separately or collectively had authority over all inhabitants of the settlement. What existed was not authority but personal leadership. There were and are in every Kalinga settlement some individuals whose exceptional prowess in combat or whose superior wealth or wisdom gave them influence not only over their immediate family members but over many of their more distant kinsmen as well. When one of these self-made leaders decided upon some course of action, a cluster of persons made up of his family and of these more distant kinsmen-followers were likely to support him. And when all of the leaders of substantial personal followings could agree on some course of action—a rare occurrence in any case—a large proportion of the settlement could be mobilized into action—but not the entire settlement. For while not everyone could be a leader, no one was obliged to be a follower. There was always the option of being an independent individual who neither led nor followed any man, and it was the presence of such individuals, as well as frequent disagreement among leaders, that made communitywide action extremely hard to achieve.

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[9] George Peter Murdock, *Social Structure* (New York: Macmillan, 1949), p. 60. For an excellent discussion of the nature of groups resulting from cognatic descent, see Robin Fox, Chap. 6, "Cognatic Descent and Ego-centered Groups," *Kinship and Marriage* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967), pp. 146–174.

[10] The personal kindred performed very similar tasks in early Europe. For an exploration of this subject see Bertha Surtees Phillpotts, *Kindred and Clan in the Middle Ages and After: A Study in the Sociology of the Teutonic Races* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1913).

[11] Fred Eggan, "The Sagada Igorots of Northern Luzon," in *Social Structure in Southeast Asia*, ed. George Peter Murdock (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960), pp. 27–30. Similar groups are found among the Muslim Maranao of the Southern Philippines, but not among the Christian peoples of the islands. See Melvin Mednick, *Encampment of the Lake: The Social Organization of a Moslem-Philippine (Moro) People*, Philippine Studies Program, Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, Research Series, No. 5 (Chicago: University of Chicago Philippine Studies Program, 1965).

Further, community action was of an extremely limited sort, being concerned mainly with such matters as defense against raiding parties from other settlements. It fell far short of "government." There was no law making, no tax collection, no arresting of accused persons by policemen, no courts, and no public executioner. Killing and other wrongs were torts against individuals and their kindreds, not crimes against the community, and they were dealt with by individuals with the assistance of their kinsmen, and the help of neutral mediators. Under such conditions justice varied, depending upon the relative ferocity of the two antagonists and the size of the kindred which each could mobilize in his support.

While the Kalinga lacked territorial authority, even at the local level, they at least recognized the existence of discrete geographic boundaries between neighboring settlements. Not so the Ifugao, another pagan tribe living nearby. Among the Ifugao, Barton reports, geographic boundaries were vague and shifting. Each "region" or settlement was viewed by its inhabitants as the center of a series of concentric rings which Barton calls respectively the "home region," the "feudist zone," and the "war zone," terms which suggest the decreasing restraints upon violence toward people who live at increasing distances from one's home. The Ifugao had no common conception of a larger territory subdivided into districts or similar units. Zones structured territory as the kindred structured people: in terms of distance from ego or ego's place of residence. Barton, citing Henry Sumner Maine, assumed the absence of discrete territorial boundaries to be a fairly primitive trait. But as will be noted in several of the later cases, a dearth of discrete boundaries or of organization based upon such boundaries, is characteristic of some more advanced polities as well and seems to be consistent with their preference for dyadic structures.

Because the Kalinga, in contrast to the Ifugao, recognized discrete territorial boundaries, they were able to create an interregional network of "peace pacts" which, though essentially dyadic, had some relationship to territory. Until recent times the absence of roads, the virtual restriction of marriage to members of the same locality, and the danger of being killed if one ventured far from one's home region served as a strong deterrent to interregional travel. With the construction of roads through the mountains by the lowland colonial government during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, travel between regions became easier while the possibility of profit making through interregional trade provided incentives for such travel. To assure their safety when visiting each others' regions, pairs of native traders established trading partnerships through which each partner gave food and lodging to the other and, more important, promised to avenge him as he would avenge his own kinsmen should the other be killed by someone in that region. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, this institution which initially had given protection only to the two partners, became transformed into a more elaborate system under which two "pact holders" living in different regions undertook each in his own region to avenge *any* traveler from the other's region who met violence while visiting there. Individual protection thus became blanket protection, but was still anchored in individuals. It was the pact holder assisted by his personal kindred, and not the region, which offered protection. It was the pact holder who paid compensation if he failed to avenge, and who collected compensation if the other pact holder failed to do so. And if a pact holder died, and no one else came forth to take his place, the pact lapsed and with it the possibility of safe travel between the two regions. Furthermore, each two of the many regions of Kalinga had—or did *not* have—their separate pacts with each other, and for each pact affecting a region the pact-holder might be a different individual. The complex of pacts thus was a network, not an association. Finally, whenever a new pact was negotiated, any individual in either pact holder's region who had an unsettled blood-debt to avenge in the other region could assert the right to be excluded from the coverage of the pact.

Thus the Kalinga were never able to devise what to foreigners might seem a much more logical, effective, and categorical solution to the problem of individual security: the establishment of a Kalinga-wide confederation guaranteeing everyone protection everywhere. The system was as primitive, and as dyadic in structure, as was the international community of powers prior to the establishment of the League of Nations.

The Tausug

The second Southeast Asian political system is that of the Tausug, a Moslem ethno-linguistic group of some 325,000 persons who live in the Sulu island chain which links the main Southern Philippine island of Mindanao with Northern Borneo. Roughly half of the Tausug reside on the largest of the Sulu islands, Jolo. The Tausug have a cognatic kinship system with a slight patrilineal bias which is attributable to the influence of Islam. Most of them live in scattered upland settlements where they engage in intensive dry rice farming. The description and explanation of Tausug political institutions presented here is taken entirely from the studies of Thomas M. Kiefer, an anthropologist.[12]

Unlike the rest of the territory of the present Republic, the Southern extremities of the Philippine archipelago, including Sulu, never came under the effective rule of the Spanish colonial regime. Foreign military subjugation of its "Moro" inhabitants was accomplished only during the American colonial period. Even now the authority of the national government in this region is uncertain. The Tausug continue to deal with their own affairs, and in particular to settle their own disputes, largely through traditional political institutions. Thus the Tausug, though nominally Filipinos, retain a political culture and a largely autonomous political system which are premodern in nature and which have more in common with the culture and polity of traditional Moslem Indonesia and Eastern Malaysia than with those of the long Christianized majority of the Philippines.

Except for some now moribund functions of the sultan, Kiefer's description is of Tausug political institutions as they function today. These institutions are of interest here because, as Kiefer observes:

> Corporate groups on all planes of society except the ultimate level of the *sultan,* are distinctly secondary to dyadic social relationships.[13]

and:

> The Tausug seem to have taken the pervasive Philippine indigenous institution of dyadic ritualized friendship and used it as a major foundation for the establishment of a state based on Islamic models, without having developed the geographically defined units of . . . more politically centralized societies.[14]

In contrast to the Kalinga, the Tausug, prior to the imposition of American colonial rule during the second decade of this century succeeded in creating an incipient state. They shared a conception of a supralocal community with a common body of law and a collection of offices differing in their dignity and the spatial extent of their authority. These offices reached their apex in the office of the sultan.

This community, its law, and its offices survive today. The sultan in recent years has lost many of his old duties. Not so the local headmen-leaders who are the main subjects of Kiefer's study, and are of special interest from the point of view of the dyadic model. These functionaries continue to play a number of important roles—the nature of which can be explained in part by certain features of Tausug culture.

Like the political culture of the Kalinga, that of the Tausug places a high value upon the personal defense of honor and property. This encourages a high incidence of both violence and litigation. Vengeance killing in the pursuit of private feuds is endemic. The obvious parallels with Kalinga feuding suggest that this is a pre-Islamic element of Tausug political culture. At the same time, Kiefer notes, the Tausug seek order and a sense of community through their common acceptance of a Tausug version of Islamic law.

Out of these contrasting values arises a need for figures of superordination who are adept both at peacekeeping through the enforcement of the law, and at the type of violent action demanded by feuding. Both tasks are performed by men whom Kiefer describes variously as headmen or as leaders.

That part of Tausug ideology which the Tausug themselves believe to be Islamic in derivation requires that every Tausug be subject to the law. More precisely, it requires that he be subject to an *individual* capable of acting as

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[12] Thomas M. Kiefer, "Institutionalized Friendship and Warfare among the Tausug of Jolo," *Ethnology* 7 (July, 1968), 225–244; and *Tausug Armed Conflict: The Social Organization of Military Activity in a Philippine Moslem Society,* Philippine Studies Program, Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, Research Series, No. 7 (Chicago: University of Chicago Philippine Studies Program, 1969); *The Tausug: Violence and Law in a Philippine Moslem Society* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972).

[13] Kiefer, *Tausug Armed Conflict,* p. 189.

[14] Kiefer, *Tausug Armed Conflict,* p. 192.

"the law," a person who has the authority to adjudicate, arbitrate or mediate, and the physical means to see to it that the outcomes of such legal actions are obeyed. The substance of this law is laid down in written form by each reigning sultan. The authority to enforce it, i.e., to act as "the law" is also bestowed by the sultan through the awarding of one of a variety of ranked secular or religious titles, though this function of the sultan now is performed less frequently than formerly.

But subjection of individuals to specific superordinates qualified to act as "the law" involves a substantial element of individual consent. While some titles are claimed through inheritance, they are in practice awarded only to those who have been able to gain acceptance as leaders. Furthermore, a headman's authority when it has been given formal sanction by the sultan, remains confined to those who are willing to be subject to it. This means that headmanship is not, strictly speaking, territorial. Receipt of a title, Kiefer reports, "does not necessarily guarantee to the holder any particular territory which is exclusively his own and distinct from that of any other office holder."[15] It has more the character of a license to practice law than of judicial authority over a specified bailiwick. Yet it does have a limited spatial aspect: Usually in any local settlement there will be found but one title holder. In the general vicinity of his domicile, his authority, legal and otherwise, is strong and nearly exclusive. The requirement that every Tausug be subject to *some* title holder qualified to act as the law, and the awesome proximity of a popular headman would seem to encourage acceptance. But with increasing distance from his place of residence, the proportion of individuals who decline to accept his authority in legal matters or who divide their allegiance between him and the headman of a neighboring settlement increases. Furthermore, his power to adjudicate declines with increasing distance, and only the ability to arbitrate or mediate remains. Finally, the range of his authority and influence may expand and contract during the course of his lifetime, and differ markedly from that of previous headmen who had the same place of residence.[16]

When disputes arise between the subjects of different headmen, they usually can be arbitrated by a higher title holder. But many disputes, it appears, are not settled through such peaceful means. Often disputes lead to violence which may turn into large scale warfare. And then Tausug headmen, especially the younger among them, assume different and more partisan roles as leaders of small bands of men of fighting age whose function is to support their members in their private feuds with nonmembers. Indeed, it is leadership of such armed bands that gives them the raw power needed to qualify as agents of the law in the Tausug state.[17] These armed followings in turn are but elements of larger fighting alliances which are made necessary by the Tausug dedication to feuding and to war.

Kiefer examines this system of fighting alliances in detail. In describing its structure he begins with simple dyadic relationships of friendship and of leadership and followership. For this purpose he employs a formal model of dyadic interaction based upon a model I had presented in an earlier publication.[18] Alliances for mutual aid between leaders of personal followings in turn are used to create *ad hoc* combinations of increasing size, culminating in maximal alliances which may stretch across an area spanning the whole Sulu archipelago, and pit themselves against equally extensive opposing alliances. At all levels except that of the sultanate itself, Kiefer finds "dyadism" to be the most striking structural feature of the system. Indeed, dyadism manifests itself even in the heat of battle, where each combatant directs his fire with a due regard for the nature of his connection with, and the degree of his enmity toward each member of the opposing side.[19]

While using the same structural devices as the Kalingas, the Tausug in their alliances are able to mobilize much larger numbers of fighting men for individual engagements. The reason for this is clear. The Kalinga, in pursuing what remain purely private feuds, rely for support upon a relatively small number of actual kinsmen. The only exception to this rule is the peace pact, a recent invention which through the establishment of compacts between unrelated pact holders in different regions offers protection to individual travelers far from home. The Tausug have moved to a higher stage of both integration and conflict. Sharing a sense of membership in an incipient state, which brings with it a general interest and involvement in the power struggles of great men, and being far more mobile than the mountain-bound Kalinga, the Tausug have created large alliances for the pursuit of civil and external war. For this, ties between kinsmen are not enough. Therefore, they have learned to make extensive use of interpersonal alliances of friendship and ritual kinship formalized through the common Muslim Filipino custom of swearing together on the Koran.

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[15] Kiefer, *Tausug Armed Conflict*, p. 36.

[16] Kiefer concludes, "Territoriality . . . is not generally conceived in terms of boundaries which create discrete spatial units, but rather in terms of the space which vaguely surrounds a single point." Kiefer, *Tausug Armed Conflict*, p. 31.

[17] Kiefer, *Tausug Armed Conflict*, p. 37.

[18] Kandé, *Leaders, Factions, and Parties*, pp. 141–148.

[19] Kiefer, *Tausug Armed Conflict*, pp. 167–171.

To sum up, in a society where discrete descent groups, voluntary associations, and territorial units are lacking, relationships of superordination and subordination are highly personal, and to a large degree voluntary. The span of a superordinate's authority has no clear cut boundaries either in terms of territory or population groups. Thus as in Kalinga, dyadic structure is superimposed upon both space and society.

The Monarchy of Premodern Thailand

The next example of a Southeast Asian political system is that of a fully developed monarchy. The case employed for this purpose is the absolute monarchy of Thailand from the beginning of the reign of King Trailokanat (1448 AD) in the latter part of the Ayudhya period, until the accession of King Chulalongkorn (1873) which marked the end of the early Bangkok period. This monarchy had a strong ruler, and performed a wide variety of administrative tasks. Nonetheless it relied heavily upon dyadic structure in performing them.

The institutions of the monarchy underwent many changes during the four centuries from which information is drawn. But the features to which I call attention retained their essential character throughout most of this time. My main sources are two historical reconstructions, one focusing upon the Ayudhya period and based largely on legal texts, by H. G Quaritch-Wales, the second dealing with the early Bangkok period, and based on a broader spectrum of contemporary records by a Thai scholar, Akin Rabibhadana.[20]

Like almost all of Southeast Asia prior to the twentieth century, premodern Thailand had a population much smaller than that which could be supported by the available land. This was especially the case because the population of Thailand, like most of lowland Southeast Asia, cultivated irrigated rice, a grain which produces a very high yield for a given amount of land. The surplus of land meant that most of premodern Southeast Asia, in the words of Georges Condominas, consisted of a scattering of cultivated islands of population set in an empty but potentially cultivable jungle. As a result, Rabibhadana argues, manpower was more in demand than land. This had important political consequences. One of these consequences was that in mainland Southeast Asia the main purpose of warfare was the capture of populations with a view to settling them on uncultivated land in the environs of the conqueror's capital, rather than the acquisition of new terrain in distant places. This meant in turn that from a ruler's point of view the effective mobilization of his own subjects for attack and defense in time of war was essential to the survival of his realm, while the demarcation of precise jungle boundaries between his and the neighboring realm was of less importance.[21]

This favorable ratio of men to land may have encouraged the growth of structural and normative patterns useful for the maintenance of control over people: Patron-client ties imposed by the state, obedience, deference, the repayment of favors on the part of those subject to the power of others, and the possession and conspicuous display of large personal retinues on the part of the powerful.[22]

Students of Thai history are in some disagreement as to the structure of the Thai political system during the first century of the Ayudhya period and the Sukhothai period which preceded it. As early as the time of King Trailokanat, however, most of the realm was under direct royal administration through governors appointed by the king, though some outlying areas were in the early part of the period under the largely independent but nonhereditary control of certain princely kinsmen of the king. In the capital there were established a number of departments of government called *krom*. During the early portion of the period these *krom* with few exceptions were under the effective or titular headship of high ranking princes or princesses. Commoner officials staffed their lower levels, and during the Bangkok period often rose to *krom* headships. Nonetheless, the princes and princesses as a group maintained their positions of privilege well into the present century. Indeed resentment of these privileges by Western-educated commoner officials was one of the causes of the palace revolt of 1932 which ushered in the present system of government.

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[20] H. G. Quaritch-Wales, *Ancient Siamese Government and Administration* (London: Bernard Quaritch, Ltd., 1934); and Akin Rabibhadana, *The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period, 1782–1873*, Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, Data Paper No. 74 (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, 1969).

[21] Rabibhadana, p. 53.

[22] Rabibhadana notes, pp. 119–120, that the large volume of historical legal documents concerning disputes over the control of manpower contrasts sharply with the dearth of similar documents dealing with disputes over land. For a discussion of Thai retinues today, see Lucien M. Hanks, Jr., "The Corporation and the Entourage: A Comparison of Thai and American Social Organization," *Catalyst* (Summer, 1966), pp. 55–63.

The main administrative tasks of the premodern Thai monarchy consisted in peacetime, of public works construction, and in wartime of the organization of large scale military activity. The labor involved in these efforts was provided by the mass of the king's subjects. It is the manner in which this labor was mobilized and directed that is of special interest here, for it was managed through an elaborate system of patron-client arrangements which endured with but minor modifications from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century.

The earliest references to such a system are for the year 1356, when by a royal command everyone was required to register under a leader. Those who failed to do so were to be registered directly under the king.[23] It was under such leaders or patrons (*nai*) that service to the king was to be performed by those who were registered as their clients (*phrai*). The *nai* were thus in effect officials of the state, and this soon came to mean that for those who were not princes or princesses, and thus were not entitled to have clients as a matter of right, an appointment to an official post became a prerequisite—and a license—for the enlistment of clients.

The system was actually a pyramidal one. Lesser officials who had clients of their own were in their turn the clients of higher officials, and all officials above a certain grade, whether they were princes or not, were the direct clients of the king to whom they pledged personal allegiance.

Although this officially created patron-client tie entailed quite specific government-related duties, it appears to have included a broader, more diffuse set of mutual obligations as well. Aside from service to the state and the patron's legal responibility to deliver his client to the courts and defend him there if he was charged with a crime, it involved, as do patron-client relationships in most premodern societies, a broad range of supervisory and protective responsibilities on the part of the patron who in turn could dispose of substantially more of his clients' time than that which they owed the state.

Eventually the system became quite complex. For those outside the ranks of the *nai*, three distinctive alternative forms of subordination were recognized by law. All of these involved attachment to a specific superordinate. Some clients were attached for their government service directly to a princely or bureaucratic superior. Others were attached directly to the king. He in turn assigned them to perform their service under specific officials who thus had both direct and royal clients working under their direction. Finally, a substantial number of Thai, estimated by a nineteenth-century European observer to comprise one-fourth of the population, were bound to specific members of the princely and bureaucratic elite not as government service clients but as private debt bondsmen.[24]

The subordination system described here is thus a classic example of vertical dyadic structure.[25] As might be expected in a system so organized, conflict between the king and the lesser power-holders of his realm took the form of a struggle over the right to control and make use of manpower more than over the possession of land.[26] In this struggle the *nai*, led by the great princes were for a time the stronger. As royal clients were wholly the king's men, their annual periods of *corvée* service were longer than those which could be demanded of direct clients of officials, a portion of whose time belonged to the latter for their private disposal in lieu of what in modern times would have been their salaries, or of debt bondsmen who had the heaviest nonofficial demands on their time. As many commoners had at least some choice in determining their own status, their patrons encouraged them to choose direct clientage or, ideally, debt bondage. The patrons did this by securing for their direct clients or debt bondsmen increased (and sometimes total) exemption from government service, and by making private service less onerous than government service.[27] This alienation of royal clients during the latter years of the Ayudhya period contributed, in the opinion of Rabibhadana, to the weakening and defeat of the state at the hands of the Burmese. Subsequent rulers at Bangkok reversed the trend and increased their control of manpower by lessening the burdens of royal clients while decreasing the exemptions from *corvée* service of private clients and debt bondsmen, and by requiring that all clients be tatooed with the names of their patrons and their towns of residence.[28]

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[23] Rabibhadana, p. 20.

[24] Debt bondage, which varied in its degree of unfreedom from merely nominal mortgaging of the debtor or a member of his family, through actual debt service, to hereditary slavery, was encouraged by the rule that a patron had a first right to extend loans to his government clients. If a debtor defaulted in his repayments, he could be transformed from a government client into the patron's private debt bondsman, the degree of his unfreedom depending upon the extent of this indebtedness.

[25] Whether the obligation of clientage was confined to men, or applied to both men and women is unclear. Some comments by Wales suggest the latter. See his observation, p. 53 that "When the parents belonged to different *kroms*, or had different patrons in the same *krom*, their children, on reaching the age at which government service was required of them, were divided between the patrons of their parents." Other descriptions of Thai clientage make no reference to women. But women it appears, were sold into slavery. Almost all men, at least, of nonelite status were obliged to assume one of these roles of subordination, according to the observation of an early nineteenth-century foreign observer, mentioned by Rabibhadana, p. 81; this foreigner noted that free labor did not exist, for the labor of every individual was appropriated by one or another chief, without whose approval he could not work.

[26] Rabibhadana, pp. 36–39, 56–59.

One aspect of the traditional Thai system has special importance for an understanding of the functioning of dyadic structures and of the conditions under which they can be expected to be prominent: A question on which Thai specialists have been in some disagreement is whether the *krom* of premodern Thailand were territorial units, functionally specialized units, or a mixture of the two. The historical materials presented by H. G. Quaritch-Wales suggested to him and to others who have accepted his interpretation, including Vella, Mosel, and Siffin, that an earlier "feudalistic" territorial form of organization was replaced in King Trailokanat's time by a system of centrally directed *krom* that in the words of Mosel, "tended to have both territorial and functional responsibilities, which in time led to considerable confounding and overlap."[29]

Fred Riggs, drawing on Heine-Geldern, has attempted to account for this apparent structural confusion by suggesting that late Ayudhya *krom* were designed to be neither territorial nor functionally specialized entities but rather to be "cosmological and topological" units which would conform to the requirement, derived from Indian religious belief, that the realm, like the palace at its center, be arranged in accordance with the directions of the compass. Territorial or functional responsibilities or both were then assigned to these units, Riggs argues, as convenience dictated.[30] Riggs's suggestion that *krom* were designed to be something other than territorial or functional units seems reasonable, but a cosmological explanation of this fact seems unconvincing as more than a partial explanation. I find more persuasive the interpretation of Rabibhadana, which was foreshadowed by Hanks, that the *krom* were intended primarily to be units of manpower.[31] If this interpretation is correct, then the aim of the monarch in establishing the *krom* would appear to have been a dual one: to attain tight control over a maximum number of his subjects, and to make use of, but at the same time limit, the power of his princely kinsmen. Given the man-land ratio of premodern Thailand and the values and forms of organization which this encouraged, as well as the rule of declining princely descent, the most efficient method of achieving these overarching goals was to attach individuals to individuals in a great pyramid of centrally controlled nonhereditary patron-client arrangements.[32] The assignment to such units of designations which satisfied cosmological, functional, or territorial needs would have been a matter of little difficulty.

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[27] Under Ayudhya law, as reported by Wales, p. 5, commoners were entitled to choose and leave their patrons. That in practice this right was always preserved seems unlikely. A decree by King Rama II quoted by Rabibhadana, p. 88, which promised runaway clients that if they returned from the jungle "this time only they would not be punished and would be allowed to choose their new patrons," attests to this. On the other hand Rabibhadana reports, pp. 34–35, that it was fairly easy, prior to the institution of tatooing of clients, for a dissatisfied client to abscond and have himself secretly taken in by another patron, or find another patron who would buy him from his first master, or by lending him money convert him into his debt bondsman.

[28] Rabibhadana, pp. 38, 59. The alienation of royal clients by princely patrons and the consequent weakening of royal authority recalls a somewhat similar development which took place in Japan during the several centuries which followed the first attempt to establish a centralized bureaucratic state in the seventh and eighth centuries. In the Japanese case however the development involved the control of land and only secondarily the enlistment of manpower. See George Sansom, *A History of Japan to 1334* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 83–89.

[29] James N. Mosel, "Thai Administrative Behavior," in *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration*, ed. William J. Siffin, (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1957), p. 287. Rabibhadana, pp. 29, 31, notes that, legally, towns were equated with *krom*, and that governors were equated with chiefs of *krom*.

[30] Fred W. Riggs, *Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966), pp. 70–72, 79; and Robert Heine-Geldern, *Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia*, Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Data Paper No. 18 (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, 1956), pp. 3–5.

[31] Rabibhadana, p. 77. Hanks, who is quoted by Rabibhadana has described the premodern social order of Thailand as one "which resembles a military organization more than an occidental class type society." Lucien M. Hanks, Jr., "Merit and Power in the Thai Social Order," *American Anthropologist*, 64 (December, 1962), pp. 1247–1261; cited at 1252.

[32] Under the rule of declining princely descent, a king's numerous male descendants by his many wives could pass on their rank to their descendants only in diminished form. The sixth generation became commoners. A king's female descendants could receive rank but could not transmit it even in diminished form. This would seem to have discouraged the creation of stable heritable princely clienteles.

Some evidence that supports this interpretation, presented by Rabibhadana, includes his finding that new *krom* frequently were created to provide positions and clients for specific princes and princesses, and conversely that on the death of a prince his clients often were transformed into royal clients and the *krom* as a whole, consisting of both clients and lesser officials, converted into a sub-*krom* and attached to another major *krom*.[33]

But the contrary interpretation, that *krom* were more than transitory unspecialized aggregations of manpower, is supported by the fact that various *krom* did have names indicative of specific functions. And further ambiguity is added because during some periods at least, when a high personage lost his *krom*, his direct clients remained with him and could be inherited by his descendants, while his royal clients stayed with the *krom*.[34]

It appears, then, that there is no single way of describing a *krom* in premodern Thailand. It seems to have been a catchall term used to describe various kinds of units including the personal retinue of a prince, a troop of soldiers under an appointive nonprincely commander, and a rough territorial jurisdiction defined as much by its inhabitants as by precise geographic boundaries. In later years it came to mean a functionally specific department of the central government. But clearly even in quite recent times, many *krom* were designed at least in part to provide support groups and a living for the great men and women of the realm.

The advantages of a system of administration employing movable entourages is obvious. The leader with his clients can be shifted about without being allowed to develop the strength that is to be derived from a fixed territorial base. Yet he is made a useful agent of the king by being given a body of men personally loyal to himself—an essential ingredient of effective administration in premodern societies. If he proves his loyalty to the king, he can be allowed to increase the size of his following. If his loyalty is in doubt, his retinue can be decreased or taken from him, or he can be made subordinate to a more trusted leader, or sent off with his men to some distant place. This type of organization is possible, however, only in a state which can dispense with complex and stable territorial organization, and one in which the need for a high degree of functional specialization at the center has not yet developed. This, it appears, was the case in premodern Thailand.

Patron-client relationships described here for the late Ayudhya and early Bangkok periods, continue to be among the main building blocks of the Thai society and polity today. David Wilson has given us the classic description of how great personal followings serve as the support groups of individual members of governing "coup groups" both in the Thai bureaucracy, military and civilian, and in Parliament. Fred Riggs has examined the same subject further, and in addition has explored patron-client relationships between high Thai officials and Chinese pariah capitalists on the one hand, and between such officials and the organizers of various voluntary associations on the other. William Siffin has explored the same subject in the sphere of administration. Finally, various nonpolitical scientists, aside from Hanks and Rabibhadana, including James Mosel and Herbert Phillips, have noted the importance of personal alliances in nonpolitical spheres of contemporary Thai society.[35] Their findings will not be summarized for Thailand is employed here as the example of a premodern monarchy.

The Modern Philippines

For analysis of a modern system which makes much use of dyadic structures and techniques, a society with yet another religious tradition may be examined: that of the predominantly Christian, Hispanized, and Americanized Republic of the Philippines.

The Philippine case is based upon my own past and ongoing research. A more detailed discussion of Philippine politics may be found elsewhere.[36] The Philippine political system is set within a political culture which may be described as follows: The individual sees himself in an unpredictable, competitive world in which his first concern must be with his own welfare and that of his immediate family. In the pursuit of self and family interest he finds himself in conflict with others. This leads to mistrust and envy. It also leads to the placing of a high value upon the achievement of power and dominance, which places him beyond the reach of the envious and allows him to advance his interests with a minimum of external interference.[37]

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[33] Rabibhadana, pp. 31, 78.

[34] Rabibhadana, pp. 30–31.

[35] David A. Wilson, *Politics in Thailand* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962); Riggs, "Thailand"; William J. Siffin, *The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966); Mosel, "Thai Administrative Behavior"; Herbert P. Phillips, *Thai Peasant Personality: The Patterning of Interpersonal Behavior in the Village of Bang Chan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).

[36] Landé, *Leaders, Factions, and Parties;* and *Southern Tagalog Voting: Political Behavior in a Philippine Region,* A.I.D. Research Paper (January, 1972).

The individual and his family need not, however, face the competitive world alone. They can form alliances with others for the purpose of mutual aid. Power and wealth are useful in the building of such alliances. The ideal is to have many allies which maximizes one's security. Alliances are built not only for the dyadic exchange of aid but also for the establishment of a common front against outsiders which allows a successful combination to appropriate a disproportionate share of the available benefits. Combinations can vary in size, expanding or contracting in accordance with the size of the arena and the size of the largest opposing combination. Old allies can quickly become opponents in a struggle over the allotment of the rewards of their earlier collaboration. In such a setting a high value is placed upon the redistribution, among followers and allies of any member of a combination, of benefits which he may obtain.

Though Philippine society is highly competitive, there exists, nonethless, an awareness of a broader community-wide interest and a yearning for community-wide harmony. While skeptical of the practicality of achieving a general increase in wealth through collective action, and dubious about the possibility of achieving exact justice through the equalization of benefits, Filipinos realize that no important individual or group will accept permanent exclusion from access to benefits, and that peace within the community requires that none be permanently excluded. Inclusion is achieved not through equalizing policies but through the rotation of benefits over time. Letting other people "have their chance," like redistributive sharing, is thus seen to be essential to social harmony.

Philippine political culture thus has some similarities with those of the earlier political systems, but it differs from them as well. Though "individualistic" to the point of disorder, it is not anarchic to the same degree as those of the Kalinga and Tausug. Though highly inegalitarian, it lacks the harsh authoritarianism of premodern Thailand. Finally, while it provides a setting appropriate for a heavy reliance on dyadic action, it also offers hope to aspirations for collective action for the common good.

Structurally, the Philippine political system viewed from the top downward, appears to be composed mainly of discrete entities: There are a wide variety of occupationally specialized voluntary associations. There are two nationwide political parties which biennially run slates of candidates for a wide variety of elective offices. There is a Congress, both of whose houses usually though not invariably organize themselves at the beginning of each session on party lines. There are departments and agencies of government staffed largely by those who have passed civil service examinations. And there is a system of courts. All of these political and governmental structures function in part at least as do their American counterparts.

But in other ways, which seem puzzling to American observers, these structures operate in a manner not easily explained by the group theory of politics. Associational and institutional interest groups account for only a small part of the totality of interest articulation. The two major parties are identical in their social composition and do not present distinctive or even distinguishable programs to the electorate. Party switching is endemic, as are cross-party alliances for control of the government. Two presidents of the Republic, since Independence, switched parties shortly before being elected. Repeatedly in the House of Representatives disloyal members of one party have helped to overthrow their party's speaker by joining with the opposite party to install one of the latter's members in this powerful post. Twice in recent years members of one party helped the opposite party retain the speakership with the tacit support of their own party's chief executive. Members of the bureaucracy, on the whole, show but limited regard for formally established lines of authority, while judges often are suspected of deciding cases with less than strict impartiality.

Some reasons why this system operates quite differently from the American one, whose macro-structures it seems at first sight to duplicate, begin to appear when one examines the Philippine political system not from the top downward but from the bottom upward. One then discovers that it makes as much use of nondiscrete as of discrete structures. For the performance of certain tasks it relies heavily, though not of course exclusively, upon a great net of dyadic alliances, some of them horizontal but more of them vertical, leading inward and upward from the villages to the national government, from "little people" to "big people," and from those who have favors to ask or demands to make to those who have the power to grant them. This network of alliances often shows little regard for the boundaries which separate discrete structures, whether they be interest groups, parties, or the various instrumentalities of government. And in performing its various tasks, the Philippine political system proceeds as much through particular decisions affecting specific individuals, and based on the principles of favoritism and the *quid pro quo,* as through categorical decisions applied impersonality and impartially in accordance with the law. In short, the Philippine political system makes use of both discrete and dyadic structures in a mix which contains a substantially larger component of dyadic structure than does its American counterpart.

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[37] For excellent discussions of behavior and its structural basis in societies not very different from that of the Philippines, see Edward C. Banfield's classic *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958); and more recently Jane Schneider, "Of Vigilance and Virgins: Honor, Shame and Access to Resources in Mediterranean Societies," *Ethnology,* 10 (January, 1971), 1–24.

The nature of this Philippine mixture can be seen in the way the system performs two major tasks: the election of public officials and the processing of the public's demands for governmental outputs. I shall discuss each of these two tasks and the structures which perform them separately.

The most striking feature of elections in the Philippines is the strong disposition of the mass of ordinary citizens to vote for "personalities" rather than political parties. Clear evidence of this was found in the course of analyzing the contents of a large number of ballots taken from ballot boxes in ten sample precincts of a typical province after the off-year elections of 1963. These showed that in the average precinct, 74 per cent of the ballots were cross-party ones, i.e., contained votes for candidates of more than one party.[38]

The cross-party voting habits of the electorate have their counterpart in the campaign techniques of candidates for elective offices. These find it necessary to build what are essentially personal campaign organizations. In this they seek the help of lower level political leaders who have personal followings whose votes they can deliver, and of candidates for even higher offices who are willing to help finance the candidate's campaign in exchange for aid in their own search for votes. In both cases, their main concern is to find strong allies, without much regard for their party identification. Thus many such alliances cut across party lines.

Formally, each party is an association composed of those who have become party members. In practice each party, at any point in time, is a multi-tiered pyramid of personal followings, one heaped upon the other. Each link in the chain of vertical dyads is based upon personal assurances of support and conditional upon the downward flow of patronage and spoils. But even this description of a party exaggerates its coherence. For as has been noted, political leaders wander into and out of parties with their personal followers in tow, feeling no strong obligation, and being under no real pressure, to support their party mates. Party membership is not a category but a matter of degree.[39]

If one wishes to discover the real framework upon which election campaigns are built, one must turn away from political parties and focus one's attention upon individual candidates and the vertical chains of leadership and followership into which they arrange themselves of any given point in time. While tending to tie together persons who claim the same party label, these chains must in fact be viewed as independent structures resembling a network of strong vines which variously cling to or twist back and forth between two great but hollow trees.

The personal basis of political loyalty helps to account for the types of individuals who win elections. Victory tends to go to those with the greatest personal wealth, to those with the most flamboyant campaign styles, and to those who are thought most likely to be able to win and thus to have access to patronage and other rewards of office. A candidate's position on questions of ideology or his loyal support of such as there is of party policy appears to be of minimal importance.

When one inquires into the way the public's demands for governmental outputs are processed in the Philippines, one finds that less use is made of the "primary" ties of kinship and patronship-clientship than was the case in the contesting of elections, and more use is made of ties arising out of considerations of specialized economic interest. But such arrangements insofar as they are employed, also are in large part dyadic.

In Almond's reworking of the "group theory" of politics into the framework of a political systems model, the demands of individual citizens, in a more developed polity are satisfied through a series of consecutive "conversion processes," performed by a number of specialized structures. Conversion as it goes through its several stages involves the progressive transformation of the particular into the categorical, and then into the particular once again. In the end, the individual citizen gets what he wants, or a portion of it, but only as a result of a lengthy process that is designed to assure that all who are like himself will receive the same benefits or be subjected to the same deprivations.

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[38] For a report on the analysis of these ballots, see Carl H. Landé, "Parties and Politics in the Philippines," *Asian Survey,* 8 (September, 1968), pp. 242–247; and *Southern Tagalog Voting,* pp. 81–93.

[39] For case studies of local and provincial politics which illustrate these points, see Mary R. Hollnsteiner, *The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality* (Quezon City: Community Development Research Council, University of the Philippines, 1963); Remigio E. Agpalo, *Pandanggo-Sa-Ilaw: The Politics of Occidental Mindoro,* Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, No. 9 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1969); and Landé, *Leaders, Factions, and Parties,* pp. 132–140.

Almond's model of this process fits the Philippines only to a limited degree. Private goals may be attained in disregard of the law by members of all social strata. The powerful, the rich, and the well connected, can obtain favored treatment through personal office holding, through the use or threat of force, or by offering material rewards to bureaucratic decision makers. The weak and the poor often can hope to obtain leniency either by becoming the clients of persons in positions of power or, in the case of those who lack such connections, through appeals for *awa* (pity)—an appeal which carries much weight in Philippine culture. For those who can obtain governmental favors or exemption from law for themselves, and this includes most of the politically adept members of society, there is little incentive to work for the passage of general legislation. This helps to account for the relatively small part which is played in the interest articulation process by organized interest groups.

The argument should not be overstated. There are in the Philippines many voluntary associations which to some degree resemble American pressure groups, and their number is growing rapidly.[40] With a few exceptions, however, notably that of the sugar industry, for whose political effectiveness there is a special historical explanation, these groups are small, subject to fission, and fairly short lived. While they do press for general legislation, major portions of their leaders' efforts are devoted to interceding with public officials on behalf of specific individuals and firms. As a result, many such associations are widely thought to be the personal instruments of their leaders whose private interests receive first attention. Ordinary members of the category for which an association professes to speak usually have little to gain through membership unless they have personal ties with the leaders sufficiently close to justify the hope that special efforts at intervention will be made in their behalf. Most individuals find it more to their advantage to cultivate whatever personal connections they may have with any politician who is willing to help them obtain favors.

The nature of Philippine political structure also affects the outcome of the interest aggregation process. Specifically, it prevents the two major parties from offering the electorate a choice between two reasonably coherent and distinctive party programs. The reason for this appears to be as follows: According to Almond's schema, which fits most modern democracies, individual political parties, while representing broader slices of society than do individual interest groups, still seek support mainly from one or another part of the whole spectrum of interests. This permits each party to devise a program that is at least to some degree distinctive and coherent. In the Philippines, however, both major political parties are what Maurice Duverger called "cadre parties," led by members of the elite who in each province and town compete with each other in seeking electoral support from members of all social strata.[41] They are able to win such support largely through the massive distribution of a broad spectrum of particular rewards appropriate to the private needs of members of all sectors of society. At the same time, leaders in both parties compete with each other in trying to satisfy to some degree at least the broader legislative demands of virtually all articulate interest groups.

This makes both major parties excellent compromises but poor instruments for the formulation of distinctive and consistent programs. Such programs, insofar as they exist at all in the Philippines, are the creations not of parties but of individuals. Each new president when he takes office begins to create his own program. In doing so, he is guided by his personal views, the views of his advisers, and by a variety of pressures from diverse sources which no president can ignore. Each member of the Congress does roughly the same, though many members of both parties respond in some degree to pressure or persuasion from the incumbent president. Thus, the legislative output of the Philippine government is the resultant of the individual decisions of numerous legislators, guided to some degree by the president, rather than the handiwork of the dominant political party as such.

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[40] See Remigio E. Agpalo, *The Political Process and the Nationalization of the Retail Trade in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1962); and Robert B. Stauffer, *The Development of an Interest Group: The Philippine Medical Association* (Manila: University of the Philippines Press, 1966).

[41] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, 2nd ed. (London: Methuen, 1959).

However legislation in any case is a less important aspect of the governmental process in the Philippines than in countries where laws are strictly enforced. More important from the point of view of most voters and therefore of most legislators is the way law is enforced—or not enforced—with respect to specific individuals, firms, and localities by administrators.

Members of the Congress influence administrative decisions by threatening to cut departmental appropriations or block promotions, as well as by placing their own proteges in various departments and agencies. One finds therefore a complex network of personal alliances which cut across the formal boundaries between the branches of government. This is the case, of course, in all political systems to some degree, but in the Philippines the pattern is especially marked.

This system of alliances has consequences for the informal operation of the executive branch. Since the proteges of members of Congress are more dependent for their advancement upon the intervention of their extradepartmental patrons than upon the good will of their immediate superiors, bureaucratic discipline is uncertain. Saddled with many uncontrollable subordinates, the wise official responds by attempting to create a personal following of his own among those of his subordinates who show a willingness to give him their primary loyalty in return for the receipt of special favors, and by refusing to delegate authority to any but his personal clients.[42]

To summarize: Together with a multistage conversion process, performed by a succession of specialized structures, one finds in the Philippines a much more simple process of favor seeking and favor giving between members of the public and administrative decision makers. This process is carried on through chains of dyadic ties that bypass interest groups, parties and the law-making structures, and therefore lessen the part they play in the country's governance.

A number of consequences follow from this heavy reliance upon dyadic methods of goal attainment:

(1) It provides specific benefits for some members of all sectors of society, thereby minimizing intercategorical, including interclass, hostility, and reducing the bitterness of conflict between the political parties as well as between other organized groups. At the same time, it produces dissatisfaction among those other members of all sectors of society who have not received their share of specific rewards.

(2) By permitting favoritism to undermine the impersonal administration of justice, it contributes to the near anarchy which presently prevails in many parts of the Philippines, and it erodes public confidence in the system of government.

(3) It causes changes in governmental policy to be secular rather than cyclical, for it makes change depend not upon the alternation in power of the two political parties but mainly upon long-term changes in the constellation of forces in Philippine society, as well as upon the accident of an individual president's personal views.

(4) It produces a system whose responsive and distributive capabilities are quite high, but whose extractive and regulative capabilities are exceedingly low.

(5) It makes the mobilization of political support immensely costly both in money and effort. An added cost is the growing conviction among many Filipino intellectuals that holding these highly expensive periodic elections is too high a price to pay for the advantages of democracy.

(6) Finally, it leads to that preoccupation with personalities, offices, and spoils, and that lack of interest in policy or ideology, which is so strikingly characteristic of Philippine politics.

The Four Systems Compared

Four Southeast Asian political systems, imbedded in different political traditions and representing different stages of political modernization, have illustrated the tasks which can be performed by dyadic structures composed variously of ties of kinship, friendship, patronship-clientship and interpersonal political alliances.

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[42] The Tagalog term for such a client is *bata* (literally, "child"). Modern organizations in the Philippines, both in the government and the private sector, are honeycombed with *bata* systems of the classic patron-client type. Equally widespread are *compadre* relationships of the type found in Latin America and medieval Europe. These may be either vertical or horizontal. A functionally equivalent tie among Filipino Muslims is that which results from swearing together on the Koran. Finally, in the economic sphere there are to be found *suki* relationships between buyers and sellers who deal with each other on the basis of favored treatment. The latter type of relationships have been described by James N. Anderson, in "Buy and Sell Economic Personalism: Foundations for Philippine Entrepreneurship," *Asian Survey,* 9 (September, 1969), 641–668. The "compadre system," which in Latin America is called *compadrazgo,* has been described by numerous writers. The best comparative discussion is that of Sidney W. Mintz and Eric R. Wolf, "An Analysis of Ritual Co-Parenthood (Compadrazgo)," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology,* 6 (Winter, 1950), 341–468. For an excellent survey of various relationships of this sort see Julian Pitt-Rivers, "Pseudo Kinship," in *The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* 8 (New York: Crowell, Collier and Macmillan, 1968), 408–431.

It may be asked why these Southeast Asian societies show such a marked tendency to employ dyadic structures in preference to discrete ones. Several possible explanations suggest themselves: One is that the peoples of these societies find models of dyadic structure in their cognatic kinship systems, and therefore are inclined to favor dyadic devices when they build larger structures that embrace nonkinsmen. If this is true, then peoples that have unilineal descent systems, which divide society into discrete clans and lineages, should favor those nonkinship structures that are discrete. I have discussed some cases which illustrate such a transfer of structural principles from the kinship to the nonkinship sphere elsewhere.[43] And there is statistical evidence of a strong association between the presence or absence of these two types of kinship and that of some other political institutions.[44] But the argument must not be pressed too far. A growing body of anthropological research shows that peoples with unilineal systems of descent employ various types of dyadic structures alongside discrete descent groups and voluntary associations. In such societies, dyads are used especially to build alliances across the boundaries which separate descent groups so as to free rulers and others from an exclusive dependence upon their lineage and clan mates.[45] And peoples with cognatic systems of kinship in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, as they become more modern, do of course make an increasing use of discrete structures.

There are other possible explanations for the proliferation of dyadic structures of the type described here in these four societies, which are not inconsistent with the previous one. The shortage of manpower in relationship to available land, which prevailed in most of Southeast Asia until quite recently, may have encouraged the development of a variety of simple but effective dyadic devices, ranging from compulsory clientage through debt bondage to slavery, which allow individuals to exploit the labor of other individuals for their private advantage. (In regions where land is scarce the impetus for the creation of patron-client ties probably is more likely to come from below, i.e., from tenants who seek to ensure their access to land.)

The endemic nature of private violence, encouraged by a conception of honor which requires that personal affronts and injuries be avenged by force, may have also encouraged the extension of webs of alliances suitable for defense and offense in private warfare. The steady growth of private armies under the control of warlord-politicians, a neo-feudal development which has characterized the Philippines since independence and is one of the underlying causes of the current crisis in that country, illustrates this point.

Finally, all four societies share a "limited good," "constant pie," or "zero sum" view of the resources available in a community in the sense in which these terms have been applied by George Foster in Mexico and James Scott in Malaya.[46] Such a view, which perceives anyone else's gain to be one's own loss, would seem to encourage a strategy for self advancement that leads the individual to concentrate upon seeking concrete benefits for himself and his family, to reward others only on the basis of a quid pro quo, and to try to convert others into exploitable dependents.

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[43] See Landé, "Kinship and Politics in Pre-Modern and Non-Western Societies."

[44] Data from George Peter Murdock's "World Ethnographic Sample" were employed to test the hypothesis that cognatic societies are less likely than unilineal societies to assign positions of political leadership on a hereditary basis. This entailed the construction of a two-by-two table for unilineal versus bilateral (cognatic) descent and for hereditary versus non-hereditary political succession. The number of societies which fit into the table were 384. Unilineal societies tended to have hereditary political succession approximately four times as often as non-hereditary succession, while bilateral (cognatic) societies were almost equally divided between the two types of succession. The Phi coefficient was .32, indicating a relatively strong relationship in the hypothesized direction. The Chi square test indicated that the relationship would occur by chance in less than one out of 1,000 cases. Another two-by-two table was constructed for unilineal descent versus bilateral (cognatic) descent and for hereditary slavery versus the absence of hereditary slavery (slavery if present, being only temporary or nonhereditary). This time the number of societies in the table was 464. While 27 per cent of the unilineal societies had hereditary slavery, only 12 per cent of those with bilateral (cognatic) descent did so. The Phi coefficient was .18. The Chi square test again indicated the relationship would occur by chance in less than one out of 1,000 cases. The data were taken from George Peter Murdock, "World Ethnographic Sample," *American Anthropologist,* 59 (August, 1957), 664–687. I shall be glad to supply the tables on request.

[45] See J. P. Singh Uberoi, *Politics of the Kula Ring: An Analysis of the Findings of Bronislaw Malinowski* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1962); and Franz Michael, *The Origins of Manchu Rule in China: Frontier and Bureaucracy as Interacting Forces in the Chinese Empire* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1942), especially pp. 80–98.

[46] George M. Foster, "Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good," *American Anthropologist,* 67 (April, 1965), 293–315; and James C. Scott, *Political Ideology in Malaysia: Reality and Beliefs of an Elite* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 91–149. Foster, p. 296, associates the "image of limited good" with land shortage. But like clientage, it seems to be found also in peasant societies where land is not in short supply.

It may be asked how it was possible for these four systems to operate with so little reliance on discrete structures. The answer would seem to lie in the fact that the particular needs of individuals can be met fairly effectively through dyadic interactions, and that discrete structures, general laws, and their impersonal enforcement are necessary only when categorical or collective goals are sought.

Barton's and Kiefer's descriptions of Kalinga and Tausug political life suggest that the traditional political process in these societies consists mainly of tasks that can be performed separately for various individuals, and in a decentralized fashion, i.e., of the *ajudication* of private disputes. Deliberate *legislation* does not occur in Kalinga where custom is the basis of law. In the Tausug state, law codes are formulated by the sultan, without the aid of a council or similar body. *Administration,* Kiefer reports, does not exist in the Tausug state as something separate from ajudication and the same may be said of Kalinga.[47]

The tasks of the Thai monarchy were more diverse and therefore required more complicated structures. To perform them, the monarchy established an elaborate system of administration. But that system lacked the structural stability and functional specificity found in the modern state. Tasks appear to have been assigned as much to individuals as to localities or departments. Governmental departments were subject to dissolution when their heads died or lost royal favor. Officialdom as a whole thus was unable to develop the cohesion and strength of a full-fledged Weberian bureaucracy. Finally, the Thai monarch, like other traditional Southeast Asian rulers, and unlike the monarchs of Europe, governed without a parliament. Legislation was the prerogative of the king, who usually ruled in a fairly arbitrary fashion. The Thai thus lacked the experience, so crucial to the evolution of the modern democratic *rechtsstaat,* of observing open debates on legislation by representatives of different social orders or points of view, taking the form of conflicting categorical demands that were resolved categorically. All this helps to explain why the king and the massive network of clients and subclients who staffed his government appear more prominent than the corporate structures of the premodern Thai state.

There remains the most nearly modern of the four Southeast Asian political systems, the Republic of the Philippines. Like other postcolonial states it has the usual functionally specialized branches of government patterned closely upon the model of its colonial tutor. And it has a growing number of formally organized voluntary associations including political parties which attempt to perform what Almond calls the articulation and aggregation of interests. Yet to a considerable degree, the interests of individuals in the Philippines are satisfied individually through direct dyadic arrangements of exchange between them and specific officeholders in the bureaucracy or the judiciary. Insofar as this occurs, the conversion of particular demands into categorical prescriptions becomes unnecessary, and the specialized associational and governmental conversion structures are bypassed.

A Typology of Action Groups

The main argument of this article has been that dyadic structures perform tasks differently than do groups of the type described by the "group theory" of politics. If the argument is valid, then it should be possible to devise a set of models to describe these and perhaps other structural types and their modes of performance.

I propose to do this at two different levels of what Giovanni Sartori has called the "ladder of abstraction."[48] I shall begin with a set of three very simple types, arrived at deductively, cast at a very high level of abstraction, and designed to be very broadly applicable. As suggested by Sartori the number of attributes of each highly abstract type will be kept to a minimum. Then, at a lower level of abstraction, which permits the filling in of more detail, I shall outline, with the help of a set of paired propositions, two contrasting types which, though they are in principle less broadly applicable, do fit, I believe, a large number of real institutions found in developing and more developed countries.

Each of the first three highly abstract types consists of three principles which, I suggest, are linked in each type. The principles are those of *composition, action pattern* and *task*. They are linked in that they are logically most suited to each other. By "most suited" I mean that the inner logic of each of the three is such that if one principle is chosen, the acceptance also of the other two provides logically the most efficient means (though *not* the only means) of goal achievement.

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[47] Kiefer, *Tausug Armed Conflict,* p. 194.

[48] Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics," *American Political Science Review,* 64 (December, 1970), 1040–1046.

The three types are named "trait group," "web" and "collectivity." Each designates a distinctive type of action group. Their features are outlined in Table 1.

I shall not discuss the principles which comprise each type here. To elaborate on the characteristics of trait groups and webs would repeat arguments made elsewhere in this article. To discuss collectivities would greatly expand the article's scope. I have included the last type in the table simply in order to suggest how another basic type of action group might be described in terms of a few interrelated principles.

The structural elements of each type, that is to say *composition* and *action pattern,* have been listed first for the following reason: Structure can be a cause as well as a consequence of other elements of a system. Ancient institutions often display an ability to survive which may be hard to explain on functional grounds, and by their presence may discourage the growth of new institutions and the performance of new tasks. A similar conservative bias applies, I think, to structural *principles.* A society accustomed to certain of these is likely to make use of them even in those new institutions which it creates to replace old ones that have fallen into decline. If it is true, as I have argued here, that certain principles of composition, action and task are linked, then a society's addiction to given principles of structure will limit to some extent the types of goals it will be able to pursue. Conversely, if a society's leaders commit themselves to pursuing wholly new types of goals, they must create not merely new institutions, but institutions based on the structural principles appropriate to these new types of goals.

The types suggest an approach to one of the problems of structural-functional analysis: The disjunction between those strategies for analysis that begin with structures and those that begin with functions. Perhaps it will be possible to move back and forth between structural and functional analyses more easily at the level of their underlying principles. A concern with such principles also may help one to connect micro-, macro- and middle-level analysis, a point previously made by René Lemarchand.[49]

It may be useful now to descend the ladder of abstraction a rung or two and to examine two further types which are sub-types of two of the types described in the previous table. Because the new types are less general than the previous ones, they can be outlined in greater detail. The trait group now takes the more specific form of a "trait association," with some degree of organization and a head. The web takes the form of a vertical web or "personal following." It need not be given a head for a web is inconceivable without a central figure. Both types, furthermore, are described as they operate in a setting where group attachment is voluntary and there is at least some competition among rival groups. Thus the types do not fit either a one-party state or a feudal fief.

In many but not in all of their characteristics these two types are polar ones, whose distinc-

Table 1. A Partial Typology of Action Groups

Three Types at High Levels of Abstraction

		Types of Action Groups		
	Types	"Trait group"	"Web"	"Collectivity"
Principles	*Structure*			
	Composition	Shared trait	Shared ally or leader	Shared membership in a bounded community
	Action pattern	Like action	Exchange of aid	Division of common tasks
	Task	Narrow spectrum categorical goal attainment	Disparate individual goal attainment	Broad spectrum collective goal attainment
	Examples	Interest groups, ideological groups, classes	Personal alliance systems, personal followings	Families, lineages, corporations, states

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[49] René Lemarchand, "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation Building," *American Political Science Review,* 64 (March, 1972), p. 68.

tive features can be placed at opposite ends of the same continua. For this reason, I shall describe the two types together, with the help of a set of paired propositions. These are the result of (a) deduction from simple structural concepts; (b) current theory concerning networks and dyads, especially that formulated by Robert Pehrson, George Foster, John Thibaut and Harold Kelley, Norman Whitten and Alvin Wolfe, and myself; and (c) a growing body of empirical research conducted in certain geographic regions where networks have attracted particular scholarly attention.

While the two types are meant to be quite broadly applicable, few institutions will conform to them exactly. Real institutions may combine different structural principles, or fall between the ends of a continuum. Or they may change their position on a continuum over time. Thus Adrian Mayer shows how the closest allies of the central member of an ego-centered web may over time form so tight a core that the central member becomes obscured by what has become a discrete multimember group.[50] Finally, the peculiar traditions of a specific culture may in various ways alter a case which in other ways would fit the type.

Table 2. Trait Associations and Personal Followings

A Set of Paired Propositions

DEFINITIONS

A *trait association* is an organized group of persons united by the fact that they believe themselves to share a distinguishing trait, or fall into a distinguishing category. It has a head.	A *personal following* is a vertical dyadic web, bound together by the fact that the followers have a common leader.

CONDITIONS

The following propositions concerning the structure and performance of trait associations and personal followings assume a setting characterized by *voluntary membership* in, and a measure of *competition* between groups.

PROPOSITIONS

Group Configuration

Genesis

Trait associations:	*Personal followings:*
Tend to grow out of pre-existing trait groups. (Recognition of the possession of a shared trait tends to precede organization and the selection of a head.)	Tend to be the creations of their leaders. (A would-be leader by winning the adherence of various individuals, creates a following. Only then does a sense of community appear.)

Reason for Appearance

Tend to appear when there are objects of common interest which can be attained through collective action.	Tend to appear when there are opportunities for mutually advantageous exchanges between leaders and followers.
Are especially likely to appear when such objects cannot be attained through individual action.	Are especially likely to appear when leaders and followers can provide large gains to each other at small costs to themselves.

Methods of Maintenance

Tend to be maintained by emphasizing shared needs and shared dangers, and by the demonstration of gains resulting from past collective action.	Tend to be maintained by periodic exchanges of favors between leaders and followers. (Such favors may be either substantial or symbolic. Thus they may be the ends or the means of group cohesion.)

Size

Size tends to be closely related to:	Size tends to be limited by:
The number of persons who share the trait.	The number of followers with whom the leader can maintain face-to-face relationships.

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[50] Adrian C. Mayer, "The Significance of Quasi-Groups in the Study of Complex Societies," in *The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies*, ed. Michael Banton, ASA Monograph No. 4 (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 115–117.

The presence of parallel groups with similar traits and interests with which fusion can take place.	The resources for distribution available to the leader.
The presence of rival groups with conflicting traits and interests which can serve as stimuli for counter-organization.	

Stability and Endurance

Tend to be stable and enduring.	Tend to be unstable and of short endurance.
For the group to endure, gains for participants need not equal or exceed costs in the short run, but must promise to do so in the long run.	For the group to endure, gains for participants must equal or exceed costs in the short run.
Endurance is threatened by indications that individual or group goals cannot be attained through collective action.	Personal followings are highly vulnerable to fragmentation, shrinkage, disintegration, or dissolution if:
	The leader loses his access to distributable resources.
	The leader is challenged by rival leaders with greater resources.
	The leader dies without being replaced at once by a suitable successor with equal resources.

Roles of Superordination and Subordination

Group Headship

Heads tend to be "officers," entrusted with authority to act by their groups.	Heads tend to be "leaders" who act on their own initiative.
Their official acts tend to be enforced by sanctions imposed by the group.	Group sanctions to compel obedience to leaders tend to be rare.
Such sanctions tend to be most effective when groups are multi-functional or mutually exclusive, or both.	Individual compliance with the leaders' commands tends to depend heavily upon the consent of each follower.

Group Membership

The rank and file tend to regard themselves as "members" having rights and obligations towards the group.	The rank and file tend to regard themselves as "followers," having claims upon and owing favors to their leader.

Criteria for Headship

The primary criterion for officership tends to be that the officer share the traits which distinguish the group.	The primary criterion for leadership tends to be that the leader have status or resources superior to those of his individual followers.

Responsibility or Responsiveness

Officers tend to a high degree to be responsible to their groups for actions taken in the group's behalf.	Leaders tend to a high degree to be responsive to the private demands of individual members.
Responsibility tends to be enforced by collective action involving the whole group or representatives of the group.	Responsiveness tends to be enforced through pressure from individual followers, rather than by collective action involving the whole group.
Responsibility tends to be highest on matters of general group policy.	Leaders tend to have considerable freedom to set broad goals and policies, as long as they satisfy the immediate private needs of their followers.
Officers tend to be relatively unresponsive to the private demands of individual members.	

Prestige

Within the association, the prestige of the officer and of members tends to a high degree to depend on their services to the association.	Within the following and the larger community, the prestige of the leader tends to a high degree to depend on the size of his following.
In the larger community, the prestige of the officer and of members tends to a high degree to depend upon the prestige of the trait group as a whole.	Within the following and the larger community, the prestige of an individual follower tends to a high degree to depend on the prestige of the leader, and the follower's closeness to him.
	(The distribution of prestige in the community resembles the top of a circus tent: The peaks, supported by the points where poles are placed, denote leaders whose prestige is their own. The sloping areas near the peaks represent the derivative prestige of close followers who are raised above the common mass by their leaders. The troughs denote the prestige of minor followers and the unattached.)

Goals and Goal Attainment

Types of Goals

Tend to focus upon a narrow spectrum of related categorical or ideological goals.	Tend to focus upon a broad spectrum of particular goals, which need not be related.

Agreement on Goals

Tend to require a high degree of agreement concerning specific goals.	Tend not to require a high degree of agreement concerning specific goals.

Alteration of Goals

Tend to find it difficult to alter specific goals.	Tend to find it easy to alter specific goals.

Participation in Rewards and Costs

Rewards tend to be of a kind that benefit all who share a trait, whether or not they are members of the trait association.	Rewards tend to be of a kind that can be restricted to members of the following:
Hence trait-wide participation in the association, or trait-wide contribution to its costs, will be sought.	Within the following, shares in the rewards tend to be closely related to the follower's value to the leader.
Equality within the group tends to be highly valued.	Favoritism tends to be valued and made explicit.

Methods of Goal Attainment

Tend to rely to a high degree upon collective action by the membership.	Tend to rely to a high degree upon the manipulative skill of the leader.
Frontal attacks against opposing groups are a favored tactic.	Among favored tactics are the following: Playing other actors off against each other; wooing away the allies of others; monopolizing access to distributors of resources.

Communication

Officers tend to communicate with members in broadcast fashion.	Leaders tend to communicate privately with each follower.
Messages tend to be categorical in content.	Messages tend to be particular in content.
	A high value tends to be placed on confidential information, diverse sources of information, and direct access to originators of information.

Goals and Rewards of Headship

To a relatively high degree officers are obliged to focus their efforts upon the attainment of group goals.	To a relatively high degree, leaders are free to focus their efforts upon the attainment of their private goals.
The rewards received by officers tend to be relatively modest, and be set by the group.	The rewards received by leaders tend to be relatively large, and to be set by themselves.

The Interaction of Groups in the Polity

Similarities and Differences Between Groups

Rival associations tend to be dissimilar in their composition and goals.	Rival followings tend to be similar in their composition and goals.
Inter-association disputes tend to turn on categorical issues.	Inter-following disputes tend to turn on "personalities" and spoils.

Expansion and Consolidation of Groups

Associations tend to be expanded through the broadening of categories, and the "nesting" of narrower trait associations within more comprehensive ones.	Followings tend to be expanded through the "pyramiding" of leaders. Under this procedure several lesser leaders, each accompanied by those who remain his personal followers, become the followers of a higher leader.
This is made possible by broadening the spectrum of goals.	This is made possible by supplying larger quantities of the same types of rewards.
	Consolidation through pyramiding tends to be limited by the resources available to the highest leader.

Changes in Individual Loyalties

Relatively few members shift their allegiance from one association to another.	The shifting of individual allegiance from one leader to another tends to be fairly common.
	Changes in allegiance tend to be affected by the ability of rival leaders to provide individual rewards to their followers.

The Stability of Inter-Group Alliances

Alliances between associations tend to be relatively stable.	Alliances between followings tend to be relatively unstable.
Two-directional reversals of alliances are very uncommon (i.e., AB vs CD may become ABC vs D or A vs BCD, but not AC vs BD).	Two-directional reversals of alliances are not uncommon.

Omnibus Propositions

The Resolution of Conflict

Systems composed of trait associations tend to resolve conflicts by the following means:	Systems composed of personal followings tend to resolve conflicts by the following means:
Fostering an awareness among individuals and groups that they have in common higher interests which override their areas of disagreement.	Avoiding issues that are socially divisive.
Under certain conditions: By creating stable majorities which are able to impose solutions to conflicts.	Employing bargaining as a method of conflict-resolution.
	Making rival groups open in their recruitment, heterogeneous in composition, syncretic in policy, and flexible in their alliances.
	Providing opportunities for individual (as distinguished from group) social mobility, and thereby placating potential advocates of conflict.

Organization for Goal Achievement

Systems composed of trait associations tend to be better suited than systems composed of personal followings for the concentration of collective effort towards the achievement of clearly defined collective goals. Specifically, they are well suited for the following tasks:	Systems composed of personal followings tend to be better suited than systems composed of trait associations for the rapid attainment of the particular goals of individuals. Specifically, they are well suited for the following tasks:
Fusing scattered private goals into collective goals, devising long-range programs for their attainment, and mobilizing for such programs support which is massive, disciplined, and sustained.	Focusing attention upon goals which are concrete and quickly attainable.
Forcing clear-cut choices between incompatible goals.	Fostering mutual aid between dissimilar individuals in the pursuit of their private goals.
Restraining individual and sub-group rivalries that jeopardize collective goals.	Creating leaders who are sensitive to the needs of individual followers, and able to intercede with power holders on their behalf.
Creating officers who are committed to collective goals, maintaining group control over them, and enforcing compliance with their commands.	

Effects upon National Cohesion

Nations whose rival political groups are trait associations tend to avoid localistic politics.	Nations whose rival political groups are personal followings tend to have localistic politics.
Nations whose rival political groups are trait associations tend to be divided on lines of ideology or general policy.	Nations whose rival political groups are personal followings tend to be divided by a simple struggle for power.
Nations whose rival political groups are trait associations tend to achieve community-wide or nation-wide unity by broadening categories.	Nations whose rival political groups are personal followings tend to achieve community-wide or nation-wide unity by replacing particular goals with categorical or collective goals.

The Future of Dyadic Structure

Dyadic arrangements for the advancement of self-interest seem natural to man. They satisfy the yearning for security, favored treatment, and power. They provide a simple means for the advancement of self-interest which require a minimum of elaborate organization, trust in a minimum number of people, and minimal delay in the achievement of private goals. Dyadic arrangements furthermore are extremely flexible and can be employed in diverse situations to mobilize a wide variety of individuals. But they have disadvantages as well: Stable dyads restrict their members' freedom to engage in more profitable exchanges. Vertical dyads can be demeaning for the subordinate partners, leave them in disadvantageous bargaining positions, and may deprive them of the advantages to be gained from class based organization. All concerned in a dyadic system may see as unjust the favoritism that usually characterizes dyadic interaction. Under certain conditions, the disadvantages of dyadic political arrangements may seem to outweigh their benefits and lead to their abandonment. What are these conditions and why do they seem to be most common in modern societies? James Scott has explored this subject at length in two excellent papers.[51] I should like to add a few comments.

The conditions are not necessarily the same for the ruler and the ruled. From the point of view of the ruler the staffing of government with personal clients rather than with those who have most skill becomes unnecessary when he can count on the loyalty of all his subordinates as a matter of course. This is most likely to be the case when officials lack the ability to overthrow the ruler or influence the succession. Such was the case in the stable constitutional monarchies of nineteenth century Europe and is the case in modern democracies. It is not the case in many developing countries, particularly in embattled traditional monarchies where the ruler feels threatened by many of his own servants, or in such "bureaucratic polities" as contemporary Thailand, where the outcome of the struggle for control of the government is determined by the maneuvering of bureaucratic cliques and not by the results of popular elections.

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[51] James C. Scott, "The Weakening of Rural Patron-Client Ties in Colonial Southeast Asia," and "How Traditional Rural Patrons Lose Legitimacy," unpublished papers, 1971.

From the point of view of the ruler also, the attachment of the common people to his officials or to a landholding nobility becomes unnecessary and need not be allowed when the ruler finds it possible to control his subjects and to extract taxes or services from them by other means. His ability to do the latter is likely to increase as population grows and labor shortage is replaced by land shortage. For then subjects are not likely to run away and *corvée* labor can be replaced by landless laborers and soldiers hired with taxes taken from the agricultural sector.

From the point of view of the common man, the protection of a patron ceases to be advantageous when he can expect to be secure in his life and property and count on equal treatment before the courts without the help of a powerful protector. This condition is likely to be achieved in a *rechtsstaat,* a state governed by the impersonal rule of law. Lacking this, it is likely to be achieved also where the individual has available to him membership in a discrete group which can offer him such protection.

Finally, from the point of view of both potential patrons and clients, these roles become unattractive when it begins to be in their interest to have freedom to shift their superordinates, subordinates, or trading partners at will. This, of course, is the case in a modern market economy. Where such an economy prevails, one can expect dyadic structures to deteriorate in the political sphere as well.

An apolitical bureaucracy, an easily taxable populace, a *rechtsstaat,* freedom of associational activity, and a market economy—these conditions are all characteristic of the modern democratic state. It is not surprising therefore that a political science which has devoted most of its attention to the study of modern Western democracies should have found little reason to interest itself in dyadic structures. As other societies achieve similar conditions, we may expect this to be the case there as well.

Still, in modern states where some of these conditions are absent, dyadic and other "traditional"structures may continue to be important. Thus, in the Soviet Union and China, the proscription against the creation of formally organized teams of would-be competitors for those in power, either outside or within the ruling party, has resulted in the emergence instead of informal cliques and personal followings reminiscent of those found in premodern polities.[52]

And even in modern democracies at certain levels of the political system dyadic structures flourish. Thus, while the mass of American citizens are accustomed to confining their political activity to membership in various voluntary associations and to the periodic casting of ballots, those who aspire to positions of high leadership in these associations organize themselves dyadically. The reason is simple: The benefits derived from general legislation can be shared by innumerable people. But high offices are in limited supply. If one hopes to be a presidential advisor, one had best attach oneself to a promising candidate early in the game.

To conclude: While traditional patron-client relationships appear to be breaking down in many peasant societies, other types of dyadic structures and techniques will continue to play a part in politics as long as political actors seek and are able to advance their interests particularistically. The study of the political process is deficient insofar as it fails to give attention to such structures.

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[52] Andrew J. Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for Chinese Politics," *The China Quarterly,* 53 (January/March, 1973).

Max Weber's Politics and Political Education

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Introduction

In December, 1915, Max Weber published an article on "Bismarck's Foreign Policy and the Present" in the liberal *Frankfurter Zeitung,* inaugurating more than twenty political tracts written in the closing years of his life. During the same period the conceptual introduction to his monumental scientific treatise, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft,* was being written, as were the later parts of the *Religionssoziologie* dealing with China, India, and the ancient Hebrew community. With the possible exception of "Politics as a Vocation"—a brilliant summation of what was being said elsewhere in his work[1]—it is remarkable that our knowledge of Weber has been based almost exclusively on the scholarly volumes. By uncritically accepting the common distinction between "scholarship" and "partisanship," to cite the terms employed in a recent study, we have failed to do justice to the political concerns connecting the sociological analyses with the so-called "political writings."[2] Since these writings contained a major theoretical critique of contemporary politics and addressed an extensive national audience in addition to the scientific community, they had considerable importance for Weber himself. Through them we begin to perceive the fundamental political nature of his thought, even in its more detached scientific expressions. This fact alone should give pause to those who still wish to see Weber as only a "pure scientist" quietly pursuing "value-free" inquiry.

This latter onesided image of Weber, which has found its home in American social science, can be explained in part by the needs of the new science of society to develop and integrate an authoritative body of knowledge capable of justifying its autonomy and setting model problems for empirical research. Together with Marx and Durkheim, Weber rightly deserves recognition as a major founder of modern social science. Now that this particular need has been satisifed, however, and sociology launched on its course, it should be possible to restore coherence to Weber's intentions and redirect our inquiry toward the political nature of his thought and action.

My purpose in this paper is to set forth a new and more satisfactory understanding of Weber by investigating what are usually considered to be the distinguishing marks of a truly political writer: his critique of a prevailing adverse political condition, his vision of a new order, and his identification of the theorist's role. I do not intend simply to demonstrate the central importance of politics for his intellectual and practical commitments, for that has been accomplished elsewhere and is in any case presupposed by the following discussion.[3] Instead, I want to argue that for Weber fulfillment of both the scientific and political vocations required the cultivation of the role of "political educator," or to put it another way, the cultivation of theory as a form of political education.

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[1] Weber nominated Friedrich Naumann as the most appropriate choice for this 1918 speech, feeling that he lacked the necessary political qualifications himself. He consented only when it was rumored that Kurt Eisner would be his actual replacement. See the account by Immanuel Birnbaum in René Koenig and Johannes Winckelmann, eds., "Max Weber zum Gedaechtnis," *Koelner Zeitschrift fuer Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie,* Sonderheft 7 (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964), pp. 19–21.

[2] Reinhard Bendix and Guenther Roth, *Scholarship and Partisanship: Essays on Max Weber* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), esp. chaps 1–4, which are valuable for emphasizing the connections between Weber's scholarly and partisan activities.

[3] See especially the work by Wolfgang J. Mommsen, the German historian, *Max Weber und die deutsche Politik, 1890–1920* (Tuebingen: Mohr, 1959). This study is mainly responsible for the debate over Weber's politics that emerged in its most heated form at the 1964 meetings of the German Sociological Society, recorded in *Max Weber und die Soziologie heute,* ed. Otto Stammer (Tuebingen: Mohr, 1965), and recently translated by Kathleen Morris. Other "political" treatments of Weber that deserve mention are two later articles by Mommsen, "Zum Begriff der 'plebiszitaeren Fuehrerdemokratie' bei Max Weber," *Koelner Zeitschrift fuer Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie,* XV (1963), 295–322, and "Universalgeschichtliches und politisches Denken bei Max Weber," *Historische Zeitschrift,* CCI (1965), 557–612. (The latter article has been partially translated in both the *International Social Science Journal,* XVII (1965), and in *Max Weber,* ed. Dennis Wrong (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970). See also Jacob P. Mayer, *Max Weber and German Politics, A Study in Political Sociology,* 2nd ed. (London: Faber and Faber, 1956); Karl Loewenstein, *Max Weber's Political Ideas in the Perspective of Our Time,* tr. R. and C. Winston (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1966); and most recently, Ilse Dronberger, *The Political Thought of Max Weber* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971). Mommsen's studies are by far the best of these, although they are sometimes badly marred by an attempt to interpret Weber as a precursor of Nazism.

Political theory, as I shall conceive of it, is composed of three closely related activities: (1) Theory organizes the real world in thought, and in doing so implicitly selects and assigns significance and meaning to previously "isolated" facts. (2) It explains why the world is as it is, why interconnections occur as they do among phenomena. (3) It produces knowledge for action which can be used as a practical instrument for changing the world. If we accept these characteristics as an irreducible minimum for any political theory, it follows that the theorist is concerned not only with illuminating the world in new and different ways but more particularly with criticizing the arrangements of that world as a groundwork for persuasion. An effective critique, as we know, depends upon finding a politically important audience and using a language which is understandable to it and which can impel it toward action. The critical and persuasive qualities of the theoretical imagination are most important, furthermore, since they are the elements of political education. Here I propose to view political education as the necessary accompaniment of political theory, the guiding impulse that directs theory's three main activities and determines their content.

Max Weber's work offers compelling evidence, both textual and biographical, to demonstrate the validity of such generalizations. Weber does have a theory of politics and an understanding of his role as a theorist in the senses specified above. By stating his theoretical and practical commitments to political education it becomes possible, I shall maintain, not only to grasp the "unity" in his science and politics, but to see as well the source and meaning of his scientific inventiveness and political motivation.

The Freiburg Inaugural Address: The Call for Political Education

If one considers Weber's work as a whole, he learns that Weber advanced the idea of political education not just in his later essays but at the beginning of his career in the 1895 Inaugural Address at the University of Freiburg. Having been appointed to a chair in political economy, Weber ostensibly devoted this maiden speech to national economic policies which had attracted his attention during the previous several years: the position of agricultural classes in Eastern Germany, the immigration question, and the Junkers' economic interests and political position. His lengthy work for the *Verein fuer Sozialpolitik, Die Verhaeltnisse der Landarbeiter im ostelbischen Deutschland,* published in 1892, served as a basis for the Address and for his political agitation against the large Junker estates in the East.

On the practical side, most of this agitation was carried on through participation in Friedrich Naumann's movement, first organized as the *Evangelisch-sozialer Kongress* and after 1896 as the *Nationalsozialer Verein,* and through contributions to its affiliated publications, *Christliche Welt* and *Die Hilfe*. Weber's energetic advocacy of a national viewpoint within these groups led to a rejection of traditional conservative interests and soon forced a rift with the right wing, which departed in 1896 under Adolf Stoecker's guidance. Yet at the same time Weber himself had joined the newly organized nationalistic *Alldeutsche Verband* in order to propagate his recommendation that the Eastern border be closed to migrant Polish agricultural workers, despite the Junkers' interest in maintaining this cheap labor supply. Indeed, the *Verband* adopted precisely this policy at its first national meeting in 1894—a measure of Weber's early success.[4]

With these involvements in mind, it is understandable that the Freiburg Address really became a discussion of power politics and a sharp critique of the tasks of political economy and social science in relation to the nation. Combining politics and science, Weber insisted that social science renounce utopian speculation in the face of the inevitable political and economic "struggle for existence." As is true for contemporary realists, this meant acceptance of dispassionate inquiry and the ubiquity of power, but also a cultivation of those qualities in men "that produce human greatness and the excellence of our nature."[5] Not their intrinsic value but their value for the nation was what mattered politically.

When science confronted the nation's citizenry and the facts of political realism, it emerged with a twofold duty: insofar as it advanced pure knowledge, it attempted to conceptualize and explain reality. But insofar as it employed value-judgments and actively promoted practical knowledge, it had to be a *national* and *political* science, seeking to raise the citizen to the highest level of accomplishment and moral worth. Intelligence, strength of purpose, integrity, and industry were the superior qualities fostered in the new model citizen.

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[4] It should be mentioned that the *Alldeutsche Verband* soon became a puppet of Tirpitz, the extreme nationalists, and large industrial interests, with an accompanying shift in political emphasis and program. Weber remained a member of it for six years, whereas his fruitful association with Naumann and with the *Verein fuer Sozialpolitik* lasted the duration of his life.

[5] The Freiburg Inaugural Address, "Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik," *Gesammelte Politische Schriften,* 2nd ed. (Tuebingen: Mohr, 1958), p. 13; all translations are the author's. (This volume will be cited as *GPS.*) Similar remarks were made in an 1894 speech before the fifth *Evangelisch-sozialen Kongress,* quoted in Marianne Weber, *Max Weber, ein Lebensbild* (Tuebingen: Mohr, 1926), p. 145; hereafter cited as *Lebensbild.*

The distinctive feature of the 1895 Address was precisely this suggestion that science should accept responsibility for politically educating the nation. Although possibly disagreeing with the later idea of scientific "objectivity," it was important for our purposes as a statement of the permanent foundations of Weber's value position, especially his national point of view and proposal for the employment of scientific knowledge.[6] The "nation" became the superior political value, even though it had to be acknowledged, using Weber's later analysis, as only one possible value standpoint. Nevertheless, commitment to it could not be wholly arbitrary, for given a "realist" understanding of politics, it was the most significant and even necessary value—one that Weber never escaped and that branded him a product of the era.[7]

Thus, in the political writings one encounters explanation of phenomena following the canons of science, together with knowledge for action molded according to rules less exact than those of strict scientific demonstration. It may help support this contention by pointing out that Weber evaluated the *Communist Manifesto* as both "a scientific achievement of the first order" and "a prophetic document."[8] The latter was not grounds for dismissing it as worthless either. I would suggest that a parallel case can be made for Weber, especially if one accepts the importance of his critical engagement with Marx's work: "theory" occurs as both explanation and knowledge for action. Weber still departed from Marx by distinguishing between pure (scientific) and practical rationality. Whereas for Marx revolutionary action and projections into the future had scientific authority behind them, for Weber they were practical assertions that called upon values for support. The fact that the world was a certain way did not carry within itself a statement of what to do, or a statement of approval or disapproval.

Insofar as any political theory provides knowledge for action, it also seeks to win an audience for its message. Not any audience will do: it must be a public one, with minimal coherence, capable of concerted action. Maintaining a strong identification with the national community and its contemporary crises, Weber stressed education for citizens as a final aim; the nation's rejuvenation did not depend exclusively upon a coterie of individuals. He went further, however, by identifying especially with the middle class: "I am a member of the middle classes, feel myself as such, and am reared in their views and ideals."[9] The testimony was significant, for it indicated that the tasks of political education were set in many ways by the failures of the German middle classes and the failures of their traditional liberalism. Nevertheless, it was to them that Weber turned in order to re-establish civic values. For this reason it has been possible to designate him a "Marx of the bourgeoisie."[10]

The central question had to become, then, Who will hold political power, Who will be responsible for defining the nation and its interests? The old landed aristocracy, responsible for creating the nation-state and providing its early leadership, could no longer be counted upon for political talent and guidance. By the 1890s the economic base of its power had suffered a marked decline; the tragedy of Bismarck lay in the fact that his work did not lead to an inner unification of the nation, or to a condition consonant with Junker political rule. Would the rising middle class or the new industrial proletariat replace it? Weber felt compelled to reject both, instead forecasting "the hard fate of political rule by epigones."[11] Bismarckian policy created a political order in which the emerging classes, although gaining economic power, could not hope to share political power and experience. As Weber saw the problem—he was to make the point even more emphatically twenty years later—the result was an enormous collapse in the political capabilities of the nation.

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[6] In 1913, referring to the problem of nationalism and the relation between value-judgments and scientific knowledge, Weber judged the speech "immature," containing arguments "with which I can no longer identify on many important points:" "Gutachten zur Werturteilsdiskussion im Ausschuss des Vereins fuer Sozialpolitik," reprinted in Eduard Baumgarten, *Max Weber, Werk und Person* (Tuebingen: Mohr, 1964), p. 127, and similar remarks quoted in *Lebensbild,* p. 416. In subsequent writings scientific statements were distinguished on *logical* grounds from the justification of ultimate practical values. Using the distinction, Weber intended to suggest the following: value-judgments or a *Weltanschauung* cannot be derived from scientific analysis, a value-judgment cannot be ultimately justified by referring only to empirical facts, and in social science an investigator's values seriously influence his observations through the search for significance (*Bedeutung*) and a value-orientation (*Wertbeziehung*). This position did not eliminate science's role as a counsellor for political action, nor did it advance the more specific claim that no conceivable way exists whereby rational scientific inquiry can inform political judgments. In these senses the early and late work was consistent.

[7] Two critiques that rely heavily on the nationalism of the Freiburg Address, to the exclusion of other features, are Arnold Bergstraesser, "Max Webers Antrittsvorlesung in zeitgeschichtlicher Perspektive," *Vierteljahrshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte,* V (Juli, 1957), 209–19, and Ernst Nolte, "Max Weber vor dem Faschismus," *Der Staat,* II (1963), 1–24.

[8] "Der Sozialismus," a lecture delivered in 1918, *Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik* (Tuebingen: Mohr, 1924), pp. 504–5; cited below as *GASS.*

[9] "Der Nationalstaat," *GPS,* p. 20.

[10] A remark made by Albert Salomon in 1926, quoted in Mommsen, *Max Weber,* p. 112*n.* In the contrasting choices of audience and the consequences following from these choices there is sense to the phrase, although Weber's expectations for his chosen audience are understandably somewhat different from Marx's.

For the middle class the only question worth asking appeared to be whether it was too late to gain political experience and maturity. For the proletariat one also wondered whether a class committed to the masses could generate an "aristocracy" of political talent. Weber's statements on this score ring with pessimism because of the complacency and caution typical of the organizations representing both classes. The working-class movement in other nations, especially Britain, had escaped such liabilities through developing strong trade union organizations and achieving a powerful international position, both of which gave the individual a "continual political schooling."[12] Weber's support of trade unionism and an activist foreign policy rested ultimately on their educational function for citizens, on their practical consequence of teaching broad classes of men how to think and act politically.

Exposure to the realities of political choice and participation was needed at all levels of society, not just among the working class. What was to be done? Toward the conclusion of his 1895 Address Weber identified an alternative path: "An enormous *political* education must be carried out, and no more serious duty exists for us than to be conscious of *this* need, even in one's small circle: to work for the *political* education of our nation, which must also remain the ultimate goal of our science."[13] Only such a vision of science's use and the theorist's task could hope to confront the political crisis effectively. As a political figure, Weber defined his work in this way: His later political essays were an attempt to meet the national needs he identified during an early period. As a social scientist, he tended to adopt the role of a national educator.

Bismarck and the Bourgeoisie

Twenty years separate the Freiburg Address from Weber's mature critique of Bismarck and the middle class. During this time it became apparent that the most urgent need for political education was to explain how the crisis in national life had developed. Historically, the answer had to be sought in the failures of the middle class's apolitical past and in the politics of Bismarck.

Weber's fulminations against the middle class were renowned. In the contemporary political situation, he asserted its failures stemmed only partially from its slavish applause for Bismarck's dazzling successes. To be sure, the middle class was alternately subjugated and scorned, but the reason for its usual acquiescence, however it was treated, went far beyond the spell of one man's statecraft. Essentially it had to do with the effects of a long apolitical tradition, developed to "perfection" by the eighteenth century. In culture and philosophical erudition, the German middle class and the nation proved its worth in this period; but politically, Weber observed, the classical wisdom of German letters had very little to offer.[14] This was true not only for the problem of understanding present needs, but for the problem of understanding politics in general. It was a point German historians were to make again and again: the culture and learning of Schiller, Goethe, and Kant, despite its brilliance, had never succeeded in broaching the serious issues of political education. In this regard Goethe proved to be the supreme symbol—an Olympian figure above the battle, politically uncommitted and unidentifiable, who left behind him a nation of poets.

As it entered the nineteenth century, the middle class simply had no widely recognized political tradition or experience; to consider distilling such things out of empty abstractions seemed fatuous. In retrospect, however, the eighteenth century's spirit was only one tendency at work. On the other side the middle class could look toward periods in its history when a political spirit had begun to emerge: the medieval *Hansa* cities offered one example, and the liberal Prussian reformers of the Napoleonic era suggested another. But most importantly, there was Calvinist man, the producer of

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[11] "Der Nationalstaat," *GPS*, p. 21.
[12] *Ibid*, p. 23.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 24.
[14] See, for example, "Wahlrecht und Demokratie in Deutschland" (1917), *GPS*, p. 274.

"the last of our heroisms," as Weber was fond of saying, quoting Carlyle.[15] It was the values of Puritanism—civic commitment, hard work, public responsibility, devotion to a vocation—which were taken up by the rising middle class in defense of antitraditional economic and political activities, and which then became the most admirable features of middle-class life. Perhaps, Weber speculated, one encountered here a fruitful starting-point for recovering a practice of political education. In generous moments, he even praised the early National Liberals and the Bennigsen era for demonstrating that politically the middle class had something to offer.

The difficulties with this analysis were in large measure a matter of historical record. First of all, as a consequence of the slow pace of industrialization and political centralization, the German middle class had always been small and had developed later in comparison with its equivalent in other Western European nations. As a noteworthy political force, it scarcely counted until the events of 1848. Second, the impact of the Calvinist version of Puritanism had been much weaker in Germany than in England and America. In fact, as a source of political education, Puritanism exerted a lasting influence on the democratic politics of the latter two countries, whereas in Germany, if anything triumphed, it seemed to be the Lutheran defense of authority with its implicit apolitical bias. Therefore, in the German context the appeal to historical antecedents as a method for developing political strength and courage could easily fail to strike a responsive chord in the nation's memories.

Despite these qualifications, the middle class might have stood a chance to prove itself had it not been for a third decisive factor: Bismarck's political leadership. Weber provided a clue to the nature of the issue here in his early remark that "a great man's domination is not always a means for political education."[16] Bismarck not only pushed the nation forward as a *Machtstaat* having far-reaching international interests, he also gave it the first lessons of power politics. *Realpolitik* conveyed a sense of correct style and an example of successful policy to be followed in the future. However, as Weber understood, in the general adulation of Bismarck many overlooked the restraint and intellectual skill that made his actions effective. Bismarckian policy without a Bismarck was an impossibility. One could express admiration for his sagacity, but at the same time one had to deplore his effect on the national audience and on Germany's external and internal condition.

Thus, a major consequence was emulation of Bismarck, particularly by conservatives and circles around William II, in the supposed defense of "realism" and "national interest." Weber had only contempt for this perversion of the Junker statesman's methods and principles. Its effects could perhaps be overcome through civic participation and criticism; but on this count too Bismarck had registered a telling impression. By cultivating only "that completely nonpolitical kind of hero worship which has become so common with us," remarked Weber, he promoted an empty, complacent apolitical attitude.[17] Such an attitude fit nicely with the policy of keeping the selection of national leaders and administration of the bureaucracy as far removed as possible from popular control. One of Bismarck's cardinal rules was to quash autonomous power whenever it threatened to appear; this rule was applied impartially to individuals, parties, classes, and national institutions. As a result, no leaders of truly national stature emerged to replace him, opposition parties were suppressed, the National Liberals were destroyed as a political force, and Parliament was held in a subservient position. In the socialist and trade-union movements, workers were driven "into the most extreme radicalism of pure party politics," which not only cut them off from the nation, but undermined efforts to strengthen some important national values, such as "honor" and "solidarity."[18] Bismarck wanted social unity and a strong international position, yet ironically his policies led over the long run to exactly the opposite results.

Parliament's lack of power was most important, for this meant that it could not function as a recruiting and training center for politicians or as a body representative of popular opinion. A weak parliament foreshadowed a decline in political talent and a breakdown in participation in political life. "Since 1878," Weber wrote, "the nation has been unaccustomed to having a voice, through its elected representatives, in its political fate. Such participation alone makes possible an education in political judgment."[19] From the point of view of the nation, and even of Bismarck's own expressed desires, this position was indefensible. What Bismarck actually left to posterity in 1890 was "a nation *without any political education . . . without any political will,* accustomed to letting the great statesman at the helm take care of politics for it."[20] Not only the impotence of Parliament, but the impotence of the citizenry was the unenviable political condition for the following generations.

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[15] "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" (1904–5), *Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Religionssoziologie*, 5th ed., 3 vols. (Tuebingen: Mohr, 1963), I:20–1; translated as a separate book by Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribners, 1958). The German edition will be cited hereafter as *GAR*.

[16] "Der Nationalstaat," *GPS*, p. 22; for the critique of Bismarck see especially "Bismarcks Aussenpolitik und die Gegenwart" (1915), "Bismarcks Erbe in der Reichsverfassung" (1917), and a section of "Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland" (1918), all in *GPS*, pp. 109–26, 229–32, 299–308.

[17] "Parlament und Regierung," *GPS*, p. 307. All of this major essay except the last part is translated as an appendix to Weber's *Economy and Society*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 3 vols. (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 3:1381–1469.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 306.

Perhaps the consequences would not have been as serious had Bismarck replaced what he destroyed with a viable tradition of political rule that matched his creation of the nation-state. Unfortunately, the final achievement of his "misanthropy," as Weber called it, was his leaving the scene without constructing a political tradition, without even legitimating a party or movement that would carry on his work. His rule was personalistic and was followed only by an unseemly scramble for the mantle of his authority. Although the state was a "constitutional monarchy" in name, it was in practice a caesarist regime buttressed by bureaucracy. Bismarck's legacy was actually a carefully concealed kind of legitimacy, a form of charismatic rule supported and hidden by the monarchy's traditional authority. In Weber's critique the ultimate result was a shrunken political space and a major crisis in political education.

The Crisis in Leadership and Citizenship

An important theoretical difficulty arose around the question of whether the crisis could be best understood as systematic in nature or as the result of special personality characteristics of national leaders. Undeniably William's nonpolitical, dilettante conduct inspired much of the outrage in Weber's attacks. His total effect was to promote an exhibitionist authoritarian regime, obscuring its insecurity with cheap propaganda and hiding its lack of real power behind external traditional forms of authority, thus insuring the nation's isolation in foreign affairs, the destruction of whatever fragile unity it had in 1890, and its inability to understand and judge political realities.

Late in his career, Weber thought that parliamentary monarchy modeled along British lines was potentially the strongest and most adaptable form of political rule for Germany, but he realized that because of the monarch's serious mistakes, this possibility had been eliminated.[21] The argument, however, did not rest at the level of personalities. Rulership is not practiced in a vacuum; a regime's legitimacy depends in some sense upon the public's action or acquiescence. The citizenry must be accounted for, and Weber found a continual source of national embarrassment in its acceptance of and in some cases even enthusiastic support for monarchical policies. The quality of this domestic response, of the political incapacity of citizens, had to be considered "a power factor of primary 'world-political' meaning."[22] Here was the problem of citizenship in its most serious form. Responsibility for the conduct of political affairs was placed on citizens, rather than easily rationalized by referring to personal pathology.

Weber often expressed his sense of responsibility as a citizen with special intensity. He once confessed to Harnack, "The fact that our nation has never gone through the school of hard asceticism in *any* form is the source of everything that I find so hateful in it *as well as in myself*."[23] With eyes cast toward England and the Puritan experience, he could throw into bold relief the German nation's failure to develop an independent citizenry. "Inner-worldly asceticism," as Weber called it, a product of the Puritan sects, led not only to disciplined economic enterprise but to a self-reliant political man, protective of his liberties and suspicious of exaggerated authority. Without the political education provided by it, he believed, there would be continuing failure to eliminate political incompetence and control irresponsible leaders.

The crisis in leadership then necessarily accompanied a crisis in citizenship. It also had to be understood as a product of a system of relationships rather than as a temporary, incidental feature of the political landscape. Weber began to argue, as he put it, that "much too much is said about the Kaiser's 'impulsiveness' and about his character. The political structure is to blame."[24] Under pressure of the confirming example of wartime politics, this view was elevated into a general critique of monarchical rule without parliament in the modern state.

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[19] *Ibid.*, p. 307.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] "Deutschlands kuenftige Staatsform" (1918), *GPS*, p. 437.

[22] From a letter to Naumann, December 14, 1906, quoted in Baumgarten, p. 486.

[23] Letter of February 5, 1906, quoted in Mommsen, "Universalgeschichtliches und politisches Denken bei Max Weber," 574, *n*48; also in Baumgarten, p. 450; cf. p. 429.

[24] Letter to Naumann, November 12, 1908, reprinted in Baumgarten, p. 488.

Two characteristics of the monarch were considered particularly significant as expressions of systematic malfunction: his incapacity as a "politician" in Weber's sense of the word, and his inevitable lack of control over the political bureaucracy. Both qualities were closely connected: "The modern monarch is always inevitably a *dilettante,* just as any parliamentary novice is, and therefore completely incapable of controlling an administrative apparatus."[25] One should note that this holds for the *modern* state, where "actual *power,*" as Weber emphasized again and again, "lies neither in parliamentary speeches nor monarchical pronouncements, but necessarily and unavoidably in the hands of the *bureaucracy,* since it is exercised through the daily routines of administration."[26] The reasons for a monarch's deficiencies are found partly in this condition, partly in his political education and constitutional position. Experience in political party affairs and the actual conduct of diplomacy are simply not a part of his training.

Bureaucracy's position is even more significant for explaining the systematic crisis in leadership than are the form and consequences of "constitutional" relations. In *Parlament und Regierung in neugeordneten Deutschland,* Weber's most impressive political essay, it is clear that the main problem lies with the political limitations of bureaucracy, and particularly with the distinction between bureaucratic and political rule. It turns essentially on two contrasting notions of action and vocation: The bureaucrat follows only the duty of office, administering impartially within a given jurisdiction, according to fixed rules and a fixed hierarchy of authority. The politician, on the other hand, must be "partial," motivated by power, and willing to accept personal responsibility for his action; from his point of view the bureaucrat is always "irresponsible."

The derangement is quite simply described: Bureaucrats have taken over tasks that should be reserved for politicians, and have done so in the name of praiseworthy values, such as impartiality, fairness, and honesty. But this takeover has been accomplished without comprehending that politics requires values and knowledge other than the types developed in a bureaucracy. "The essence of all politics," to use a typical Weberian formulation, "is struggle, recruitment of allies and voluntary followers; the career system of the authoritarian state (*Obrigkeitsstaat*) offers no possibility to practice this difficult art."[27] Bureaucracy's encroaching dominion, then, goes hand in hand with the elimination of areas in the political system in which the nature of genuine political action can be learned. In this way the system reinforces itself, closing off other possibilities, and generating only public figures with a bureaucratic mentality.

The results are predictable: The nation's international position is damaged, and its domestic problems go unattended. Ironically, the bureaucrat thinks he has performed admirably, and indeed he has from the standpoint of his own vocation: "Our officialdom has been brilliant wherever it had to prove its sense of duty, impartiality, and mastery of organizational problems in the face of official, clearly formulated *specialized* tasks." "But," Weber continues, "here we are concerned with *political,* not bureaucratic achievements, and the facts themselves proclaim a knowledge which cannot be truthfully concealed: the bureaucracy has *failed completely* whenever it has dealt with *political* questions."[28]

One might say that Weber is writing with only the German state at the turn of the century in mind, and that a democratic state or a different historical era will be utterly dissimilar. For Weber, however, bureaucratization is "universal" and "inescapable" in the foreseeable future; it will penetrate democratic politics just as it will other forms of governance. This is above all what he means by the "Europeanization of America."[29] Also, it is the real meaning hidden in slogans such as "socialism of the future" or "cooperative economy." Even if ideals of this sort strive for exactly the opposite development, in reality they promote the development of bureaucracy.

"The future belongs to bureaucratization," Weber writes in summation.[30] Why is this the case? The sheer size and indispensability of the modern administrative apparatus will tell one very little about its actual power and universality. Instead, three other features are decisive: First, an economic foundation for bureaucratization is formed in the functional relationship between bureaucratization and capitalism, which depends for its coherence and strength upon a shared rational calculation of action and rational organization of work. Since capitalism in Weber's terms is "the pacemaker of the economy's bureaucratization," it will create the conditions necessary for the ultimate triumph of bureaucratization—an event that will start to become evident, Weber predicts, in all cases in which capitalism is replaced as an economic system either gradually or by revolution.[31]

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[25] "Wahlrecht und Demokratie," *GPS,* p. 277; see also "Parlament und Regierung," *GPS,* pp. 325–6, and *Economy and Society,* 3:991 ff., for the same point.

[26] "Parlament und Regierung," *GPS,* p. 308.

[27] *Ibid.,* p. 335; cf. p. 380 for a similar statement.

[28] *Ibid.,* p. 339.

[29] "The Protestant Ethic," *GAR,* 1:208, 215 *n*1.

[30] "Parlament und Regierung," *GPS,* p. 318.

Second, one must consider the kind of knowledge the bureaucrat possesses and its intimate connection with services performed in the modern "mass" state. Much of the bureaucrat's power rests on "technical" and "specialized" knowledge that qualifies him as an "expert," or on "official knowledge" to which he has exclusive access as a member of the administrative apparatus. For Weber it is really the precise social form of this qualification—rational specialization and training in an educational institution—which makes modern bureaucratization so inescapable.[32] It will become universalized, consequently, to the extent that the mass state with its demands for such knowledge and training becomes the dominant political form.

Third and finally, the process will come about because of its underlying "rationality." Bureaucracy is a human analogue to the machine, similarly bound up with technological "progress." Like any machine, it strives toward its own technical, even "mechanized" perfection. "A lifeless machine is *objectified mind,*" writes Weber in one crucial passage: "*Objectified mind* is also that living machine, the bureaucratic organization . . . Together with the lifeless machine it is busy fabricating the iron cage that men will perhaps be forced to inhabit some day, as powerless as the fellahs of ancient Egypt."[33] Ultimately a value choice is required: If a superior, purely technical "administration of things" becomes the highest value for ordering human life, then the projected development will proceed swiftly and surely. The affinity between this vision of the future and Marx's "association of free individuals" is surely not coincidental. But has the "objective rationality" of the process penetrated the foundations of Western civilization to the point where choice is no longer possible?

To raise this question is not to suggest that the movement of bureaucratization, a scientifically demonstrable fact in the modern world, should not be subject to practical evaluation. To ask whether Weber is a "determinist" in his attempt at a systematic explanation of a political crisis is to ask a useless question; similarly, to emphasize exclusively the "objectivity" of his analysis, as is so often done, is to miss his recommended actions. In a well-known statement at the 1909 meeting of the *Verein fuer Sozialpolitik,* Weber's most stinging attack was launched against the "passion for bureaucratization." He argued there that:

> It is as though in politics we were knowingly and willfully to become men who need order and nothing but order. . . . That the world should know nothing more than such men of order—we are already caught in this development, and the central question is therefore not how we can promote and accelerate it, but what we can *oppose* to this machinery in order to keep a part of mankind free from this parcelling out of the soul, from this absolute domination by the bureaucratic way of life.[34]

To anticipate my discussion for a moment, I think Weber's own answer is embodied in a number of his major notions—his ideas about the charismatic leader, the parliamentary and democratic constitution of the state, and the quality of its citizens' political education. It should be emphasized here, however, that for these reasons bureaucracy raises a nearly insurmountable barrier against political leadership, and even more significantly it supports an idea of action that increasingly permeates the political order. Not only the bureaucrat, but the citizen as well becomes a "man of order," driven to act only when his security is at stake. "Today's German citizen," remarked Weber in the same year, but in a different context, "has scarcely more of his ancestors' qualities from the medieval town leagues than the Athenean in Caesar's time had from the fighters at Marathon. 'Order' is his motto, even in most cases if he is a Social Democrat."[35] In this condition the citizen provides poor material for restoring the political space to its proper dimension. And because of the universality of this process, what can be said for the German citizen can be said for modern man in general.

This portrait of the citizen also offers little hope for redefining the attitudes typical of bureaucracy. Within certain limits one can postulate alternative forms of the "bureaucratic mentality," but whether they will have actual importance depends upon a sociological consideration: the system of recruitment into positions of authority. In Germany, Weber recognized that the Junker strata, the Prussian officer corps, and the student fraternities constituted *the* recruiting grounds for bureaucracy. Cognizant of the political relevance of these groups and their *parvenu* culture, he traced the political crisis to its source in educational conventions which were thought "to be a means of aristocratic education qualifying one for leadership in the state."[36] In practice they did nothing of the sort, but instead perpetuated caste conventions and a strictly "plebeian" form of conduct that was both ridiculous in its contradiction—claiming to be aristocratic, but actually being quite the opposite—and also useless as a democratic instrument—i.e., as a model to be emulated by the nation. By contrast, Weber reasoned, the English aristocracy had successfully educated the nation politically by providing a notion of what politics and political action should be. Germany lacked genuine aristocratic forms; it was "a nation of plebeians, or if it sounds more agreeable, a middle class people."[37] To write for this class was also to write for the nation, and above all, it was to seek a sounder civic ethic than the pretentious and hollow values of the *parvenu.*

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[31] On this theme see *Ibid.* pp. 310 ff.; "Agrarverhaeltnisse im Altertum" (1909), *Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Tuebingen: Mohr, 1924), p. 278, to be cited as *GASW;* and *Economy and Society,* 3:956–1005.

[32] "Parlament und Regierung," *GPS,* pp. 319, 340.

[33] *Ibid.,* p. 320.

[34] From the proceedings reprinted in *GASS,* p. 414.

[35] "Agrarverhaeltnisse," *GASW,* p. 278.

If the class structure offered little promise in this regard, there was still one institution worth considering: Parliament. After all, here was the perfect arena for recruiting and educating political leaders. Through participating in the struggle for power, engaging in party debates, excercising leadership and parliamentary authority, individuals could perhaps be brought to understand the nature of politics and could therefore serve as a counterweight to bureaucracy. It is an encouraging picture, but one which presupposes the existence of a parliament with actual political power—precisely what was absent under Bismarck's constitution. "Until now there was simply no place for natural leaders in Parliament," Weber wrote in 1918.[38] As a result of its lack of guaranteed constitutional powers Parliament was condemned to "negative politics."

Power was to be found, of course, in the hands of governmental officials. Consequently, Parliament became at best a recruiting ground not for politicians but for bureaucrats, a nicely placed stepping-stone to the higher state administration. Although power could be found in the bureaucracy, an ironic and vengeful twist was that it suffocated there under administrative norms and modes of action. Given so shrunken a political space, Weber suspected that "natural leaders" should not be sought in politics at all. Private capitalism offered "the only area today in which there is anything approaching a selection of men with leadership qualities."[39]

The reshaping of political institutions presented one sound possibility for correcting deficiencies in political education. Weber also argued, however, that "the question of whether the masses of the bourgeoisie will grow a new, more responsible and more self-conscious political spirit" was more decisive for the future.[40] Heretofore, one could only count on their "cowardice" and "will to powerlessness." In fact, these features had been used to develop and then secure rule by bureaucracy. And once the relationship was firmly established, it could be reversed, with uncontrolled bureaucratic rule leading to a lack of political participation and responsibility, which then in turn led to uncontrolled bureaucratic rule. The process had the certainty of a closed circle of causation. An idea of active citizenship had to be restored in order not only to raise the level of political intelligence, improve the quality of leadership, and thus break through this circle, but also to secure the unqualified participation of the middle class required by the task of building a new order.[41] Ultimately, the hopes for solving the crisis rested on whether or not this requirement would be met.

The New Order

Bureaucratization with its accompanying crises was only one historical trend visible on the horizon. The other was political democratization. Because it could accommodate an increasingly powerful state administration and usher in the age of "mass politics," democratization did not carry with it any guarantee of greater liberties or individual rights; therefore, it made little sense to see it as an answer to the perils of bureaucracy. But together with bureaucratization, it served the useful purpose of focusing the dominant alternatives that began to preoccupy Weber's later work. "One only has the choice," he wrote in *Wahlrecht und Demokratie in Deutschland*, "of either leaving the masses of citizens without rights and without liberty, 'administered' like a herd of cattle in a bureaucratic 'authoritarian state' with pseudoparliamentarism, or including them as participants in the state."[42]

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[36] "Wahlrecht und Demokratie," *GPS*, p. 268.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 272.
[38] "Parlament und Regierung," *GPS*, p. 428.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 334.
[40] "Deutschlands kuenftige Staatsform," *GPS*, pp. 441–2.
[41] "Wahlrecht und Demokratie" and "Deutschlands kuenftige Staatsform," *GPS*, pp. 233, 471.

Three themes were interwoven in Weber's response: the need for a reconstituted parliament, the search for excellence in political leadership, and the problem of the "democratic" nature of the future state and society. The first of these raised an important set of issues, despite Weber's conviction that "technical changes in the state in themselves make a nation neither virtuous, nor happy, nor valuable."[43] Ultimately something like "political culture" or Machiavelli's notion of "civic virtue" may matter most in the life of a community, but it is still possible that institutional reforms will create conditions leading to changes in underlying values and commitments, to an improved quality of citizens, or to the appearance of leaders with a calling for politics.

In theory, Parliament could be made fit to rule by giving it extensive autonomous powers —a conception borrowed from British practices. The right of inquiry, parliamentary accountability of leaders in the government, regulation of the state administration by parliamentary committees, unrestricted access to "official" information, and of course the usual control of budgetary and legislative matters were minimal requirements, necessary to create an institution that could avoid the "negative politics" of Parliament in the *Reich*. This represented an improvement because of certain advantageous consequences for politics. Like earlier democratic theorists, Weber conceived of parliament as a representative institution, and thus a means of obtaining and expressing consent; this was its traditional purpose and meaning. He also saw, however, that under contemporary conditions, "Modern parliaments are primarily representative bodies of those who are ruled by bureaucratic means."[44] For this reason "consent" might be a significant problem—as modern democracies seem to demonstrate—but one subordinate to the problem of how "bureaucratic means" could themselves be controlled and direction of policy placed in the hands of fully accountable representatives. Consent could in fact be approximated only after control had been achieved.

A political leader might temporarily succeed in this endeavor, but only a strong parliament offered a permanent and consistent source of control. Given the key role played by bureaucracy in precipitating and maintaining the crisis in leadership and citizenship, this was a far-reaching promise. Weber hoped that Parliament would counteract not only the state bureaucracy, but also those officials, such as military leaders, who possessed actual power but lacked political experience and accountability. Whether it would do so effectively was in some measure a constitutional question, but how it would evolve in practice posed an additional problem. Weber had confidence in his recommended solution not only because of its formal features, but because he thought that Parliament would help modify politics' emotional tone, avoid unrepresentative administrative rule, promote the "relative best" among competing interests, and assure a permanent means for political education of the nation.[45] By making politics an open and public affair, it would educate common citizens. By becoming the arena for recruitment and selection of national political leaders—its so-called *Fuehrerauslese* function—Parliament would produce individuals with a correct understanding of the nature of politics and political action. They were the apolitical bureaucracy's natural opponents, prepared to substitute their conception of politics as a vocation for an essentially apolitical rule.

In order to dispel the illusion that a parliamentary body could not effectively formulate national policy, Weber pointed to the British institution's performance in securing domestic unity and becoming the chief agent of the nation's world supremacy.[46] As a democratic institution, Parliament could contribute to national power by insuring citizens' allegiance and guaranteeing a training in national purposes. After all, democracy and nationalism were certainly not incompatible. But since the highest political value was the nation and its interests, it followed that Parliament's existence must be justified from a national standpoint. As Weber acknowledged, any political arrangements—Parliament included—were potentially alterable to conform with national needs and interests.

Such an admission understandably raises questions about Weber's attitudes toward constitutional democracy. Parliamentary institutions, we discover, are defended on pragmatic grounds; their ultimate worth depends upon performance or utility, not intrinsic merit. Thus, Weber can be said to eschew the procedure of earlier democratic theorists who rested their case at some point on principles of natural law. But some have accused him of undermining the legitimacy of the order he has just created: by not appealing to the authority of natural law, he thereby presumably loses any possible "moral basis" for the political order. To make such an accusation is to create unnecessary confusion.[47] It is more helpful to point out that as a writer recognizing the modern dilemmas confronting natural law, especially its loss of meaning, Weber could not seriously contemplate resurrecting it without inviting contradiction and ridicule. A different kind of appeal was necessary: The new order's legitimacy would follow either from its "legality" or from practical proof of its worth. Only one other possibility remained: the appearance of a charismatic leader, a founder, whose authority could be transferred over time to the political order itself. While this prospect had the suspicious features of a *deus ex machina,* it was nevertheless a serious part of Weber's calculations.

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[42] *Ibid.*, p. 279; see also "Zur lage der buergerlichen Demokratie in Russland" (1906), and "Parlament und Regierung," *GPS*, pp. 60–1, 321.

[43] "Parlament und Regierung," *GPS*, p. 298. See also the letter to Prof. Ehrenberg, July 16, 1917, in the first edition only of *GPS*, pp. 469–70; Mommsen gives the correct date in *Max Weber*, p. 55 *n*1.

[44] "Parlament und Regierung," *GPS*, p. 327.

[45] See "Wahlrecht und Demokratie" and "Parlament und Regierung," *GPS*, pp. 259, 275 ff., 324 ff., 334, 343, 367, 384, 412, 421.

[46] "Parlament und Regierung," *GPS*, pp. 342–3. The popular search for a unique German form of state was Weber's polemical target here.

The problem of the emerging order's "democratic" nature rested not only with Parliament, its most important element, but also with Weber's advocacy of equal suffrage and a popularly elected president as head of state. The view taken here was interesting not so much for its overt recommendations—by 1917, for example, even William II was promising postwar electoral reforms—but because of the grounds on which it was based. The defense of an unrestricted franchise grew out of a belief on the one hand that it would improve political education, since it provided an avenue for participation, and on the other that according to the logic of "equality," the modern state could simply not treat individuals equally in most respects and at the same time discriminate among them as citizens.[48] The vote was one of the few concrete mechanisms Weber offered for reshaping the political consciousness of the middle class, and yet in some respects it fit poorly with his search for a new kind of leader.

This search began in response to Bismarck's legacy, but also in an attempt to meet the deficiencies in Weber's own call for political education. The difficulty arose because the nation and the middle class would take time to reach political maturity; education was above all a slow process. In a newly formed Parliament, still unsure of itself, one could not realistically expect a rapid recruitment and selection of qualified leaders. Weber reasoned that a solution which would be consistent with "democratic" accountability might be found in a preeminent leader elected directly by a national constituency. Using charismatic authority as an informing idea and the American presidency as a practical model, he proposed a popularly elected *Reichspresident* as a concrete means for obtaining a national leader with a calling for politics. However, now the old problem returned: What if one succeeded only in finding another Bismarck, or something even worse? Would the cycle of autocratic rule and middle-class acquiescence simply repeat itself?

The issue raised here can be clarified by referring to Weber's unconventional critique of the democratic leader. Just as he revised the usual estimations of parliamentary authority and its purposes, so he reformulated the notion of leadership in a mass democracy, in this case by emphasizing its "plebiscitarian" features. That modern democracies were *mass* democracies was important, for it meant, among other things, that citizens were now regarded as constituting an active political force whose support the leader attempted to win "by means of mass demagogy."[49] Their *opinions* counted as the politician's base for power. Weber then found the leader-mass relation conducive to the rise of "caesarist" figures, citing as evidence the development of the British caucus system.

A cardinal principle in this understanding of leadership was the conviction that an active citizenry and a strong leader were equally valuable political commodities. When combined, they did not necessarily work at contrary purposes or make parliament and democratic representation superfluous; instead, they guaranteed effective responsibility by presupposing an informed constituency and by clearly identifying those who make the important decisions, thus facilitating their retention or replacement in an election. Obviously, "demagoguery" could be abused, but in any case it would inevitably be employed by politicians as a technique of power. The task was then to teach citizens to evaluate speech and action intelligently, and at the same time create a system that would make political leadership *possible.* Germany had done neither; consequently it lived with the worst imaginable combination: irresponsible demagoguery from above, emotional pressures from below, but without parliament, responsible leadership, or democracy—that is, without the only institutions capable of ending this condition and channeling political conflict in a constructive direction.[50]

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[47] This is true for Mommsen in the 1959 work, *Max Weber*, esp. p. 390. See also his "Zum Begriff der 'plebiszitaeren Fuehrerdemokratie' bei Max Weber," where a few qualifications are made (particularly the admission that Weber was "the last great representative of classical liberalism," p. 315) even though his view is on balance unchanged. On these issues Mommsen's critique is additionally unconvincing, since it systematically ignores Weber's intentions.

[48] "Wahlrecht und Demokratie," *GPS*, pp. 255 ff.

[49] Parlament und Regierung," *GPS*, pp. 380–1. Gladstone, for example, was judged to be "the dictator of the battlefield of elections:" "Politics as a Vocation" (1919), *GPS*, p. 523.

Weber's political activity, beginning in the 1890s, was aimed at solving these problems. He never held elective office, even though he was offered a Reichstag candidacy in 1897 from Saarbruecken and was informally placed on the German Democratic Party (DDP) candidate list from Frankfurt in 1918. And he was denied a position in both the wartime government and the new Republican government formed in November, 1918. But despite these failures, Weber was a prominent political figure—prominent enough in some circles to be considered a serious contender for Chancellor or Cabinet Minister in the early Weimar government. The *Frankfurter Zeitung,* Naumann's *Fortschrittliche Volkspartei* (founded in 1910) and *Arbeitsausschuss fuer Mitteleuropa* of 1916, and the DDP afforded Weber practical opportunities for placing his ideas before the public. As a founder and spokesman of the DDP, he gave numerous public speeches in the electoral campaign of 1918–19. Also, the new regime appointed him to the Versailles delegation as an "expert," along with thirty-seven others, and more significantly, it included him among the small group responsible for drawing up a new constitution for the Republic.

Weber first presented part of his plans for constitutional reform in 1917 to Conrad Haussmann, a member of the parliamentary committee responsible for examining the issue. Then a year later, following William's abdication, his recommendations were used in the constitutional discussions led by Hugo Preuss, State Secretary for Domestic Affairs in the new government. Unknown to himself, Weber had been considered to head this ministry, but had lost to Preuss in the final decision.[51] As events turned out, his influence on drafting the constitution was still considerable, partly because his proposals for selection of a national leader received the support of Preuss and Friedrich Ebert, then head of the revolutionary cabinet and soon the Republic's first president. It was one of Weber's most successful proposals in the sense that it was eventually written into the Weimar Constitution. But in 1932 it also contributed to its destruction.

Undoubtedly Weber's hopes for the "plebiscitarian" principle were mainly expressed in his own public statements: it was expected to give the state a leader of national stature, promote the difficult postwar tasks of "nationalization," and advance the cause of party realignment.[52] But actually there was more to it than these practical justifications. A persistent urge to free the political leader for creative work was written into the conception of charisma; the leader was a statesman, destined to do more than merely dabble in politics or administer its routine affairs. Since politics was his vocation, one could anticipate from him a correct understanding of the distinctive "laws" of political combat. This kind of leader was really offered as a corrective vision to the narrow, uninspiring rule of dilettantes and bureaucrats.

Small successes were overshadowed by Weber's ultimate failure. Unfortunately, in order to be put into practice, his theory presupposed the existence of experienced leaders—something that could not be assured, as Weber recognized: "Because of our long inner powerlessness, pre-eminent political *leaders* are missing who have an influence on the masses."[53] From this point of view one could despair at the threat of a return to Bismarckian rule. Weber sought to avoid this pitfall by advocating a "democratic" conception of the leader, but without fully acknowledging the new dangers in either the leader-mass relationship or the powerful position granted to the leader himself. The oversight was a direct result of his belief that for the present greater dangers were presented by bureaucracy than by charismatic authority.

While Parliament's formal powers and function as a "proving ground" for leaders remained, the spectre was created of a struggle between it and the plebiscitarian principle. The national leader was potentially elevated above Parliament, for his selection no longer depended on parliamentary action, and his appeals could be made directly to the people. Aware of such a conflict, Weber nevertheless failed to explore its consequences fully. One is left with the suspicion that the leadership notion contained within it the eclipse of the parliamentary functions that Weber found so important for political education. The evolution of American institutions at least has demonstrated that this was not only Weber's problem.

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[50] *GPS,* p. 381; cf. p. 275, where strengthening of political leadership *as such* is made an important task.

[51] See the definitive account of the constitutional discussions in Gerhard Schulz, *Zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur, Verfassungspolitik und Reichsreform in der Weimarer Republik* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1963), 1:114–42. Some helpful documents can be found in Charles B. Burdick and Ralph H. Lutz, eds., *The Political Institutions of the German Revolution, 1918–1919* (New York: Praeger, 1966), esp. pp. 66, 264.

[52] "Der Reichspraesident" (1919), *GPS,* pp. 486–9; see also Baumgarten, p. 549 for these points, and "Deutschlands kuenftige Staatsform," *GPS,* p. 457.

[53] "Deutschlands kuenftige Staatsform," *GPS,* p. 458.

Appeals for national dignity, control of the bureaucracy, middle-class participation, and a stronger parliament rested on the hope that through correct *knowledge,* a different citizen and a different polity would emerge. But what was achieved by knowledge was threatened by Weber's *plebiszitaere Fuehrerdemokratie,* for in it the hopes for an active, politically sophisticated nation were juxtaposed with manipulation by a leader. One conceivable result appeared to be suspension of political education in favor of the benumbing procedure of managing the masses.

Since the middle class had lost a sense of its best traditions, Weber's choice of it as a special audience was unfortunate, if not daring. Had this class lived up to his expectations and had the Weimar Republic lasted, then our understanding of his work would be different. As it is, his lasting audience has been located in the scientific community: Weber is remembered as the founder of a new science, not of a new political order. His political failure was less a result of indecision than of the political environment and, more specifically, the failures of the middle class. When political life was caught in the grip of bureaucratic rule, when opportunities for action appeared scarce, it became necessary to snatch at even the most futile hopes.

Conclusion

One cannot intellectually invent effective and genuine values or a new political ethos; when not provided by a tradition, they only emerge gradually through social practice. From the Freiburg Inaugural Address to his last works, Weber attempted to work out a theoretical basis for this new practice. I have tried to show that his political and sociological writings can be traced back to their sources in political education, to a commitment to the national community and a concern for the quality of its citizens and leaders. His proposed theoretical solution, however, never successfully offered a means for insuring the kind of institutions, knowledge, and action that were needed. The call for political education possessed an ambiguity and lack of substance that undermined its "practicality."

In Weber's work, knowledge as a practical, scientific, and historical quest defined the foundation for political education. Since the tasks of political education were frequently formed in response to crises that demanded action, the political knowledge thus offered had to be practical in the sense of drawing upon political experience and maintaining a close tie with the language and purposes of a political audience. In addition, this knowledge had to be scientific. While the scientist's conceptual language was necessarily put to the test of meeting nonscientific needs, his empirical knowledge remained relevant for political education. Clear factual information could help replace illusion with understanding. Finally, knowledge was to be historical, for by comprehending society's past and the traditions of thought and practice out of which contemporary crises had arisen, men gained an ability to act intelligently.

It has been common in political theory to speak of either experience or scientific rationality as the source of political knowledge, but in the view proposed here their reciprocity and complementarity are emphasized. Experience is needed in order to convey what it means to participate and be a citizen; science is needed as a resource for informed opinion and criticism. Such a reconciliation must not be effected too hastily, however, for Weber's social science was to be a critical "science of reality." Commitment to the "truth" was the core of its ethic—an ethic that carried over to the aims of political education itself. "My most crucial inner need," Weber once remarked, "is intellectual integrity. I say what is."[54] A critical temper and an affirmation of "intellectual integrity" could be jusified on scientific grounds, but what would be the consequences of introducing them into politics?

For Weber the inevitable, necessary conflict between truth and politics could never be finally resolved, for, as he understood, to "say what is" was not always to say what is politically productive or valuable. Political education as a critical "search for truth" ran the risk of leaving the citizen stranded between the cold realities of politics and the insistent needs of the community. Citizenship may be a fragile practice that depends upon sustaining myths about men and the political order. If the truths of realism are hard, unsettling, and unwelcome, the scientific search for reality may be forced to compromise with political education. The refusal to compromise in this way, grounded in a scientific ethic, may explain Weber's political failures.

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[54] Quoted in Golo Mann, "Max Weber als Politiker," *Die neue Rundschau,* 75 (1964), 400. See the interesting discussion by Hannah Arendt, "Truth and Politics," *Philosophy, Politics and Society,* ed. Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman, third series (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), pp. 104–33.

It certainly explains the urgency of his search for a tradition worth emulating in the present. In political theory, a national perspective, knowledge of historical practice, and acceptance of the "necessities" of action often seem to have a natural affinity with each other. Machiavelli's demonstration of these relations is only the most famous.[55] We know, even so, that traditions of political practice are highly differentiated entities that can be reconstructed in numerous contrasting forms. The problem of *what* tradition one speaks about is especially inescapable in a setting, such as the one Weber faced, where temporal breaks and ideological discontinuities are significant for defining the contours of politics and society. Historical knowledge can perhaps add depth to practice, but can it so confidently do justice to the different traditions composing a nation? In this matter Weber's propensity for merging the middle class with the nation as a whole tended to narrow his vision and lead him to discount the value of other groups and movements for restoring political education to its proper place.

How do political education and politics appear when the middle class is chosen as theory's special audience? Here Weber can be turned back on himself and the full extent of his theoretical and practical failures seen. What he wanted was indeed a profound shift in politics away from complacency and jingoism toward responsibility and realism. Change was blocked by a class thoroughly unfamiliar with and untutored in the political institutions, attitudes, and values he wished to promote. Middle-class politics, in other words, was grounded in precisely that empty view of the world detested by Weber; it no longer resembled the "heroic" models of its inception. To persuade this class to revive the political order required something more than mere preaching. At the very least it called for an extensive exercise in self-criticism.

The Archimedean point for this labor was glimpsed by Weber in his analysis of the interconnections between students, the military, and bureaucracy, but it never became an integral part of his thought and action. From Plato to Hobbes, the schools had been perceived as the best means for political education, not just through disciplines dealing directly with political subjects, but through the protection given to critical knowledge in general. In the modern state, where power is monopolized by government, this view needs to be reinforced. Weber's science, we should recall, was a political and national science, aiming to build the foundation of empirical and historical knowledge without which an understanding of politics would be impossible. The school could not serve as a substitute for experience, but it could provide resources for serious political learning, as well as a setting for converting knowledge into power. As social institutions, the schools would inevitably promote some values and forms of action, regardless of their intentions; as the home of both science and the middle class, they came as close as one could expect to providing a "natural" setting for political education. The logical conclusion of Weber's work would have been to place it where it could serve not the interests of the propagandist or "prophet," but those of the educator and his audience. Although the modern world has provided ample illustrations that knowledge *is* power, it has not always reminded us of the obvious fact that knowledge, without an audience, is quite powerless.

Today we face these issues once again, with students pleading that education offer something more than technical training, politicians pondering the advantages of indoctrination, and political scientists doggedly pursing an appreciation of "political socialization." In this situation a small query may be permitted: Have we perhaps obscured the educator's calling and the needs of the political order behind a rush to establish a new science? Have we perhaps forgotten the political inspiration that created the citizen described in the *Republic:*

> . . . when reason comes, he will greet her as a friend with whom his education has made him long familiar.[56]

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[55] Michael J. Oakeshott's essay, "Political Education," which concludes with the sentence, "The world is the best of all possible words and *everything* in it is a necessary evil," belongs to this tradition: *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1962), pp. 111–36. Unlike Machiavelli and Weber, however, Oakeshott is uninterested in founding a new "realistic" science of politics.

[56] Plato, *Republic*, 402*A*.

The Political Ideas of C. G. Jung*

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C. G. Jung never wrote a treatise that systematically defines the implications of his psychological theories for politics. His views on the subject are dispersed throughout his works, although a number of books and essays are closely concerned with politics, either explicitly or by implication and logical extension. Principal among these are: *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology* (1916), "On Psychic Energy" (1928), *Essays on Contemporary Events* (1946), and *The Undiscovered Self* (1956).[1] The following study examines two of Jung's most significant contributions to the science of politics: his conjectures about the origin of culture and politics, and his theory of psychic inflation. The essay deals with the theoretical import of Jungian psychology; it is not concerned with Jung's personal political views. Although a comparison with Freud's political theories may seem warranted, a fair treatment of their differences and similarities would require a separate study.

Culture and Politics

Jungian psychology accepts and tends to substantiate the biological and anthropological assumption that in his origin man is a herd or social animal. Jung therefore commences his inquiry into the social nature of man with the question of how man became a cultural animal. He approaches the problem of the origin of culture through an examination of the concept of libido. He defines "libido" as a general life instinct, or "psychic energy," which is not reducible to the sexual instinct but includes all human drives—hunger, or the urge to imitate, for instance. Generally speaking, libidinal energy is "apportioned by nature to the various functional systems, from which it cannot be wholly withdrawn,"[2] although under certain conditions, "a small part of the total energy can be diverted from its natural flow."[3] This diverted "surplus" energy then becomes available for the development of culture and civilization. But how is the surplus psychic energy produced? Jung outlines a number of possible means through which libidinal energy may be diverted from its natural flow and thereby become available for other purposes.

To begin with, he maintains that surplus psychic energy must be a product of some sort of tension of opposites, "for there is no energy unless there is a tension of opposites."[4] And he implies that the most generalized form of such a tension of opposites is that between "matter" and "spirit." Jung does not define these categories, for he asserts that the "ultimate nature of both is transcendental, that is, irrepresentable, since the psyche and its contents are the only reality which is given to us *without a medium*."[5] It is only on the basis of his examination of the human psyche, its structure and contents, that he postulates these two categories: the existence of matter is attested to primarily by sense perception, while the belief in the existence of spirit is supported by psychic experience. And he maintains that a study of man's history and psyche indicates that a fundamental opposition between matter and spirit exists within human nature. For instance, he thinks that

> man living in the state of nature is in no sense merely "natural" like an animal, but sees, believes, fears, worships things whose meaning is not at all discoverable from the conditions of his natural environment. Their underlying meaning leads us in fact far away from all that is natural, obvious, and easily intelligible, and quite often contrasts most sharply with the natural instincts.[6]

In part, Jung has in mind here the various primitive religious beliefs and practices.

A more specific source of tension that accounts for the appearance of surplus psychic energy is the "opposition between the profoundly primitive nature of the newborn infant and his highly differentiated inheritance."[7] The "natural man," for Jung, is characterized by unbridled instinctuality. In time, however, his instinctual nature is thwarted by the inherited "mnemonic deposits accruing from all the experience of his ancestors."[8] These deposits are not *inherited ideas,* but *possibilities* of ideas, potentialities; they are psychic paths traced out by the remote and immediate ancestors of the individual. The individual's mind, therefore, as the "active principle in the inheritance, consists of the sum of the ancestral minds, the 'unseen fathers' whose authority is born anew with the child."[9] The child, of course, is unconscious of this inheritance. It is only aware of the fact that something is interfering with the free expression of its instincts. For obvious reasons, it projects this internal interference first onto its parents, and later onto the society.

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* I am grateful to Columbia University and the Chamberlain Fellowship for according me the opportunity to undertake this study.

[1] These works may be found in Volumes VII, VIII, and X, respectively, of *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, Bollingen Series XX, Pantheon Books: New York. The dates refer to the year of composition, not necessarily of publication.

[2] "On Psychic Energy," Vol. VIII, p. 47. All footnotes refer to the first edition of the *Collected Works* cited above.

[3] "On Psychic Energy," p. 47.

[4] *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, Vol. VII, p. 52, and see also Vol. VIII, p. 53.

[5] "On the Nature of the Psyche," Vol. VIII, p. 216.

[6] "On Psychic Energy," Vol. VIII, p. 52.

[7] "On Psychic Energy," p. 53.

Since the parents and the society actually do play a role in restricting the natural expression of the individual's instincts—for that is how, at least partially, the inherited restrictive dispositions developed in the first place—they supply the third source of tension that leads to the production of surplus psychic energy. But why should there still exist an opposition between the individual's instincts and the demands of the parents and the community, if these demands have been passed on through inheritance and therefore have been internalized by the individual? The implication is that the individual's instincts, in strength and direction, recapitulate a more primitive stage of human development than that into which he is born. Consequently, his parents, and in adulthood, the society, must inculcate in him modes of behavior that as yet have not been passed on through inheritance. Another possibility is that the new modes of behavior have already been passed on through inheritance, but being of recent origin, they are, at birth, not as strong as the earlier instincts and patterns of behavior and come to the fore only with the further maturation of the individual. In this case too, until the later inherited modes of behavior do make their appearance, the parents and the community must again oppose those aspects of the individual's behavior that still reflect his earlier instincts. And since regression to earlier forms of instinctual behavior is an ever-present possibility, not only for the children, but for the adults, as well as for the community as a whole, the tension between man's primitive instincts and his more developed communal behavior, or ethics, is always present. Therefore, Jung notes, that "the conflict between infantile instinctuality and ethics can never be avoided. It is . . . the *sine qua non* of psychic energy."[10]

Thus, the combination of tensions resulting from the opposition between "spirit" and "matter," between the original instincts and the inherited anti-instinctual dispositions, and between the individual's instincts and the ethical demands of the society produces that surplus psychic energy which man has at his disposal for the construction of civilization and culture. To a degree, this is a cumulative process, so that as man continues to evolve, the tension resulting from these three factors and the corresponding surplus energy released are constantly increased.

There appears to be no simple answer to the question of why man should utilize the excess psychic energy for the development of culture. Jung believes that man's movement in this direction "must be due to something rooted deep in his nature, indeed in the nature of the living organism as such. For living matter is itself a transformer of energy, and in some way as yet unknown life participates in the transformation process."[11] Jung thinks, however, that he is able to account for the psychological mechanism that transforms the surplus psychic energy into cultural manifestations—the *symbol.* In psychological terms, the symbol is a *libido analogue,* because it is "an idea that can give equivalent expression to the libido and canalize it into a form different from the original one."[12] But the formation of symbols is not a conscious procedure—this is one reason why it is difficult to answer the question about transformation of energy—rather they are "produced out of the unconscious by way of revelation or intuition."[13] Very often they are derived directly out of dreams, or are influenced by them. In most cases, the symbols so produced possess a numinous, magical quality: they are highly charged with psychic energy, and have an overpowering, compulsive influence. Consequently, when such symbols arise, men frequently objectify them in analogous material or behavioral form. Magic and magical rituals, therefore, are the first expressions of the transformed libidinal energy. The very nature of magical rituals, and of talismans and sacred objects, and the actions performed on or around them clearly indicate their function as transformers of energy. Magic serves as a bridge between the world of symbol and the world of matter: first, it attempts to embody the symbol in the world and so lift the objective realm to a symbolic level—it "spiritualizes" the world; and second, it strives to call forth or revivify the symbolic images so that the energy associated with them reappears. In time, men discover that even if the symbol does not return in its original power, the magical ritual itself has the effect of releasing the desired energy. As this effect is recognized, the ritual is often deliberately invoked to release instinctual and emotional energies and guide them to the desired object or activity: it narrows the psychic field of vision and concentrates the conscious and unconscious forces on the desired ends. By canalizing the psychic energy into an object or an activity, the ritual produces the magical numinosity even without the appearance of the symbol. The numinosity then has a stimulating effect on the imagination, and the mind becomes fascinated. Because the primitive psyche is not well differentiated, the concentration often appears as possession. In turn, the fascination usually gives rise to playful, frequently repetitive and rhythmical images, sounds, or actions, which, at times, lead to the accomplishment of valuable work or the making of important discoveries. The enormous effort normally expended during the primitive rituals also indicates the difficulty of diverting the libido from its natural and habitual flow into an unaccustomed activity. With further psychic evolution, the act of will, to a certain extent, replaces the magic ritual.

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[8] "On Psychic Energy," p. 53.

[9] "On Psychic Energy," p. 54.

[10] "On Psychic Energy," p. 56.

[11] "On Psychic Energy," p. 41.

[12] "On Psychic Energy," p. 48.

[13] "On Psychic Energy," p. 48.

At any rate, Jung argues that it is the slowly evolving symbol formation which is responsible for the development of "cultural" ideas and behavior. For instance, after the stage associated with fetish objects, a more sophisticated stage in symbol formation is reached with the totem; and the totem "is closely bound up with the beginnings of tribal life and leads straight to the idea of the palladium, the tutelary tribal deity, and to the idea of an organized human community in general."[14] Once again, the implication is that the community begins to reflect and live out its symbols in practice. Symbols, therefore, are the formative agents of communities and supply both the psychic and the organizational foundations of social life.[15] And Jung would add that this principle is as true today as it was in primitive societies.

Closely associated with the formation of culture and tribal organization is the differentiation of individual from group consciousness. For to begin with, the psyche is essentially collective, and there exist no perceptible differences among the members of a community in matters of thought, feeling, and behavior. Moreover, if anything happens which indicates that someone is not of like mind, an immediate disturbance is created. For "nothing arouses so much panic among primitives as something out of the ordinary; it is at once suspected of being dangerous and hostile."[16] One reason for the hostility and panic is the fear of the unknown. But when the unknown has to do with human consciousness and behavior, that fear is compounded by the bias for uniformity that the psyche possesses as a result of its long evolution from "a sort of generalized or cosmic consciousness, with complete unconsciousness of the subject," to its first differentiation into group consciousness.[17] When primitive man encounters a phenomenon that indicates a difference or a separation from group consciousness, he must feel this "splitting of the psyche as something unseemly and morbid, just as we do. . . . [To his] mind it must . . . seem a sin to shatter the divine unity of consciousness that ruled the primal night."[18]

The psyche of the primitive individual, therefore, is "more or less identical with the collective psyche, and accordingly has all the collective virtues and vices without any personal attribution and without inner contradiction."[19] Whatever personal differentiation exists is still in its infancy, and for the most part unconscious. Only at a higher level of development of the group consciousness does individual consciousness begin to separate itself from the collective psyche. The gradual emergence of individual consciousness appears inevitable, since it is the individual who literally serves as the motor for the production of surplus psychic energy. He is the center around which revolve the various oppositions and tensions—spirit and matter, instinct and inheritance, individual and group—that are conducive to the production of psychic energy. To begin with, these opposing tensions are not strongly charged, and he remains unconscious of their conflicting demands: he is able to contain them or to project them onto symbols or objects. But with the further evolution of group consciousness and symbol formation, with the corresponding changes in group behavior, and with the resulting new demands made upon the individual's psyche and instincts, the growing opposition between the tension-producing antipodes finally bursts forth into the individual's consciousness. To his surprise and horror, he discovers that it is he himself who embodies the contradiction between the demands of his instincts and the requirements of his psyche and his community. "The consequence of this discovery is the conflict of repression. We want to be good, and therefore repress evil; and with that the paradise of the collective psyche comes to an end."[20]

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[14] "On Psychic Energy," p. 48.

[15] See Chapters 3 and 4 of Erik Erikson's *Childhood and Society* (New York: Norton & Co., 1950) for a description of the vital role that symbols and myths play in integrating the life of a society, and of the disintegration of social and individual life when for some reason their validity and authority are undermined.

[16] "The Meaning of Psychology for Modern Man," Vol. X, p. 137.

[17] "Meaning of Psychology," pp. 136–137.

[18] "Meaning of Psychology," pp. 139–140.

[19] *Two Essays,* Vol. VII, p. 147.

Once more, symbolism and magic play an indispensable role in aiding the development of individual consciousness—of personality. "The figure of the medicine-man or chief leads the way: both make themselves conspicuous by the singularity of their ornaments and their mode of life, expressive of their social roles."[21] These outward tokens, as well as the possession of secret signs and rituals segregate them from the rest of the group. By these means "the primitive creates around him a shell, which might be called a *persona* (mask)."[22] Initially, it is only while he is wearing the mask or performing his ritual task that the individual is separated from the group. Once the mask is cast off, and the ritual completed, he again returns to the fold of the collective psyche. He does not strictly identify himself with the "persona" that he was during the ritual. He was either "possessed" for a time, or simply acted as an agent for the tribe or the spirits. He sees no reason why the possession could not equally occur to someone else, or why another properly initiated individual could not act as the agent. It is only at another stage in the evolution of consciousness that the individual begins to identify himself more or less completely with his "persona," and that the group acknowledges him as a distinct individual with unique powers. At that point, his office becomes permanent and often hereditary.

Jung speculates that "the impelling motive in this development is the will to power;"[23] for "the will to power is surely just as mighty a daemon as Eros, and just as old and original."[24] But he adds that the building up of individual prestige can only be the result of a collective compromise. Society "needs the magically effective figure" (because of the role that magic plays in releasing and channeling psychic energy, and because such a figure satisfies an archetypal need of the collective unconscious), and "it uses this need of the will to power in the individual, and the will to submit in the mass, as a vehicle, and thus brings about the creation of personal prestige."[25] Similarly, because the prestigious, powerful personality is of such paramount importance for the life of the community, it is assiduously guarded against the everpresent possibility that it may regress and dissolve into the collective psyche: for collective thinking, feeling, and effort are less demanding and are experienced as more natural than are individual functioning and effort.[26] Consequently, secrecy and taboos, both carrying magical connotations, are relied upon to forestall this threat. Any infringements of the sacred secrecy and taboo restrictions are followed by Draconian punishments. All these measures are designed to heighten the individual's self-awareness and ensure the proper performance of his unique tasks.

With the emergence of all the above manifestations, resulting from the continuing evolution of the collective and the individual psyche, there now emerges the possibility of conscious conflict and conscious harmony—in a word, *politics*. All the necessary conditions for the inception of politics are present: the self-consciousness of the group and its conscious separation from other groups (on the basis of different totems and taboos); the individual's awareness of himself as a member of a specific group; the distinction, even if temporary, between the rulers and the ruled; the recognition of legitimate authority; the conscious use of power; and a system of normative demands.

It is also clear from the above that the development of culture and politics is accomplished through a progressive subjugation of the instinctual nature of man and the gradual differentiation of the collective and individual psyche. It is a painful process, for it puts the individual at enmity with his original nature, with his instincts and his collective consciousness. This disunity, which in clinical terms is actually a neurosis, is "the hall-mark of civilized man," for he is called upon to "harmonize nature and culture within himself."[27] The attempted unification of the often disparate elements is not accomplished without a periodic "rebellion on the part of the animal nature that thirsts for freedom."[28] Thus, from time to time,

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[20] *Two Essays*, p. 147.
[21] *Two Essays*, p. 147.
[22] *Two Essays*, p. 147, my italics.
[23] *Two Essays*, p. 147.
[24] *Two Essays*, p. 33. Jung argues that Freud erred in making the Death instinct the opposite of Eros: "logically, the opposite of love is hate, and of Eros, Phobos (fear); but psychologically it is the will to power." See *Two Essays*, Vol. VII, pp. 52–53.
[25] *Two Essays*, p. 148.
[26] *Two Essays*, p. 148.
[27] *Two Essays*, p. 18.
[28] *Two Essays*, p. 18.

Dionysian orgies pass as a "wave of frenzy through the ranks of men too long constrained within the limitations or their culture."[29] However, these periods are then compensated for by an often harsh asceticism or spiritual idealism.[30]

Jung stresses that as a civilized being, the European has a history reaching back no further than 2,500 years. Beyond that there is a longer prehistorical period of a primitive tribal culture, and then "hundreds of thousands of years of neolithic culture, and before that an unimaginably vast stretch of time during which man evolved from the animal."[31] Obviously, then, the layer of culture "must therefore be quite extraordinarily thin in comparison with the powerfully developed layers of the primitive psyche. But it is these layers that form the collective unconscious, together with the vestiges of animality that lose themselves in the nebulous abyss of time."[32] And since "nothing is ever lost," men are, though outwardly civilized, "inwardly . . . still primitives."[33] Consequently Jung concludes that "mankind is, in essentials, psychologically still in the state of childhood—a stage that cannot be skipped. The vast majority needs authority, guidance, law. This fact cannot be overlooked."[34] He is skeptical of the Pauline overcoming of the law; he thinks that is a path for which few are chosen, and they tread it "only from inner necessity, not to say suffering, for it is sharp as the edge of a razor."[35] There seem to be two principal reasons why man needs authority, guidance, and law. First, the primitive instincts in man are still powerful and pressing, so that if they are not restrained by authority and law, they would quickly wreak havoc with the individual and the society. And second, authority and law are also internal needs of the psyche as a result of its inherited patterns and archetypal demands.

In Europe, Jung states, Christianity split the barbarian's psyche into two, and by repressing the lower half "enabled him . . . to domesticate the brighter half and fit it for civilization. But the lower, darker half still awaits redemption and a second spell of domestication."[36] And as Christianity loses its authority, this darker half which bears the repressed elements of the collective psyche and the vestiges of the prehistoric age will inevitably manifest itself more actively. Then the "blond beast" will "be heard prowling about in its underground prison, ready at any moment to burst out with devastating consequences. When this happens in the individual, it brings about a psychological revolution, but it can also take a social form."[37]

This prediction was written in 1918. Jung claims that it was based, in part, on the analyses of his German patients, all of whom showed a marked disturbance in the collective unconscious: the archetypes expressed primitivity, violence, and cruelty.[38] Given his view that the psyche, like the body, is a homeostatic organism, the disturbance of the collective unconscious was, at the same time, indicative of a maladjustment in the collective consciousness. And as became evident in later years, the problem was not restricted to the Germans. Consequently, in his later writings Jung frequently referred to the interplay between the conscious and unconscious attitudes and their influence on political thought and behavior. One of his most valuable contributions in this area is his examination of *psychic inflation*—a phenomenon resulting from the conscious assimilation of the contents of the collective unconscious.

Psychic Inflation

Before proceeding to a discussion of psychic inflation, it is necessary to summarize Jung's definitions of the "conscious," the "unconscious," and as part of the unconscious, the "archetype," which, he argues, "is an indispensable correlate of the idea of the collective unconscious."[39]

Both the conscious and the unconscious contain a personal and a collective element. *Personal consciousness* is composed of immediate sense-consciousness of external and internal stimuli, and of past stimuli that can be brought back to immediate consciousness, all drawn together and unified by a fluctuating, changeable ego-complex.[40] *Collective consciousness* is the prevailing *Weltanschauung* or *Zeitgeist,* composed of the accepted beliefs, biases, attitudes, and principles of a given society or group.[41] The *personal unconscious* contains the following elements: personal experiences that were forgotten or repressed; external and internal stimuli and combinations of ideas that never reached consciousness, either because they were too weak and indistinct or because they were repressed; all psychic contents that are incompatible with the conscious attitudes and appear morally, aesthetically, or intellectually inadmissible; and potential functions of the psyche or the personality that are not consciously developed.[42] And finally, the *collective unconscious* is composed of the inherited instincts and forms of perception or apprehension that have never been conscious in the individual and that are not acquired during his lifetime, but are characteristic of an entire group of individuals—family, nation, race, or all of mankind.[43]

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[29] *Two Essays*, p. 18.

[30] Jung has in mind not only the "October Fest" or the Mardi Gras before the onset of Advent and Lent respectively, and the similar socially sanctioned freeing of the instincts in non-Christian cultures, but also the more general historical periods of "licentiousness," such as that of the late Hellenistic period culminating in the Stoic and Christian ideals, that of the Renaissance followed by the Reformation, and that of the Romantic era followed by Victorianism. He conjectures that presently Western Europe is once again undergoing such a period of "instinctual liberation," which will undoubtedly culminate in a new ascetic ideal. See Vol. VII, pp. 18–19.

[31] "The Role of the Unconscious," Vol. X, p. 12.

[32] "The Role of the Unconscious," Vol. X, p. 12.

[33] "On the Psychology of the Trickster-Figure," Vol. IX, Part I, pp. 268–269.

[34] *Two Essays*, Vol. VII, p. 239.

[35] *Two Essays*, p. 237.

[36] "The Role of the Unconscious," Vol. X, p. 13.

[37] "Role of the Unconscious," p. 13.

[38] "The Fight with the Shadow," Vol. X, p. 219.

[39] "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious," Vol. IX, Part I, p. 42.

In reality, therefore, the collective unconscious is divided into its "group" and "universal" layers. For to the extent "that human brains are uniformly differentiated, the mental functioning thereby made possible is also collective and universal."[44] But there are also "differentiations corresponding to the race, to the tribe, and to the family, at a level that is less deep than that of the 'universal' collective psyche."[45] This would mean that there is a point where the distinction between the personal and the collective unconscious is very tenuous: it becomes a question of degree and distance. For example, the particular talents and temperamental disposition of an individual are obviously inherited from his most immediate ancestors; therefore they are a part both of his personal unconscious (for they are uniquely his) and of his collective unconscious (for they are inherited and do not owe their existence to personal experience). The gradual accretion of such unique characteristics eventually makes up the particular contents of the collective unconscious of the family, the tribe, and the race.

The collectively inherited forms of perception and apprehension Jung calls *archetypes.* The archetypes are psychic correlates of the instincts and could be described as the "instinct's perception of itself . . . in exactly the same way as consciousness is an inward perception of the objective life-process."[46] But they come to consciousness only indirectly, through images and symbols, and in this manner give a definite form to the collectively inherited psychic contents. They are "the most ancient and the most universal 'thought-forms' of humanity," although they are as much feelings as thoughts.[47] Other writers have defined them variously as "categories of the imagination," "*représentations collectives,*" "elementary" or "primordial thoughts."[48] Jung thinks that they originate from the "deposits of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity."[49] He argues that man's natural and social environment is full of psychological stimuli that leave behind definite mythical traces in the psyche. All repeated situations, particularly if they call forth an intense emotional response, give rise to archetypal motifs: recurring dangers to the body or the psyche, the images of mother, father, child, husband, wife, the magically powerful personality, and so on.[50] And in order to understand the often grotesque and fantastic nature of the archetypes it is necessary to imagine the psychic reactions of the primitive to his environment. Furthermore, once the imprint is present, the archetype then acts like an agent that tends "towards the repetition of these same experiences. For when an archetype appears in a dream, in a fantasy, or in life, it always brings with it a certain influence or power by virtue of which it either exercises a numinous or fascinating effect, or impels to action."[51] By way of summary, therefore, the situation is as follows:

> Although the child possesses no inborn ideas, it nevertheless has a highly developed brain which functions in a quite definite way. This brain is inherited from its ancestors; it is the deposit of the psychic functioning of the whole human race. The child therefore brings with it an organ ready to function in the same way as it has functioned throughout human history. In the brain the instincts are preformed, and so are the primordial images which have always been the basis of man's thinking

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[40] "Spirit and Life," Vol. VIII, p. 323–324.

[41] Vol. VIII, pp. 218–219, 340.

[42] Vol. VIII, pp. 133, 151, 311; Vol. IX, Part I, p. 42.

[43] Vol. VII, pp. 144–145; Vol. VIII, pp. 137–138, 310.

[44] *Two Essays,* Vol. VII, p. 144.

[45] *Two Essays,* p. 270. In the same place Jung adds a functional distinction to the collective psyche: the *collective mind* represents collective thinking, and *collective soul,* collective feeling.

[46] "Instinct and the Unconscious," Vol. VIII, pp. 136–137. Jung states that he has borrowed the idea of the archetype from St. Augustine, and considers the term a paraphrase of the Platonic Forms. See "Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious," Vol. IX, Part I, p. 4, for Jung's etymology of the term.

[47] *Two Essays,* Vol. VII, p. 65.

[48] "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious," Vol. IX, Part I, pp. 42–43, my italics.

[49] *Two Essays,* Vol. VII, p. 68.

[50] "The Structure of the Psyche," Vol. VIII, pp. 155–156.

[51] *Two Essays,* Vol. VII, p. 69.

—the whole treasure-house of mythological motifs.[52]

One of the aims of analytical psychology[53] is the integration of the conscious and the unconscious elements of the psyche. Since the unconscious contains both personal and collective aspects, a frequent and apparently unavoidable phenomenon resulting from the conscious assimilation of the contents of the unconscious is the extension of the personality beyond individual limits. The individual under analysis suddenly discovers elements within himself that reach, first of all, beyond his personal consciousness, and then, even beyond his personal unconscious. The assimilation of the personal unconscious may often produce a sense of exhilaration, and provide new confidence and strength for the individual. Moreover, since the contents of the collective unconscious also seem to belong to the individual, he at the same time attempts to assimilate these no longer personal aspects of his psyche and to identify with them. The problem then arises that he extends his personality beyond his individual limits and "fills a space which he normally cannot fill. He can only fill it by appropriating to himself contents and qualities which properly exist for themselves alone and should therefore remain outside our bounds."[54] As a result of this extension of his personality, the individual experiences a sense of being "superhuman" or "godlike." Jung defines this phenomenon as *psychic inflation.*

As will become evident from the examples described below, psychic inflation is not exclusively related to an individual's assimilation of the contents of the collective psyche. Since consciousness is both personal, and collective, psychic inflation may also be personal or collective. Furthermore, it is not limited to the unwarranted identification with contents of the collective unconscious. It may result from an identification with any contents—social or metaphysical, for instance—that reach beyond the limits of the individual's or the group's actual and consciously determined nature and powers. Often such identifications may have unconscious and archetypal foundations; but that is unavoidable, for all behavior is inevitably tainted by the archetypes. The point is, that psychic inflation not only results from an identification with the contents of the collective unconscious; it may also result from an identification with the contents of the collective consciousness.

One example of the latter, provided by Jung, is "the humourless way in which many men identify themselves with their business or their titles."[55] For the office an individual holds also contains a personal and a collective factor. It came into existence though the cooperation of many people, and its dignity or power still depend on collective approval. When, therefore, an individual identifies himself completely with his office or title, he too makes an extraordinary extension of his personality and usurps qualities that are not in him but outside him: "*L'état c'est moi* is the motto for such people."[56]

This example, incidentally, points out that "transpersonal contents are not inert or dead matter . . . rather they are living entities which exert an attractive force upon the conscious mind."[57] In other words, not only is the individual drawn to an identification with the office in order to enlarge his personality, but, also, the office itself has a power that attracts the individual and entices him to submerge his personal identity in the enlarged collective identity of the office. One of the dangers of such psychic identification and inflation is the atrophy of the individual personality. "In vain would one look for a personality behind this husk. Underneath all the padding one would find a very pitiable little creature."[58] It appears that a vicious circle develops as a result of the individual's identification with the transpersonal qualities and powers of his office. On the one hand, such identification is attractive because "it offers easy compensation for personal deficiencies."[59] But, on the other hand, the identification does not allow for the development of the personality, and therefore increases the sense of personal deficiency, which, in turn, strengthens the identification with the compensating transpersonal contents.

Although, in the above case, Jung uses an example in which the individual psyche is extended and "inflated," one could argue that there are instances of identification with social roles that lead to an narrowing of the individual psyche, and therefore to "psychic deflation." For instance, the members of the pariah or the lower classes, or members of socially despised national or racial groups frequently identify personally with their externally designated status and roles. These roles, too, contain transpersonal contents which exert an influence on the conscious and unconscious mind. The result again is the atrophy of the individual and the failure to develop the personality beyond the limits imposed by the social roles. Such deflationary roles also have their attractive aspects: they too, offer easy compensation or justification for personal deficiencies, and a psychologically satisfying submergence of the individual in the collective. The history of religion provides a metaphysical example of "psychic deflation." In religion, man's better qualities are externalized in and identified with an idol or an extramundane "Father in Heaven." "The logical result is that the only thing left behind here is a miserable, inferior, worthless, and sinful little heap of humanity."[60]

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[52] "The Psychological Foundations of Belief in Spirits," Vol. VIII, pp. 310–311. Jung speculates that certain archetypes may also exist in animals (Vol. VII, p. 69), and theoretically, therefore, "it should be possible to 'peel' the collective unconscious, layer by layer, until we come to the psychology of the worm, and even of the amoeba." Vol. VIII, p. 152.

[53] Jung uses this term to distinguish his psychotherapeutic method from the "psychoanalysis" or Freud and the "individual psychology" of Adler.

[54] *Two Essays,* Vol. VII, p. 140.

[55] *Two Essays,* p. 140.

[56] *Two Essays,* p. 140.

[57] *Two Essays,* p. 142.

[58] *Two Essays,* p. 142.

[59] *Two Essays,* p. 142.

Indeed, the fact that identification with contents outside one's personality may lead to both psychic inflation and psychic deflation is borne out in Jung's analysis of this phenomenon with reference to the individual's assimilation of the unconscious heritage of the collective psyche. Here, Jung clearly states that there are two possible reactions resulting from such an assimilation—a feeling of superiority, or a feeling of inferiority. In one individual, the conscious realization of the unconscious contents gives rise to a feeling of superiority and heightened self-confidence. For such realization is not effected without painfully acquired insights and a moral struggle necessary to bring together two disparate spheres that have been anxiously kept apart. In another individual, the newly won insights into the shadow side of his collective unconscious and the recognition of the powerlessness of the ego against the forces of the unconscious produce feelings of inferiority and depression. The first man assumes a responsibility for the unconscious that goes much too far, while the second refuses to accept any responsibility at all for the unconscious. One becomes overweening and arrogant, the other becomes overanxious and despondent. Jung admits that these are the two extremes of the possible reactions, and that most men fall somewhere between these two "pure types." Moreover, he argues that if these two extreme modes of reaction are analyzed more closely, it turns out that "behind the optimistic self-confidence of the first there lurks an equally deep, or rather far deeper, helplessness, for which the conscious optimism acts as an unsuccessful compensation. And behind the pessimistic resignation of the second there is a defiant will to power, far surpassing in cocksureness the conscious optimism of the first."[61]

Applying the above insights to the realm of politics, it would seem that the political leader who has extended his personality through his office, or who feels that he represents the collective will, and who thereby experiences the sense of self-confidence, omnipotence, and megalomania that often borders on "godlikeness" is, in fact, compensating for a deep-seated impotence that expresses itself in this extraordinary will to power. Also, once the identification with the collective contents is established, the development of the individual personality may begin to suffer, thus giving rise to the vicious circle referred to above, where the sense of personal deficiency is compensated for by a strengthened identification with the collective contents. Often, this sense of personal deficiency leads to an anxiety about the loss of power, which may in turn inspire a paranoid fear of competition from others. All of this is then compensated for by an intensified will to power leading to political tyranny, and when possible, totalitarianism. On the other hand, the conscious feeling of impotence and inferiority in men who do not strive for power, frequently conceals an unconscious, often pathological will to power, which may be satisifed by an identification with the powerful, megalomaniacal "leader." The identification may be conscious, but it can also operate on the unconscious level by producing passivity and thwarting any conscious resistance to the powerful "leader" figure. In addition, the tyrannical control established by such a leader may serve to heighten the sense of inferiority and impotence on the part of the subjects, thereby again strengthening in them the compensatory will to power. If the leader can channel this reaction into an identification with himself and his powers, then the tyranny is fortified; if he is not able to do this, the reaction may burst forth in a rebellion.

Besides the collective contents associated with the feelings of superiority and inferiority, Jung notes the collective unconscious contains many other contents and pairs of opposites that may be similarly activated and inflated—good and evil, for example. The inflation of either is possible because the collective psyche is made up of a conglomerate of both the virtues and the vices of humanity. And again, therefore, one man may arrogate to himself the collective virtues, while another takes collective vice as his personal burden. Both are suffering from a delusion because the apparently personally possessed virtues and vices are in reality "the moral pair of opposites contained in the collective psyche, which have become perceptible or have been rendered conscious artificially."[62] Prophets and saints, rather than politicians, are prone to this form of psychic inflation. And meditation is the religious method of becoming aware of the contents present in the personal and the collective uncounscious.

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[60] *Two Essays,* pp. 233–234.

[61] *Two Essays,* p. 136.

Another form of psychic inflation occurs when an individual consciously assimilates one of the archetypal figures of the collective unconscious. It has been mentioned earlier that archetypal figures possess a numinous, charismatic, mana-like quality. Jung thinks that this numinous quality of the personified archetypes is partially a result of the primitive's attribution of magical powers to an aspect of his collective psyche, which, because of its development in the psyche over untold ages, is so much more powerful than the individual's conscious powers and personality. When an archetypal figure is brought to consciousness, the ego tends to identify with the mana-like quality of the archetype. Once again the individual experiences a sense of superhuman knowledge and power which is illusory, because the ego has merely become adulterated with the archetype and appropriated something that does not belong to it.[63] And while the individual may feel that his ego has mastered the archetypal forces of the unconscious, in fact, his ego has been mastered and possessed by them.

Jung argues, however, that there are cases in which the individual does actually assimilate and master the archetypal figure, and then does take over its mana and becomes a mana-personality or a charismatic personality. In such cases, "nothing more should happen that is not sanctioned by the ego, and when the ego wants something, nothing should be capable of interfering."[64] He mentions Napoleon and Lao-tzu as the ideal types of the mana-personality: one the steadfast superman, and the other the sublime sage. In order to distinguish the real from the illusory assimilation of mana, Jung demands empirical evidence that the individual has become as important and powerful in the world as he feels, or that he does exercise unusual personal influence over others. If he feels like a mana-personality, but has no empirical proofs, it is a case of psychic inflation.

Nevertheless, a problem develops in this respect. Since "the mana-personality is a dominant of the collective uncounscious," it is an archetype that takes the forms of hero, chief, ruler of men, medicine-man, doctor, saint, or prophet.[65] Consequently, the archetype is constellated by and projected onto anyone who fills or approximates these positions. And if the person in question is already suffering from psychic inflation because of the adulteration of his ego with an archetypal figure, then the projection supplies him with the empirical evidence needed to conclude that he, in fact, is a mana-personality. Furthermore, projections and beliefs tend to create their own "psychic reality," and their influence may be such as actually to produce or increase the mana-quality in the receiver of the projection. For projections inevitably call forth counter-projections. And like the transpersonal contents of an office or a title, projections and beliefs also are not inert or merely imaginary forces; they too exert a psychic influence upon the conscious and the unconscious mind and alter their structures and functions. Nonetheless, it is still a case of psychic inflation, for the individual so affected identifies with qualities that he does not possess and over which he has no control; on the contrary, the archetypes and the projections possess his ego and function through him. He has become an instrument for the forces of the collective unconscious. This complicated and many-faceted psychological interplay helps to explain the mana or the charisma that doctors, teachers, priests, kings, and politicians, at times, seem to possess, and with which they readily identify, although as individuals they may lack any personally appealing qualities. This is not to deny the possibility that under such conditions the individual may develop conscious mastery over the unconscious and archetypal forces that at the moment possess him and provide him with the effective mana. But the rule seems to be that possession by an archetype, like the personal identification with one's office or title, "turns a man into a flat collective figure, a mask behind which he can no longer develop as a human being, but becomes increasingly stunted."[66] And, therefore, Jung warns that one must beware of the "danger of falling victim to the dominant of the mana-personality. The danger lies not only in oneself becoming a father-mask, but in being overpowered by this mask when worn by another."[67]

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[62] *Two Essays*, p. 147.

[63] *Two Essays*, p. 227.

[64] *Two Essays*, p. 230.

[65] *Two Essays*, p. 226.

[66] *Two Essays*, p. 232.

The possibility of being overpowered by the archetypal mask when it is worn by another, *points to an new source of psychic inflation. In* this case, the inflation results from an identification with an individual who either actually is or merely appears to be a mana-personality. *For not all men have the strength to be independent* and self-reliant; "the disciple fantasy is perhaps the best they can accomplish," and "the gratifications of the accompanying inflation at least do something to make up for the loss of spiritual freedom."[68] For through his deification of the mana-personality the disciple also waxes in stature: "does he not possess the great truth . . . received straight from the Master's hands?"[69] And again, psychic deflation is an equally possible reaction: the disciple sits modestly "at the Master's feet and guards against having ideas of his own."[70] And there is also an accompanying advantage to feeling unworthy, for the disciple can indulge in infantile fantasies and revert to childish dependence without any loss to himself—"all responsibility is laid at the Master's door."[71] This form of psychic inflation, experienced in varying degrees, is widely prevalent, because given the power of the archetypes, men have "an urge to find a tangible hero somewhere, or a superior wise man, a leader and father, some undisputed authority," and so often they "build temples to little tin gods with the greatest promptitude and burn incense upon the altars."[72] For just like the chief and the prophet, so also the disciple and the loyal follower are primordial images of the collective unconscious.

Finally, there is one more case of psychic inflation that is worth mentioning because of its significance for the understanding of political behavior. This is the case of *collective psychic inflation* owing to a group identification with the contents of the collective unconscious. Here it is the collective or the group-ego that is overpowered by the unconscious contents. It may be that the individual members of the collective already experience a feeling of psychic inflation because of their identification with the group. This identification and inflation are now strengthened by the group's submergence into the collective unconscious. Such group unification with the preconscious collective wholeness "possesses a prodigious psychic virulence" and "power of contagion."[73] For "identification with lower and more primitive stages of consciousness is invariably accompanied by a *heightened sense of life,"*[74] *and provides a* "new source of power, which may, however, unleash a dangerous enthusiasm."[75] As with the individual, so, too, the group's identification *with the collective unconscious produces a* feeling of universal validity, omnipotence, and godlikeness, which then leads to the forcing of the demands of the unconscious upon others. In *this case, however, the sense of validity is* supported by the unanimity of thought among the members of the group. Any toleration of individual differences is obliterated by the natural propensity of the collective psyche for psychic unity. And the feeling of omnipotence is intensified by the group's actual physical and social force. Clearly, under such conditions, both the individual and the group are deprived of all conscious expression and development. The political and social consequences of such collective psychic inflation are obvious.

Again, since the contents of the collective unconscious are diverse in character, the group, for various reasons, may be drawn to assimilate only certain parts of the unconscious and ignore others: collective virtue or collective vice, collective love and gentleness or collective hatred and violence. It may also react to its confrontation with the unconscious with either a sense of superiority or inferiority, of optimism or pessimism.[76] But in either case, its collective will to power will be activated and demand expression, at times, even in suicidal terms.

Archetypes, too, have an individual and a collective character: the group united, the group in action, and the group in submission to a leader, for example, are complements of the more individual archetypes of the family, the medicine-man, and the ruler. By assimilating these archetypal contents into its collective consciousness, the group, like the individual, feels that it has come to possess the charismatic, mana-like quality of the archetypes. The sense of omnipotence, omniscience, and godlikeness already present in its initial submergence into the collective unconscious is strengthened by the contact with archetypal elements. And once more, if empirical efficacy and actual influence are the criteria of chrisma, then given the power of a large unified group, the criteria often seem to be fulfilled. In addition, others, who are not members of the group, may project their unconscious forces upon the group, thereby increasing its sense of mana-possession and perhaps even effectuating its charismatic powers. But time is also an element, and the effectiveness of mana-personalities and groups must be judged in historical terms. Still, the powers awakened by the group's identification with the contents of the unconscious and by the projections of others, may be of such dimensions that it would be difficult to determine by external evidence alone, whether it is a true or a pseudo-charismatic group. The conclusive test is psychological. If its sense of charisma and power are due to external projections and to its possession by the collective archetypes, then it is a pseudo-charismatic group. It is a victim of psychic inflation, for it identifies with contents that it neither possesses nor controls. It is ruled by the forces of the unconscious and merely acts out its collective images and needs. Since, however, the conscious mastery of the archetypal elements of the unconscious is possible for individuals, it should also be possible for groups. In such cases, real mana-personalities and groups emerge: psychic inflation comes to an end, and the individuals or the groups actually do embody and control the qualities with which they identify.

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[67] *Two Essays,* p. 232.

[68] *Two Essays,* p. 169.

[69] *Two Essays,* pp. 168–169.

[70] *Two Essays,* p. 168.

[71] *Two Essays,* p. 168.

[72] *Two Essays,* p. 231.

[73] "On the Nature of the Psyche," Vol. VIII, p. 225.

[74] "Concerning Rebirth," Vol. IX, Part I, p. 126.

[75] "The Psychological Foundations of Belief in Spirits," Vol. VIII, p. 315.

[76] Jung often refers to Nazi Germany as an illustration of the collective possession of one particular group by the unconscious shadow contents. He argues that Hitler's successful hold over the German population was partially due to the fact that he both personified and compensated for the unconscious sense of inferiority and hysteria of the German psyche of the period. See Jung's *Essay on Contemporary Events* (Vol. X, Part III) for his views on the Nazi phenomenon.

But these are unusual and rare cases, and therefore, Jung concludes that the psychic inflation that is due to an individual's or a group's identification with the forces of the collective unconscious and to the "naive concretization of primordial images" is a natural psychic law.[77] He does not think it possible to alter the law and so to escape the power of the collective unconscious. "One can only alter one's attitude and thus save oneself from naively falling into an archetype and being forced to act a part at the expense of one's humanity."[78] The alteration of attitude he has in mind is for the individual to confess his "weakness in face of the powers of the unconscious,"[79] for "when the ego makes no claim to power there is no possession."[80] In order to do this, however, it is first of all necessary to become aware of the forces of the unconscious. Unfortunately, Jung states, the social and intellectual developments of the past four centuries in Europe have largely tended to repress man's awareness of both the personal and the collective unconscious. The repression has energized and distorted the unconscious, and in view of the neglect of the personal unconscious, brought the collective unconscious to the fore. Consequently the discharge of its pent up energy then takes the form of mass psychoses. And because of the post-Enlightenment secular and organizational orientation, these mass psychoses usually appear as political movements.

[77] *Two Essays*, Vol. VII, p. 231.
[78] *Two Essays*, p. 232.
[79] *Two Essays*, p. 232.
[80] *Two Essays*, p. 228.

A Research Note on the Impact of Interparty Competition on Congressional Voting in a Competitive Era

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Introduction

The status of interparty competition as an independent variable ultimately depends upon its utility as a predictor of political behavior. In the area of legislative behavior, party competition as a correlate of party voting has received a good deal of attention.[1] The results, however, have been mixed.[2] One institution in which competition seems to explain little of the variance in voting behavior is the U.S. House of Representatives.[3] The most plausible explanation for this phenomenon is that since 1914, interparty competition for House seats has declined.[4] This research note examines the predictive ability and correlational magnitude of party competition in regard to voting behavior in the House during a relatively highly competitive era (1892–1900). The analysis shows that during the 1892–1900 period, competition for House seats was intense, and that in at least two of the Houses in this period, the 55th and 56th, competition was strongly correlated with and a good predictor of voting behavior.

Party Competition 1892–1900

In the modern House of Representatives 75 to 80 per cent of congressional seats remain in the control of one party over long periods of time. This means that from one census period to the next only 20 to 25 per cent of House seats are competitive, i.e., change in party represented at least one in five elections. One good measure of party competition for House seats is the Hasbrouck-Jones Fluidity Index which is a ratio of the actual number of party switches to the total number of party switches possible. Table 1 shows the levels of interparty competition for congressional seats for the majority of the 1892–1960 period.

Table 1. InterParty Competition for Congressional Seats 1892–1960

Time Period	Percentage of Fluidity*	Percentage of No. Change Districts	Actual No. of Change
1892–1900	17.1	53.4	275
1914–1926	12.0	62.1	308
1932–1940	10.6	69.9	184
1942–1950	11.9	74.0	199
1952–1960	7.8	78.2	135

* Where the Percentage of Fluidity:

$$F=\frac{AC}{C(E-1)}$$

AC = the number of actual changes in districts
C = the number of constituencies
E = the number of elections

Source of rows 2–5: Jones, "Inter-Party Competition for Congressional Seats," *Western Political Quarterly*, 17 (1964), p. 465.

The table shows that the level of interparty competition has steadily declined since the turn of the century. This is true both in terms of the percentage of districts without any change and the amount of change within districts where change occurred.

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[1] Duncan MacRae, Jr., "The Relation Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review*, 46 (1952), 1046–55; Frank J. Sorauf, *Party and Representation*, (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), pp. 133–144, Chap. 6; Thomas A. Flinn, "Party Responsibility in the States: Some Causal Factors," *American Political Science Review*, 58 (1964), 60–71; Thomas R. Dye, "A Comparison of Constituency Influence in the Upper and Lower Chambers of a State Legislature," *Western Political Quarterly*, 14 (1961), 473–480, Pertti Pesonen, "Close and Safe State Elections in Massachusetts," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 7 (1963), 54–70; John G. Grumm, "The Systematic Analysis of Blocs in the Study of Legislative Behavior," *Western Political Quarterly*, 18 (1965), 350–62.

[2] See Malcolm Jewell and Samuel Patterson, *The Legislative Process in the United States* (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 438–439, for a discussion of the mixed results.

[3] Charles O. Jones, "The Role of the Campaign in Congressional Politics," in M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler, *The Electoral Process* (New Jersey, 1966), 21–41; and Marvin G. Weinbaum and Dennis R. Judd, "In Search of a Mandated Congress," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 14 (1970), 276–302.

[4] Charles O. Jones, "Inter-Party Competition for Congressional Seats," *Western Political Quarterly*, 17 (1964), 461–476; Paul Hasbrouck, *Party Government in the House of Representatives* (New York: Macmillan, 1927), Chap. 9. Jones used a modified version of Hasbrouck's Fluidity Index.

Table 2. Factor Scores in the 55th and 56th House of Representatives by Party

	Factor Scores	Pct. of Times voted with party majority	55th House		56th House	
			Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.
Strong Republican Support	.0 to .9	85+	0	34	0	50
Moderate Strong Rep. Support	1 to 1.9	70 to 84	0	149	0	121
Rep. Supportive	2 to 2.9	60 to 69	0	21	0	8
Mixed	3 to 3.9	40 to 59	2	2	6	2
Demo. Supportive	4 to 4.9	60 to 69	17	0	32	0
Moderate Strong Demo. Support	5 to 5.9	70 to 84	72	0	84	0
Strong Democratic Support	6 to 6.8	85+	36	0	30	0
			127	206	152	181

Competition and Party Voting in the Modern House

Legislative scholars have found that inter-party competition is only slightly related to the voting behavior of representatives. MacRae found competitiveness of district to be slightly related to the cross-pressuring effect on representatives.[5] Shannon found that marginality of districts was related to party loyalty in the 86th and 87th Houses.[6] There was a tendency for representatives from competitive districts to have lower party support scores although the tendency was small. During the period in which these findings were recorded, however, there was little interparty competition for House seats. The next section tests the correlational magnitude and predictive ability of party competition during a period of relatively high fluidity.

The Multiple Regression on the 55th and 56th Houses

The test for the predictive ability of party competition consists of running a multiple regression analysis on voting behavior in the 55th and 56th U.S. House of Representatives. The dependent variable measures the level of party support shown by the representatives on party related roll calls (75 per cent of one party voting against 75 per cent of the other).[7] Since the regression was to be run against all congressmen and not by party it was necessary to make the party support variable a single dimension. Thus a set of Varimax rotated factor analyses was run over the party related roll calls, and factor scores were generated for each representative. As expected the results showed a one factor solution (party), and the factor scores were found to measure the number of times a representative voted with a majority of his party. Table 2 shows the range of factor scores and their equivalent party support scores.

The results show that Republicans cluster in the 0 to 3 range, while Democrats fall in the 4 to 6 range. The higher the factor score, the higher the Democratic party support score, and the lower the factor score the higher the Republican party support score. Thus the dependent variable (the factor scores) is a unidimensional measure of party support which avoids the methodological problem of both Republicans and Democrats having identical party support scores.

The independent variables in the regression analysis are party competition and proportion of industrial workers in each district. Party competition was scaled on a one to seven basis using the Ranney-Kendall scale as modified by Pfeiffer.[8] The data were collected from the Congressional Records for the 1892–1900 period and the 1890 Census.

In the regression analysis for the 55th

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[5] Duncan MacRae, Jr., *Dimensions of Congressional Voting* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1958), p. 286.

[6] W. Wayne Shannon, *Party, Constituency and Congressional Voting* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1968), pp. 42–46.

[7] The number of roll calls analyzed in each House were: 109 roll calls in the 55th House and 92 in the 56th House.

[8] Austin Ranney and Wilmoore Kendall, "The American Party Systems," *American Political Science Review,* 48 (1954), 477–485; David G. Pfeiffer, "The Measurement of Inter-Party Competition and Systematic Stability," American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), 457–467. The Pfeiffer index is used in the regression equation because it results in a seven value index whereas the Hasbrouck-Jones index yields a smaller number of categories, e.g., change/no change; and the smaller the number of values that a variable takes the more inflated the magnitude of the correlation coefficients. Thus the Pfeiffer scale is used because it is more appropriate for the multiple regression technique. Further, the Hasbrouck-Jones index was regressed against the party voting scores and the correlations were found to be about .10 higher than those reported in Tables 4 and 5.

Table 3. The Proportion of Competitive Seats in the 55th and 56th House: All Seats and By Party

			55th		56th	
Average percentage of victor (1892–1898)	All Seats N	%	Dem. N	Rep.	Dem. N	Rep.
Competitive (49% 55.9%)	180	52		Switched from Congress to Congress		
One-Party Competition (56.0% 60.9%)	63	18	23	40	24	39
Modified One-Party (61.0% 70.9%)	58	17	28	30	29	29
One-Party (71.0% 100%)	46	13	33	13	34	12

One-Party Republican coded 1 through one-party Democratic coded 7.

House, however, the competition index includes the electoral data for only the 1892, 1894, and 1896 elections. The party competition index for the 56th House includes the electoral data for the 1892 through the 1898 elections. Thus the competition index does not include data from elections occurring after the 55th and 56th Houses. Table 3 shows the Competition scale and the proportion of districts falling into each of the categories.

The next procedure was to run a stepwise regression analysis. The proportion of industrial workers in the total work force of a district was scaled and included in the regression analysis for purposes of comparison.[9] Tables 4 and 5 present the regression analysis for the 55th and 56th Houses respectively.

The tables show that in both Houses, interparty competition for seats was highly correlated with (more than .60 in both cases) and predictive of voting scores. The pattern underlying the data reveals that party members from safe seats have high party support scores while congressmen from competitive seats tend to be less supportive of their respective parties. The same analysis run on the 89th U.S. House of Representatives yielded a low correlation (less than .20) between party competition and party support and was not predictive of party support. In sum, the results show that, during a period in which competition for seats was relatively high, party competition was strongly correlated with, and predictive of, voting behavior.

Comments

This analysis has shown that a traditional political variable (interparty competition) was strongly related to and predictive of legislative

Table 4. Results of Multiple Regression Analysis for the 55th U. S. House of Representatives*

Independent Variables		*R*	*b*	Beta	Standard Error
Step One:	Party Competition Scale	.61	.72	.59	1.61
Step Two:	Industrial/Agricultural Scale	.63	.12	.15	1.60

* Independent variables correlate at .32.

Table 5. Results of Multiple Regression Analysis for the 56th U. S. House of Representatives*

Independent Variables		*R*	*b*	Beta	Standard Error
Step One:	Party Competition Scale	.65	.90	.66	1.64
Step Two:	Industrial/Agricultural Scale	.65	.01	.01	1.64

* Independent variables correlate at .28.

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[9] The scale is:

Percentage of Total Work Force Industrial
0 to 10 coded 1
11 to 25 coded 2
26 to 40 coded 3
41 to 55 coded 4
56 to 70 coded 5
71 to 86 coded 6
87 to 100 coded 7

voting behavior in an era when competition was intense. The results point to the fruitfulness of extending time-series analyses of Congress. In short, such analyses should show that traditionally defined political variables do explain and predict behavior depending upon the historical milieu. Further, time-series analyses in other areas of political science should also discern the ebb and flow of the impact of traditional political variables on behavior.

A Note on "Voting or a Price System in a Competitive Market Structure"*

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Martin Shubik in "Voting, or a Price System in a Competitive Market Structure"[1] presents a thought-provoking argument designed to show that simple majority voting can lead to a less efficient distribution of goods than a price system does.

The purpose of this note is to point out a simple but fatal error in Shubik's analysis. We find that once corrected, Shubik's argument does not lead to simple dominance for the price system over majority voting but it does lead in other interesting directions.

Shubik postulates a three-person exchange economy, with the three goods x, y, and z. The total endowment for the community is the same quantity, a, for each of the goods. In the initial distribution of goods, all of x is in Mr. 1's hands, all of y is in Mr. 2's, and all of z is in Mr. 3's. Each actor has the same utility function $\phi_1=\phi_2=\phi_3=\phi(x, y, z)$.

The problem confronting the three actors is, "What kind of institutional arrangement should we make for redistributing the initial endowments among ourselves?"

Shubik offers two possible institutions for determining income distribution: (1) the price system, and (2) the majority rule system.

In the case in which the majority rule system is used in choosing between two possible redistributions, or imputations, Shubik postulates that each individual votes for that imputation which gives him the higher level of utility. Now, in the context of this symmetrical model, the majority rule system is indeterminate. We can understand the indeterminacy in the context of Shubik's Figure 1, reproduced below. The point S_1 specifies a distribution (0, 0, 0) of x, y, and z to the first actor, and S_1 also specifies the utility $\phi(0, 0, 0)$ generated by this distribution. In the distribution indicated by S_1, Mr. 1 is cut out, and Mr. 2 and Mr. 3 evenly split the goods.

The set of imputations $\{S_1, S_2, S_3\}$ is a von Neuman-Morgenstein solution. Given any redistribution other than S_1, S_2, or S_3, we can find one element of $\{S_1, S_2, S_3\}$ which is preferred by a majority. For any given element in this solution set, however, there will be many possible redistributions not contained in the solution which are preferred by a majority. Because of this cycling phenomenon, there is no determinate way, for Shubik's simple model, that the majority rule system can make a final choice of redistribution.

The existence of cycling means that there is a set of points, each with equal claim for selection by the majority. But there is another set of points which are not on an equal footing with $\{S_1, S_2, S_3\}$. This other set is the set of inefficient (non-Pareto) points. Geometrically, these points form the interior of the utility possibility set in Figure 1. Each interior point W is less preferred by *all three* actors to the point on the frontier which lies on the intersection of a ray from the origin through W and the frontier.

In spite of the cycling problem and our confidence that a majority rule system has a compelling reason to avoid inefficient points, Shubik assures us (p. 179) that it is possible for "simple majority voting to determine the distribution of goods [which] may be less efficient than a price system." For this to happen, the majority rule system has to choose determinately an inefficient point.

To achieve this result, Shubik adds to his model a two-party system in which each party puts up a platform (possible imputation) and each of the three agents votes according to which imputation gives him the most utility. Each party wants only to win, and the parties are symmetrical in the sense that the value of winning to each is 1, the penalty for losing is -1, and ties are valued at 0. We have, therefore, a two-person, zero-sum game between the parties. Shubik writes down seven of the many possible alternative platforms for the parties:

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* The authors wish to express thanks to the Brookings Institution for support in the course of carrying out this research. Especial gratitude is due to Roger Noll of Brookings and Edwin Haefele of Resources for the Future for their insightful comments and criticism.

[1] Martin Shubik, "Voting, or a Price System in a Competitive Market Structure," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (March, 1970) 179–81.


φ_3
φ_1
φ_2
S_1
S_2
S_3
E
F
$(\varphi(0,0,0),\ \varphi(\frac{a}{2},\frac{a}{2},\frac{a}{2}),\ \varphi(\frac{a}{2},\frac{a}{2},\frac{a}{2}))$
$(\varphi(\frac{a}{2},\frac{a}{2},\frac{a}{2}),\ \varphi(0,0,0),\ \varphi(\frac{a}{2},\frac{a}{2},\frac{a}{2}))$
$(\varphi(\frac{a}{3},\frac{a}{3},\frac{a}{3}),\ \varphi(\frac{a}{3},\frac{a}{3},\frac{a}{3}),\ \varphi(\frac{a}{3},\frac{a}{3},\frac{a}{3}))$
$(\varphi(\frac{a}{2},\frac{a}{2},\frac{a}{2}),\ \varphi(\frac{a}{2},\frac{a}{2},\frac{a}{2}),\ \varphi(0,0,0))$

Figure 1. Shubik's utility diagram

S_1: $[(0, 0, 0), (a/2, a/2, a/2), (a/2, a/2, a/2)]$
S_2: $[(a/2, a/2, a/2), (0, 0, 0), (a/2, a/2, a/2)]$
S_3: $[(a/2, a/2, a/2), (a/2, a/2, a/2), (0, 0, 0)]$
S_4: $[(e, f, g), (g, e, f), (f, g, e)]$
S_5: $[(f, g, e), (e, f, g), (g, e, f)]$
S_6: $[(g, e, f), (f, g, e), (e, f, g)]$
S_7: $[(a/3, a/3, a/3), (a/3, a/3, a/3), (a/3, a/3, a/3)]$

with $e>f>g>0$, $f>a/3$, $e+f+g=a$.

By adding vote-maximizing parties, Shubik ingeniously transforms the early indeterminacy into something more amenable to analysis. While the outcome of the game is still uncertain, the optimal mixed strategies may be wholly determinate. And uncertainty of the outcome of this majority voting game allows the possibility that with risk aversion, *ex ante*[2] valuations of the game are inefficient distributions of utility, while each possible outcome, *ex post*, is an efficient distribution.

Before going on with the argument, however, we note Shubik's simple but fatal error: Shubik erroneously identifies the egalitarian point S_7 as the point chosen by the price system, stating that "it is easy to check that in this case [all individuals having identical utility functions] the unique price system will be (1, 1, 1) and the final imputation to each will be ($a/3$, $a/3$, $a/3$)" (p. 179). For the special case of Cobb-Douglas utility functions $\phi = x^{\alpha}y^{\beta}z^{\gamma}$, the unique price system is (α, β, γ). The imputation in this case, where

$$k = \frac{a}{\alpha + \beta + \gamma},$$

is $k(\alpha, \alpha, \alpha)$, $k(\beta, \beta, \beta)$, and $k(\gamma, \gamma, \gamma)$. Unless we have equal valuation, in which case $\alpha = \beta = \gamma$, the price system will not lead to the egalitarian point.[3] In general, without equal valuation, the corner endowments $(a, 0, 0)$, $(0, a, 0)$, and $(0, 0, a)$ will constitute differing market powers, and will not lead to the egalitarian point.

In order to account for this discrepancy, we enlarge the set of candidate redistributive institutions to include, besides (1) the price system and (2) the majority rule system, another possibility, (3) an egalitarian system in which each person receives equal amounts of x, y, and z. Having done so, we continue with Shubik's exposition.

For his seven platforms, $S_1 \cdots S_7$, Shubik produces a seven-by-seven matrix of payoffs to Party 1.

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[2] The actors can evaluate potential distributions of wealth either before or after the actual distributions occur. We call prior evaluation *ex ante* and later evaluation *ex post*. The difference between *ex ante* and *ex post* evaluations is due to elimination of uncertainty.

[3] The egalitarian point is the Nash equilibrium in the Cobb-Douglas case.

Figure 2. Shubik's payoff matrix

		Party 2						
		S_1	S_2	S_3	S_4	S_5	S_6	S_7
Party 1	S_1	0	0	0	−1	−1	1	1
	S_2	0	0	0	−1	1	−1	1
	S_3	0	0	0	1	−1	−1	1
	S_4	1	1	−1	0	1	−1	1
	S_5	1	−1	1	−1	0	1	1
	S_6	−1	1	1	1	−1	0	1
	S_7	−1	−1	−1	−1	−1	−1	0

This payoff matrix does not follow from the assumptions of the model. The Cobb-Douglas utility function, this time with equal valuation, again is a counterexample. In this case, when $\alpha=\beta=\gamma$, voters are indifferent between S_4 and S_5, S_4 and S_6, and S_5 and S_6.[4]

But there is a set of strategies S_4', S_5', S_6', which if substituted for Shubik's S_4, S_5, S_6 will produce the same payoff submatrix for those three alternatives:

$$S_4'\colon\ [(f, f, f),\ (g, g, g),\ (e, e, e)]$$

$$S_5'\colon\ [(g, g, g),\ (e, e, e),\ (f, f, f)]$$

$$S_6'\colon\ [(e, e, e),\ (f, f, f),\ (g, g, g)]$$

$$\text{with } e > f > g \text{ and } f > a/3.$$

By the further assumption that $e>a/2$, Shubik's whole payoff matrix is implied by the above seven strategies.

With these replacements for S_4, S_5, S_6, and with "egalitarian" substituted for "price," the remainder of Shubik's argument is apparently correct. For majority rule each party has a solution among mixed strategies. This means that rational parties will randomize over platforms. For Shubik's game, Figure 2, the solution is (0, 0, 0, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0) for each party. In the customary political terms each party moves to the center and tries to be the best of all things to all people. Therefore, the voter knows that if he votes for the majority rule institution, he is setting up this two-party system in which parties will randomize over a set of platforms and from which the individual voter can expect to receive $1/3[\phi(e, e, e)+\phi(f, f, f)+\phi(g, g, g)]$. If ϕ is concave, this imputation, for each agent, gives less utility than his egalitarian share, $\phi(a/3, a/3, a/3)$. We conclude that the egalitarian solution (not the price solution) dominates (*ex ante*) the majority voting system. It is evident that no such general relation can be established between the price system and the majority rule system. To see this, take $\alpha=0$ in our example, and it is clear that Player 1 will prefer majority rule to the market system.

Thus, Shubik is inadvertently proving something about the relation between the egalitarian system and majority rule, rather than about the relation between the price system and majority rule. Clever socialists will take heart in the above argument, for it does not lead to a constitutional preference for the price system even where "all the conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium are satisfied" (Shubik, p. 179). The basic reason the egalitarian system dominates the majority rule system is that the former avoids uncertainty, which makes the latter much less attractive. Each possible outcome of the majority rule system, S_4', S_5', or S_6', is preferred by a majority to the egalitarian solution S_7. Yet the uncertainty of which outcome will occur leads to expected values that are unanimously less preferable than the egalitarian solution.

Uncertainty plays a decisive but unsymmetric role in Shubik's model. If, however, we introduce uncertainty into the outcomes of the price and egalitarian systems, the problem remains fundamentally the same. For example, consider a village of three families. The head of each family specializes in one form of food gathering: one is a hunter, one is a fisherman, and one is a berry-picker. To simplify matters, suppose that the probabilities of the hunter's capturing an animal, the fisherman's catching a fish, and the berry-picker's locating a berrybush are all independent and equal to p. To maintain consistency with Shubik's notation, one animal equals a units of x; one fish is a units of y; and one bushful of berries is a units of z. The three families must decide before they go out to gather food how they will divide the take.

There are eight possible states of the world in this model, each corresponding to a possible combination of success and failure among the three gatherers. We consider three of the many possible institutions: egalitarianism, majority rule, and the price system. Each institution provides a different set of eight payoffs to each family depending on the state of the world which actually exists. We note the following proposition:

Proposition: The egalitarian system always Pareto-dominates the majority rule system (with Shubik parties).

Proof: Denote the states of the world:

$$A_1 = (a, a, a)$$

$$A_2 = (a, a, 0)$$

$$A_3 = (a, 0, a)$$

$$A_4 = (0, a, a)$$

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[4] For $\alpha = \beta = \gamma$, $\phi = x^{\alpha} y^{\beta} z^{\alpha} = (xyz)^{\alpha}$. Thus $(efg)^{\alpha}$, Mr. 1's utility from S_4, is the same as $(fge)^{\alpha}$, Mr. 1's utility for S_5.

$$A_5 = (a, 0, 0)$$
$$A_6 = (0, a, 0)$$
$$A_7 = (0, 0, a)$$
$$A_8 = (0, 0, 0)$$

and with the corresponding probabilities

$$b_1 = p^3, \quad b_2 = b_3 = b_4 = p^2(1 - p),$$
$$b_5 = b_6 = b_7 = p(1 - p)^2,$$
$$b_8 = (1 - p)^3.$$

For a given village family, the expected payoff under the egalitarian rule is

$$E_{\text{eg.}}(\phi) = \sum_{i=1}^{8} b_i\phi(A_i/3),$$

and under majority rule the expected payoff is

$$E_{\text{m.r.}}(\phi) = \sum b_i \frac{1}{3}\phi\left(\frac{e}{a} A_i\right) + \frac{1}{3}\phi\left(\frac{f}{a} A_i\right) + \frac{1}{3}\phi\left(\frac{g}{a} A_i\right)$$
$$\leq \sum b_i\phi\left(\frac{A_i}{3}\right), \quad \text{as } \phi \text{ is concave.}$$

Thus, introduction of uncertainty of the endowments affects both majority rule and egalitarianism in the same way, leaving the previous dominance relation unchanged.

Besides introducing uncertainty into egalitarianism, we can decrease the uncertainty of majority rule. For example, we can restrict the set of points eligible for redistribution by majority rule to those within a limited radius of the egalitarian point. As the radius of possible unequal distribution goes to zero, the restricted majority rule converges to egalitarianism. By sufficient restriction on majority rule, we can guarantee that the price system can not dominate it. We cannot guarantee dominance of restricted majority rule over the price system. If in some state of the world a person does *much better* with the price system than with the majority rule system, and if this state has a large probability, then even though in some other state(s) he does better under majority rule, he may still prefer the price system. It is evident that the decision will depend upon both the probability distribution over possible states of the world and the magnitudes of the utility differences in each state.

This note tends to confirm the view of Buchanan and Tullock[5] that a specification of a sharing rule—in our case an egalitarian rule—will generally defeat a majority rule system of income insurance in constitutional decision making. The price system holds no such unambiguous position in either Shubik's system or ours, which is similar to that of Buchanan and Tullock. Shubik has constructed a model which captures some of the elements of small hunting and gathering cultures. Those small societies do, in fact, generally prefer fixed sharing rules to majority voting or a price system for constitutional redistribution of income.

Egalitarianism does well in Shubik's model, partly because everyone has identical utility functions. Without identical utility functions it is unlikely that the egalitarian distribution will lie on the Pareto surface. To solve this problem, some hunting and gathering cultures allow trading from a fixed sharing point.

With allowance for different preferences a price system becomes more attractive as a constitutional choice. Another modification which might lead to a preference for the price system would be to include leisure as a good for each villager. Then, since under a fixed share rule like egalitarianism, the act of gathering food by a villager is a public good, villagers will tend to hunt and fish "too little" in the absence of coercive or social incentives, and the people will be hungrier than they would like.[6] One advantage of the price system is therefore the oft-remarked distributing of incentives among the food gatherers to maximize village welfare.

Shubik's model, with identical utility functions and small numbers, constitutes an unfavorable setting for majority rule. It is hard to imagine a situation with more instability for voting choice. Majority rule will be more attractive, in the constitutional sense, when people have different utility functions.

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[5] James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965).

[6] See Mancur Olson, *Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

The Structure of Policy Thinking in Adolescence: A Research Note

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The December, 1971, issue of this *Review* contained an article entitled "The Development of Policy Thinking in Adolescence,"[1] which reported findings about nine forms of policy thinking employed by a group of 37 eighth and twelfth graders as they reasoned about the problem of poverty in the United States. Figure 1, below, describes the policy thinking dimensions examined in that study, their nine variants, the operational definitions for each variant, codes, and mean scores for each grade level.

Two additional questions related to that research may be of interest to readers of the *Review*. First, how are the nine variants of policy thinking related to each other? Do they cohere into structures or is policy thinking fragmented? For example, do students who manifest sophisticated moral judgment about poverty also possess well developed imaginative capacities when dealing with poverty problems? Cognitive developmental theory, which focuses on a number of cognitive processes analogous to policy thinking, leads us to expect adolescents to display well-developed cognitive structures when they reason about political problems?[2] But do they?

Second, what personal characteristics are related to the presence or absence of structured policy thinking frameworks among these students? Is the adolescent's age a major determinant, as theories of cognitive development would predict,[3] or is his level of political interest, knowledge, and motivation more significant, as many political scientists might expect?[4] This brief research note, drawing on the data reported in the earlier article, provides information relevant to these two questions.

Table 1 reports intercorrelations among the nine variants of policy thinking for the whole sample.

Table 1 shows convincingly that most forms of policy thinking do not cluster together, at least in this small sample of adolescents. In its diffuseness, the pattern of intercorrelations resembles findings reported for political issue preferences among adult populations,[5] and in general does not accord with cognitive development theory.

Closer examination leads to a modification of this conclusion, however. First, the very strongest positive correlations involve either causal or hypothetical thought, both of which are important aspects of Piaget's definition of "formal" reasoning in adolescence.[6] Notice too

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[1] Richard M. Merelman, "The Development of Policy Thinking in Adolescence," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (December, 1971), 1033–1047.

[2] See especially Jean Piaget, *Six Psychological Studies* (New York: Vintage, 1967), 69; and Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral Development," unpublished manuscript, p. 65. Manuscript prepared for *Cognitive Development and Epistemology*, ed. T. Mischel (New York: Academic Press, forthcoming).

[3] The older the adolescent, the greater the opportunity he has had to equilibrate his diverse cognitive processes. See Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to the Study of Socialization," *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research*, ed. David Goslin, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 347–480.

[4] See, for example, Herbert McClosky, Paul J. Hoffmann, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," *American Political Science Review*, 54 (June, 1960), 406–427. See also Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality and Politics* (Chicago: Markham, 1969), p. 54.

The questions used to assess degree of politicization were:

How interested would you say you were in politics? Very interested, moderately interested, not very interested (Scoring—two points for very interested, one for moderately, zero for not very).

Have you ever done any campaigning for a political candidate? Yes (three points), No (zero points).

Are you a member of any extra-curricular activities having to do with government or current affairs? Yes (two points), No (zero points).

How often do you read about politics in the newspapers? Not very often (zero points), Moderately often (one point), Very often (two points).

How often do you watch the news on TV? Not very often (zero points), Moderately often (one point), Very often (two points).

Finally, we asked four questions in order to provide a score based on the respondent's level of knowledge about current political issues. A point was given for each correct answer.

The mean politicization score among the politicized respondents was 8.64; among the apathetic the mean score was 5.11. Equal numbers of eighth and twelfth graders fell in each of the two politicization categories.

[5] See especially Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David E. Apter (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 206–261. A contrary view is presented by Norman R. Luttbeg in "The Structure of Beliefs Among Leaders and the Public," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 32 (Fall, 1968), pp. 398–409.

[6] See especially Barbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, *The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Ado-*

Figure 1. The components of policy thinking

Dimension	Variants and Description	Measurement Techniques, Codes and Mean Scores
Moral Thought	No variants. The capacity to justify one's policy preferences by reference to universalistic norms of reciprocity or individual moral principles rather than by hedonistic calculation of external effects.	Based on responses to questions asking whether anything should be done about poverty. Responses coded from 1 to 5. Mean scores: 8th—2.50, 12th—3.63.
Cause-Effect Thinking	Causal Thinking: The capacity to produce explanatory chains for social problems.	Based on responses to questions asking about the causes of poverty. Responses coded from 1 to 4. Mean Scores: 8th—3.00, 12th—3.21.
	Effect Thinking: Social vs. Personalistic. The capacity to see general social ramifications of social problems.	Based on responses to questions asking about the effects of poverty. Responses coded from 1 to 3. Mean Scores: 8th—2.22, 12th—2.10.
	Effect Thinking: Behavioral vs. Psychological. The capacity to visualize behavioral effects of policy problems, rather than simply attitudinal effects.	Based on responses to questions asking about the effects of poverty. Responses coded from 1 to 3. Mean Scores: 8th—2.29, 12th—2.06.
Sociocentrism	Social Source Thinking. The ability to locate the source of a social problem in distinctly social institutions rather than in personal predilections or frailties.	Based on responses to question asking about whether the poor people themselves or the environment that produced them was most responsible for poverty. Responses coded from 1 to 3. Mean Scores: 8th—2.35, 12th—2.34.
	Definitional Sociocentrism. The willingness to allocate a collective entity, such as government, the right to define the extent of a social problem.	Based on responses to question asking who should have primary responsibility in deciding whether a person is poor or not. Responses coded from 1 to 3. Mean Scores: 8th—1.86, 12th—2.21.
Imaginative Thinking	Hypothetical Thought. The capacity to imagine the effects of removing a social problem. This ability involves reasoning about a contrary-to-fact situation, i.e., the world minus the problem at hand.	Based on responses to questions asking about how the United States would be different if there were no more poverty. Responses coded from 1 to 3. Mean scores: 8th—2.83, 12th—2.76.
	Role taking. The capacity to construct arguments contrary to one's own preference.	Based on responses to questions asking the respondent to imagine what someone who disagreed with him about poverty would use as an argument. Responses coded from 1 to 3. Mean scores: 8th—1.64, 12th—2.13.
	Linkage Thinking. The capacity to see the effects of a distant social problem on the circumstances of one's own life.	Based on responses to questions asking if the individual were aware of any effects that the existence of poverty has on him or his family. Responses coded from 1 to 3. Mean scores: 8th—1.64, 12th—1.89.

the close relationship between causal thinking and moral judgment, a finding that is also very much in accord with Piagetian theory.[7] It would appear, in other words, that what few strong relationships do emerge involve aspects of policy thinking specifically discussed by cognitive developmental theory, particularly causal

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lescence, trans. Anne Parsons and Stanley Milgram (New York: Basic Books, 1958).

[7] Henry W. Maier, *Three Theories of Child Development,* rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 101.

Table 1. Gamma Correlations Between Nine Forms of Policy Thought[a] (For Whole Sample)

		1. Causal	2. Effect: Social vs. Personalistic	3. Effect: Behavioral vs. Psychological	4. Moral	5. Linkage	6. Hypothetical	7. Role Taking	8. Definitional	9. Social Source
Causal Thought	1. Causal	—								
	2. Effect: Social vs. Personalistic	.064	—							
	3. Effect: Behavioral vs. Psychological	−.088	.587	—						
Moral Thought	4. Moral	.452	.241	.069	—					
Imaginative Thought	5. Linkage	−.332	.012	−.270	−.230	—				
	6. Hypothetical	.204	−.023	.253	.106	−.191	—			
	7. Role Taking	.198	−.034	.013	.135	−.145	.086	—		
Sociocentric Thought	8. Definitional	.101	.034	−.102	.042	.024	.371	−.042	—	
	9. Social Source	.135	−.027	−.192	−.057	.371	.331	.029	.059	—

[a] Tests of statistical significance are inappropriate in this context since the sample was not chosen to be representative of a larger population and is, in any case, quite small in number. These correlations, therefore, are only suggestive of probable patterns in representative populations and are certainly not to be taken as defintive.

Table 2. Gamma Correlations Between Nine Forms of Policy Thought (For 8th Graders)

		1. Causal	2. Effect: Social vs. Personalistic	3. Effect: Behavioral vs. Psychological	4. Moral	5. Linkage	6. Hypothetical	7. Role Taking	8. Definitional	9. Social Source
Causal Thought	1. Causal	—								
	2. Effect: Social vs. Personalistic	.167	—							
	3. Effect: Behavioral vs. Psychological	.188	.700	—						
Moral Thought	4. Moral	.546	.579	.529	—					
Imaginative Thought	5. Linkage	−.353	.205	.000	−.303	—				
	6. Hypothetical	.125	.388	.545	.259	.055	—			
	7. Role Taking	.217	.268	−.121	.477	−.055	.261	—		
Sociocentric Thought	8. Definitional	−.021	.216	.045	−.021	.261	−.036	−.277	—	
	9. Social Source	−.277	.167	.213	−.286	.558	.609	.316	−.214	—

Table 3. Gamma Correlations Between Nine Forms of Policy Thought (For 12th Graders)

		1. Causal	2. Effect: Social vs. Personalistic	3. Effect: Behavioral vs. Psychological	4. Moral	5. Linkage	6. Hypothetical	7. Role Taking	8. Definitional	9. Social Source
Causal Thought	1. Causal	—								
	2. Effect: Social vs. Personalistic	.042	—							
	3. Effect: Behavioral vs. Psychological	−.219	.513	—						
Moral Thought	4. Moral	.311	.108	−.125	—					
Imaginative Thought	5. Linkage	−.325	−.175	−.494	−.269	—				
	6. Hypothetical	.273	−.220	.053	.101	−.341	—			
	7. Role Taking	.176	−.297	.116	−.192	−.267	−.030	—		
Sociocentric Thought	8. Definitional	.091	−.059	−.025	−.226	−.231	.612	.143	—	
	9. Social Source	.494	−.153	−.500	.011	.163	.229	−.265	.179	—

Table 4. Gamma Correlations Between Nine Forms of Policy Thought (Among Less Politicized Students)

		1. Causal	2. Effect: Social vs. Personal-istic	3. Effect: Behavioral vs. Psycho-logical	4. Moral	5. Linkage	6. Hypo-thetical	7. Role Taking	8. Defi-nitional	9. Social Source
Causal Thought	1. Causal	—								
	2. Effect: Social vs. Personalistic	.205	—							
	3. Effect: Behavioral vs. Psychological	−.412	.618	—						
Moral Thought	4. Moral	.298	.264	−.280	—					
Imaginative Thought	5. Linkage	−.256	−.205	−.182	−.278	—				
	6. Hypothetical	−.333	−.475	−.259	−.200	.333	—			
	7. Role Taking	.118	.101	.387	−.067	−.407	−.043	—		
Sociocentric Thought	8. Definitional	−.221	−.056	−.213	.070	.310	.074	−.137	—	
	9. Social Source	.188	−.164	−.245	.067	.526	.227	−.165	−.278	—

Table 5. Gamma Correlation Between Nine Forms of Policy Thought (Among More Politicized Students)

		1. Causal	2. Effect: Social vs. Personal-istic	3. Effect: Behavioral vs. Psycho-logical	4. Moral	5. Linkage	6. Hypo-thetical	7. Role Taking	8. Defi-nitional	9. Social Source
Causal Thought	1. Causal	—								
	2. Effect: Social vs. Personalistic	−.077	—							
	3. Effect: Behavioral vs. Psychological	.182	.824	—						
Moral Thought	4. Moral	.620	.214	.351	—					
Imaginative Thought	5. Linkage	−.444	.189	−.373	−.229	—				
	6. Hypothetical	.558	.343	.474	.311	−.500	—			
	7. Role Taking	.273	−.167	−.371	.505	.133	.221	—		
Sociocentric Thought	8. Definitional	.366	.176	−.162	.089	−.196	.506	.051	—	
	9. Social Source	.095	.075	.042	−.121	.326	.438	.226	.295	—

thinking, moral judgment, hypothetical thought, definitional sociocentrism, and social source thinking.[8]

At the same time, the other four dimensions —i.e., the two forms of effect thinking, linkage thought, and role taking—do not seem to follow cognitive developmental theory at all.[9] The two aspects of effect thinking are positively related only to each other, and linkage thought is peripheral to every other form of policy thought. Moreover, the imaginative thought variants—linkage thinking, hypothetical thought, and role taking—are quite distinct from each other, as are the two forms of sociocentric thought. In short, although most of the elements of mental structure discussed by cognitive developmental theory cluster together in this sample's policy thinking, they appear to be a nondeterminative subset of the cognitive processes employed by these adolescents when they confront problems of public policy.

Tables 2-5 examine the effects of age and politicization on the structure of policy thinking. Because the sample size in each of these tables is halved, some of the correlations are undoubtedly unreliable. Yet the general pattern of the findings is revealing.

Tables 2 and 3 shows no age trend toward the development of structured policy thinking, although it is well to remember that we are treating cross-sectional, not longitudinal, data. Nonetheless, if anything, eighth graders displayed slightly more cohesive policy thinking than did twelfth graders. This conclusion is based mainly on a comparison of the causal, moral, and hypothetical variants at the two grade levels. Indeed, the only major exception to this generalization is the substantially greater correlation between social source and causal thought among twelfth graders than among eight graders. In general, however, these limited findings provide no support for a developmental interpretation of policy thought structures.

By contrast, Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate that regardless of grade level, politicized students (defined by responses to questions described in footnote 4) possess more structured approaches to policy thinking than do their apathetic fellows. A case in point is causal thought, which is far more closely linked to moral and hypothetical thought among the politicized than among the relatively apathetic. The same conclusion applies to moral thought, which is closely related to two variants of imaginative thinking—role taking and hypothetical thought—among the politicized students, but has no such correlation among the apathetic. There are twenty-one negative correlations among the apathetic students, as opposed to only fourteen among the politicized respondents. In short, policy thinking becomes more structured among the politicized students than among their more apathetic contemporaries.

Conclusion

Taken together with the findings reported in "The Development of Policy Thinking in Adolescence," these new data lead us to a paradox. As reported in the earlier article, a student's level of maturation on *individual* variants of policy thought depended more on his age than his level of politicization. As we now see, however, politicization helps produce coherent, though not necessarily mature, policy-thinking *styles*. These findings only indicate the need to investigate policy thinking further.

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[8] Sociocentrism through cooperation is discussed as an alternative to egocentrism in Jean Piaget et al., *The Moral Judgment of the Child,* trans. Marjorie Gabain (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 187.

[9] The peripheral position of role taking in our findings is quite damaging to cognitive developmental theory. Role taking has been considered by most developmental theorists to be both a primary motivator of individual growth and a central component of all cognitive structures. See especially John H. Flavell, in collaboration with Patricia T. Botkin, Charles L. Fry, Jr., John W. Wright, and Paul E. Jarvis, *The Development of Role-Taking and Communication Skills in Children* (New York: Wiley, 1968), pp. 4–5.

ASPA PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1972

Skill Revolution and Consultative Commonwealth

HEINZ EULAU

Introduction

HAROLD D. LASSWELL
Yale University

You may recall that we have a tradition of flippant anecdotage on occasions of this kind. It is not difficult to see why this happened. The President's address came late in the annual meeting and after dinner. Everybody was stuffed with food, marinated in liquid dressing, and dazed by communication overload.

Now all this is abruptly changed. Here we are in the afternoon having starved since lunch, dried out since last night, and feeling stimulated by the recollection of our dazzling rhetorical contributions to the meetings.

I shall, however, take a measure of responsibility for a brief personal allusion. Like so many people, Heinz began as a smiling infant and joy-bringer to his environment. From then on it was, in a sense, downhill. He made the environment less comfortable as he got closer and closer to politics and political science.

He passed through the labyrinth at Berkeley, served as an indentured servant of research in Washington during the war effort, and joined the staff of that organ of perpetual advice to the nation, *The New Republic*. Then came his full commitment to a career of teaching, investigation and consultation—based in Antioch College and Stanford University.

By this time the latent potentials were fully developed. His independence and creativity were apparent. And Heinz was outspoken and tenacious of opinion close to the point of provocativeness. Combined with a lucid mind and an arresting style he was the manner of man who inspires able students, colleagues, and decision makers who can stand the heat.

It is rumoured that a gifted and disciplined mind is a useful tool in the profession, and Heinz's career tends to confirm this proposition. As a gifted mind he had no trouble with a conceptual and philosophically differentiated map of the whole. What was particularly distinctive was the intellectual discipline that enabled him to suspend preferential commitments until a situation was scrutinized to see whether the preconditions were present that were appropriate for applying the preference.

It was not uncommon at the time of another Aristotelian revival in political science to recognize the relevance of observing the environment. What was impressive was that Heinz went far beyond a change in vocabulary to make the sacrifices necessary to acquire skill in the requisite procedures of data gathering and processing, and of theory building.

His strategy of investigation is in many ways a professional model worth emulating. He chose as an axial frame of reference one of the principal components of the decision-making and executing process—legislation—for which we have professional responsibility. He attacked the problems involved with "intensive" methods of inquiry. He went on to utilize "extensive" standpoints and procedures. And he kept relating the specific function to the context of interaction in the process of decision and in the social process as a whole.

We are indebted to our colleague for the distinguished investigations that have thus far appeared, and we look forward with keen anticipation and respect to those to come. I give you President Eulau.

Skill Revolution and Consultative Commonwealth*

HEINZ EULAU
Stanford University

My vision is a commonwealth in which human needs are discovered, human purposes formulated, and human problems handled by political processes better adapted to the requirements of a rapidly changing technological society[1] than are participative, representational, or bureaucratic processes alone. I am not saying that this commonwealth is one in which human needs are satisfied, human purposes achieved, and human problems solved. There is a world of difference between discovering and satisfying needs, between formulating and achieving purposes, between handling and solving problems. The vocabulary is experiential rather than existential, processual rather than programmatic.

My argument is that the "consultative commonwealth"[2] is at least one probable outcome of the relationship between the skill revolution of modern times and some of the socially problematic consequences of modern technology. The consultative commonwealth is not an inevitable outcome of contemporary trends. It is, however, a plausible construct—more optimistic than Lasswell's construct of the "garrison state,"[3] and more pessimistic than Bennis's construct of the "temporary society."[4] My task is to explore some of the logical and empirical linkages between the skill revolution, an empirical phenomenon, and the consultative commonwealth, a developmental conception of the future.[5]

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* Presidential address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 7, 1972.

[1] By "technological society" I mean a society in which not only agricultural and industrial production have been automated, computerized, and otherwise rationalized, but one in which also the provision of human services is increasingly subject to technological innovation. I prefer this expression to "postindustrial society" because the latter does not really convey a meaning of the direction of change. A technological society need not be "technocratic." The construct of "consultative commonwealth" assumes the technologization (and professionalization) of the human services but not rule by technologists. See Victor C. Ferkiss, *Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality* (New York: George Braziller, 1969), or Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era* (New York: Viking Press, 1970).

[2] "Consultative" is related to consult and consultation. These words derive from the Latin *consultare* which has at least three behavior-relevant meanings. All of these meanings define, etymologically, the consultative commonwealth. First, depending on the context in which it is used, *consultare* can be translated as consider, deliberate, cogitate, reflect, think over, advise with, take advice from, and so on. The variety of these meanings is less helpful, however, than the meanings of the more primitive Latin verb *consulere*, which directly calls attention to the reciprocal character of the consulting relationship. On the one hand, *consulere* means to ask, question, or examine; on the other hand, it means to give counsel. The reciprocity appears even more strongly in the German translation of *consulere* where it simultaneously means to ask someone (*jemanden befragen*) and to advise someone (*jemanden beraten*).

To seek, give, or take advice is hardly the only property of professional behavior. Interestingly, *consultare* refers to a second family of meanings that define the consulting relationship. In some contexts, *consultare* is used as a synonym for *curare*—to care for or worry about—and for *prospicere*—to provide for. In this usage, then, both an empathetic and a providential aspect of consultation are emphasized.

Thirdly, the related adjective *consultus*—one who is consulted—may be used as a synonym for *intellegens, peritus* or *eruditus*—intelligent, expert and learned; and the process to which *consultus* applies is supposed to be *dilegens* or *accuratus*—careful or accurate.

In combination, the different meanings and uses of *consultare* yield a comprehensive profile of the consultative relationship. The relationship is entered voluntarily for the purpose of deliberation or consideration because one party, the seeker of advice, is ignorant or in need of help, while the other party, the consultant, is a skilled or learned person who gives advice diligently and intelligently. But the consultant is not just an expert but also a compassionate person who cares for and worries about the matter brought to him for counsel, and he has the gift of accurate diagnosis and wise prognosis.

[3] See Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," in *The Analysis of Political Behavior: An Empirical Approach* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 146–57.

[4] See Warren G. Bennis and Philip E. Slater, *The Temporary Society* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969). In this utopia, problem solving by strangers with diverse professional skills is expected to occur through organic rather than mechanical means of interaction; the executive becomes a coordinator who mediates among task forces; and "people will be evaluated not according to rank but according to skill and professional training. . . . Adaptive, problem-solving temporary systems of diverse specialists, linked together by coordinating and task-evaluating executive specialists in an organic flux—this is the organization form that will gradually replace bureaucracy as we know it" (p. 74). Bennis's view of democracy, though he does not seem to know it, is anarchosyndicalist: ". . . democracy seeks no new stability, no end point; it is purposeless, save that it purports to ensure perpetual transition, constant alteration, ceaseless instability. . . . Democracy and our new professional men identify primarily with the adaptive process, not the establishment" (p. 12).

[5] For a discussion of "developmental constructs," see Heinz Eulau, "H. D. Lasswell's Developmental Analysis," in *Micro-Macro Political Analysis: Accents of Inquiry* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 105–18.

Skill Revolution

The skill revolution of the last hundred years is one of the significant factors in the development of industrial and technological society. Many occupations, and especially the oldest and still most prestigious among them—the professions of law, of the clergy, the academy, and medicine—have their roots in a distant past.[6] What is new, and what not even Emile Durkheim envisaged when he sought to explain the consequences of the division of labor for society,[7] is the incredible specialization in and proliferation of occupations that have accompanied industrial and technological developments. Harold Lasswell refers to this set of events as skill revolution and sees it as the basis for an observational standpoint in the study of politics "which cuts across the conventional categories of class and nation."[8]

The emphasis on skill is not to provide an alternative but a complementary frame of reference for the observation of social and political situations. An integrative view of society and politics cannot neglect nation and class as both significant social realities and analytic categories. But cutting across these realities and categories is skill specialization which, it is clear, does not stop at national boundaries or class barriers. It is as much a part of social change in the United States as in the Soviet Union,[9] and in the white-collar middle class as in the blue-collar working class.[10]

Skill specialization is probably the best directly available indicator of social and technological changes as behavioral dimensions. It has the virtue of empirical concreteness and relatively easy operational specification at the level of individual behavior. It therefore facilitates predictions about the future of political organization and processes in technological societies, regardless of their formal constitutional regimes.

Research on the political implications of the skill revolution has varying scholarly objectives. Lasswell was primarily interested in the rise and decline of skill elites for an explanation of the distribution of political values and the political transformation of societies.[11] Because scientific or other knowledge, higher education, and rational intelligence are important values, some analysts use similar notions to predict the emergence of societies in which owners, workers, or consumers have lost, and managers, scientists, or technologists have gained, control of the means of political power.[12] They do so by rather fanciful leaps of the imagination, not to mention neglect of intervening or contravening social processes. Changes in the composition of social and political elites will not be suspended in the future. But these changes rarely bring with them the one-tailed transformations that are so resolutely predicted.

The permeation of society's public and private spheres by the old professions and many new skill groups is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. Yet, it is premature to speak, as Frederick C. Mosher does, of "the professional state,"[13] at least in the sense that the professions will, in Daniel Bell's terms, constitute "the leadership of the new society."[14] It is a fragile presupposition that the possessors of new skills or specialized old skills will necessarily be dominant, if not exclusive, holders of political power. Tendencies contrary to the skill revolution evoked in response to social malfunctionings of technological society may attenuate or dissipate the concentration of power in the hands of those who have the new skills and specialized knowledge.

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[6] The classical work on the professions remains A. M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson, *The Professions* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1933). See also these authors' article, "Professions," in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1934), Vol. 12, pp. 476–80. For a contemporary overview, see Kenneth S. Lynn, ed., *The Professions in America* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965).

[7] Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, transl. by George Simpson (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960). First published in 1893.

[8] Harold D. Lasswell, "Skill Politics and Skill Revolution," in Lasswell, *Analysis of Political Behavior*, pp. 133–45, at 135.

[9] See Nicholas De Witt, *Education and Professional Employment in the U.S.S.R.* (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1961), pp. 207–545; George Fischer, *The Soviet System and Modern Society* (New York: Atherton Press, 1968); for long-term transformations, see some of the essays in *The Transformation of Russian Society*, ed. Cyril E. Black (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Milton C. Lodge, *Soviet Elite Attitudes Since Stalin* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1969).

[10] Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967); Richard H. Hall, *Occupations and the Social Structure* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969).

[11] See Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell, *The Comparative Study of Elites* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952).

[12] See, for instance, John Kenneth Galbraith, *The New Industrial State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967); Michael Young, *The Rise of the Meritocracy, 1870–2033* (London: Penguin Books, 1961). For an earlier example of this genre, see James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution* (New York: The John Day Company, 1941).

[13] Frederick C. Mosher, *Democracy and the Public Service* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968). This is not to say that I disagree with Mosher's appraisal that "the emergence of the professions [has] revolutionized the precepts and practices of public employment" (p. 123). By turning over the recruitment, training and accreditation of skilled employees to the professions and the universities, current practices "are challenging, modifying, or overturning the most central—and most cherished—principles associated with civil service reform . . ." (p. 124). It is unlikely, Mosher concludes, "that the trend toward professionalism in or outside government will soon be reversed or even slowed" (pp. 132–3).

[14] "The leadership of the new society will rest,"

Imaginative extrapolations of trends in the structure and distribution of skills are conducive to the creation of benevolent or malevolent utopias; but constructs of the future are useful only to the extent that they permit us to orient ourselves meaningfully and correctly in the present. Apocalyptic visions of the future have just the opposite effect. They disorient the beholder and make it impossible for him to observe and explain the world as a prelude to predicting what it is likely to be or changing it in a preferred direction. What is needed to make research on the political implications of the skill revolution significant is a construct of the future that breaks with the familiar linear extrapolations of the effect of the skill revolution on the transformation and distribution of political power. The concept of the consultative commonwealth is such an alternative construct.

Research guided by the construct of the consultative commonwealth does not focus simply on the appearance of new elites whose influence is grounded in the possession of socially, economically, or politically useful skills and esoteric knowledge. Rather, it concentrates on the attitudes, orientations and, especially, modes of conduct in their relationships with others that skill specialists bring to the task of governance. If skill specialists are asked to help in the manipulation of social problems and in the delivery of human services, not their positions in the hierarchies of power but their ways of doing things deserve our close research attention. This focus does not preclude other types of investigation into the political implications of the skill revolution. However, with a few exceptions, political scientists have not been much concerned with the political behavior of individual professionals,[15] or with professional associations as what Corinne L. Gilb calls "private governments,"[16] or with professional organizations as conventional pressure groups.[17] There is, then, a gap in our knowledge of the political implications of the skill revolution at the micro level of the individual as well as at the macro level of society.

Research on the professions promises to be a fascinating entry point into some problematic aspects of social structure and social change. The demographic and biographical approaches to the study of elites have not yielded the hoped-for results in contributing to an understanding of social and political change: The demographic approach is too aggregative and conceals more than it reveals at the level of the individual;[18] the biographical approach is too molecular and reveals more than is needed at the level of society.[19] Because politics is an

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writes Daniel Bell, "not with businessmen or corporations as we know them . . . , but with the research corporations, the industrial laboratories, the experimental stations, and the universities." Daniel Bell, "Notes on the Post-Industrial Society I," *The Public Interest,* 6 (Winter, 1967), 27.

[15] Among the few exceptions are Herbert Kaufman, *The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1960); Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Heinz Eulau and John D. Sprague, *Lawyers in Politics: A Study in Professional Convergence* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs Merrill Company, 1964); Robert C. Wood, "Scientists and Politics: The Rise of an Apolitical Elite," in *Scientists and National Policy-Making,* ed. Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 41–72; Arnold A. Rogow, *The Psychiatrists* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1970); Harmon Zeigler, *The Political World of the High School Teacher* (Eugene, Oregon: Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration, 1966); Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: The Free Press, new ed., 1971); Everett C. Ladd, Jr., and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Politics of Academic Natural Scientists and Engineers." *Science,* 176 (June 9, 1972), 1091–1100.

[16] See Corinne Lathrop Gilb, *Hidden Hierarchies: The Professions and Government* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966); Martin Mayer, *The Lawyers* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968); Eliot Freidson, *Profession of Medicine* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1970).

[17] The pioneering study is Oliver Garceau, *The Political Life of the American Medical Association* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941); see also Stanley Kelley, Jr., *Professional Public Relations and Political Power* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956); Harry Eckstein, *Pressure Group Politics: The Case of the British Medical Association* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960); Joel B. Grossman, *Lawyers and Judges: The ABA and the Politics of Judicial Selection* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

[18] See Donald R. Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1954). See also Dwaine Marvick, ed., *Political Decision-Makers: Recruitment and Performance* (New York: The Free Press, 1961); Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969).

[19] For an appraisal, see Lewis J. Edinger, "Political Science and Political Biography: Reflections on the Study of Leadership," *Journal of Politics,* Vol. 26 (May and August, 1964), pp. 423–39, 648–76. For a recent reassertion, see Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality*

emergent coefficient of the skill revolution, the professions are important topics of investigation.[20] For specializing professions are critical interstitial structures between the individual person and society.

If the emphasis is on those occupations conventionally called professions, it is not because there is a sharp dividing line between them and other vocations, or because the professions may in fact occupy positions of power and prestige in social and political systems.[21] It is because the consultative processes stemming from professionalization in the wake of the skill revolution and the modes of conduct normally associated with professionalism have crystalized more fully in the professions and paraprofessions.[22] The strenuous efforts made by many occupations to achieve professional status, whatever such status may mean to them, are further indications of the political implications of the continuing revolution in skills for the governance and servicing of modern societies.[23]

Future-in-Coming: Emergencies

The consultative commonwealth is only a tentative construct, but among alternative models of the shape of political things to come it is more persuasive than most others. It is more persuasive because its emergence can be observed at the micro level of individual professional behavior. This is not to accept the convenient and comfortable assumption that present trends or countertrends will continue indefinitely into the future. Far from it. The weakness of futuristic extrapolation of trends is its neglect of the puzzling problem of how past, present, and future are connected in human action.[24]

Scenarios of the future are never played out as expected. There are two methodological points to be made about the construct of the consultative commonwealth. First, though a construct of the future, it is tutored by theory and empirical research. Its utility is to be judged not by its predictive power, for the future is not known and can therefore not be used to test derivative hypotheses. Rather, its utility must be judged by its ability to give rise to research and thought in the present that may be relevant to the future.

Second, not only is the future unknown but the laws of social development leading to the future are unknown. Every construct of the future therefore makes assumptions about the developmental process. The developmental model underlying the construct of the consultative commonwealth assumes oscillations between the polar ends of a temporal continuum. It assumes that there is no action without reaction, no force without resistance, no unity without plurality; no identity without difference, no growth without decay. The polar principle assumes that contradictory social processes are mutually entailed through time.[25]

The skill revolution and notably its vanguards, the professions, provide a suggestive point of departure. The professional is not a man who creates knowledge but a specialist who translates knowledge into action. The man of knowledge is a "longhair," and a longhair is by definition an impractical person. The professional is not a longhair, for he applies knowledge to practical concerns.[26] Unlike the man of

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and Politics (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969).

[20] On emergence, see Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), pp. 366-80.

[21] See Albert J. Reiss, Jr., *Occupations and Social Status* (New York: The Free Press, 1961). For measurement aspects, see John P. Robinson and others, *Measures of Occupational Attitudes and Occupational Characteristics* (Ann Arbor: Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1967). For a broad overview, see Joseph Ben-David, "Professions in the Class System of Present-Day Societies: A Trend Report and Bibliography," *Current Sociology*, 12 (1963–4), 247–330.

[22] Amitai Etzioni, ed., *The Semi-Professions and Their Organization: Teachers, Nurses, Social Workers* (New York: The Free Press, 1969).

[23] See William Mitchell, "The Ambivalent Social Status of the American Politician," *Western Political Quarterly*, 12 (September, 1959), 683–98.

[24] See, for instance, Daniel Bell, ed., *Toward the Year 2000: Work in Progress* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).

[25] The polarity principle is explicated in the writings of the philosopher Morris R. Cohen. See, for instance, *Studies in Philosophy and Science* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1949), pp. 11–13: "The principle of polarity is suggested by the phenomena of magnetism where north and south pole are always distinct, opposed, yet inseparable. We can see it in general physics where there is no action without reaction, no force or cause of change without inertia or resistance. In biology the life of every organism involves action and reaction with an environment. There is no growth without decay. . . . This suggests a supplement to the principle of causality. Not only must every natural event have a cause which determines that it should happen, but the cause must be opposed by some factor which prevents it from producing any greater effect than it actually does. . . . The principle of polarity, of necessary opposition in all determinate effects, thus becomes a heuristic principle directing our inquiry. . . . Yet the principle of polarity is not the same as that of the Hegelian dialectic. . . ."

[26] Robert Boguslaw, *The New Utopians: A Study of System Design and Social Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 43, puts is nicely: "An applied scientist is a scientist who has had his hair cut." For further aspects of the problem, see Bernard Barber and Walter Hirsch, eds., *The Sociology of Science* (New York: The Free Press, 1962), as against

knowledge, the professional "does something" that is oriented to the future in terms of goal values to be realized. The physician seeks to make the sick person healthy; the lawyer tries to recover a victimized person's rights; the professor as teacher strives to lead the student out of ignorance to understanding; the minister hopes to ease the penitent's road to salvation. This is not all that physicians, lawyers, professors or ministers do, but their main task is to use their knowledge or experience in helping people meet problems which they cannot handle themselves;[27] and they do so by forming images of a desired future for their patients, clients, students, or parishioners.

Much of what the professional does is routine. It is routine because the problem at hand has usually been encountered before, or because the solution has been codified in a work of reference. But sometimes the professional confronts a genuinely new problem for which there is no ready-made solution. He then faces a situation of uncertainty that is, in effect, an emergent future because he must "do something" about it and cannot avoid the problem or postpone action.[28] In an emergency the professional will deal with the problem as best as he can, relying on his general skill, ingenuity, and what is called "intuition"—an estimate of the future. When the professional is involved in an emergency, the future is in the making. The future is simply the present-in-transition, and the present is the future-in-coming.

At the macro level of analysis, attention turns to the professions as collectivities and how they orient themselves to action in problematic social situations.[29] There is no lack of situations in contemporary society that call for professional intervention and the application of professional skills. How the professions relate themselves to problematic social and technological situations is therefore a matter of great significance for the future.

The relationship between the behavior of the professions as prototypical carriers of the skill revolution in a rapidly changing world and a viable construct of governing processes in the future is directly pertinent to many critical social problems—for instance, the formulation of public policies concerning and the adequate provision of those human services in fields like health, education, welfare, and safety that are the domain of the highly skilled occupations. These are not the only fields in which the skill revolution has consequences for the problems of society; but the provision of professional services, from medical care to legal aid, education, welfare and protection—services on which modern society heavily depends for successful functioning—is inadequate in both distribution and quality.[30] Access to these services has come to be claimed as a common right of citizenship;[31] it is a right in conflict with differential privilege inherent in a segmented and stratified social structure. The realization of the right of access to professional services cannot be left, therefore, to the spontaneous working of the economic market.[32] Indeed, if there were no maldistribution and inadequacy in delivery, professional services in health, education, welfare, or protection would hardly be regarded as urgent matters of public concern.

The professions, paraprofessions and subprofessions are sufficiently diverse, and their circumstances sufficiently different, that it is dangerous to generalize about matters as complex and intricate as the provision of a multitude of services. This is why a developmental construct like the consultative commonwealth is useful, indeed necessary, for research. For it

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Alvin W. Gouldner and S. M. Miller, eds., *Applied Sociology: Opportunities and Problems* (New York: The Free Press, 1965).

[27] "The client," writes Everett C. Hughes, "comes to the professional because he has met a problem which he cannot himself handle," *Men and Their Work* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), p. 141.

[28] See Renee C. Fox, "Training for Uncertainty," in Mark Abrahamson, ed., *The Professional in the Organization* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1967), pp. 20–4. See also Renee C. Fox, *Experiment Perilous* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959).

[29] The best discussion of what is meant by a "problematic situation" is still John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1938).

[30] The literature on America's "unsolved problems" is legion, but few works treat the matter from the perspective of the professions. But see: Harold L. Wilensky and Charles N. Lebeaux, *Industrial Society and Social Welfare* (New York: The Free Press, 1965); Eli Ginzberg, with Miriam Ostow, *Men, Money, and Medicine* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); F. Raymond Marks, with Kirk Leswing and Barbara A. Fortinsky, *The Lawyer, The Public, and Professional Responsibility* (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1972); Rosemary Stevens, *American Medicine and the Public Interest* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); James Q. Wilson, *Varieties of Police Behavior* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); Heinz Eulau and Harold Quinley, *State Officials and Higher Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970).

[31] An early and still one of the best arguments in this regard is T. H. Marshall, "The Recent History of Professionalism in Relation to Social Structure and Social Policy," in T. H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development* (Garden City, N.Y.: Double-Day Anchor Books, 1965), pp. 159–79. The essay was first published in 1939.

[32] Market regulation of human services is proposed by Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 137–60.

should demonstrate that the problems involved in the provision of human services are not soluble simply by recourse to facile policy panaceas, faith in benign administrative palliatives, or dependence on political mobilization of inadequately served groups of clients.

This is not to say that these means are unimportant political change mechanisms or that their consequences, whichever, are unimportant. On the contrary, they are themselves issues in the relationship between skill revolution and consultative commonwealth.[33] For they are symptomatic of the strains and tensions between changing societal expectations concerning the delivery of human services, on the one hand, and difficulties facing the professionalization of these services, on the other hand.

Polarity: Professionalization and Deprofessionalization

Skill revolution is not to be equated with professionalization; it does not in itself generate either the process of professionalization or the ideology of professionalism.[34] Because the most highly developed skills are in short supply, the skill structure will remain stratified; and those most highly placed in the skill structure, the professions, will be responsible for the delivery of human services and decision making concerning these services. The shape of the skill structure, however, will not remain the same.[35] Internal differentiation among those at the top of the skill hierarchy and the addition of new skill specialists are likely to broaden the structure and to increase the pool of trained personnel available for service, potentially enabling both the public and private sectors to respond more adequately to the novel problems created by high technology—either those that are foreseeable byproducts of scientifically grounded technology or those that are the unanticipated and socially harmful consequences of technological change.[36]

Although defining "profession" is important, it may become a passion, as it understandably is for those occupations that are striving for professional status.[37] In opting for a definition, one should let the problem at hand serve as the guide. The problem in this instance is to build a construct of the future commonwealth that pays attention not only to the professionalization of social or technical services and policy making, but also to a variety of countertendencies that are indicative of deprofessionalization.

On the one hand, the increasing application of scientific knowledge, technical skill and rational intelligence will professionalize the delivery of human services and bring professionals into the policy-making process, in both the public and private sectors.[38] Moreover, if present trends continue, the provision of a great variety of services to all citizens will be high on the agenda of politics. The availability of a basic body of abstract knowledge with connected skills, and the performance of services, then, are the defining properties of what is meant by profession, and the patterns of behavior or conduct associated with these properties are the building blocks of the consultative commonwealth.[39] In this perspective, the internal transformation of the older professions and the appearance of some new professions, responding to changes in scientific or technical knowledge and the demand for new services, are significant social and political processes.

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[33] See Murray Edelman, *Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971).

[34] As Harold L. Wilensky points out, "while there may be a general tendency for occupations to seek professional status, remarkably few of the thousands of occupations in modern society attain it." See "The Professionalization of Everyone?" *American Journal of Sociology,* 70 (September, 1964); quotation is from p. 141.

[35] As William J. Goode observes, "the occupational structure of industrial society is not becoming generally more professionalized, even though a higher percentage of the labor force is in occupations that enjoy higher prestige rankings and income and that call themselves 'professions.'" See "The Theoretical Limits of Professionalization," in Etzioni, *Semi-Professions,* p. 267.

[36] There is a large literature on the consequences of technological change. Some of this literature is highly sensational; but see the Report of the Study of Critical Environmental Problems, *Man's Impact on the Global Environment* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970); William E. Ewald, Jr., ed., *Environment and Change: The Next Fifty Years* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968); Harrison Brown, *The Challenge of Man's Future* (New York: The Viking Press, 1954); William W. Brickman and Stanley Lehrer, eds., *Automation, Education, and Human Values* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1966); Albert Teich, ed., *Technology and Man's Future* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972).

[37] Howard M. Vollmer and Donald L. Mills, *Professionalization* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. viii, differentiate between professionalism and professionalization, as follows: "Professionalism as an ideology may induce members of many occupational groups to strive to become professional, but at the same time we can see that many occupational groups that express the ideology of professionalism in reality may not be very advanced in regard to professionalization. Professionalism may be a necessary constituent of professionalization, but professionalism is not a sufficient cause for the entire professionalization process."

[38] See Harold L. Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry* (New York: Basic Books, 1967); Don K. Price, *The Scientific Estate* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).

[39] Wilensky, The Professionalization of Everyone?" p. 138, comes to a similar minimal set of criteria: "(1) the job of the professional is *technical*—based

On the other hand, professional skill and expertise are being challenged in these fields by countercurrents to professional approaches released in the name of consumerism, community power, and open access for previously excluded groups, especially women and ethnic minorities.[40] First, because professionalism is a *political* ideology, it motivates not only those who use it to protect their social status and those who aspire to higher social status, but also those who see in professionalism a defense of the *status quo*.[41] And second, professionalization—the transformation of an occupation into a profession—is a *political* process because it involves, among other things, a quest for statutory legitimacy and related publicly-sanctioned privileges as well as for public acceptance. It is therefore always exposed to the vagaries of politics.

Ironically, both professionalizing and deprofessionalizing tendencies derive from two major changes in the classical relationship between professional and client. First, professionals increasingly work in and for organizations with clients who are not their employers but rather the consumers of their services. And second, professional dominance in the professional's relationship with clients is contained by the appearance of client organizations which presume to speak for individual or collective clients.

A number of derivative consequences follow: As professionals come to work in political milieux, politicization of the professional-client relationship tends to undermine professional autonomy. The challenges encountered from clientele organizations, with their own ideas about the provision of services and performance, tend to undercut professional authority. The need of professionals to protect their own interests may lead to unionization, which, in the view of some, endangers the professional norm of commitment to the public interest. The location of professionals in bureaucratic organizations with their tendency to inertia and ritualistic behavior can easily thwart experimentation, innovation, and discretion.[42] Finally, the built-in obsolescence of professional skills in a rapidly changing scientific and technological culture makes for tensions within and between the professions that weaken professional credibility and legitimacy.

At the same time, society will also be much more demanding in its expectations concerning the delivery of services. The demand for more and better services combined with tendencies toward the deprofessionalization of services, represents a paradox. Rather than improving service, deprofessionalization would have just the opposite effect. This is so because it would involve an altogether irrational reversal of normal expectations. The normal chain follows a sequence in which a client in need of help seeks out a competent specialist whose professional authority he accepts and to whom he grants decisional autonomy. Deprofessionalization reverses this chain, because its main effect is to reduce professional autonomy. But reduced autonomy weakens professional authority; weakened authority devalues professional competence; and devalued professional skill will impoverish the quality of the service that is rendered.

In the perspective of contemporary countertendencies to professionalization, then, the consultative commonwealth would seem to breed the seeds of its own destruction and negate the promises of the skill revolution. Before accepting this dismal prospect, however, some other considerations are in order. One need not be a dialectitian to recognize that deprofessionalizing tendencies in turn generate their own countervailing forces. The professions do not passively accept deprofessionalizing challenges, be they internal to a profession or external. They develop adaptive techniques and coping strategies that blunt the impact of deprofessionalization and, in fact, strengthen a profession's authority and autonomy.

The consultative commonwealth, in taking account of deprofessionalizing pressures in its consultative arrangements, also contains within itself the seeds of renewal.[43] It differs, then,

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on systematic knowledge or doctrine acquired only through long prescribed training. (2) The professional man adheres to a set of professional norms."

[40] See Frank Bowles and Frank A. DeCosta, *Between Two Worlds: A Profile of Negro Higher Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971); James L. Curtis, *Blacks, Medical Schools, and Society* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1971); Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, *Woman's Place: Options and Limits of Professional Careers* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).

[41] See Piet Thoenes, *The Elite in the Welfare State* (New York: The Free Press, 1966).

[42] For a balanced view, see Victor A. Thompson, *Bureaucracy and Innovation* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1969).

[43] For similar optimistic estimates of the future, see Amitai Etzioni, *The Active Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1968); and Warren Breed, *The Self-Guiding Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1971).

from those constructs of the future society that are based on one sided extrapolations of either tendencies alone, or countertendencies alone, in the formation and circulation of skill elites. These models are deficient in two respects. First, they fail to recognize the dynamics of the polarity principle in the development of societies, especially those in the stage of advanced technology. And second, they neglect the normative capabilities of politics. However, even if deprofessionalizing tendencies are accounted for, it is more probable than not that the future commonwealth will be highly dependent on professional services.

Because increasing demand for services will continue to exceed available supply, the power of skill specialists is always balanced by new demands coming from dissatisfied clienteles. If all of this were only a matter of supply and demand in the economic sense, political science would not have much of a contribution to make to its understanding. But the problem of professional services is not just an economic question; it is also an eminently political question, for it involves relationships of authority and autonomy between those who provide and those who demand the services.

To appreciate the political issue, I take a clue from an insightful passage by that wise student of the occupations, Everett C. Hughes. Investigation of the challenges facing the professions and of their responses, Hughes suggested, "is study of politics in the very fundamental sense of studying constitutions. For constitutions are the fundamental relations between the effective estates which make up the body politic."[44] Professionals are involved in four constitutional relationships—with clients, with organizations, with their own colleagues, and with the larger society. The structures and functions of these relationships and the norms of professional conduct in a particular relationship, for the professional and his significant others, create political issues that differ a good deal from profession to profession, from one institutional setting to another, and from one set of relationships to the next. They should therefore be expected to have different consequences as one projects the consultative commonwealth of the future.

Relationship with Clients

Of all the professional's relationships, that with clients is of fundamental constitutional importance for the evolution of social institutions and public policies. The classical relationship between professional practitioner and client is contractual and in the nature of an exchange. The client takes the initiative in seeking out the professional and, by paying a fee, employs him to perform the desired service. Professions differ in their responses to client initiatives; but, in general, the relationship is assumed to be reciprocal.

As the interaction proceeds, however, the relationship is transformed. Once having "placed himself in the hands" of the professional, the client becomes a dependent. The client is still free to reject the professional's advice and help, but he does so at his own risk and, for all practical purposes, does not do it. Client behavior is important, then, in defining the professional's role. As long as the relationship is built on trust which, in turn, derives from the client's recognition of his own ignorance and the professional's competence, the client is willing to accept the practitioner's decisions concerning his needs. In effect, then, what was initially a functional relationship is transformed into an intrinsically hierarchical relationship. This transformation is overlooked by those who take a benign view of professional expertise as purely functional and who expect the infusion of expertise into the creation and delivery of human services to have *ipso facto* salubrious consequences for society.[45]

Because the relationship between professional and client is one of authority, in a generally democratic culture it is likely to be ambivalent, if not conflictual. Although, in essence, the client surrenders himself to the professional, neither party is fully comfortable. If the resulting ambivalence or conflict remains contained and does not seriously interfere with the service, it is because there also remains, in an open market, the posibility for the client to terminate the consultation or for the professional to withdraw his service. But if the market is restricted or state-controlled, and if free choice of services is impossible, tension and even hostility will characterize the professional-client relationship. Although maldistribution or substantive inadequacy of medical, legal, welfare, or protective services is the manifest target of current discontent, some of the dissatisfaction, especially among those who depend on state-provided and state-controlled services, stems from the tension build into the authority relationship.

Ambivalence and conflict may also arise because the client's perspective of professional service and what is brought to that perspective may differ from the professional's perspective in the first place. Because of this difference, as Hughes has noted, professionals, although "convinced that they themselves are the best judges, not merely of their own competence but also of what is best for the people for whom they perform services, are required in some measure to yield judgment of what is wanted to these amateurs who receive the services."[46] Professionals are understandably reluctant to do this. If, therefore, the professional wishes to insist on the correctness of his own judgment, it is incumbent on him to mold client expectations of what constitutes proper service. More often than not, however, in order to make clients accept their authority, professionals rely for persuasion on institutional means, notably the doctrine of "free choice,"[47] rather than on professional ways.

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[44] Hughes, *Men and Their Work*, p. 85.

[45] See, for instance, Robert E. Lane, "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 31 (October, 1966), pp. 649–62.

Reliance on the authority of status exacerbates the professional-client relationship in the contemporary democratizing environment. In the classical model, the environment in which professional-client interaction was played out did not consciously enter the relationship because professional and client could be assumed to share the same environment. Professionals, of middle-class status by definition, either served those above them in the class structure or those on their own level; and if they served the lower classes, their institutional authority was not questioned. Because of social class barriers, professionals found it difficult to empathize with the lower orders of society, even if they served them occasionally in charitable ways. It was the great genius of the Roman Catholic Church that by replicating in its own hierarchy the class structure of society, and by recruiting its servants from among all social classes to serve all social classes, it did not lose contact with its lower-class clienteles, even as democratization of the hierarchy provided for mobility within the ranks of the clergy.[48] Such rootedness in the total environment was never the case with physicians, lawyers, or professors, even after the social recruitment base was widened, precisely because institutional professionalization caused these professionals to consider themselves, and to be considered, middle-class in status. Identification with the middle class alienated professionals from the lower-class environment.

As a result of the extension of professional services to the working and lower classes, professionals now encounter clients whose perspective is very different from their own. The shock of recognizing the difference in environments is more or less shared in the different professions, and it has led to the belief that in at least some cases and situations not the individual client but his entire social environment requires professional treatment. Credit for discovering the salience of the environment in professional practice must be given to social work, but the discovery has now considerable influence in law, medicine and university teaching. In the academy, retreating into the "ivory tower" is no longer an appropriate professional posture as it is recognized that an environment favorable to the pursuit of knowledge cannot be taken for granted.

The discovery of the environment and the movement toward professional intervention in the environment has created a profound crisis in the professions. If the environment must be changed before the client's problems can be treated, the role of the client in the relationship with the professional comes to be redefined. This is so because clients are themselves a part of the environment and, as a result, are seen as important components in shaping the environment. The client perspective intrudes into the professional-client relationship more than it ever has. Much of the current crisis in professional services turns on the nature of client participation in decisions concerning these services. The professional schools, sensitive to this, increasingly try to give instruction not only in subjects that relate to the environment in which the prospective professional will work, but also in subjects that provide him with skills in organization, negotiation, human relations, and so on.[49]

If the professionals fail to persuade clients of what constitutes proper service, they leave themselves open to client demands of what proper service should be. They allow themselves to be pressured into conformity with client expectations, even if it violates professional criteria of service. As Hughes noted, this is especially likely in periods of social unrest: "In time of crisis, there may arise a general demand for more complete conformity to lay modes of thought, discourse and action."[50]

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[46] Hughes, p. 54.

[47] This is reinforced by monopolistic practice, the prestige of the profession as a whole and the imputation of competence to the individual consultant. As Eliot Freidson, *Professional Dominance: The Social Structure of Medical Care* (New York: Atherton Press, 1970), pp. 120–1, points out, this doctrine is unsatisfactory because it allows the consultant "to rest on the authority of his professional status without having to try to present persuasive evidence to the client that his findings and advice are correct."

[48] See Aaron I. Able, ed., *American Catholic Thought on Social Questions* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1968).

[49] See Edgar H. Schein, *Professional Education: Some New Directions* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972).

The pressure for conformity to lay perspectives comes from people who occupy higher- or lower-status positions in society than does the professional himself. The legal profession, itself highly stratified, is especially exposed to client perspectives.[51] In the academy some professors yield to student pressures for conformity to their interpretations of what learning and knowledge are all about by lowering standards and "being with it," sometimes assuming student styles and demeanor. Deprofessionalization has become a burning issue in social work. As one critic writes,

> the new activist spirit in social work downgrades professional practice, which is ineffective in dealing with social problems. In place of professionalism the activists offer the idea that revolution will create change more rapidly than social work practice, which may be correct. But this is not what the profession prepares one to do, nor should it.[52]

Professional consultants at the highest levels of policy-making often conform to policymakers' wishes and predilections, permitting their knowledge to be used for societal objectives that from a professional perspective may be undesirable.[53]

Perhaps the problem of differing perspectives between professional and client is insoluble. If so, there will always be an element of conflict in the relationship. If the professional only relies on his authority without further efforts at persuasion, the client is in no position to evaluate the grounds of the professional's advice. Under these conditions professionals will jealously guard their monopoly on expert knowledge and status, but clients will not comply with professional advice and, in some cases, they will revolt against the prescriptions of the experts. Most recently there has been a trend toward reducing professional autonomy and enabling clients to enforce professional responsibility in the provision of services that has hitherto been the professions' own prerogative. Professionals in turn resent lay interference, especially when, as in teaching or librarianship, clients can bring pressure on policy-making elected boards. In this context, present trends toward unionization of professionals takes on an aspect that goes beyond the bread-and-butter unionism of old, for it is as much a matter of politics as of economics. If professionals feel that laymen make undue demands in areas of competence they consider their own, the collective withdrawal of services—traditionally frowned upon as "unprofessional conduct"—is a very real possibility.[54]

All of these developments could have possibly disastrous consequences for professional service. If the client cannot distinguish between the professional's authority that is based on expertise and his authority that is based on status or power, the basic trust on which the professional-client relationship is founded becomes eroded. In revolting against the professional's status and power, however, the client also revolts, if inadvertently, against professional knowledge and competence.

Relationship with Organizations

The professional increasingly encounters the client not in private but in organizational settings.[55] The original professions—clergy, law, academy and medicine—had been characterized as *freie Berufe* or "free callings." Freedom referred to independence from organizational constraints. Although clergymen and academics depended for support on church and university, the professions were assumed to be free in two senses: first, the professional's behavior was guided by norms created by himself and designed to protect him against external pressures

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[50] Hughes, p. 83.

[51] See Jerome E. Carlin, *Lawyers on Their Own* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1962); Jack Ladinsky, "Careers of Lawyers, Law Practice, and Legal Institutions," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 28 (February, 1963), pp. 47–54; Erwin O. Smigel, *The Wall Street Lawyer* (New York: The Free Press, 1964).

[52] Harry Specht, "The Deprofessionalization of Social Work," *Social Work*, 17 (March, 1972); quotation is on p. 6.

[53] Although this theme has much agitated the academic professions in recent years, it is not especially new. Alexander H. Leighton, *Human Relations in a Changing World* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1949), p. 128, reports a Washington saying that "the administrator uses social science the way a drunk uses a lamppost, for support rather than illumination." See especially Gene M. Lyons, *The Uneasy Partnership: Social Science and the Federal Government in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969).

[54] Michael H. Moskow and Kenneth McLennan, "Teacher Negotiations and School Decentralization," in *Community Control of Schools*, ed. Henry M. Levin (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1970), pp. 191–215.

[55] For a variety of perspectives, see Barney G. Glaser, ed., *Organizational Careers: A Sourcebook for Theory* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1968). See also F. William Howton, *Functionaries* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969).

—the professions enjoyed autonomy; and second, the professional worked alone with individuals by applying his best professional judgment and was unencumbered by responsibility to an employing organization—the professions had authority.

The professional's work today is likely to take place in organizational and institutional settings that restrict his freedom more than was the case before the skill revolution reached its apogee.[56] The professional in these settings is subject to two modes of authority—organizational-hierarchical authority in the hands of administrative officials, and the authority of skill and competence exercised by professional colleagues, both inside and outside the organization.[57] The two forms of authority are conflictual and make for stress and strain in professional conduct vis-à-vis administrators, colleagues, and clients.[58] As a result, "disjunctive processes" are widespread.[59] Speaking of the academy, for instance, Logan Wilson notes:

> Even though academicians are professional men and women enjoying a high degree of independence as specialists per se, they function within an institutional framework which evaluates, ranks, and rewards them in terms of their presumed value to the organization. The whole process is so complex that it is inevitably a source of misunderstanding, and the results are unavoidably a further source of real or alleged grievance to some individuals.[60]

If this is true in the highly permissive context of the university, it is surely even truer in the highly organized contexts of public or private bureaucracies.

If the professional's identification and commitment are stronger than his organizational loyalty,[61] rather than being threatened by bureaucracy, it may be professionalism that disturbs administrative ways of doing things. Hierarchical authority in administrative decision making is being undermined, Francis E. Rourke suggests, by "the growing power of skilled professions in the work of public bureaucracy. . . . Professionalism is rapidly succeeding politics as the principal source of decentralization of authority in American bureaucracy. A subordinate who is master of esoteric skills is no easier to dominate than one backed by a strongly entrenched group of political supporters."[62]

This transformation is by no means self-evident, because the problem of coordinating specialized expertise in organizations was long obscured by the ready availability of what Max Weber called "legal-rational authority" or bureaucracy.[63] The most obvious answer to the question of how best to coordinate specializations leads to the bureaucratic model that stresses rationalization, routinization, and standardization. Despite wide variations in practice, the organizational settings in which professionals work—hospitals, law firms, government bureaus, research laboratories, corporation offices, labor unions, religious organizations, universities, engineering firms, and so on—remain basically bureaucratic. What is happening, however, is an interpenetration of bureaucratization and professionalization—"the culture of bureaucracy invades the professions; the culture of professionalism invades organizations."[64]

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[56] By 1962, it was possible to speak of a "knowledge industry," so pervasive had knowledge making become in the American economy. See Fritz Machlup, *The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). Also: D. N. Chorafas, *The Knowledge Revolution: An Analysis of the International Brain Market* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968).

[57] Robert L. Peabody, *Organizational Authority* (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), pp. 1–43.

[58] See Harold L. Wilensky, *Intellectuals in Labor Unions* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956); William Kornhauser, *Scientists in Industry: Conflict and Accommodation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962); Barney G. Glaser, *Organizational Scientists: Their Professional Careers* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1964); Warren O. Hagstrom, *The Scientific Community* (New York: Basic Books, 1965); Spencer Klaw, *The New Brahmins: Scientific Life in America* (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1968); Walter Hirsch, *Scientists in American Society* (New York: Random House, 1968).

[59] The president-elect of the American Chemical Society has complained recently that the first loyalty of chemists, seventy per cent of whom are employed in industry, is to their employers. He feels that for the chemist to discharge his responsibility to society, he must have a "professional atmosphere where [he] will identify with his profession rather than his employer." *Science*, 175 (February 4, 1972); quotation is on p. 501.

[60] Logan Wilson, "Disjunctive Processes in an Academic Milieu," in *Sociological Theory, Values, and Sociocultural Change*, ed. Edward A. Tiryakian (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p. 293.

[61] See Dwaine Marvick, *Career Perspectives in a Bureaucratic Setting* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1954), chapter 4. See also Alvin W. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 2 (December, 1957) 281–306 and 2 (March, 1958), 444–80.

[62] Francis E. Rourke, *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1969), p. 105. Because he sees professionalism in government as a political force, yet insists that "the importance of preserving the independence and integrity of certain kinds of expertise in government is thus very great," Rourke concludes that "the need for professional autonomy begins to assert itself in all phases of bureaucratic policy-making" (p. 110). Rourke concedes that professionals are no more immune from political pressure than other public officials and suggests that public policy making in bureaucratic settings "becomes in effect a mixed system of politics and professionalism" (p. 111).

[63] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 329–41.

In the broadest historical perspective, skill revolution, professionalization, and bureaucracy are symptoms of the same secular trend in Western society which Talcott Parsons describes as making for rationality, impersonality, functional specificity, and universalism.[65]

If bureaucratic means of coordination had not been as well developed as they were when the skill revolution reached the professions, consultative modes of coordination as immanent properties of professionality might have emerged sooner than they did. However, bureaucratization and professionalization are possibly isomorphic in structure and characterized by convergent tendencies with respect to authority—"professional authority is more similar to bureaucratic authority than is generally recognized. . . ."[66] While it is difficult empirically to disentangle the two phenomena because of their interdetermination,[67] the isomorphism between bureaucratic and professional authority, if true, casts doubt on some romantic notions that organization theorists have about the superiority of functional over hierarchical forms of coordination. If only professional or functional criteria were dominant in organization, bureaucratic pathologies like arbitrariness, unimaginativeness, authoritarianism, rigidity, and so forth, would miraculously yield to creativity, flexibility, involvement, and so on.[68] That the professions themselves may be tainted by bureaucratic tendencies is, therefore, a sobering thought.

In addition, the organizational context of professional practice is a source of deprofessionalizing tendencies that are as yet little understood. Deprofessionalization, in this connection, means loss of professional identity. There are two contradictory possibilities. On the one hand, loss of professional identity may be due to initial overidentification with and subsequent overreaction against the organization. This makes it difficult to separate out the alleged evils of bureaucracy from the alleged evils of professionalism. Attacks within the professions on "professionalism" which is sometimes seen, probably rightly, as a conservative force, are easily misplaced. At least it is not at all clear whether they are directed at the bureaucratic or at the professional component of the organization that is seen as requiring change if policy formulation and human services are to be improved.

Deprofessionalization in this sense has become a very real issue, though it varies a good deal from profession to profession, depending to a large degree on a profession's involvement in public policy as a condition for the realization of its professional goals. For instance, a profession like social work, which is directly affected by public policy, has a strong stake in welfare policies and public financial support. Attacks on professionalism have become an almost endemic feature of discourse in social work. In teaching at the primary and secondary levels, the long quest for professional status seems to have abated in recent years as teachers turn to unionization rather than professionalization as a means to improve their working conditions, raise their social status, and influence public policy.[69] By contrast, however, technical professionals are reported to evince "a complete lack of consensus on what needs to be done," with unionizers in one camp and "professional purists" in the other.[70]

On the other hand, loss of professional identity may be due to an inability to discover a specific client in organizational settings. A person's sense of identity is in no small part determined for him by the significant others with whom he interacts. Loss of professional identity is inevitable if the professional cannot identify the clients whom he is supposed to serve.

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[64] Wilensky, "Professionalization," p. 150. T. H. Marshall, *Class Citizenship*, p. 171, articulated the same idea as early as 1939 when he wrote that in modern democratic societies "State and professions are being assimilated to one another. This is not happening through the absorption of the professions by the State, but by both of them moving from opposite directions to meet in a middle position."

[65] Talcott Parsons, "The Professions and Social Structure," in *Essays in Sociological Theory* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 34–49.

[66] Freidson, *Professional Dominance*, p. 211. This is Freidson's central argument in analyzing professional dominance and the ordering of the health services; see especially pp. 127–64.

[67] There may be more than meets the eye in all this, for it has also been suggested that professional authority, in addition to being based on knowledge and competence, "does rest to some extent on tradition," and "to some degree the professional's authority *is* charismatic. . . ." See Nina Toren, "Semi-Professionalism and Social Work: A Theoretical Perspective," in *The Semi-Professions and Their Organization*, ed. Etzioni, p. 152.

[68] See, for instance, Peter Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959); Victor Thompson, *Modern Organization* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961).

[69] See Harmon Zeigler, *The Political Life of American Teachers* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967); Joseph W. Gambino, "Faculty Unionism: From Theory to Practice," *Industrial Relations*, 11 (February, 1972), pp. 1–17.

[70] Deborah Shapley, "Unionization: Scientists, Engineers Mull over One Alternative," *Science*, 176 (May 12, 1972), 618–21, at 618.

In the classical model of the profession, the professional was expected to serve a particular client, usually in a face-to-face encounter, and by serving the client to serve, in a vague way, society. As long as client interests and societal interests could be assumed to be the same, there seemed to be no problem. Again, this consonance varied from profession to profession. Physicians, for instance, had little trouble in this respect, at least until recently. Health was a value on which a social consensus existed, and in treating his patient, the physician was serving society. Today the conflict over abortion and the disagreement about the artificial prolongation of life have created considerable affective dissonance about the value of life. Similarly, while justice is presumably the consensual aim of the legal profession, it has long been recognized that what may be good for the lawyer's client may not advance the best interests of society.

The complexity of modern social and technological problems defies the simplicity of the traditional model. "Client uncertainty" is so pervasive that it not only makes for deprofessionalization but prevents some aspiring occupations from becoming professionalized. Who, for instance, is the client of the corporate manager who so desperately seeks professional status? Is it the employing corporation, the stockholders, the consumers, or society at large?[71] University professors are highly sensitive to client uncertainty. Who are their clients? The students whom they teach, the colleagues who benefit from their research, the governing board who pays their salaries, the publishers for whom they write texts, the government agency or business with whom they consult, or society at large? Client uncertainty obscures what providing a service means, and it suggests the great potential for conflict in the provision of services.

In some circumstances, the professional serving various clients is under enormous pressure to help some but not other clients. University professors have been subjected to much pressure, if not force, to refuse service to some clients whose policies or goals other clients disapprove.[72] This type of pressure for *selective* service undermines professional autonomy, and without autonomy—the right to decide whom to serve—the very concept of profession is meaningless.

Relationship with Colleagues

The professional's best defense against client uncertainty caused by organizational complexity is his identification with colleagues. Strong collegial ties are an important requisite of professional autonomy. Yet the professional's relationship with colleagues is by no means always simple. It is *relatively* simple if two professional colleagues enter a reciprocally advantageous consultative relationship, for it is mutually deferential and consensual in the sense that both partners share a common perspective. As a result, control problems like those arising in the professional-client relationship because of the confusion between the authority of expertise and the authority of status do not occur. The ideally limiting case seems to be the kind of relationship that exists when one scientist consults another. Indeed, Hughes and Parsons suggest that there is a basic structural difference between science and profession which makes for differing authority relationships between scientific colleagues, on the one hand, and professional colleagues, on the other.[73] It seems preferable to make this role differentiation less sharp. The university-based scholar in his role as teacher stands in a professional relationship to his colleagues because they share a student clientele; the practicing attorney sometimes stands in a scholarly relationship to his colleagues at the bar or on the bench.

Nevertheless, as an analytic distinction the differentiation between the scholar-scientist and the professional with clients is suggestive; it calls attention to different control mechanisms and consultative relationships. Scientists control each other directly and publicly. They do so by frank and open reporting of the assumptions that go into the gathering of evidence, of the methods used in analyzing the evidence, and of the evidence itself.[74] Scientific associations are primarily learned societies whose principal goals are to publish journals and hold meetings in order to facilitate scientific communication and exchange.[75] Although there are standards as to what is good or bad scientific work, there is no such thing as a code of ethics for scientists in their role as scientists. Of course, when scientists become policy advisers or perform services for public or private organizations, they take on the professional role and come to be concerned about "proper professional conduct."

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[71] See David W. Ewing, *The Managerial Mind* (New York: The Free Press, 1964); William H. Whyte, Jr., *The Organization Man* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956); Roy Lewis and Rosemary Stewart, *The Managers: A New Examination of the English, German and American Executive* (New York: Mentor Books, 1961).

[72] See Sanford H. Kadish, "The Theory of the Profession and its Predicament," *AAUP Bulletin*, 58 (June, 1972), 120–5; Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Politics of Academia," in *Perspectives on Campus Tensions*, ed. David C. Nichols (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1970), pp. 85–118.

[73] Everett C. Hughes, "Psychology: Science and/or Profession," *The American Psychologist*, 7 (August, 1952), 441–3; Talcott Parsons, "Some Problems Confronting Sociology as a Profession," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (August, 1959), 547–559.

[74] Eliot Freidson, "The Impurity of Professional

In contrast to pure scientific knowledge, much professional knowledge is a kind of tacit know-how that cannot be readily communicated and evaluated and that may even be secret or confidential.[76] Only extraordinary cases of abuse in professional behavior generally come within the purview of collegial control. Because direct control as in relationships among scientists is not available, the professions seek to maintain professional standards through their organizations, codes of ethics, and government-sanctioned licensing. Yet the professional control mechanisms are weak. Although holding a professional license implies professional authenticity, codes of ethics are poorly enforced,[77] and membership in professional associations, being voluntary, is far from universal.[78]

A profession as a whole, then, is by no means a community of like-minded equals or an *imperium in imperio* as is sometimes claimed. It is a complex aggregate of skill specialists working in a great variety of settings and differentiated not only in function but also in esteem, status, authority and influence.[79] Specialization and subspecialization in the wake of the skill revolution accentuate these tendencies.

Stratification within and between the professions, as in all status systems, restricts vertical communication. As a result, although interprofessional collaboration may be needed—as in the modern hospital where physicians depend on nurses, technicians, pharmacists and other specialists—professionals of higher status may not get the cooperation they need from lower-status professionals.[80] Stratification reduces society's potential for consultation even if there is growing professionalization of human services.

Whether efforts to democratize the professions will improve the delivery of services is an open question. It is probably true, as Cynthia F. Epstein observes in discussing the entry of women into the professions, that

> many of today's gifted young professionals are no longer eager to enter the traditional inner corps of the professions. . . . This seems to be particularly so in law and medicine, where there are signs of a breakdown in the collegial structure and an increasing challenge to the traditional insistence on recruits of particular types.[81]

But this may actually reinforce already existing oligarchical tendencies in the professions. If the professional associations are to be the guardians of professional standards and interests, those best qualified in terms of professional rather than extraneous criteria will continue to emerge as professional leaders. This

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Authority," in *Institutions and the Person,* ed. Howard S. Becker et al. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1968), p. 26, points out that if this is so, it suggests an "unemphasized point, namely, that the type of influence or authority exerted by the professional on his clients must be quite different from that exerted by the scientist on his colleagues—that professional and scientific 'authority' are different even though profession and science are both characterized by special technical competence."

[75] Of course, professional associations like the American Bar Association or the American Medical Association are also devoted to the promotion of knowledge by way of learned meetings and journals. In turn, purely scientific societies share some of the characteristics of the professional associations. This is precisely the reason why the distinction between science and profession is at best of limited analytic value.

[76] Wilensky, "Professionalization," p. 149, also remarks that "the tacit component of their knowledge base is a seldom-recognized cause of the tenacious conservatism of the established professions."

[77] Jerome E. Carlin, *Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1966), p. 170, estimates that "only about 2 per cent of the lawyers who violate generally accepted ethical norms are processed, and fewer than 0.2 per cent are officially sanctioned." If lawyers are so reluctant to enforce their ethics, other professions are likely to be even more lax.

[78] See Gilb, *Hidden Hierarchies,* pp. 117–28. Gilb reports that in 1960 less than half of attorneys belonged to the American Bar Association, and only 42 per cent of the teachers to the National Education Association. Only 45 per cent of America's 344,823 doctors were reported to be dues-paying members of the American Medical Association in June, 1972, in *San Francisco Chronicle* (June 17, 1972), p. 5.

[79] Wilbert E. Moore, "But Some are More Equal than Others," *American Sociological Review,* 28 (February, 1963), 13–18.

[80] See William A. Glaser, *Social Settings and Medical Organization: A Cross-National Study of the Hospital* (New York: Atherton Press, 1970); Eliot Freidson, ed., *The Hospital in Modern Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1963); Charles Perrow, "Hospitals: Technology, Structure, and Goals," in James G. March, ed., *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965), 910–71.

[81] Cynthia F. Epstein, "Encountering the Male Establishment: Sex-Status Limits on Women's Careers in the Professions," *American Journal of Sociology,* 75 (May, 1970), 968–82, at 981.

will mean, as Roberto Michels would predict, that associational oligarchs will continue to rule, though their ideological blinders may be different from those worn by their predecessors. If the leadership of the professions is to constitute an influential elite of merit, however, it will emerge not from the application of plebiscitary techniques to professional control but from consultative understandings and arrangements. As Wilbert E. Moore has put it well, "the criteria in organizational advancement tend to be mixed, and, as in all representational systems, the very attributes that distinguish a man from his colleagues may set him apart from their interests, rather than representing them with exceptional skill."[82]

Relationship with Society

Society's dependence on specialized and skilled professional services is balanced, in a constitutional sense, by the professions' dependence on society for accreditation. Accreditation, a profession's success in having "license" to perform its services, is contingent on society's satisfaction with professional performance. Involved is not just the legal permission to practice a trade, with its complementary prohibition to others who do not have the requisite skills; also involved is the profession's legitimacy to carry out a "mandate" for society. This means that only the profession, and no one else, can collectively presume "to tell society what is good and right for the individual and for society at large in some aspect of life."[83]

The relationship between profession and society is in a deepening crisis. At issue is the profession's authority within its area of competence. Authority is a precondition for the exercise of the profession's mandate to determine what is in the best interests of society as a kind of collective client. At issue also is the profession's autonomy from societal constraints which, in this connection, means that professional performance can only be judged by the profession itself, for only the profession is qualified to do so.[84] Professional authority and autonomy are threatened by a number of developments over which a profession has little control. One development, it was noted, is the organizational context in which professionals work, and in which the profession's functional and the organization's hierarchical authority come into conflict. Another development is a generally more competitive environment. An old profession may encounter competition from new professions or semi-professions whose work is adjacent or overlapping. In the case of the legal profession, for instance, "tax accountants, trust officers in banks, insurance adjusters, marital counselors, labor arbitrators, and a host of others are engaged in matters that are in part legal."[85] What is challenged is the profession's claim to exclusive mastery of a body of unique knowledge and related skills.

Finally, professional services come to be seen not as purchasable private goods but as public goods with accessibility to all as a matter of right. Clients have come to the realization that professionals not only do things *for* them but also *to* them.[86] This varies of course considerably from client to client. While the big Wall Street law firm can do little to its corporate client but give it bad advice, the social welfare worker has almost absolute control over the poor welfare mother on relief.[87] While the corporation has effective sanctions over the law firm, the solitary welfare recipient has practically none. Like corporate clients, organizations of individual clients (e.g., welfare rights organizations) have come to demand a voice in the professional decisions affecting them.

This demand jeopardizes one of the professions' most cherished prerogatives—the authority to determine client needs. To protect this prerogative, the professions have always sought to justify themselves in terms of the mandate given them by society. Indeed, the mandate of service in the public interest more than authoritative expertise has been the justification for insisting on autonomy. Yet a profession's mandate is always probationary, in very much the same sense in which an elected representative's term of office is probationary.

A profession's persistence as a "community within a community" is contingent, as any mandate is contingent, on continued ability to satisfy the public trust placed in it as the custodian of esoteric competences.[88] At least until recently, the professions were given this public trust. The legal profession was expected to be directly concerned with the administration of justice and relevant legislation; and the medical profession was expected to concern itself with the organization, distribution and remuneration of medical services.

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[82] Wilbert E. Moore, *The Professions: Roles and Rules* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), p. 167.

[83] Hughes, "License and Mandate," p. 79.

[84] Goode, "Theoretical Limits," in Etzioni, ed., p. 291.

[85] Moore, p. 112.

[86] Hughes, "License and Mandate," pp. 69–70.

[87] For some of the problems involved, see Michael Lipsky, "Toward a Theory of Street-Level Bureaucracy," in Michael W. Kirst, *State, School, and Politics* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1972), pp. 205–12.

[88] William J. Goode, "Community within Community: The Professions," *American Sociological Review*, 22 (April, 1967), 194–200.

Their public roles expose the professions to public criticism, and their public mandate has come to be questioned. The professions are accused of not meeeting societal expectations of proper policy or service, and their role as agents of the public interest in particular areas of policy or service is being attacked on the ground that they have been more self-serving than other-serving.[89] This criticism, Parsons suggests, tends to confuse private motivation with the institutional setting that differentiates professionals from those who, like businessmen, pursue private gain.[90] But the professions organize themselves as interest-group associations in the same way as do labor unions or business organizations. And although one should not confuse a profession as such with its associational instruments, the professions have been no less "selfish," whatever this means, than other interest groups.[91] Public sensitivity to the professions' political involvement in favor of their own rather than public interests is widespread.

That they are in trouble as trustees of the public interest has not gone unnoticed in the professions themselves. How to respond to societal distrust of their integrity proves to be perplexing. Investigations conducted at Stanford over the last few years concerning the political behavior and attitudes of professionals in particular institutional settings or with respect to particular public issues, indicate much political ambivalence within the professions themselves.[92] In the ministry a "new breed" of activist clergymen feel that the churches should give forceful leadership on public issues.[93] City planners have come to realize that they "must be able to persuade, bargain and compromise, lest decision-makers listen to those who are better able to persuade, bargain and compromise."[94] Law students evidently continue to prefer careers in the private sector to careers in the public sector, but extracurricular experience may be an increasingly important factor in determining their choice.[95] Countergroups in law and medicine organize law communes and people's clinics that challenge the traditional priorities of these professions.[96] Policy-oriented scientists "go public" and expand the scope of conflict over issues of public policy.[97] Journalists seem to be quite sensitive to the problem of how their reporting the news affects the success or failure of protest groups in different fields of welfare.[98] Black professionals are concerned about the effect of their work environment, whether predominantly black or white, on their leadership potential in home communities.[99] All of these studies reveal tensions that arise out of the relationship between the professions' presumed obligations to the public interest, their investment with a public trust, and the increasing criticism of their work both inside and outside the professions.

The Stanford studies show that ritualistic invocation of the professions' mandate to serve the public interest is not sufficient to help them out of their quandary. For it is the definition of the public interest that *is* the quandary. The problem of definition is of course not unique to the professions.[100] In the absence of an accepted formal definition, contextual treatment seems most appropriate.

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[89] Marshall, *Class, Citizenship*, p. 165, has argued that the professions "have not always struck a true balance between loyalty to the client and loyalty to the community, and they have sometimes treated loyalty to the profession as an end rather than as a means to the fulfillment of other loyalties. They are often accused of neglecting the public welfare."

[90] Parsons, "The Professions," p. 36: "Perhaps even it is not mainly a difference of typical motives at all, but one of the different situations in which much the same commonly human motives operate. Perhaps the acquisitiveness of modern business is institutional rather than motivational."

[91] Gilb, *Hidden Hierarchies*, David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, second ed., 1971), pp. 93–8, 168–9, 249–50, 452–3.

[92] These investigations were made possible in part by a training grant from the National Institute of Mental Health, in part by support for dissertation research from the National Science Foundation, and in part by fellowship support from the Social Science Research Council, the Danforth Foundation, and the Mabelle McLeod Lewis Research Fund.

[93] Harold E. Quinley, *The Prophetic Clergy: Social Activism among Protestant Ministers* (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming).

[94] J. Vincent Buck, *City Planners: The Dilemma of Professionals in a Political Milieu* (unpubl. Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1972).

[95] Philip R. Lochner, Jr., *Learning to be a Lawyer: Homogenization and Differentiation into Public and Private Sector Professional Roles* (unpubl. Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1971).

[96] Ruth Ann Becker, *Potential Groups: An Exploration of the Conditions and Processes of Group Formation among Doctors and Lawyers* (Ph.D. dissertation in process, Stanford University).

[97] Robert O'Connor, *Scientists in Politics: A Study in Political Participation* (Ph.D. dissertation in process, Stanford University).

[98] Edie Goldenberg, *Politics and the Press: A Study of the Access of Welfare Groups to the Boston Metropolitan Press* (Ph.D. dissertation in process, Stanford University).

[99] Ellen B. Levine, *Role Conflicts among Black Businessmen* (Ph.D. dissertation in process, Stanford University).

[100] See Glendon Schubert, *The Public Interest* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), p. 11: "Most of the literature characteristically tends either to define the public

The context in which most professionals worked was long pervaded, and to a large extent still is pervaded, by the ethos of social and economic individualism. This ethos set limits to the services which professionals sought to render and were expected to render. In effect, service in the public interest was defined in terms of those who could afford professional services. This meant that the professions largely served the interests of the affluent society rather than the interests of what Michael Harrington has called "the other America."[101] The professions were satisfied that they were serving the public interest if their services met "effective demand," that is, the demand of those who could purchase their services.

The definition of professional service in the public interest is changing, from an essentially economic to a social-moral content. The new definition refers to "unmet needs" rather than to effective demand. It is an open question whether the new definition will help the professions overcome the crisis in their relationship with society. On the one hand, if the professions succeed, by their own practices and the policies they are able to influence, in broadening the range and improving the quality of the services they provide for society, their claim to autonomy is strengthened rather than weakened. This is perhaps something that the American Bar Association and the American Medical Association have yet to learn.

On the other hand, the notion of unmet needs is sufficiently ambiguous to create new troubles. The substitution of unmet needs for effective demand gives the impression that one is somehow dealing with a self-evident, readily usable standard for judging professional performance. In fact, just the opposite is the case. Effective demand is an economic market phenomenon that, within its defined parameters, can be measured; unmet need is a moral criterion that is by no means easy to operationalize. In general, unmet needs become visible only when those whose needs are not met rise to the occasion, as happened in the 'sixties. Insofar, however, as the professions accept unmet needs as a criterion by which to judge the adequacy of human services, they also seem to admit that clients have a right to participate in the making of policies that had previously been their own professional mandate.[102]

Protest and Response

In fact, what clients articulate are not unmet needs but unmet wants. Client participation in decisions appropriately within the province of the professions violates the constitutional basis of the professional-client relationship. This basis cannot be democratic if professional service is to have any meaning. As T. H. Marshall has pointed out, "authority passes to the professional, who must give [the client] what he needs, rather than what he wants. The client, unlike the customer, is not always right."[103] If the protest movement of recent years is not to be a mere "revolution for the hell of it," its influence on the delivery of human services depends, as Michael Lipsky has persuasively shown, on increasing the bargaining ability of powerless groups in the arena of politics by building viable organizations and harnessing stable political resources. Protest as such is symptomatic of unmet needs, but it can only articulate demands.[104] It therefore does not absolve the professions from their responsibility to determine needs. Whatever other functions are served by protest, demands for community control and client participation in *professional* decision making are probably more a distraction than a remedy.[105] Community power as a panacea for solving the problems of professional service is at best ironic, for local sovereignty—whether in the name of the feudal prince or the common people—has always been a shibboleth of conservatism and reaction. As Wilbert Moore remarks, "decentralization does not end oligarchy; it only dissipates and therefore in a sense extends it."[106]

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interest as a universal, in terms so broad that it encompasses almost any type of specific decision, or else to particularize the concept, by identifying it with the most specific and discrete of policy norms and actions, to the extent that it has no general significance."

[101] Michael Harrington, *The Other America* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962).

[102] See Herbert Kaufman, "Administrative Decentralization and Political Power," *Public Administration Review*, 29 (January-February, 1969), 3–14.

[103] Marshall, *Class, Citizenship*, p. 164.

[104] See Michael Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (December, 1968), 1144–58; James Q. Wilson, "The Strategy of Protest: Problems of Negro Civic Action," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 3 (September, 1961), 291–303.

[105] See Bertram M. Beck, "Community Control: A Distraction, Not an Answer," *Social Work*, 14 (October, 1969), 14–20. For an opposite point of view, see Marilyn Gittell, "Professionalism and Public Participation in Educational Policy Making: New York City, A Case Study," *Public Administration Review*, 27 (September, 1967), 237–51. See also Henry M. Levin, ed., *Community Control of Schools* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1970).

[106] Moore, p. 169. See Theodore J. Lowi, *The Politics of Disorder* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 80: "Decentralization through delegation of power

In the perspective of professionalism, the protest movement attacks something endemic in professional service. Hughes has pointed out that "in many occupations, the workers or practitioners (to use both a lower and a higher status term) deal routinely with what are emergencies to the people who receive their services."[107] If this is true of normal situations, it is even truer when service must be rendered to mass publics under bureaucratic conditions in times of crisis. The client's feeling of being neglected is not something easily dealt with. Although consultative forms of interaction between spokesmen for professional services and organized clienteles may be conducive to mutual understanding of this dilemma, it would be utopian under modern organizational conditions to expect an easy solution of the routine-versus-emergency problem.

Very much the same can be said of another problem to which Hughes has called attention—the problem of mistakes and failure. Sensitivity to the possibility of mistakes and failure is common to both the social worker in a local welfare agency and the economist on the President's Council of Economic Advisers. Mistakes harm both the professional and his client; the absence of clearcut criteria of success or failure makes the problem all the more perplexing. Clients tend to confuse the successful conclusion of the service with good professional work. For this reason professionals insist on peer judgment of their performance. The medical quack, the shyster lawyer, and the grandstanding professor will please their customers but not their colleagues. To protect themselves against mistakes, the professions place great emphasis on routine, ritual, etiquette, and approved ways of doing things. Referral to and consultation among colleagues serve the same function of minimizing risk. In this connection, the division of labor is not just technical but also psychological.

The volatility and sometimes violence of what has been called "the revolt of the client" are for some professionals traumatic experiences. Their consequences are difficult to foresee because it is impossible to separate out long-term secular changes in the professions from changes in response to immediate social pressures. For a time it appeared that the protest movement, as two sociologists concluded in 1969, "attacks the basic legitimacy of the occupational and institutional claims to power of the professional," on a number of grounds: "1) the expertise of the practitioners is inadequate, 2) their claims to altruism are unfounded, 3) the organizational delivery system supporting their authority is defective and insufficient, and 4) this system is too efficient and, exceeds the appropriate bounds of its power."[108] Although this funeral oration was probably premature, the paradox of the last two points calls attention to at least one important problematic aspect of the skill revolution's impact on the provision of professional services in modern technological society.

Self-criticism within the professions has long been directed toward the growing fragmentation of services due to specialization and subspecialization.[109] The fragmentation of service is seen as a source of client discontent because it seems to depersonalize and standardize the professional-client relationship, making the client feel that he is merely an assembly of parts rather than a whole person with interrelated problems requiring an integrative solution. At least some professionals have therefore called for holistic treatment of the client that would restore his dignity as a whole person.[110]

Precisely the opposite argument has also been made. The protest movement is seen as opposed to restoring the client as a whole person through institutional co-ordinating mechanisms. "The client seems to be rejecting what he considers institutionalized meddling under the cover of professional concern," write Haug and Sussman; and they continue:

> Outreach programs from the client perspective have become out-grab. Students want to organize their own courses and call in the professional as a consultant. The "whole man" approach in medicine infringes on areas of social relations where clients consider themselves competent; patients want to turn to the doctor when in trouble, but not be

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merely meant conversion from government control to a far more irresponsible, enigmatic, unpredictable group control."

[107] Hughes, "License and Mandate," p. 54. As Hughes continues, the professional's "very competence comes from having dealt with a thousand cases of what the client likes to consider his unique trouble."

[108] Marie R. Haug and Marvin B. Sussman, "Professional Autonomy and the Revolt of the Client," *Social Problems*, 17 (Fall, 1969), at p. 156.

[109] Alexander M. Carr-Saunders, "Metropolitan Conditions and Traditional Professional Relationships," in Robert M. Fisher, ed., *The Metropolis in Modern Life* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1955), p. 283, writes: "As a consequence of the trend toward specialization, the professional man no longer takes a comprehensive interest in his client. He feels that he has no general responsibility for those who come under his care, and the personal relationship between practitioner and client is weakened."

[110] See Helen Merrell Lynd, *On Shame and the Search for Identity* (New York: Science Editions, 1965).

bothered otherwise. This suggests that the client is demanding the right to define the problem, and then call upon the professional only as a specialist in a narrow domain.[111]

Though their evidence is flimsy, Haug and Sussman present a rather ingenious theory about the consequences of the client revolt as they describe it:

> . . . since the major thrust of the client revolt has been against the institutional concomitants of professionalism, including the tendency of the professional to extend his authority beyond the limits of his legitimated special expertise, one might predict a narrowing of professional authority to the most limited and esoteric elements of his knowledge base. This is unlikely to mean, despite client-revolt rhetoric, that the professional will fully lose the core of his autonomy, the right to define the nature of the client's problem. Even if the client exercised his right to pick and choose the time and place of his use of the professional's expertise, once the client enters the interaction, the expert's knowledge of cause-effect will permit him to diagnose and respecify the original complaint or need into his terms.[112]

These analysts conclude, therefore, that the tension between professional and society can lead to deprofessionalization, but that "what the client demands—the professional as a limited consultant—may be less a curse than a blessing in disguise."[113]

There is something comforting in this theory. On the one hand, it does not contradict the skill revolution hypothesis of progressive specialization; on the other hand, it anticipates changes in the professional-client relationship which, on close inspection, seem to be radical without really being so. The theory may well be true.

Despite antiprofessional tendencies in the protest movement, a new balance in organized professional-client relations seems to be emerging. On the one hand, the protest movement comes to realize that it needs professional assistance. As Lipsky points out,

> the need for skilled professionals is not restricted to lawyers. . . . Protest groups may need architects and city planners to present a viable alternative to urban renewal proposals. They may need consultant assistance to present testimony concerning the inadequacy of governmental programs. They may need grantsmen to compete for federal and private philanthropic funds. . . .[114]

On the other hand, new developments within the professions in response to changing social values appear as reassertions of professional authority. Representation of client interests and their satisfaction through new professional roles rather than through direct client participation is the most noteworthy of these developments.[115]

The new "advocacy role" is available at both the level of individual service and societal policy making. In this role, the professional does not just respond to client demands and, by responding, serve society; rather, his task is to anticipate needs, initiate services, and improve society.

There are some real difficulties with the advocacy role. In the enthusiasm accompanying its discovery, it was easy enough to mistake advocacy as a *professional response* to presumably unmet social needs, with activism as a *political* response. Clearly and intentionally identifying advocacy with political action, a professor of social work has defined the advocate as "the professional who identifies with the victims of social problems and who pursues modification in social conditions"; and he has argued that the advocate "will need to have the professional dedication to take the risk and be political."[116] Needless to say, this interpretation has not gone unchallenged, and there is no indication that this is the meaning given it by most members of the legal profession where it originated in the first place.[117]

Paradoxically, its radical appearance notwithstanding, advocacy implies an essentially paternalistic attitude. Although he does not give it this interpretation, Edgar H. Schein, speaking of "role innovators," has this to say:

> These members of the profession accept its central or pivotal norms but try to redefine where, how, and on whom the profession is to be practiced. A strong theme in this group has been the concern for the ultimate client, who is the actual receiver of professional services but who may have little or no voice in the design of those services—the consumer, the low-income tenant, the welfare recipient, the nonpaying charity case in the local hospital, the ghetto dweller. Thus, advocacy law and advocacy architecture are efforts by some lawyers and architects to provide services to clients who never saw

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[111] Haug and Sussman, "Professional Autonomy," pp. 157–8.

[112] Haug and Sussman, p. 159.

[113] Haug and Sussman, p. 160.

[114] Michael Lipsky, *Protest in City Politics: Rent Strikes, Housing and the Power of the Poor* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1970), p. 168.

[115] See Michael G. Michaelson, "Medical Students: Healers Become Activists," *Saturday Review* (August 16, 1969), pp. 41–3, 53–4; Robert J. Bazell, "Health Radicals: Crusade to Shift Medical Power to the People," *Science*, 173 (August 6, 1971), 506–9.

[116] George A. Brager, "Advocacy and Political Behavior," *Social Work*, 13 (April, 1968), 5–15, at 15.

[117] Richard Du Cann, *The Art of the Advocate* (London: Penguin Books, 1964).

themselves as clients, who did not realize that they were entitled to any voice in their own affairs, and who could not pay professional fees.[118]

The professional as advocate not only knows what is best for people but also has the advantage over political representatives of not being responsible to his clients as elected officials are responsible to their constituents. So the professional as advocate must fall back on the collective mandate given his profession by society. But in taking the generalized mandate theory seriously, advocate professionals should answer some serious questions. What will happen if things go wrong? To whom will the advocate professional be accountable? His clients, his peers, his employers, or only his own conscience? What would accountability imply? Would it imply making restitution? Risking censure or suspension of license? Dismissal from the job? Most of these questions have yet to be answered.

Advocacy as a professional response to unmet social needs and not as a substitute, in professional guise, for social action, has come to be accepted in the planning profession. This profession has understandably long been of interest to political science, for two reasons—first, because its clientele is never an individual person, and second, because its activities are clearly and intimately implicated in the public interest.[119] The plight of people displaced by urban renewal projects became a source of protest, but protest alone would never have brought about a solution in the public interest.[120] What makes possible a broadening of the meaning of public interest is the intervention of advocacy planners who bring the interests of the deprived groups into the planning process by giving them expert advice. The relationship between the expert-advocate, individual or firm, and the client organization has taken a variety of forms. Blecher, in an analysis of six demonstration programs, found that when the relationship followed the classical model of a strictly formal contract between professional and client, relations of the client group with public authorities were less conflictual than when the client organization tried to influence directly the technical aspects of the planning process.[121]

The most significant contribution of the advocacy role, or what the lawyers interestingly call "public interest work," is perhaps not its immediate payoffs to clients in need, but its bringing the profession's idealized model of public service somewhat closer to reality than it has been in the past. Nevertheless, the present extent and future promises of the advocacy role should not be over-estimated. As a very thorough recent study of the legal profession concludes,

> The level of public interest work by those parts of the private bar that we observed was low; the delivered efforts of private firms represent only a small part of the available energies of those firms. For the bar as a whole the response appears to be even smaller; indeed it appears to be infinitesimal. Certainly one cannot say that the bar as a whole has fashioned a public interest response unless some of the institutional definitions of professional responsibility are being affected by its efforts.[122]

Because it is dependent on government or foundation support which may be withdrawn, or because clients themselves may reject an advocate's help, the role is difficult to sustain. Nevertheless, as a new form of professional conduct, and if it is not misused, professional advocacy is quite in line with the realities of technological society. However, it should not be considered an alternative to either conventional or unconventional politics. Although in articulating and advocating client needs the professional puts them on a firmer knowledge base than would otherwise be the case, interest-group formation and pressure politics will continue to be primary ways to influence policy-making and administration.

To predict the outcome of the contemporary ferment in the relationship between the professions and society is imprudent. There is only a thin line between politicization that leads to de-professionalization of human services, on the one hand, and responsible involvement in those public issues that are the legitimate concern of the professions, on the other hand. Political awareness will make the professions perhaps more responsive to societal needs; but professionals must bring to the treatment of public issues professionally pertinent criteria of substance and conduct that warrant their being respected for their knowledge and skills rather than for the particular ideological predilections that may be the fashion of the moment. The winds of politics are moody and have a way of changing faster than professional responses to these winds.

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[118] Schein, p. 51.

[119] See Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield, *Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955); Alan Altshuler, *The City Planning Process: A Political Analysis* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965); Francine F. Rabinovitz, *City Politics and Planning* (New York: Atherton Press, 1969).

[120] This was recognized in an early study by Peter H. Rossi and Robert A. Dentler, *The Politics of Urban Renewal* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961).

[121] See Earl M. Blecher, *Advocacy Planning for Urban Development: With Analysis of Six Demonstration Programs* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971).

[122] Marks, *The Lawyer, the Public,* p. 250.

The Consultative Commonwealth

Rooted in the social and technological changes occasioned by the modern skill revolution, the consultative commonwealth does not denote a revolutionary state. On the contrary, the construct assumes that as a result of the prominence of old and new professions in policy making and the delivery of human services, consultative modes of interaction will be a pervasive feature of governance in the future society. Consultation is the most characteristic aspect of the relationships among professional skill specialists and between them and their clients. Consultation will not be the dominant process but will complement, supplement, and implement other governmental processes like democratic participation, bureaucratic organization, pluralistic bargaining, or oligarchic decision making.

It is because professionalization and deprofessionalization are mutually entailed that professionalization will not usher in the bureaucratic state of rulership through professional expertise, and deprofessionalization will not bring in the democratic state of governance through client participation. There will be both more bureaucratization and more democratization, but the skill revolution will inject professional ways of doing things into the emerging commonwealth. Although they are necessary, neither bureaucratic nor democratic techniques are sufficient to cope with the extraordinarily complex social and technological problems of the future. Consultation will be a necessary but also not sufficient condition of the future commonwealth.

In the real world of politics, consultation is contaminated by other social processes so that it can never occur in pure form. The consultative commonwealth is therefore not a political system in which men of knowledge or skill specialists have uncontested power to constitute a new ruling class. Rather, it is a system of government in which professional norms and modes of conduct are acknowledged components of individual and collective choice making, at the level both of policy and of administration. The construct assumes that insofar as familiar bureaucratic-hierarchical and participative-representational patterns continue, they will be permeated by consultative patterns. This is so because in the technological society, the ways of consultation are, on balance, well suited to the formulation and delivery of professionally based services. For consultation infuses professional expertise as well as client perspective into the policy process and the delivery of services.

Consultation as a form of interaction does not assume equality among all participants. It takes for granted that the participants are unequal precisely because the professional whose advice or service is sought is superior to the client in his area of competence. Were it otherwise, the whole notion of expertise and skill specialization would be meaningless. The inequality taken for granted is of course based on an authority of competence and not of position. The client may be superior or equal to the consultant in social status or organizational position, but for the purposes of consultation he is dependent on the consultant. But a political milieu reduces the status advantage that the professional normally has in his client relationships. Professionals cannot simply depend on their authority but may have to persuade their clients, especially if the clients are highly placed executive or legislative policy makers. Policy makers as clients do not stand in awe of professionals.

There are also limits to professional dominance at the humble end of government where the low-level bureaucratic professional encounters his clients. One of the paradoxes of professional practice is that the professional's reputation partly depends on his being evaluated, whether he likes it or not, by clients—that is, precisely by those persons least qualified technically to judge professional performance. The more that human services are extended to larger classes of people and become professionalized, the less are clients willing to be passive recipients of service, and the greater is their demand for high performance.[123] The professional's need for at least some client approval has always been a source of client control.[124]

It is in the nature of pluralistic processes to multiply channels of consultation, thereby introducing competition into the advisory function. As expert encounters expert, alternative solutions become political compromises that safeguard the commonwealth against the professional or personal biases of skill specialists.[125] What Rourke says of bureaucrats is equally applicable to professionals in political milieux: "In the case of advice, the power of bureaucrats is indirect, resting as it does upon their ability to persuade political officials that a certain course of action should be taken. Bureaucrats have influence only if politicians accept their advice."[126]

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[123] Gilb, *Hidden Hierarchies,* p. 89.

[124] Client control, however, may be frustrated by what Clark Kerr calls "institutional markets" in which the boundaries of service are not set by the participants in the consultative relationship but by institutional rules. See Clark Kerr, "The Balkanization of Labor Markets," in *Labor Mobility and Economic Opportunity,* ed. E. Wight Bakke et al. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1954), p. 93.

Constitutionally speaking, then, the consultative commonwealth is characterized by status ambiguity. In the classical professional-client model, the professional is in a superior and the client in a subordinate position. In the professional-colleague relationship, the actors appear to be in equal positions. And in the professional-organization relationship, the professional's position appears to be subordinate to that of the organizational supervisor. But in reality these constitutional relationships vary a good deal and may actually be reversed. Clients do have ways of controlling the professional; status jealousies among professionals interfere with mutual deference; and professionals in organizations have ways of gaining the upper hand. Especially in organizational settings in which the professional interacts simultaneously with clients, colleagues, and supervisors, ambiguities inherent in any one relationship will be confounded by the complexity of the total network in which all the actors are enmeshed.

The need to integrate specializations and subspecializations into a coherent professional service is best met through consultation. Neither market-type exchange mechanisms nor hierarchical modes are sufficient to coordinate diverse specialties. Status differences within and among the professions make nonconsultative ways of coordination problematical, for they ignore ambiguities in status relationships. On the one hand, the "superior" professional is expected to "direct" the work of subordinate personnel; but on the other hand, for some purposes the higher-skill specialist "depends" or "relies" on the lower-skill specialist, as physicians depend on nurses or university professors rely on librarians.[127]

Traditional solutions to the coordination of specialized services have been, first, to have professionals run their own affairs, as professors do in some universities; second, to turn coordination over to lay boards, as in primary or secondary education; and third, to create altogether new administrative professions, like the city manager or hospital administrator. All of these modes of coordination make implicit assumptions about status differentiation. By transcending formal social or bureaucratic status lines and organizational barriers, consultation facilitates the utilization of diverse knowledge and intelligence that otherwise would not be brought to bear on policy making or administration, including knowledge of what is politically feasible and attainable.

Consultation will not erase ambiguities in professional relationships because status differentiation is immanent in skill differentiation. Therefore, interprofessional bargaining and negotiations concerning jurisdictional matters will continue in the consultative commonwealth,[128] as will hierarchical forms of conflict resolution. This is likely to be so because, as Moore puts it, "authenticated professionals are scarcely more prone to rational and sensible compromises and reasonable innovations than others who occupy a privileged position."[129]

The consultative commonwealth will be circumscribed by political and economic processes that may but need not involve consultation. Many human services will continue to be rendered by occupations whose professionalization is more a distant aspiration than an early prospect. To expect that in the foreseeable future the two largest and most powerful institutional sectors of society—government and business—will be fully professionalized would be to burden the construct of the consultative commonwealth beyond its heuristic capability.[130] Government, in particular, will be guided by the politics of elections, group processes and bureaucratic inertia. The continuing skill revolution will accentuate the professionalization of advice and services *in* government, which is something different from the professionalization *of* government. Increased sensitivity of professionals to their own position in society and to the nature of their relationships with clients as diverse as slum dwellers and high policy makers will make for more rather than less politics in the consultative commonwealth,[131] but technological developments and the delivery of human services become increasingly dependent on consultation as the linkage mechanism between democracy and bureaucracy.[132]

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[125] Multiple advocacy as a conscious decision-making strategy is recommended by Alexander L. George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review,* 66 (September, 1972), 751–785.

[126] Rourke, p. 45.

[127] See Donald C. Pelz, "Interaction and Attitudes between Scientists and the Auxiliary Staff," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* 4 (December, 1959), 321–36 and 4 (March, 1960), 410–25.

[128] Gilb, *Hidden Hierarchies,* pp. 162–64.

[129] Moore, *The Professions,* p. 73.

[130] "There are professional ethics for the priest, the soldier, the lawyer, the magistrate, and so on," Durkheim observed three quarters of a century ago, and then asked: "Why should there not be one for trade and industry?" Emile Durkheim, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), pp. 30–39. No answer has yet been forthcoming, but see Bernard Barber, "Is American Business Becoming Professionalized?," in ed. Tiryakian, pp. 121–45. The English Socialist R. H. Tawney argued, in *The Acquisitive Society* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1920), chapter VII, "Industry as a Profession," that nationalization of industry was a necessary condition of its professionalization.

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[131] Daniel Bell comes to the same conclusion, if by a different route: "It is more likely, however, that the post-industrial society will involve *more* politics than ever before for the very reason that choice becomes conscious and the decision-centers more visible." See his essay, "The Measurement of Knowledge and Technology," in Eleanor B. Sheldon and Wilbert E. Moore, eds., *Indicators of Social Change: Concepts and Measurements* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), p. 238.

[132] On contemporary institutional trends, see Thomas E. Cronin and Sanford D. Greenberg, eds., *The Presidential Advisory System* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969); Committee on the Utilization of Young Scientists and Engineers in Advisory Services to Government, Office of Scientific Personnel, National Research Council, *The Science Committee* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1972). 2 vols.; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "The Professionalization of Reform,'" *The Public Interest,* 1 (Fall, 1965), 6–16; Advisory Committee on Government Programs in the Behavioral Sciences, National Research Council, *The Behavioral Sciences and the Federal Government* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1968); Special Commission on the Social Sciences of the National Science Board, *Knowledge into Action: Improving the Nation's Use of the Social Sciences* (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1969).

COMMUNICATIONS

To the Editor:

Professor Robert J. Lieber's article "Interest Groups and Political Integration: British Entry into Europe" in the March 1972 issue of *APSR* is interesting and usefully provocative. His conclusions that "group politics" is more explanatory than functionalism, at least with respect to enlargement of a geographic area of integration, and that, in such a case, group pressures are likely to impede rather than facilitate integration command attention and should evoke further interest.

It is not, therefore, in an especially contentious spirit that I offer two deviant comments.

Professor Lieber's comparison between group politics and functionalism takes as its point of departure what might be called "pure functionalism" as outlined in its archetypal form by David Mitrany and Ernst Haas. In doing so, he scants the subsequent development of neofunctionalist doctrine which seeks, precisely as he wishes, to explore the interactions among functionalist phenomena, politics, and leadership. The recent special issue of *International Organization,* edited by Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, *Regional Integration: Theory and Research,* is testimony to the extent to which scholarship has moved beyond the simple model taken as the basis for Professor Lieber's analysis. In an important sense, the article knocks down a straw man.

Second, Professor Lieber quite sensitively distinguishes between "the task of enlarging a geographic area of integration," such as was implied by the question of British membership in the EEC, and functionalist performance within an integrated system. Yet, six European nations did decide to form the EEC in the first instance. If Professor Lieber were to analyze that experience, applying the methods he used in the article he has published, the result might well be to support the hypotheses he has formulated. It is not fair to criticize an author for having written what he wanted to write rather than what somebody else thinks he might have done. Would it not, however, be appropriate to test Professor Lieber's hypotheses by comparing the British experience with the successful continental experience?

Lawrence S. Finkelstein
Harvard University

To the Editor:

I appreciate Lawrence S. Finkelstein's generous remarks on the virtues of my article in the March 1972 issue of the *APSR,* though I find his two "deviant comments" to be of little additional benefit.

First, it is inappropriate of Mr. Finkelstein to bracket Mitrany and Haas under the label of "pure functionalism," and I specifically noted in the original article that Haas "has developed important modifications of Mitrany's approach" (p. 58). Indeed, Haas himself has devoted considerable attention to these differences, and in Chapters One and Two of *Beyond the Nation-State* he develops a sophisticated and detailed revision of that approach. Haas's orientation would more appropriately be characterized as neofunctional. Yet the semantic problem deepens here because Finkelstein categorizes the recent work of Lindberg and Scheingold as neofunctional. Actually, Lindberg and Scheingold have set themselves off from neofunctionalism: "We think of our approach to the analysis of integration as a voluntaristic, actor-oriented one, emerging out of neofunctionalist thought, but distinct from it in the extent of its voluntarism" (*Europe's Would-Be Polity,* p. 282). In fact, their findings on the establishment of the European Economic Community cause them to take issue with what they term the "standard neofunctional model." So, I find Mr. Finkelstein's categorizations to be unhelpful.

Secondly, Mr. Finkelstein has suggested that my analysis be extended to the original creation of the EEC. But his speculation that "the results might well be to support the hypotheses he [Lieber] has formulated" is ambiguous. Does Mr. Finkelstein really mean that the EEC case would confirm *both* hypotheses? This is logically impossible since I have constructed them in such a way that they are mutually exclusive —i.e., if interest groups influence policy formation, then progress toward integration is likely to be (a) impeded, or (b) facilitated. Or does he mean the results would support my conclusions which were, in the confines of the British case, to accept the "group politics hypothesis" and to reject the "functionalist hypothesis"? I suspect Mr. Finkelstein really means that an application to Europe would sustain my "functionalist hypothesis." But it is precisely on this question that my article did draw upon the work of Lindberg and Scheingold—not, to be sure, their special issue of *International Organization,* but their book which appeared some months prior and was thus available at the time I wrote my article. I specifically sought to speculate "beyond the confines of the British case" in order to generalize that at least in the task of enlarging a geographic area of integration, "a conscious political decision must first be made" (p. 67). And I then expanded upon this point in a footnote: "Lindberg and Scheingold find, directly contrary to Haas in *The Uniting of Europe*, that the successful transformation leading to the establishment of the Common Market itself was not due to functional spillover: 'The transformation of the European Community cannot be adequately described within the context of the standard neofunctional model with its heavy emphasis on supranational institutions and functional linkages.' (*Europe's Would-Be Polity*, p. 243)."

I would like to conclude with the observation that the purpose of my original article was not that of a talmudic excursion into semantic and textual definitions. Rather, the effort at hypothesis testing was carried out in order to explore which of two theoretical perspectives might be most fruitful in making sense of the timely and important question of Britain's Common Market entry. In essence, I regard this as part of the prime task of theory building and application.

ROBERT J. LIEBER
University of California, Davis

TO THE EDITOR:

In his recent article on William Godwin and anarchism (March, 1972), Prof. Kramnick raised several valid points about Godwin in particular and anarchism in general. However, his overall analysis seems to be flawed by a too simplistic view, and is vaguely disquieting in its misrepresentation of anarchist thought.

First, I think it is fair to specify two notable points which were raised in the essay: (1) the fact that Godwin (and other anarchists as well) seems willing to substitute the "tyranny of public opinion" for the "tyranny of the state" (p. 118); (2) the rather exasperating weakness of posited means which are advanced by anarchist thinkers as instruments for achieving the anarchist society.

Unfortunately, many of the other points raised by Kramnick are not so worthwhile. For example, calling Godwin's *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* the "Bible of anarchism" (p. 123) is mystifying, to say the least. Godwin's influence on anarchist thought is quite limited. Many of the later anarchists (Maximoff is one such thinker who comes to mind) considered Godwin bourgeois. Proudhon dismissed him as a precursor of Robert Owen. Others such as Bakunin were quite probably unaware of Godwin's work. Finally, Kropotkin was aware of his work and admired it, but he was certainly not much influenced by Godwin. This small point is tied to a larger one—namely, why was Godwin chosen to represent anarchist thought? He is said to have given anarchism its peculiar ambiance (p. 114), but this assertion is not supported by anything that Kramnick says. In making this assertion, it almost seems as if Kramnick is imputing a sort of unity to anarchist thought. This inference is patently incorrect. Anarchists themselves have engaged in internecine warfare for many years over just what anarchism is. In the pages of Benjamin Tucker's *Liberty*, for example, the Kropotkin communist-anarchists are read completely out of the anarchist camp, denounced as state socialists. John Henry Mackay raised the same criticism against the communist-anarchists in the 1890s. These examples are meant to suggest the philosophical "anarchy" among anarchists, and they make it extremely difficult to understand the selection of Godwin to serve as a basis for a more general criticism of anarchism.

Second, and much more serious, Kramnick apparently misreads a significant number of anarchists when he argues that ". . . the doctrine after [Godwin] is forever torn between the liberal values of individuality, independence, autonomy, privacy, and self-determination, on the one hand, and the nonliberal values of community, solidarity, and the encouragement of virtue through social pressure, on the other" (p. 128). This is a misstatement of fact based upon the attribution of a false dichotomy to many anarchist thinkers. In his essay, *Anarchism*, Malatesta argues on behalf of the human solidarity model, i.e., the contention that individual and community are not opposed but are, in reality, complementary to one another. Kropotkin's analysis in *Mutual Aid* certainly suggests that he does not consider there to be a basic conflict between individual and collectivity. From the individualist anarchist point of view, it is even clearer that there is no conflict. The individual is seen as supreme, and everything else is measured by the criterion of the individual. Community is worth considering to the extent that the individual is concerned with the community in terms of his own rational self-interest. Max Stirner provides the clearest example of this line of reasoning. In all of these examples, it seems safe to say that there is no perception of any conflict between individual and society. And from the point of view of what such thinkers say, there is little reason to doubt the sincerity of their views. Now, it would have been most useful to examine the validity of such views, but this is a separate question. It would seem that Kramnick has greatly oversimplified the anarchist position(s), posed a false dichotomy based on a small sample of anarchists, and proceeded to attack a very frail straw man.

Finally, the inference is that since anarchism is antipolitical it is therefore of no real benefit in the attempt to achieve meaningful social change, but, rather, actually conservative in its effect. In one sense, this criticism is valid, but it neglects certain positive benefits of anarchist thought. In their *The Sociology of the Future,* Wendell Bell and James Mau argue that any account of decision making must take into consideration views of the future. The literature on game theory (specifically Prisoner's Dilemma) is an empirical example of how images of the future affect decision making. Utopian anarchism, by positing alternative futures, can have some potential influence on social change. Posing alternative futures can act as a check on present trends, can provide something of a benchmark for measuring where a society is going and how it will get there. This may not sound particularly impressive a function, but the literature of future studies clearly suggests that one should not underestimate the potential utility of such a function.

Other points could be raised to emphasize the essential comments made above, but I think that that would be unnecessary. It seems that Kramnick, despite a number of perceptive observations, has vastly oversimplified the doctrine he is criticizing and has ignored a possibly important function that renders his pronouncement regarding anarchism's conservative effect otiose.

STEVEN A. PETERSON
State University of New York at Buffalo

TO THE EDITOR:

Like most exiled Haitians, Garcia-Zamor does not appreciate foreigners, much less Americans, analyzing the reasons for his unhappy country's dramatic lack of political development. His review (*APSR,* March 1972) takes my *Haiti: The Politics of Squalor* to task for being insufficiently commendatory to and understanding of the methods used by François Duvalier to subjugate Haiti from 1957 to 1971. It seems that Garcia-Zamor would have preferred an apologia for terrorist dictatorship. Did the regime of Papa Doc really constitute what Garcia-Zamor calls a "necessary transitional stage"? If so, transitional to what?

It is Garcia-Zamor's privilege to make these and other unworthy gibes at *Haiti* (and Haiti), but the main point of this letter is to indicate the serious extent to which Garcia-Zamor libels the authors of *Haiti,* and their research. The days that we spent in Haiti (over three years) were far more than "a few." And our research at no major point was "frustrated." Professor Christopher Clague, Dr. Henry Vaillant, and I all spent long periods of time traveling and interviewing freely in a Haiti, where Garcia-Zamor has not lived for some years. (Garcia-Zamor also falsely assumes that I had no role in the preparation of the three chapters which he praises.) Does one really advance the cause of scholarly criticism by making wild allegations which could have had absolutely no basis in fact?

In the future, I hope your reviewers will read, reflect, and constructively criticize rather than, as in this case, merely parade their own prejudices.

ROBERT I. ROTBERG
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

TO THE EDITOR:

In my review I questioned the validity of the theoretical framework characterizing Haiti as a "predatory state." I also expressed puzzlement at the author's sweeping conclusions about the psychological character of the Haitians. My other main criticism was that the extensive reporting of trivial details, intrigues, and rumors help keep the book at the level of a lengthy journalistic account. Rotberg's letter does not clarify these points. He says that he has been in Haiti more than a "few days." He should have specified the exact length of time because no records of any extended stay could be found by Haitian government officials when this reviewer inquired about it during one of his two visits to Haiti since publication of the book. Furthermore, I did not write that Rotberg had no role in the preparation of the three chapters on the Haitian economy; I assumed, naturally, that they were written by Christopher Clague, because Professor Clague is an economist and his name appeared with Rotberg's on the title page of the book. (The unusual arrangement of the names—Rotberg *with* Clague—simply misled me.)

Although I deplore the tone of Rotberg's letter, I fully understand his reaction.

JEAN-CLAUDE GARCIA-ZAMOR
Howard University

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Earl Latham's review of G. William Domhoff's *The Higher Circles* in the March, 1972 issue of the *APSR* was such a thoroughly wrongheaded and frivolous piece of writing that it scarcely seemed worth the space which it took in a professional journal. The number of errors contained in so short a piece are worthy of comment.

(1) Professor Latham claims that Domhoff does not define a social class "in terms of social and economic functions but in terms of personal attributes." This is entirely wrong in view of the fact that Latham explicitly recognizes *The Higher Circles* to be a continuation of the research which Domhoff began in *Who Rules America?* In the earlier work, Domhoff defined a social class as "a group of families with similar aspirations and values . . . who perceive each other as equals and freely intermarry" (p. 3). The economic attributes of the upper class in the United States are delimited in terms of the proportion of the country's annual income which it receives and in terms of the proportion of the country's wealth which it owns and controls. All of chapter one in *Who Rules,* in fact, is devoted to the economic functions which the upper class performs in the American corporate economy. If Domhoff's statements of the personal attributes of the upper class annoy Latham, we might point out that social classes are made up of people (what else?) and that it is necessary to operationalize those characteristics of a class which allow us to decide whether or not to place any given individual within that category. In the first sentence of *Higher Circles,* Domhoff writes that the present report "is intended to deepen, extend and defend the picture of how America is governed," which was presented in two previous works. Is it too much to expect Professor Latham to refer to the definitions and concepts of the earlier work?

(2) Professor Latham claims that Domhoff relies upon "anecdotal, impressionistic, journalistic and inferential" data to prove the existence of class consciousness among the upper class. First, it appears that one man's pop sociology—depending upon the point that he is arguing—may be Latham's realistic political science. Domhoff's data is certainly no more flimsy than the weak journalism of pluralists like Edward Banfield, Arnold Rose, and others whom Latham apparently prefers. Secondly, Latham dismisses the results of the attitude survey which Domhoff conducted with the statement that the upper-class, psychiatric patients who were reported by their analysts as possessing class consciousness were probably an unreliable sample since such class consciousness is *prima facie* evidence of the sort of neurosis which necessitated psychotherapy in the first place. A realistic rather than a neurotic view of the world, according to Latham, would have led these upper-class men to the observation that "all 'classes' in effect do the same thing—they tend the bureaucratic machine—and if there are indeed social differences, they tend to blur." Well, Professor Latham, we're not "all in this together." We don't all tend the machine. The evidence that has now mounted up against the solipsistic *embourgeoisement* thesis of writers like Latham should create some caution on the part of reviewers prone to glib generalizations. Latham's criticism is both logically and empirically dubious.

(3) The point raised immediately above also applies to Latham's general attempt to lump Domhoff together with the reactionary McCarran Committee as part of the paranoid style in American politics. This bit of *ad hominem* argument neither furthers discussion nor bears any psychological tenability. Professor Domhoff, it might be noted, is a psychologist by training who specialized in personality theory. In *The Higher Circles,* he addressed himself to this name-calling tendency of pluralists and consensus historians. Professor Latham would do well to reread that section of the book which discusses the obsessive-compulsive academic styles to which certain political behaviorists are addicted.

(4) In dicussing Domhoff's usage of the concepts of "dominance" and "control," Latham is wrong again, or right in only a trivial way. Domhoff does use the two terms in *Higher Circles* in a different manner from his usage in *Who Rules,* but the change does not mean that Domhoff is hedging his argument more in the newer book. Domhoff in *Higher Circles* was responding to the criticism that he had earlier used the two terms interchangeably to refer to the upper class's hegemony over both the political and the corporate-university-foundation sectors. The nature of the upper class's hegemony over the two sectors is not precisely the same. Upper-class "dominance" over the executive branch of the federal government, for example, is defined by Domhoff in the manner which Professor Latham quotes. Upper class "control," on the other hand, refers to the "legal authority which that class exercises over non-governmental organizations and institution." It is unfortunate when a reviewer mistakes the precise use of terms for the uncertainty and retrenchment of an argument.

(5) Finally, Latham ends his review, appropriately enough, with a badly confused bit of reading. The final quote which is extracted from Domhoff is, admittedly, an awkward sen-

tence but it is still clear that the quote does not convey the meaning which Latham imputes to it. The statement simply asserts the pluralists are right to ask the extent of unity, class consciousness, and ability to manipulate which the upper class possesses. Domhoff's reply to this question is to point "to findings such as I have presented throughout this book" as evidence of a relatively high degree of such upper-class possession. It is fascinating how anyone could read that and understand it to mean that Domhoff is saying that the pluralists will have to prove his arguments. Instead of digging out oh-so-precious remarks from Cabell and Maurice Ravel, Professor Latham would do better to spend his time with *How to Read a Book* or Fowler's *Modern English Usage*.

DANIEL R. HOFFMAN
University of California, Santa Barbara

TO THE EDITOR:

I am grateful to the critic of my review of Domhoff, *The Higher Circles* for the many suggestions as to how I might better use my time. It was certainly a waste of it to read his letter. I have, however, torn myself from Fowler's *English Usage* and tried to fathom his, or, to put it another way, "operationalize those characteristics" upon which comment is owed, and just.

First, Domhoff says (p. viii) that he is "painfully aware" of some of his limitations in his quest for a "general picture" of the upper class and its involvement in the governing process. And so is the reader. His picture is a montage of shots drawn from the *Social Register, Who's Who in America,* the sayings of women's page and society editors and other such sources, more like a home movie than New Wave documentary, with the camera catching the kids going to school and playing at the beach, while interior close-ups show mommy and daddy counting their money. Domhoff says that he prefers a definition of the upper class "which points to the great wealth and unique life styles of those inter-marrying and interacting families of high social standing" (p. 32). Indeed he prefers it to the Social Register approach, but, either way, he defines social class in terms of personal attributes, which is what I said he said. It does not seem to me that Domhoff is really very clear about the concept, "class," which he makes interchangeable with "elite" and "higher circles." Assuming that "higher circles" is simply rhetoric without analytical value, it can then be said, with Mills, that the "conception of the elite as members of a top social stratum" is technically "closer to 'status group' than to 'class'. . . ." And that, I suggested, is what Domhoff has described, a status group that he confuses with class and elite.

Second, the epistolarian in a bit of mind-reading that fair takes the breath away presumes to tell me what my political science is and whom I prefer. Banfield? Did I mention Banfield? Rose? Did I mention Rose? In this respect they are like Domhoff, tuned in on the same wave length of the occult, for at one place he suggests that David Rockefeller "probably accepts Darwin's evolutionary theory" (p. 291). With intuitions of this order who needs facts? It is said that I dismiss Domhoff's survey of 982 analysts because I think that class consciousness suggests neurosis, and that this somehow makes the sample unreliable. This misconstruction is evidently based on the line, "It is not said whether this [class consciousness] is what brought them into analysis." The remark was ironic. The "sample" cannot be taken seriously because it is only 36 responses out of 982, and those who did reply were not a random but a haphazard selection from the population surveyed. I did not say that a realistic rather than a neurotic view of the world would support the thesis that all tend the bureaucratic machine. What I said was that the views of Ossowski and Marcuse on this point were "worth consideration." The apostrophe to me—"Well, Professor Latham, we're not 'all in this together' " has all of the pathetic bravado of the man on his death-bed who, when told, "You can't take it with you" said, "Then, I won't go." In a society dominated by giant corporations, where even the working class has been co-opted into the corporate structure, and is without the slightest revolutionary potential, where there is socialism for the rich and free enterprise for the poor, where business values dominate and the counter-culture has had little more effect than to put side-burns and sandals on swinging corporate executives, where millionaires pay no income taxes because the tax laws are so rigged that the wages and salaries of the middle classes carry the costs of welfare, *everybody* tends the bureaucratic machine, even professors who give courses on the military-industrial complex to students who may or not make it with Coca-Cola or the Chase Manhattan Bank.

Third, my statement that there is a resemblance between Domhoff and the "reactionary McCarran Committee" is indirectly honored by Domhoff who finds himself so much in agreement with the ultra-conservative Right. He just thinks that they go too far when they talk about an "international Communist-Jewish conspiracy." David Rockefeller is not a communist, he says, which must certainly take a load off Nelson's mind. To refute the suggestion that Domhoff and the Right resemble each other by asserting that Domhoff is a "psychologist by training who specialized in personality theory" is to commit a fallacy.

Fourth, the epistolarian agrees with me that Domhoff uses the concepts of "dominance" and "control" in different ways in *Who Rules* and *The Higher Circles,* that is, what Domhoff said in the first work is retracted in the second (namely, that the upper class controls the executive branch of the Federal government). The formulation I prefer is neither of those of Domhoff but that of Robert Paul Wolff in *The Poverty of Liberalism* who says that the elitists and the pluralists are both incorrect—that what exists is not a commanding elite that has its way against any opposition nor a dispersion of offsetting points of power, but an "establishment" that has its way by default because of the indifference or apathy of the many who can turn it away from selfish courses when sufficiently aroused, as they do from time to time.

Fifth, in the opinion of Domhoff, pluralists have contributed virtually no data on the tough empirical question—how unified, conscious, and manipulative the "power elite" is—but since they deny the concept in the first place it is pretty ridiculous to expect them to supply data for what they say does not exist. Domhoff however wants them to tell him what he fails to establish, namely, the degree of control that the power elite or the ruling class or the higher circles maintain over public decisions.

At the end of his book he is, as I said, where he started, obsessed by the notion that there is a commandantura of influentials with lots of consciousness, unity, and manipulation. In fact he is more confused and ambiguous than I showed him to be in my review. For example, the Council on Foreign Relations is the key middle term between the corporations and the Federal government in foreign policy (McCarran said much the same of the Institute of Pacific Relations), but Domhoff says that he cannot demonstrate the influence of the CFR on any single act of policy. Most of his material on this point seems to have been derived from an article by Joseph Kraft, but Domhoff admits that Joseph Kraft did not think that the CFR controlled anything (p. 122). At p. 120, Domhoff says that the CFR is nonpartisan and secrecy conceals the evidence of control or influential connection. But at p. 287 the CRF is a propaganda organization and at p. 301 it is *not* all that secret. And after a long recital about the involvement of the ruling class—power elite—higher circles in the enactment of social legislation, Domhoff says "I do not say that it is possible to prove that *they* [his emphasis] made the legislation down to its last detail because I believe it is virtually impossible to show who influenced whom in any definitive way in such complex situations" (p. 196). But although he cannot show who influenced whom he is sure that it was the power elite that put workmen's compensation over on the workers, regulation of unfair trade practices over on businessmen in interstate commerce through the Federal Trade Commission, forced social security on everybody, and fastened the compulsory recognition of labor unions on employers through the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. What Domhoff actually exhibits is some of the activity of a few business organizations, and an almost total ignorance of the political process. With "findings" like these perhaps the pluralists should wait for more certain directions.

E. M. Forster in *Two Cheers for Democracy* says, "I do not believe in Belief." Nor do I. What we have from Domhoff and the epistolarians is intuition, righteous conviction, a fluttering stagger around logic and evidence, and a weakness for passionate proclamations. I am certainly willing to believe that Domhoff has learned important things about the way America is ruled. My complaint is that he has kept it to himself.

EARL LATHAM

Amherst College

TO THE EDITOR:

Mr. Sigelman's research note (*APSR,* June 1972) is *not* a test of the imbalance thesis because: (1) the formalistic segregation (on which his "data" from Almond and Coleman is based) of executives and army from bureaucracy is not valid for any of the Latin American nations in the upper left hand cell of Tables 1 and 2, with the exception of Chile, and (2) the variable "level of bureaucratic development" is not in fact measured by the post-colonial v. semi-modern ratings of Banks and Textor. My statement has the same data base as the Almond and Coleman findings—a one-man judgment. The one man in this case (the writer) is not a regional specialist, to be sure. But he is a comparative bureaucracy specialist, which the other judges were not. If the above be accepted as meaningful, 16 nations are added to the lower lefthand cell of Table 1 and 12 nations to the lower left hand cell of Table 2, thus modifying the statistic cited for each table. My point is not that Mr. Sigelman is wrong, but that no data presently exists to support or refute his conclusion. Studies of bureaucracies in a few of the countries in the table have been made since 1960, and they do not confirm the categorizations made at that time.

ROBERT T. DALAND
University of North Carolina

TO THE EDITOR:

It is refreshing to find a specialist in comparative administration arguing, as Professor Daland does, that the widely accepted belief that modern bureaucracies dominate less developed polities is unsupported by any available data. If my note can convince others in the field of that point—either because it persuades them by its argument, or because it makes them leery of any data available for testing the hypothesis—then it will have served a useful purpose.

Of course, Professor Daland questions my own conclusions as well as the conventional wisdom. The data, he feels, simply do not warrant any conclusion about the relation of administrative modernity and dominance. In response, several points need to be made:

(1) Concern about the quality of judgmental data on administration is well placed. These data are not as reliable as one might wish, and their compilers are maddeningly terse about the methods employed in making their judgments. Comparative administration is sorely in need of a more solid foundation of cross-national data.

(2) But is it impossible, as Professor Daland contends, to conclude anything at all about administrative modernity and dominance? I think not. It is quite possible, as Raoul Naroll argues, to derive trustworthy conclusions from rather untrustworthy data.[1] To the extent that random errors affect the data, they can only depress correlations; so, paradoxically, the presence of random error would only increase confidence in the findings presented in the note. While many comparativists might detect some judgments with which they disagree in the Banks-Textor or Almond-Coleman data, the important question is whether these putative "errors" are systematic in nature.

(3) This brings us to the charge that the note treated Latin American nations improperly. Those who argue that modern bureaucracies dominate less developed polities (a) have confined their attention to civil bureaucracies and (b) have not, to my knowledge, suggested any geographic limits beyond which their hypothesis is inapplicable. Without arguing the merits of Professor Daland's contention that Latin American bureaucracies should not (even analytically?) be separated from executives and armies, it would seem that this criticism should be directed at the imbalance thesis itself rather than at my test of it. My note simply tested the imbalance argument in its own terms; that, it seems to me, makes it a valid rather than invalid test of the argument.

(4) Finally, in a retest of the hypothesis examined in the note, built upon an entirely different data base, I have found results which are quite consistent with those reported in the note.[2] Replication, of course, serves to increase confidence in research findings. While neither the original note nor the replication should be considered the "last word" on the subject, they do suggest the wisdom of remaining extremely skeptical about the belief that modern bureaucracies dominate less developed polities.

LEE SIGELMAN
Texas Technical University

TO THE EDITOR:

In a recent article "The PCIJ, the ICJ, the League of Nations, and the UN: A Comparative Empirical Survey," *APSR*, 66 (June 1972), pp. 529–550, Coplin and Rochester assert, on page 538, concerning the "political nature" of the two Courts: ". . . this fact [dyadic nature of the study] would explain the low number of cases involving members of opposing alliances for the League and UN, it does not explain the relatively high number of cases involving members of opposing alliances for the PCIJ and ICJ. Hence, it is fair to interpret the evidence as indicating that the PCIJ and even more so the ICJ have not been as apolitical as some might have hoped . . ." They then imply that cases brought between the US and the UK with Warsaw Pact Countries were brought not in the interests of justice, but that the ". . . Court has been frequently used by parties for propagandizing or legitimizing purposes rather than with expectation of settlement."

It seems to me that it is misplaced to infer that the ICJ has been less than apolitical in its treatment of contentious cases involving Communist states. It may be true that the parties, and by that the USA, the UK, and Israel, attempted to use the Court as forum for propagandizing; it is to the Court's credit that it found that it lacked jurisdiction in all but the Corfu Channel Cases. This, fortified by the

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[1] Raoul Naroll, *Data Quality Control: A New Research Technique* (New York: Free Press, 1962).

[2] Lee Sigelman, "Administrative Development and Dominance: A New Test of the Imbalance Thesis," unpublished manuscript, 1972; copies are available from the author on request.

Court's findings in its Advisory Opinion concerning the Genocide Convention which is compatable with the Soviet doctrine of "contemporary" international law, surely must indicate that there is no pro-Western bias.

Their argument further fails to take into account that UN procedural avenues could not bring satisfaction to the plaintiffs, since the USSR could exercise its veto in the Security Council. Hence, it might be fair to assume that recourse was made to the ICJ rather than the Security Council since the probability of settlement would be better there, rather than to seek propaganda value in a world court.

It is completely ungrounded to imply that the Court was used for "legitimizing purposes" by any of the parties (with the possible exception of the second Judgment in the Corfu Channel Case, when it was acknowledged that British warships carried out mine sweeping operations in Albanian territorial waters). None of the Communist states made arguments on the merits in the various cases involving aerial incidents; they simply argued, in the Preliminary Objections, that the Court lacked jurisdiction. And it would be difficult to argue that the plaintiffs were attempting "legitimizing purposes."

It is my feeling that the ICJ has been most scrupulous, perhaps too much, in being certain that it not be used for political purposes, nor as forum for propaganda. Inferences to the contrary cannot be entertained.

WALLACE C. KOEHLER, JR.

University of Tennessee

TO THE EDITOR:

Mr. Koehler's criticism of our point that the record of the ICJ shows that the post-War Court is less *apolitical* than the pre-War Court is based on a failure to accept or understand our assumption that the *apolitical* or *political* quality of an institution is a subjective concept. The court is *political* if the parties involved perceive it as a *political* institution. Mr. Koehler seems to assume that the quality of being *apolitical* is an objective property of the Court regardless of how it is perceived by the parties. While such a definition is defensible, we clearly implied a subjective definition in the article.

Hence, we do not necessarily disagree with Mr. Koehler's assessment that the Court has performed in an *apolitical* manner; we argue only that, looking at the question from the behavior of the states, the Court has not played an entirely *apolitical* role.

WILLIAM D. COPLIN
J. MARTIN ROCHESTER

Syracuse University

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Son of Nasty Letters. A few random comments to us by political scientists suggest that the Editorial Comment about nasty letters (December, 1971, p. 961) may have given an inaccurate impression of the quality of life in the editorial office. In fact, nasty letters are few and far between. Most of the transactions that occupy our days are simple, pleasant, and courteous. And some of our correspondence is a good bit more gratifying than that.

Recently, for example, Professor Edward Tufte of Princeton, perceiving correctly that we have had difficulty standardizing the presentation of tabular and graphic materials, and making them readable, wrote to suggest criteria that we might use in putting these sorts of material in shape. We do not know how faithfully we will be able to follow his suggestions, but they seemed to us to be sensible, and they were undeniably addressed to a real problem. Substance aside, the kindliness and good will that animated this unsolicited professional contribution made us feel cheerful for quite a while.

To Encourage Promptness. On August 28, 1970, the APSA Committee on Professional Ethics approved its Advisory Opinion No. 8, titled "Promptness in Appraising Manuscripts." This Opinion reads:

1. Editors of professional journals, and readers who advise them, have an ethical obligation to act promptly in appraising manuscripts submitted for their consideration.
2. An editor should aim to inform the author of his or her decision within two months if possible, or within three months at most. If three months elapse without a decision, the editor should inform the author of the circumstances; and the author will be free to withdraw his or her manuscript.
3. A reader should report his or her appraisal of a manuscript to the editor within one month unless he or she and the editor agree on a different limit.

At the time this Opinion was approved, the current management of the *Review* had very little experience. Consequently we had no idea whether this Opinion expressed feasible hopes or suggested reasonable constraints. Two and a half years later, we can make the following observations—also neatly numbered:

(1) Authors are always free to withdraw manuscripts from consideration. This is a freedom seldom exercised in practice. As a matter of principle, however, the circumstances under which a manuscript might legitimately be withdrawn run beyond those contemplated in this Opinion.

(2) We make a considerable effort to secure prompt evaluations of manuscripts. Our standard request—infrequently modified by negotiations—asks for an evaluation within two weeks. We have an elaborate system of reminders and entreaties that we wheel into action when a reader is delinquent.

(3) We aim to give authors decisions on their manuscripts as soon after receipt as we can, within two months if possible, and longer only if necessary.

(4) In a more than negligible minority of cases, we fail to send word to authors within three months. The reasons for delay vary slightly from case to case, but usually boil down to three rather boring variations on a single theme: (a) we couldn't induce two qualified referees to appraise the manuscript in time; (b) we found two referees and one reported promptly but the other evaluation became seriously overdue and we couldn't get the delinquent referee to answer mail or come to the phone; or (c) the original referees disagreed and we had to send out for more help.

(5) Nervous authors sometimes query our office about the fate of their manuscript. They do not always observe a three-month moratorium before launching their inquiry. We endeavor to respond cheerfully and informatively to such inquiries, regardless of the time we have the manuscript in custody.

(6) We do not seek out authors when three months are up to inform them of the circumstances of delay. It is our judgment that our limited resources are better invested in getting the answers authors are waiting for than in making a special effort to commiserate with them. This managerial decision can result in circumstances in which we do not comply with the recommendation in the text of the Opinion.

(7) As we read the intention of the Opinion, it is to encourage promptness in transactions between journals and prospective authors. We applaud this aim, and try to do what we can to further it.

Articles Accepted for Future Publication

Paul R. Abramson, Michigan State University, "Generational Change in American Electoral Behavior"

Timothy Almy, University of Georgia, "Residential Location and Electoral Cohesion: The Pattern of Urban Political Conflict"

Herbert B. Asher, Ohio State University, "The Learning of Legislative Norms"

Robert Axelrod, University of Calfironia, Berkeley, "Schema Theory: An Information Processing Model of Perception and Cognition"

Louis P. Benson, Kansas State University, "A Research Note on Machine Politics as a Model for Change in a Philippine Province"

Harry W. Blair, Bucknell University, "Minority Electoral Politics in a North Indian State: Aggregate Data Analysis and the Muslim Community in Bihar, 1952–1972"

Bernard H. Booms, Pennsylvania State University and James R. Halldorson, F. W. Woolworth Co., "The Politics of Redistribution: A Reformulation"

Steven J. Brams, New York University and Morton D. Davis, City College of New York, "The 3/2's Rule in Presidential Campaigning"

Eric C. Browne, University of Georgia and Mark N. Franklin, University of Strathclyde, "Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies"

Andrew T. Cowart, University of Oslo, "Electoral Choice in the American States: Incumbency Effects, Partisan Forces and Divergent Partisan Majorities"

Harry Eckstein, Princeton University, "Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry"

Virginia Gray, University of Kentucky, "Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study"

Bernard Grofman and Edward N. Muller, State University of New York at Stony Brook, "The Strange Case of Relative Gratification and Potential for Political Violence: The V-Curve Hypothesis"

Nobutaka Ike, Stanford University, "Economic Growth and Intergenerational Change in Japan"

Donald B. Johnson and James R. Gibson, University of Iowa, "The Divisive Primary Revisited: Party Activists in Iowa"

Richard S. Katz, Yale University, "The Attribution of Variance in Electoral Returns: An Alternative Measurement Technique"

Chong Lim Kim and Donald P. Racheter, University of Iowa, "Candidates' Perception of Voter Competence: A Comparison of Winning and Losing Candidates"

Fred Kort, University of Connecticut, "A Theoretical Relationship for the Application of Multiple Regression Analysis to Discriminant Analysis"

Warren Lee Kostroski, Wittenberg University, "Party and Incumbency in Postwar Senate Elections: Trends, Patterns and Models"

Lawrence B. Mohr, University of Michigan, "The Concept of Organizational Goal"

Peter B. Natchez, Brandeis University and Irvin C. Bupp, Harvard University, "Policy and Priority in the Budgetary Process"

Bradley M. Richardson, Ohio State University, "Urbanization and Political Behavior: The Case of Japan"

William H. Riker, University of Rochester, "The Paradox of Vote-Trading"

David W. Rohde, Michigan State University and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Washington University, "Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives: Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process"

Lester M. Salamon, Vanderbilt University and Stephen Van Evera, University of California, Berkeley, "Fear, Apathy, and Discrimination: A Test of Three Explanations of Political Participation Among the Poor"

Donald D. Searing, Joel J. Schwartz and Alden E. Lind, University of North Carolina, "Political Socialization and Political Belief Systems: An Essay on the Theoretical Relevance of Some Current Research"

Brian Silver, Florida State University, "Social Mobilization and the Russification of Soviet Nationalities"

A. H. Somjee, Simon Fraser University, "Caste and the Decline of Political Homogeneity"

Richard Stillman, II, California State College, Bakersfield, "Woodrow Wilson and the Study of Public Administration: A New Look at an Old Essay"

Michael W. Suleiman, Kansas State University, "Arab Elite and Palestine-Israel"

Peter J. Taylor, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, "A New Shape Measure for Evaluating Electoral District Patterns"

Edward R. Tufte, Princeton University. "The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems."

Vernon Van Dyke, University of Iowa, "Human Rights Without Discrimination"

Susan Welch, University of Nebraska, "The Impact of Party on Voting Behavior in a Nonpartisan Legislature"

Eugene R. Wittkopf, University of Florida, "Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study of Aid Allocations and Voting Agreements"

Donald A. Wittman, University of California, Santa Cruz, "Parties as Utility Maximizers"

William Zimmerman, University of Michigan, "Issue Area and Foreign Policy Process: A Research Note in Search of a General Theory"

BOOK REVIEWS

The Republic of Plato. Translated with an interpretive essay by Allan Bloom. (New York and London: Basic Books, Inc., 1968. Pp. 487. $12.50.)

Professor Bloom's translation is superior to its better known competitors such as Jowett, Shorey, Rouse, Lee and Cornford. It is the best available English translation of the *Republic.* Neither the translation, nor the useful notes and interpretive essay accompanying it, insult the reader's intelligence by assuming that Plato's language must be vulgarized to please the "modern reader." Nor does Bloom eliminate seemingly trivial or boring passages as Cornford did. Instead he rightly prefers a literal translation which, although unavoidably awkward at times, compels intelligent readers to come to grips with what Plato actually wrote. Thus his translation brings to light essential difficulties obfuscated by less literal, more popularized versions. The long interpretive essay (130 pages) and the notes to the text help clarify these difficulties which usually are overlooked by other translations and interpreters. Many seeming absurdities and confusions are shown to be "protective mechanisms" intentionally designed by Plato to exclude those incapable of being charmed by the inner beauties of his thought (p. xviii).

The *Republic*'s beauty attracts Professor Bloom as Belmont's spell charmed Lorenzo and Jessica (p. 358). Both his translation and interpretive essay are informed by this charm. On Bloom's horizon the *Republic* presents itself as one of the few intelligent guides to the problem of human happiness, the question of how to live (p. viii). This is the chief question of political philosophy whose founder was Socrates. Bloom maintains that the *Republic* is the true *Apology of Socrates* (p. 307). Philosophy is never free of the need to apologize, since its questioning throws doubt upon the prevailing orthodoxies. Consequently, it incurs the wrath of men committed to those orthodoxies (p. 310). Political philosophy is the effort to defuse that wrath by finding an acceptable apology for philosophic questioning. The apparent success of this effort makes it difficult for contemporary political scientists to comprehend Bloom's contention that the coupling of philosophy and political power is a "shotgun wedding," repulsive to both parties (p. 408). This lack of comprehension is itself an eloquent testimony to the success of the Socratic-Platonic apology (pp. 390–2).

Platonic-Aristotelian political science is meant to be the architectonic art or science which determines the true hierarchy of human goods (pp. 431–4). Prior to its emergence, this hierarchy was determined by the gods of one's city. It is noteworthy that no orthodox representative of civic piety appears in the *Republic.* For the apparently orthodox Cephalus is not even an Athenian citizen (p. 441, note 11). Consequently, he cannot decide whether his fear of Athenian gods arises from senility or knowledge. Furthermore the Athens which tolerates resident aliens such as Cephalus also is guilty of importing new gods, the crime for which it killed Socrates (p. 311). Bloom sees that a successful apology for philosophy is possible only in regimes relatively tolerant of it (pp. 421–2). Yet Bloom correctly observes that even a Cephalus must be eliminated, if Athenian piety is to be subject to philosophic questioning (p. 312).

Bloom perceives the kinship between Socratic religious criticism and modern Biblical criticism which refuses to credit pious claims that Moses received the Torah pure and entire from God on Mount Sinai and that so-called corruptions or contradictions in the Bible are, in reality, products of God's unfathomable wisdom. Thus Socrates subtracts fear of divine punishment from Cephalus' account of justice, just as he chooses to ignore Homer's claim that a goddess is the true author of the *Iliad* (pp. 314–16; 452, note 39).

Cephalus answers the impious spirit of Socratic inquiry in the only way that Athenian piety could answer it peacefully: He leaves to sacrifice to the Athenian gods who sanctify his private property. In his absence, Socrates persuades his son and the other interlocutors to abandon their private property in favor of absolute rule by a communized managerial elite who assign to everybody what is good for him (pp. 316–25). This political communism reflects the universal moral principles championed by all the interlocutors except Cephalus (pp. 409–11). Bloom notes that, for them, particulars are real only insofar as they participate in universals (p. 394). He wrongly insists, however, that "ideas" must be universals. Plato's *idea* comes from the aorist tense of the verb *to see* (p. 448, note 24). Here the aorist indicates the gist or heart, the sum and substance. Thus *idea* means the look something has when it is seen for what it is. According to Cephalus, piety or justice have a local, Athenian "look." On the horizon of Socrates (and the others, including Thrasymachus), they have a global or universal "look." Consequently, Socrates and Thrasymachus are basically friends; Socrates' real enemies are pious Athenians (pp. 399–400). In a Socratic spirit, Bloom regards Arginusae as an Athenian victory, although pious Athenians experienced it as a defeat, since the "victorious" admirals were unable or unwilling to fulfill the pious duty of recovering the corpses of their dead from the sea (p. 377).

If the good has the pious, Athenian look ascribed to it by Cephalus, Arginusae was a defeat; if it has a universal or Socratic look, it was a victory. Unfortunately (or fortunately?) the wisdom needed to decide this issue is unavailable, if Socrates correctly places knowledge of the good's true "looks" beyond human grasp (p. 409). If so, how can one know whether Socrates' cosmopolitan taste is superior to Cephalus' narrow, Athenian piety?

As a philosopher, one who lacks and therefore seeks wisdom, Socrates is at a disadvantage before Athenians whose confidence in the wisdom of their ancestral piety is responsible for "the city's insistence that it knows the truth" and that "it has a monopoly of wisdom" (p. 330). Bloom traces this monopolistic claim to the city's belief that "all knowledge, divine or human, must be ratified and codified by the sovereign" (p. 330). By the "sovereign," he obviously means the human sovereign or the ruling class *in any regime.* Thus he assumes that true justice has a universal and not a particular look. Athenian piety, however, taught that the ancestral dieties feared by Cephalus were sovereign. On Cephalus' horizon, this Athenian sovereignty was not merely another particular participating in a universal called *sovereignty.*

Bloom's inadequate presentation of the case for Athenian piety is not his fault. To speak in what he calls "the high tragic manner" (p. 467, note 5), this inadequacy is the fate of moral tastes formed by Platonic disestablishment of civic gods in favor of global moral orthodoxies. In their turn, civic gods had disestablished or subordinated worship of clan and family gods. Bloom observes that both citizenship and philosophy require a break with bodily or blood ties (pp. 384–6; 423–4). In a sense, therefore, philosophy radicalizes the city's devaluation of the family. However, the city's gods remained too attached to the family to support this radicalization (p. 459, note 18). Since morality inevitably has a cosmopolitan look for supporters of that radicalization, they no longer perceive the problem as pious Athenians did pp. (409–11). For even if one asks whether global or civic piety is superior, this question assumes a global answer valid for all societies. It seems that modern men are voluntary or involuntary "footnotes to Plato." Like Plato's Thrasymachus and Socrates, they may argue about which global morality is best; they all, however—implicitly or explicitly—assume some universally valid standard of justice or piety. Consequently they begin, as Socrates began, by ignoring the claims of civic piety, relegating it to the realm of pre-scientific error.

Bloom perceptively notes that Plato's *Republic* intends to replace Achilles by Socrates "as the authentic representation of the best human type" (p. 354). Homer's Achilles, the son of a goddess, was the model for Plutarch's heroes whose unquenchable thirst for civic honors precluded Socratic subordination of "everything that attaches one to particularity" (p. 387). This subordination implies the equality of all men as particulars, since any superiority is dependent on who best obeys or imitates the universal standards. Those global standards, and not the gods of one's own city, would be the ultimate moral authorities. Bloom rightly insists that Achilles, who prefers death to slavery, nevertheless would choose to live in a city which had masters and slaves, even at the price of being a slave there, rather than rule a world-state in which no slavery or mastery exists because all individuals equally are slaves to global standards (p. 355; p. 465, note 2).

Obviously Socrates needed to be more prudent than his modern disciples, since he lived in a regime whose gods were hostile to cosmopolitan sympathies, although not so hostile as the gods of Sparta in which philosophy never arose. Bloom shows why modern regimes officially dedicated to the equality of all individuals under global principles fail to see how hazardous dedication to such principles was in Socrates' Athens (pp. 307–10). What could be more orthodox politically, and therefore easier, than affirming universal principles against local pieties in contemporary America or Russia? To realize how problematic such affirmations are, citizens of contemporary globally oriented regimes must embark on historical studies centering around the conflict between Socrates, the founder of political philosophy, and Athenian piety.

Why opt for global moral standards, if, as Socrates claims, men cannot catch sight of the true look of the good? In the light of this ignorance, would not a preference for cosmopolitan standards arise from the will or determination to have it so? Is truth dependent upon will? According to Bloom, *thumos,* that part of the soul translated as *will* (or as *spiritedness, determina-*

tion, anger, courage) "is the only element in the city or man which by its very nature is hostile to philosophy." For "anger is always self-righteous," arousing indignation against nonbelievers (p. 355). Consequently it hates philosophic *eros,* the yearning to discern what the good really looks like apart from all willing or positing (pp. 375–8). Yet must not the conviction of philosophy's goodness arise from willing it to be good, if insight into what is good is unavailable? Is not a philosophic act of will a contradiction, if will or commitment is philosophy's natural foe? Is a philosophic Achilles possible (p. 357)?

The problematic relation of will or spiritedness to philosophic *eros* is responsible for Bloom's quarrel with those translating *kalon* and *agathon* as *moral values* and not more literally as *beautiful* and *good* (p. ix; p. 443, note 19). *Moral values* implies that men apprehend something as good not because of its intrinsic goodness (which is posited to be unknown), but because they value it as good. If *moral values* is the better translation, it would be mendacious to claim that anything is known to be good or noble in itself. Seen in this light, Bloom rightly opposes those who refuse to translate *gennaion pseudos* literally as *noble lie,* since they deny that nobility can be coupled with lying or propaganda (p. xiv). In the absence of knowledge of the good's true look, any ascription of worth or nobility to anything is a lie, a claim to know what one does not know.

In defense of his globally oriented morality, Socrates opposes poetry which "adorns the particular and makes it more attractive, hence making it difficult to transcend" (pp. 395, 404–5, 431–4). But what if true justice does not have the universal look ascribed to it by the Platonic tradition (p. 394)? Does respect for philosophy or science spring from a noble lie, or, if you will, a noble value? Bloom's more literal translation leaves such questions open. Reflecting the richness and ambiguity of ordinary English, *beautiful* and *good* may be interpreted in a cosmopolitan or in a local spirit (or both). Like the ordinary speech of which they are a part, these words exist between the Scylla of scientific jargon and the Charybdis of gutter slang which abstract from—and thereby impoverish—the richness of ordinary speech. Thus the translation *moral values* reflects one possible solution of the ambiguity inherent in *beautiful* and *good.* This translation, however, tends to obfuscate other possible solutions. For example, pious Athenians never would regard their piety and justice as their values, "mere individual subjective preferences or, at most, ideal creations of the human spirit" (p. ix). Nor would it seem reasonable to them to degrade their ancestral piety by perceiving it as merely another particular which participates in a universal called *moral values.* In this sense, *moral values* is a term coined by heirs and radicalizers of Socratic enlightenment (pp. 390, 404–5).

Glaucon notes that succeeding generations, the radical heirs, are more easily indoctrinated with new noble lies than is the original generation on which the hoax is perpetrated. Thus Cephalus left Socrates to sacrifice to the ancestral gods, while his son became an ally of Socratic enlightenment (p. 316). The question of who made the wiser choice remains *the* question of political philosophy (pp. 409–11). Bloom's translation and interpretation is a good introduction to serious thought about the question.

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Studies in Machiavellianism. Edited by R. Christie and F. L. Geis. (New York: Academic Press, 1970. Pp. xii, 415. $12.50.)

This book is an attempt to establish the construct validity of a new personality trait called Machiavellianism. It is made up of three parts. The first deals with scale construction and relationships with other scales. The second deals with experimental studies, and the third deals with conclusions and field studies.

In part one, the development of two scales designed to assess Machiavellianism is described. Most of the item content was taken from Machiavelli's *The Prince* and *The Discourses.* The first scale (Mach IV) is a 20-item Likert format scale. It is counterbalanced for agreement response set. The mean split-half reliability for nine samples was .79. The mean item whole correlation (sample unknown) was .38. The scale therefore has very high internal consistency. This scale was found to correlate very highly with social desirability (especially for females), a finding that spurred the authors on to the construction of a second 20 item scale called the Mach V. The Mach V has a forced-choice format requiring that a respondent choose (among three subitems) which is most true of him and which is least true of him. The logic of this system need not be described here. It does seem to do away with the effects of social desirability. The reliability of the Mach V is in the .60's. The correlation between the two scales for both males and females is about .66. In much of the research reported in the book, subjects were separated into high and low groups on the basis of combined scores on both scales.

Unfortunately Christie deliberately chose not to examine systematically the relationship between the Mach scales and other paper and pencil measures that might be expected to assess the same or similar traits. In this reviewer's opinion this was an incredibly shortsighted strategy even if the scale was designed only for research rather than assessment of individual cases. One suspects that the authors are so sure they have a new and valid measure that there is not need to test it. This attitude pervades most of the research done in psychology today. I call it the strategy of weak inference, in deference to Platt's notion of strong inference. The strategy is simple and run as follows: "Don't ever pit your model against a viable competing alternative. Straw men are okay, but a test against the null hypothesis that your model is better than nothing is best of all." Thus we never find out how the scales correlate with the MMPI Pd scale, the CPI So scale, the 16PF factor 14 scale (shrewdness vs. naivete) or whether these other scales might be more powerful than the Mach scales in the laboratory settings studied in the next section of the book.

There are a few correlations, however. Most of them were supplied by other investigators who used the scales in their own research. There is no correlation between the Mach scales and IQ, and therefore as one would expect there is no correlation with educational level, occupational status, or social class. Neither is there a relationship between Mach and political preference or ideology in the single study addressed to the question (e.g., favorability toward Johnson as against Goldwater). The slight positive trends for age, degree of urbanization, and cosmopolitan orientation are based on poor methodology and should not be taken seriously at this time. There is a slight negative correlation between Mach IV and the F scale (−.20).

Perhaps the best construct validity for the Mach IV comes from the following correlations with Wrightman's philosophies of human nature scales: −.67 with Trustworthiness, −.54 with Altruism, −.47 with Independence, −.38 with Strength of Will. Additional suggestive correlations are those between Mach IV and the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale and various measures of hostility (all around .40). The Mach V does not correlate with the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, and its correlations with the other scales mentioned above are unknown. Since both scales were used to select *S*s in the experimental studies cited in the second section of the book it is virtually impossible to draw any conclusions about the personological characteristics of the high and low Mach subjects used in those studies on the basis of the above data.

In the second section of the book a large number of laboratory studies is presented in considerable detail. Most of them have never been published before, although many had been presented as papers at conventions. Detail and interpretation are so extensive they could never have been presented in journals in their current form. Thus the scale(s) have been validated primarily in highly contrived contexts, and it is impossible to estimate the importance (power, pervasiveness, predictive validity) of the scale(s) when applied in real settings against backgrounds of great complexity.

My main complaint against *this* section of the book is that the authors consistently generate complex personological descriptions of their subjects on the basis of both the experimental outcomes and their intuitive impressions of the subjects' behavior in the experiments, as if the experimental outcomes were not sufficient—and they are not. They never move from this level of abstraction and scientific naiveté to the careful examination of individual cases. Nevertheless, the laboratory studies do turn up a few nuggets. High Mach subjects seem to take over leadership positions in informal face-to-face groups. Little effect is found in more structured groups. These results coincide with other experiments which suggest that the more latitude for improvisation there is, the more effective a High Mach subject will be. Machiavellianism seems to interact with situational structure. A very interesting general model which attempts to predict behavior tactics as a function of this interaction is developed in Chapter 17. The model deserves to be explored.

The failure by the authors to study Machiavellianism in real-world settings is perhaps the biggest drawback of this book. The lack of correlation with most demographic variables examined suggests it will have very little power. Until the appropriate studies are conducted, all we know is that "Somehow, college students have been socialized to produce responses on paper-and-pencil tests that are significantly related to a variety of different behaviors in controlled laboratory situations" (p. 323).

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Youth, University and Democracy. By Gottfried Dietze. (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. Pp. 117. $6.50.)

The main themes of Professor Dietze's little book are suggested by its title. The author attempts to describe the broad characteristics of youth, democracy and the university and to consider how they interact with one another. Dietze describes some of the features of youth movements of the past, in Germany since the 18th century, in 19th century Russia and Italy; and of course he has much to say about the beliefs, attitudes, and activities of contemporary youth. The central part of the book deals with the nature and role of the university treated in a broad historical way; Dietze draws more heavily on the pronouncements of earlier German thinkers—Humboldt, Fichte, Nietzsche, Weber, Jaspers—than on contemporary writing. He considers how the claims of youth as they manifest themselves from time to time affect the performance of the university's essential functions. Democracy is treated in a more incidental way, but his concern with it is the same: How is youth affected by the characteristics of modern democracy, and how are universities affected by the context of democratic institutions and ideologies within which they now operate?

These are large themes for a book of little more than a hundred pages, and inevitably the whole exposition proceeds on a dizzying level of abstraction and generality. Dr. Dietze *asserts;* there is very little in the book in the way of analysis, argument or presentation of evidence. Many of the generalizations he asserts are more than a little questionable. Thus: ". . . the student diagnosis of present societies is a quack diagnosis, for establishments are not sick because they are insufficiently democratic, socialist, egalitarian etc., but for the very opposite reason—namely, because they have gone too far to the left" (p. 4). Today's more activist youth movements "admire scientific materialism yet they emotionally dream of a better world than that realized in the Soviet Union. They desire the emancipation of men yet shy away from emphasizing the freedom of the individual from government" (p. 15). Dewey is castigated harshly for allegedly having eroded the notion of any connection between education and discipline, and many will be surprised to hear that Dewey taught that "there are no fixed beliefs . . . He subordinated the end to the means and even abolished the distinction between them. Life is meaningless, the aimless life to be commended" (p. 27). His views about modern politics are presented equally dogmatically; for example: "It has also been shown that the forms of socialism which are mitigated, or disciplined, by liberal democracy, lead to serfdom" (p. 29). Bald assertion of by no means self-evident truth makes up much of the book.

Dietze believes that democracies have developed in ways that accentuate both the problems of youth and those of universities, and no doubt in some senses they have. But he holds views about the characteristics of modern democracy that call for some justification. Limited democracy, he thinks, has given way to absolute democracy (he offers no explication of these two categories), and "the leadership of democracy has been transferred to the less educated masses" (p. 31). Liberty has been subordinated to equality, and modern democracies "while not devoid of rational features, in large measure have become theaters of the emotions." These are not unfamiliar complaints, but there is some evidence that tells against their unqualified truth. Much recent political science suggests that the location of leadership in contemporary democracies is a complex and often obscure matter; after all, "elitist" analyses of democratic political processes have had some support from students of modern democracy. And one is tempted to say that, if among their goals modern democratic states have given priority to equality, then the enormous and diverse inequalities that persist, many of them supported by policy and law, suggest that those states have been extraordinarily ineffective in achieving their goals. But Professor Dietze seems to have little interest in exploring these debatable issues of analysis and interpretation.

Similarly, Dietze does not explore deeply the problematic issues concerning the functions of universities; his aim is the exposition of an orthodoxy. His view is that the university's essential function is the pursuit of truth, clarity, and reason, and nothing should be allowed to impede that single-minded pursuit. "It is risky to serve those one may become subervient to. Since there is a good chance that the university may become subservient to the political community, it must be wary of serving that community" (p. 64). "In the turbulence of modern democracy, the idea of the university must stand out as a ray of hope. The *sapientia universitatis* must emerge as a welcome check upon the *confusio multitudinis* of the pluralist society" (p. 33). That is a concept of the university it is important to keep clearly in mind, but its bare and quite abstract assertion does nothing to clarify the perplexities and complexities that attend this question of the place of the university in modern society. Professor Dietze does not open up issues, search out problems, or come to grips with those dilemmas which really trouble those who are trying to think through the nature and role of university education within contemporary societies.

Thus, it must regrettably be said that those who have thought a great deal about the philosophy of modern higher education are not likely to learn much from this book. In those sections of the book that deal with the ways in which social pressures and the attitudes and demands of students are affecting the universities, Professor Dietze has some sensible things to say, but very little that is not a commonplace of the earlier and contemporary literature. Far too often he descends into mere banality. There are too many pages of writing that are on the level of his remarks about student pranks which, he says, although they are "often justly denounced as going too far, can be useful outlets for youthful exuberance. As a natural relaxation, they can be conducive rather than detrimental to learning" (p. 90).

This is a pity, because Professor Dietze is clearly a scholarly man who has read widely in the "classical" literature dealing with culture and higher education. But his book is not a lively, stimulating, or challenging contribution to the complicated questions with which it deals.

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The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. By Alvin W. Gouldner. (New York: Basic Books, 1970. Pp. 528. $12.50.)

Alvin Gouldner's *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* is in the line of descent of C. Wright Mill's *The Sociological Imagination.* Gouldner's is a larger, more ambitious and more scholarly work. It resembles its predecessor most closely in its critical aims and its pungent prose. Both represent a rejection of the dominant versions of positivist social science in favor of a critical sociology of the European type, a turn away from Cambridge and toward Frankfurt.

Gouldner's themes will be familiar to those who have followed his earlier work: the critique of functionalism developed in "Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory" (1959) and "The Norm of Reciprocity" (1960); the exposé of the pretense of value-freedom in American sociology, published in the Millsian *Sociology on Trial* (1963); the examination of the roots of Western social thought in *Enter Plato* (1965), to which this book is a sequel; and most directly, the widely misunderstood attack on Howard Becker's "underdog" approach to social problems as a mere adjunct to the paternalistic meddling of the welfare state (1968).

The Coming Crisis has a dual program. On one level, it is an exercise in the historical sociology of knowledge of the sort practiced in Germany since the 1920s, but with an American-style emphasis on concrete empirical rather than abstract philosophical interpretations. The general approach is to look for the social "infrastructure" shaping successful theories—the audiences of students, colleagues, and funding agencies and their practical and political concerns. The primary target is the positivist tradition of theoretical system-builders from Comte to Parsons. Parsonian functionalism is interpreted as a distinctively modern version of the complacent bourgeois worldview, developed in the 1930s and '40s in direct response to contemporary events: the rise of the centrally-controlled welfare state, and the threat of a Marxist alternative in that period of economic and political upheaval. Representing the liberal, university-based (and therefore at least indirectly state-supported) segment of the middle class, Parsons' system is both a sociological justification of the New Deal against older laissez-faire ideologies, and a critique of materialist sociology.

A crisis has emerged, however, because of shifts in the infrastructure. A student revolt has broken out within today's universities. From Berkeley and Columbia to Paris and Berlin, the revolts are usually led by sociology students. There is a shift in political conditions, although Gouldner does not exactly put his finger on the reasons for it, and according to his sociology of knowledge this is a sign of impending intellectual changes.

This diagnosis is bolstered by a second level of analysis, a theoretical critique of positivist sociology in terms of its own claims for logical and empirical adequacy. The main target here is Talcott Parsons (in a section taking up one-third of the book), with shorter sections given to Homans, Goffman, and Garfinkel, and a quick survey of sociology in the Eastern bloc. Gouldner's conclusions are that the dominant systematic theory cannot stand on its own when examined purely on its scientific merits, apart from the protective shield of a favorable political climate. The smaller-scale theories are criticized more cursorily: Goffman and Homans as reflecting the commercialism and atomization of today's apolitical affluence, Garfinkel and the ethnomethodologists, the ethos of psychedelic anarchism.

The work does not quite live up to its aims. The sociology of knowledge is applied mainly to the functionalist version of positivism, as is the theoretical critique. What is left out is the main body of empirically-based explanatory sociology, with its considerable advances in such areas as the study of organizations (to which Gouldner himself has significantly contributed), comparative politics, and historical change. Sociology is a more powerful science than Gouldner depicts it in concentrating on the parts that rise least above ideology. Similarly, the treatment of the phenomenological sociologies picks up only their political resonances, missing what they can contribute to grounding explanatory sociology in the real contingencies of face-to-face interaction.

Like the Hegelian Marxists who supply intellectual leadership for the student radicals of today, Gouldner has a tendency to treat scholarship primarily for its political relevance, and dismiss scientific objectivity as technocratic ideology. The shift from Marx's day is interesting: *then* scientific objectivity could be identified with revolution because conservative powers relied on religious legitimation; today, a vulgar practical interpretation of science has become the new opiate of the masses. The task now, it would seem, is to take science back from the opportunists.

Gouldner's version of the infrastructure of intellectual life is too limited to account for those segments of the scientific community which do pursue the development of progressively more powerful explanatory theory on their own terms. Yet surely these exist, for scholarly advances do occur apart from political trends; scientific communities have an internal social structure as well as an external one. Perhaps Parsons receives fullest treatment in this work because functionalism is the theory that can be most adequately comprehended in its political biases. More recently, however, Gouldner seems to be moving towards a concern with just such social bases for the critical autonomy of intellectuals.

The shortcomings of *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* are summed up in its title. "Western Sociology" is too broad; it is primarily about functionalist sociology, not about empirical sociology, neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian conflict theory, phenomenological sociology, or even the European idealist-historicist tradition upon which Gouldner himself draws. (The last of these, however, is the promised subject of Gouldner's next book.) And the "Coming Crisis" is too late; functionalist sociology has been in crisis for at least a decade, during which the vital front of intellectual advance has passed to the phenomenologists, the historical-comparativists, and the conflict theorists. A more accurate title might have been "The Crisis of Functionalist Sociology."

In his conclusion, Gouldner proposes a reflexive sociology in which critical thought corrects itself by reflecting back on its social base. It is an idea in the tradition of Mannheim's "relationism" and more current *theorie und praxis* formulations. What seems superior about Gouldner's is the implication that sociology develops by concerning itself not merely with *what is*, but with what society *might be*. The striving toward realistic utopias can have an important scientific significance, forcing us toward the wider range of possibilities which make up the domain of any truly general explanatory theory. Progress toward more penetratingly humanistic critical thought and progress toward a real social science, it appears, will have to be worked out together.

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Fundamental Change in Law and Society: Hart and Sartre on Revolution. By William L. McBride. (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1970. Pp. 235. 35 Dutch Guilders.)

William L. McBride, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Yale University, offers in this book a probing, penetrating, and exacting comparison of two radically different philosophers for the purpose of explicating and justifying the "obtrusive" phenomenon called "fundamental change" (comparatively more "neutral" and broad than "revolution"). The two philosophers he explores are H. L. A. Hart, British author of *The Concept of Law,* who represents the tradition of analysis; and Jean-Paul Sartre, French author of *Critique de la Raison Dialectique* (Vol. 1: *Théorie des Ensembles Pratiques*) in which he employs the method of dialectic, professes to be a Marxian philosopher, and claims Marxism to be *the* insurpassable philosophy of this epoch.

This work focuses on two central areas of comparison between Hart and Sartre—one is methodological and the other substantive. In terms of philosophical methodology, the contrast between the two thinkers is sharpest and most decisive: Hart's method of *analysis* augmented by the extensive use of analogies vs. Sartre's dialectic accompanied by "abstractions." Professor McBride attempts to show that the "hard core meaning" of Hart's concept of analysis is not confined to narrowly conceived linguistic analysis and is neither purely descriptive nor simply nonsystematic. In contrast to Hart, Sartre claims that his dialectical method, as opposed to the method of analysis, is characterized by synthesis, internality, progression, and novelty. Indispensable to the understanding of their philosophies both individually and comparatively are the notions of human survival, rules, and acceptance in Hart; and scarcity, totalization, and the oath in Sartre. To facilitate the comparison of the two, these substantive categories are methodically plotted—each one having its counterpart in the other. The main value of Professor McBride's work, it seems to this reviewer, lies in bringing to light with clarity and prudence the concepts used by the two philosophers with divergent backgrounds in order to focus on the issue of fundamental change. Particularly lucid is the way in which Professor McBride deciphers Sartre's difficult *Critique,* which is not only massive in size but also tortuous in prose.

In his discussion of substantive issues, Professor McBride agrees with Hart who, unlike Kelsen, regards law as a social phenomenon and thus treats legal matters in the total context of human behavior. Nonetheless, he criticizes Hart's notion of rules contending that the primary rules and secondary rules Hart develops (along with distinctions and combinations) are inadequate for an analysis of both legal systems (primitive and modern or national and international) and a fundamental change. It is in Hart's notion of acceptance, I think, that several important questions concerning fundamental change in law and society are raised: the validity and the justification of a legal system, the distinction between a "healthy" and a "pathological" legal system, and above all the relationship between law and morality. Unlike Kelsen, Olivecrona, and Ross—all of whom accept the "external aspect" of legal rules as an adequate criterion for the science of law—Hart insists that the "internal aspect" of acceptance must be accounted for in understanding the functioning or malfunctioning of the legal system. Professor McBride points out that, despite Hart's original insistence on the complete separation of law and morality, his notion of fundamental change in relation to his notion of acceptance reveals the intimate relationship between law and morality. The issue of law and morality necessarily leads to his concept of "the minimum content of natural law" which consists of five "truisms": human vulnerability, approximate equality, limited altruism, limited resources, and limited understanding and strength of will. For Professor McBride, Hart's view here is not "in any fundamental opposition to the 'deontological' concept of natural law" held by such theorists as A. P. d'Entrèves (p. 95).

In his treatment of Sartre's *Critique,* Professor McBride describes the place of law, or rather lack of law, therein, "abstractions" (two ultimate ones are *praxis* and inert matter, comparable to the *pour-soi* and the *en-soi* in *Being and Nothingness*), and the oath, a social contract which accounts for the permanence and solidarity of a social structure or the organization of society. But his analysis of Sartre's notion of totalization is most decisive for understanding what is taken to be the limitations of Sartre's philosophy of man and society (i.e., "structural anthropology"), the integral part of which is the issue of fundamental change. It is also within the concept of totalization that the other notions of Sartre such as *praxis,* project, matter, alienation, the group and the series come to the fore and emerge clearly as interrelated concepts. Totalization (not to be confused with totality) is the phenomenon in which individuals through their projects come together for a common objective. For Sartre, it is never complete, since there remains always a gap between individual and common action due to the sovereignty of individual action and the irreducibility of individual projects. The transformation of the series into the group (in fusion) in pursuit of a radically social objective (that is, a revolutionary event) is indeed the clearest instance of totalization. Only the Christian eschatology matches Sartre's concept of totalization.

The thrust of Professor McBride's criticism of Sartre's notion of totalization is indeed sweeping, perhaps too sweeping: totalization is both impossible and undesirable. In the first place, totalization rooted in pure consciousness makes philosophy itself an impossibility, since philosophy cannot break away from linguistic restraints. It is by "the concept" rather than pure consciousness, Professor McBride argues, that the criterion of truth is (logically) determined. Thus, for him, the completely anticonceptual philosophy of pure consciousness is self-contradictory. In the second place, the apocalyptic vision of totalization based on sovereign and irreducible projects results in "madness," as it were. The logic of totalization can hardly escape moral relativism. It is then by way of Hart's "concept of law" that Professor McBride seems to dampen Sartre's passions for anticonceptual thought and for madness in action and insists that human action is governed by rules.

By exposing the strengths and the weaknesses of both Hart and Sartre, Professor McBride conceives of "fundamental change in law" and "fundamental change in society" as "a single concept." Moreover, he appeals to the notion of immutable human nature, including man's rule-governed nature, in the hope of remedying Sartrean madness and moral relativism and yet of preserving novelty and creativity in individual and social action and of upholding the right to fundamental change.

In sum: Professor McBride has written a definitive and judicious critique. He is most skillful, I think, in pinpointing those difficulties which exist in Hart and Sartre in terms of their own respective philosophical frameworks. Professor McBride has made the convincing argument that philosophy (social, political, and legal philosophy in particular) is capable of dealing with a socially urgent and relevant problem like fundamental change or revolution in terms of both *explication* and *justification*. As opposed to Marcuse, he has demonstrated that there is no one privileged philosophical method but a plurality of methods which guide us to an exploration of "the possibilities of a new experience." As opposed to Kant, moreover, he has succeeded in showing us the way in which the philosopher, by upholding the right to fundamental change in law and society, does not have to be a mere apologist for the existing state of affairs. Thus the concept of justification in philosophy raises not only social, political, and legal questions but also, more importantly, ethical questions as well. Professor McBride's book is an important contribution to the literature of the theory of social change. To appreciate the tightness of the arguments and the conceptual continuity of this book, political scientists as well as philosophers (particularly those who are interested in the theory of social change) will benefit greatly from reading it.

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The Foundations of Political Analysis, Empirical and Normative. By Eugene J. Meehan. (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press. 1971. Pp. 274. $7.70.)

Despite its title, this book is not about politics, but about the social sciences generally. In fact, one of its themes, presented in the opening pages and the final chapter, is that "political science" is a mere label, and that the proper division of labor for social scientists is by practical projects, not academic disciplines. "Political scientists," however, are expected to take note.

Those who know of Meehan's earlier books will be prepared for the general theme. We start with the idea of systematic inquiry as an operation which requires the use of various tools or instruments. These tools can be tested only in use. Explanations are such tools, ones which provide people with the means of control over their environment. Value judgments are likewise tools; they provide people with the means of choosing between alternative courses of action. In using explanations people engage in *empirical* inquiry. In using value judgments, they engage in *normative* inquiry. Neither of these forms of inquiry can be separated from the other. In both of them, the instruments—the explanations and the value judgments—are created by men to fulfill their purposes, and in both of them the test of the adequacy of the instruments lies in practice. Pragmatism is thus claimed as providing an effective way of circumventing the logical gap between fact and value in the social sciences.

Because of this main theme, it is the second part of the book, dealing with normative inquiry, which is of the most interest. The first part, on empirical inquiry, presents an account of scientific method which is on the whole familiar; it is in terms of calculi and their application of phenomena. Meehan no longer speaks of a "systems paradigm" as in his earlier book on "Explanation in Social Science," and he has dropped, advisedly in my opinion, the sharp contrast between his view of explanation and the deductivist view. He dissociates himself from the deductivist view (p. 114) only because it is too rigorous for the social sciences. He wants to insist, rightly enough, on the ubiquity of the *ceteris paribus* clause in the social sciences and the consequent looseness of fit between theory and fact. But he still associates this, unfortunately, with the view that theories, or "explanations," as instruments for securing justifiable expectations, are not "statements about reality."

A general difficulty with this first part of the book has to do with the key term "explanation." I think what are here called "explanations" are normally called "theories." Meehan rejects the term "theory" (pp. 86–7) on grounds of its ambiguity, but it would at least have relieved him of such odd-sounding statements as that explanations are the means for controlling the environment. An explanation (in the usual sense) is only concerned with what has occurred, and when the explanation is given, it is too late to do anything about what is being explained. Part of the past year's traffic toll may be explained by drunken driving, but this toll is beyond being controlled. What is useful for control, of course, is the general causal proposition, used in the explanation, that drunken driving contributes to traffic deaths. Given this causal theory we might do something about next year's toll.

Clarity about explanation would also help with the very confusing contrast drawn between explanations and forecasts in Chapter 3. This looks like the standard contrast between explanation and prediction, but it is nothing of the sort. It is a contrast between causal laws and what have been called indicator laws, or symptom laws. Meehan is pointing out, quite rightly, that it is only causal laws, giving the sufficient conditions for the occurrence of an event, which provide the means for making the event happen; you cannot control the weather by interfering with barometers. But he gives no clear analysis of this distinction.

It is when we get to the treatment of value judgments, however, that the real trouble starts. One is constantly given the impression that value judgments are to be tested in use in the same way as explanations. Their acceptance as correct depends on their consequences in action. But what consequences are we to consider? If we accept a naturalistic definition of values, in terms, say, of the satisfaction of human needs, there would be no trouble, for then our criterion for choice would be a simple empirical one—how many needs will be satisfied? But Meehan cannot intend this, for it would make normative inquiry into a branch of the empirical, and there would be no logical gap to circumvent.

We are therefore driven on, chapter by chapter, to find out how we do test the soundness of our choices. It looks as if we are getting there in Chapter 9, but the solution still eludes us. What we do find is effective criticism of a tradition of normative inquiry in which absolute principles are presented without any way of applying them. It is no good merely setting up health, say, or education as desirable goals. We must ask, first of all, how much health, how much education; that is, in Meehan's jargon, we must specify the values of our normative variables. And secondly we must assign priorities, deciding how to balance health against education, in their varying degrees. Thus our principles must be distilled from our assignments of priorities in specific cases. Reasoned choice, as Meehan puts it, is a form of cost-benefit analysis.

All this is important for the problem of utilitarian calculation, but it does not solve the problem of the justification of choices. It does not tell us what to count as a benefit and what as a cost in the setting up of preference scales. Meehan is charging philosophers with ignoring the minor premisses of normative arguments. But what he is doing on his side is ignoring the major premisses.

This might not matter so much in cases where everyone is agreed on the priorities. In an interesting passage Meehan points out that this state of affairs is approached in moderately poor societies, where first place is given to the general maintenance of the necessities of life. But choice problems become serious below this level, where there is a battle for necessities, and above it, where there is a battle of luxuries. And when there are such choice problems, they are not resolved merely by being illustrated in the concrete.

It should perhaps have been mentioned in this book that much of it, especially Part II, reproduces very closely the argument of "Value Judgment and Social Science" published two years previously. Even the Foreword is substantially the same. It is a little confusing to find a passage quoted in the text from the Foreword of the previous book which reappears in the Foreword of the present one.

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Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society. By Bertell Ollman. (Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1971. Pp. xvi, 325. $10.50.)

Ollman aims to expose essential features of Marx's critique of modern society. The author is among those who deny the existence of any break in doctrine or method between the early and mature Marx. Accordingly, he concentrates much of his attention on early and unpublished works of Marx (the *Paris Manuscripts, The German Ideology,* the "Introduction" to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* and the *Grundrisse*) as well as on *Capital,* in order to show the basic unity, coherence, and sense which he feels most of Marx's critics and many of his sympathetic commentators have missed.

Ollman's basic thesis is that Marx's doctrine embodies a special philosophical perspective, a "philosophy of internal relations," and that this explains Marx's perplexing and at times apparently incoherent use of language. Marx's biggest problem, says Ollman, was that of communicating the complex conception of things he attained through the perspective in question. He was aware of the problem but never quite solved it. As a result, a good deal of commentary on Marx, which presupposes a perspective other than Marx's, is made up of oversimplification and misdirected criticism.

The task Ollman sets for himself is threefold: (1) to clarify the features of Marx's "philosophy of internal relations," (2) to show how it operates in Marx's conception of human nature, and (3) to present the essentials of Marx's criticism of capitalist society as based on the conception of human nature.

Ollman gives a clear and scholarly exposition of Marx's doctrine: The subject of Marx's critical inquiry, he talls us, was the historical world of human society, or human social production. Marx viewed that world as an evolving organic totality whose components are not conceived to be logically distinct entities open to clear-cut definition, but rather to be organic members whose individual reality and significance are constituted of sets of relations to other members and, ultimately, to the organic totality as a whole. The terms Marx used to describe the modern world—capital, wage-labor, value, class, civil society, state, etc.—signify the relations that constitute the organic world of social production in its present moment of historical evolution. Because the elements named are organic members, they are defined in terms of their co-elements and, further, are legitimately defined in a variety of ways, each of which points up one or other of the relations the set of which comprises their total reality and significance. For Marx, the "essence" of a thing is identically the set of relations that constitutes it, and "science" (*Wissenschaft*) is the discovery and tracing out of those relations. His "scientific" treatment of modern society, therefore, was his effort to expose in their full complexity and specifically modern form the relational ties of an organic totality that embraces nature, man, and man's economic, social, political and cultural "products." Within such a view of things, no primary causes or ultimate determinants are to be found. "Economic determinism" and other such reductionist concepts violate the subtlety of Marx's thought and method. Still, the historical world of social production had for him a crucial, single sense: all facets of that world have their meaning ultimately in reference to human nature. The relations named by terms such as capital, wage-labor, commodity, exchange value and state are nothing other than the contemporary "alienated" form of the "natural" and "species" relations that constitute the essence, or nature, of man as a dynamic, purposive and creative being. The modern world of capitalist production in its organically related economic, social, political and cultural facets *is* alienated human nature.

In expounding the particulars of this doctrine, Ollman makes important contributions to the contemporary study and discussion of Marx. His treatment of Marx's philosophical perspective and its methodological corollaries provides the sort of propaedeutic needed for an intelligent reading of Marx's texts, and should thus help clear the air of onesided interpretations and misdirected criticisms. He also provides much clear and valuable commentary: his treatment of Marx's concept of human nature is excellent, among the best to be found in the secondary literature, and should be read by anyone tackling the *Paris Manuscripts* or, for that matter, *Capital;* for Ollman also clearly shows that the doctrine on human nature in the *Manuscripts* underpins the economic doctrine in *Capital* and is the key to understanding the theory of value at the heart of the later work.

Given its appearance in a series of "Studies in the History and Theory of Politics," I had expected Ollman's book would give more attention than the single brief chapter it devotes to the explicitly political writings and thought of Marx. This is not to say, however, that political scientists will find the book of little interest. On the contrary, Ollman's clarification of the more basic methodological and doctrinal positions of Marx should prove both stimulating and valuable for the study of Marx's specifically political texts.

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Consent and Consensus. By P. H. Partridge. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 165. $5.00.)

It is a maxim among publishers that a textbook need not advance the frontiers of knowledge but only guide the reader toward them. The more well-traveled the route, the more acceptable the text, and the more widely it will be adopted. When the frontiers are changing or uncertain, this formula does not work so well. The present volume, written for a series of "key concepts in political science," is a case in point.

As a short introductory essay, it has its virtues. It is literate, cites much relevant material (including the work of such contemporaries as Almond and Verba, Dahl, Friedrich, Key, and McClosky), and uses both the historical and linguistic or analytical approaches to political theory, neither to excess. Examples are drawn from political practice, not from contrived conversation or the rest of the trivia and quadrivia of everyday life out of which philosophers too often extrapolate political truth. Sociological theory compensates for any narrowness owing to the perspective of political science. The whole is knit together by an argument in favor of the view that both consent and consensus—the first defined in narrowly political terms, the second defined as a broader, social phenomenon—are essential to stable democracy.

What then is there to complain about? One clue to the shortcomings of the effort is the treatment of Rousseau early in the book. Once again, France's "Newton of the moral world" (Kant) emerges from British scrutiny (Partridge teaches in Australia) as a continental oddity. The concept of the general will is set aside because it is "of a special kind that departed far from ordinary notions of consent" and was intended by Rousseau to be applied only to small communities (p. 24). In themselves, these observations are unobjectionable, but when the issue of consent is taken as the central question of democracy, as it is by Partridge, and Rousseauean democracy is deliberately left out of account, prominent features of the political landscape are certain to be omitted or poorly represented.

Exclude Rousseau, and democracy is almost automatically depicted in terms of the liberal parliamentary model alone. Regular majoritarian consent is essential because government is understood as the representation of self-interest, as defined by Locke and Bentham. When the English Idealists, especially Green, objected to this parochialism, it was because they saw the need to distinguish between interests and aspirations, between the actual and the potential self, lest great issues of moral reform be barred from the public agenda. Indeed, only by including the Rousseauean dimension of democracy is it possible to appreciate the influence of many other factors vital to the understanding of the consensual process, including the force of egalitarian populism, the persistence of demands for devolution and decentralization, and the mystique that envelops even democratic constitutions and rulers.

Sociological theories of social integration, such as Durkheim's *conscience collective,* are a useful corrective, and Partridge uses them for this purpose, but they are hardly sufficient. To be at all adequate today, political theory must come to grips by itself with the fact that a good many nonwestern states, some reasonably stable, claim to be democratic, but on Rousseauean rather than Lockean grounds. These include not only the Communist "people's democracies" but also the "vanguard democracies" (C. B. Macpherson) in the developing nations. When the spokesmen of modernizing elites tell us they speak on behalf of an as yet incompletely formed general will, are we to insist that they are simply autocrats in disguise, without investigating the claim any further, as though they cannot be conceded even theoretical legitimacy?

The defense of liberal, parliamentary democracy also suffers when it must be made entirely on non-Rousseauean grounds. Partridge asserts that systems can be divided into democratic and undemocratic according to whether consent is required and dissent is possible. He admits, however, that in mass societies public opinion can be manipulated, voting is often ambiguous, and the power of voluntary associations constricts rather than broadens the opportunity to participate. To those who maintain that democracy is stable only when it rests on habit instead of deliberate agreement, he replies that it rests on a "weak consensus." Just how weak may be judged from his concession that norms internalized as a result of socialization, even when they involve "an emotional identification with an object, may justly be characterized as *agreement* with it" (p. 79).

It would be much better to acknowledge that conventional liberal democratic theory has serious weaknesses, both in the face of the rise of Rousseauistic democracies and in view of much empirical study pointing to the inherent practical difficulties of combining liberty and equality with social stability. Just such difficulties have lately led to efforts to reconstruct the theory by developing a "calculus of consent" or by drawing analogies between democracy and a market economy and between all polities and communication systems. None of these efforts is treated by Partridge, so preoccupied is he with the defense of positions that others have already evacuated under fire. Only once, toward the end of his book, does he hint that he understands more than he has tried to reveal in this book. Sorel, he remarks, may have seen an important truth:

> Political action which can involve or affect large numbers will always be ideological politics, that is, politics which involves broad issues and moral concerns. On the other hand, it could well be that the politics of "incrementalism," of bargaining, negotiation and adjustment, is a form of politics that will almost inevitably accord a central role to the political, bureaucratic or organizational elites and thereby tend to exclude the rank and file from the experience of political involvement (137).

This shrewd observation could have been the beginning of a more fruitful inquiry into the role of consent in democracy. Here it is offered apologetically because it involves "matters of high speculation" (p. 137). Partridge apparently felt that his job was to prepare the reader to undertake such speculation on his own. It is at least arguable that, contrary to his intentions, he has actually precluded advanced inquiry by pre-empting the only ground on which it can take place.

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The New American Society. By Joseph Bensman and Arthur J. Vidich. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971. Pp. 306. $10.00.)

This sociological essay on revolutionary change in America asserts in its opening lines that American society has been "changing continuously" since the beginning of World War II and that the "direction" and "total amount of change" has produced a "social and cultural revolution." Since one of the most commonly accepted professional opinions about American political institutions is their great stability, one who advances such a proposition must expect, at least initially, to be greeted with skepticism. There has certainly been no announced departure from the liberal-democratic consensus within which the political parties are located, nor any observable changes in the essential structure of America political institutions. Our domestic institutions have demonstrated a remarkable capacity for surviving many of their own failures and for successfully co-opting the leadership of groups whose initial aim was general social change.

An obviously crucial consideration in evaluating the merits of this thesis is reaching an agreed upon definition of revolutionary change. Although no formal definition of revolution is provided in the course of the essay, it is a fair inference from the text that the change to which reference is made is in the form of possession of capital. The present revolutionary situation, it is developed, has been generated by four changes in the position of capital in society roughly beginning with the 1940s: First, there has been a change in the manner in which capital in society is acquired and accumulated. The state presently acts as an important instrument of capital accumulation, providing through tax write-offs, depletion allowances, depreciation allowances, investment incentives, insurance schemes, subsidies, and grants a major source of the funds employed in stablizing and maintaining the economy. The indirect nature of many of these subsidies has disguised the circumstance that the middle class is the principal beneficiary of the policies arising out of the Roosevelt era, *not,* as commonly believed, the low-income groups. Nevertheless, Bensman and Vidich contend that the Marxian prognosis of increasing proletarianization and misery has been divested of its essential relevance by the absorption of the blue-collar worker and the farmer into the middle class, and by an increasing diversion of industry to the production of services. Second, we are told that a change has occurred in the productivity of physical capital. Automation seems to assure a much higher rate of production with less overhead cost. Third, capital has been consolidated in the hands of large corporations and organized in keeping with bureaucratic standards. Finally, there is a declining emphasis on competition for capital in the form of physical or financial resources and an accentuated drive for capital in the form of the expertise and manipulative skill needed for an important managerial or professional post. This quest for human capital is a function of the dependence of modern industry on science and technology.

The thesis that a revolutionary situation has been produced by the above changes in the role of capital would gain strength if it could be related to changes in the purposes for which capital was employed. The logical outcome of the developments described by the authors points to an apparent need for the socialization of the uses of capital corresponding to the activity of the state as an instrument of capital accumulation. Nothing said by the authors disturbs the central proposition that decisions about the uses of capital, whether in the marketplace or in the legislative arena, past or present, originate in the private sector and are extensively shaped by personally defined goals. Evidence for this proposition is supplied by the authors themselves, who point out that the "Ph.D. intellectual-entrepreneur of space, science, and data-processing," is differentiated from the entrepreneurs of America's past solely as the possessor of human capital rather than physical or finance capital, *not* in terms of the instrumental rationality and commercialism which is common to them both (p. 143). By the same token, the role of the state in the "revolutionary era" described by Professors Bensman and Vidich remains consistent with the traditional functions assigned to the state by liberal-democratic theorists since Madison. The role of the state is to manage conflict among individuals and groups contending for short-term gains through the political process, providing for the needs of each group in an amount sufficient to establish a vested interest in the political system. Apparently unaware that they are describing the operative realities of politics in a system constituted in keeping with Madisonian principles, the authors relate that

> In its political dimension, the managers of this New Society are forced to allocate expenditures to differ-

> ent segments, groups, classes, interests, firms, and so on, so as to avoid what previously might have been a struggle of each class against the others and against the regime itself. . . . In short, it is possible for an administration to prevent or exacerbate forms of group conflict by making or not making concessions to the various claimants (p. 31).

While I do not feel that the authors have succeeded in proving their thesis, this essay is nevertheless recommended for its illuminating treatment of the social effects of changes in the position and the form of capital in America from the 1940s to the present.

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Censorship and Freedom of Expression: Essays on Obscenity and the Law. Edited by Harry M. Clor. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1971. Pp. x, 175. $2.50, paper.)

This is a fascinating and intellectually exciting collection. Professor Harry Clor has assembled eight essays which represent both diversity of thought and professional interest and expertise. The first two selections, opinions written by Judge Jerome Frank and Mr. Justice William J. Brennan and treating for the first time the issue of whether obscenity is protected speech within the meaning of the First and Fourteenth Amendments [*Roth* v. *United States* and *Alberts* v. *California* (1957)], are prologue to the subsequent six essays that provide the essence of this volume. More specifically, *Censorship* represents the careful deliberations of attorney Charles Rembar, political scientist Walter Berns, theologian Richard F. Hettlinger, political scientist Clor, attorney Richard H. Kuh, and psychoanalyst Willard M. Gaylin.

Editor Clor successfully accomplishes his purpose in "plac[ing] the reader in the midst of a debate" (p. vi), even though the slightly more than one page of prefatory commentary is all the intellectual cement that holds this collection together. And yet, this volume is not, as perhaps one would expect on first examination, merely an assemblage of a few hastily compiled articles. Regardless of one's philosophical attitudes and psychological reactions to obscenity, the six essays are stimulating, provocative, and illuminating; they are persuasively argued, well written, and, with few exceptions, free from tantrums. Some readers will, however, find the highly subjective and unsubstantiated statement "It is true that Douglas is uniquely vulgar for a Supreme Court justice [*sic*], but his colleagues have not been far behind him on the substantive issue" (p. 64) as irritating, unwarranted, and distractive to the author's otherwise meritorious discussion. But then, this is precisely the exciting characteristic of *Censorship*: obscenity per se is (1) a controversial subject, (2) teeming with emotional thickets, and (3) difficult to discuss, let alone resolve. The essayists are to be commended for their lively and penetrating treatment of a dynamic subject.

The multitude of divergent and convergent issues and themes raised by these papers precludes extensive comment and analysis. A brief overview: In his "The Outrageously Immoral Fact," Charles Rembar, the successful defender of *Fanny Hill*—the "prima ballerina of the law of obscenity" (p. 31), tells us that what is outrageously immoral "is that the only morality for whose sake the law has been willing to suppress books is sexual morality" (p. 48). Rembar intentionally limits his discussion to literary censorship and does not delve into the more difficult areas of film, stage, or other public, expression-conduct forms of communication as they relate to government control and the First Amendment barrier.

A case *for* obscenity censorship is next presented by Walter Bern in "Beyond the (Garbage) Pale or Democracy, Censorship and the Arts." Among other things, Professor Berns contends that obscene material promotes an unnatural sense of shamelessness that is destructive to a democracy dependent upon "the good character" of its citizenry.

With respect to religious institutions and sexual censorship, Richard Hettlinger argues that the Church "has been markedly *negative, authoritarian,* and *distorted* in its attitude toward sex" (p. 74). "It is not," he says, "the *content* of obscenity that is important. It is the *principle* of singling out this field of human concern for official restraint that is harmful" (p. 90); this view is similar to Rembar's and to Willard Gaylin's contention in "Obscenity is More Than a Four-Letter Word." Gaylin questions whether obscenity is harmful to the individual and to society and maintains that this issue must be answered before determining "whether and on what basis we should preserve a legal concept of obscenity" (p. 168).

Harry Clor vividly and perceptively sees obscene material and pornography as depersonalized sexuality that is humanly degrading. According to Clor, obscenity and pornography strip the individual of his personality and dignity and reduce him to an object whose body merely becomes an instrument of sexual gratification—what Richard Kuh in his paper terms the reduction of "lovemaking to a *spectator* sport" (p. 137). Since, for Clor, obscenity and pornography do not appeal to the "mind of man" or to "ideas," they cannot receive First

Amendment protection but are appropriate subjects for government control. Appended to his essay is his critical commentary on the 1970 Report of the President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography.

Richard Kuh argues that a "little censorship" of obscenity is desirable, workable, and politically realistic and "is *not* inconsistent with democracy, with freedom of expression, with political dissent" (p. 132). According to Kuh, some censorship serves a legitimate societal purpose when obscenity and pornography are available to children and adults through public exhibitions (e.g., burlesque billboards, nude and sadistic films, live sex shows, "adult" newsstand and bookstores). Kuh admits, however, that "grounds for obscenity regulation may be less persuasive" when the "sale or display of alleged hardcore pornography [is] to adults" (p. 136). His reasoning is influenced, in part, by the Supreme Court's decision in *Stanley* v. *Georgia* (1969) that private possession of obscene material is constitutionally protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But he also asserts that public entertainment that "smacks somewhat of the sick, of the voyeuristic" may be banned "*solely* on the grounds of *morality*" (p. 137). Attached to his essay is one of several antiobscenity statutes proposed by the author.

Unfortunately, *Censorship* fails to include a bibliography for further consultation which, for this volume, leaves the collection truncated and the reader intellectually dangling. Furthermore, those not familiar with obscenity litigation and the intricate legal, political, social, psychological, and moral issues contained therein will find that the footnotes to each essay, while helpful, are far from complete. These, however, are minor deficiencies in a small but powerfully absorbing volume.

ELLIOTT A. BROWN

Park College

The Un-Politics of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-Decisionmaking in the Cities. By Matthew A. Crenson. (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. Pp. 227. $10.00.)

Professor Crenson has taken non–decision making seriously enough to pursue it carefully and assiduously. He is scrupulous about operationalizing his concepts, specifying and testing hypotheses, and confronting potential challenges to his conclusions. He rarely overstates his position, and he generally avoids the tired polemics of the pluralist-elitist debate. All this he accomplishes without sacrificing his belief (oftstated in the book) that pluralism has "failed democracy" (p. 177). There is but one real problem; he doesn't prove his case.

Crenson pierces quickly to the heart of the non-decision-making debate. The central issue of that debate—and of his book—is the "penetrability" or openness of the polity to incipient policy demands. He believes, quite rightly, that penetrability is an important requirement of democracy, and, therefore, that it can be used to test the pluralist faith in democratic structures. By specifying the political conditions that turn air pollution into a live issue in some communities and that prevent its emergence in other communities, he hopes to discover whether non–decision making, which exists whenever potential activists shy away from pushing the air pollution issue because of anticipated opposition, limits the penetrability of the polity.

Crenson's data base is a survey of formal political and organization leaders in 51 medium and large cities. In addition, detailed case studies of Gary and East Chicago, Indiana, provide him with many of the hypotheses he tests against the survey data.

The question, of course, is whether Crenson demonstrates a systematic non-decision-making bias that reduces the penetrability of the political system to demands for air pollution regulation. The answer to this question is that he doesn't quite. Let me criticize some of Crenson's line of argument:

Crenson first tries to give the reader a reason to believe that air pollution is serious enough to be a political issue. This step is obviously crucial. Unless there is some public sympathy for air pollution regulation, there is nothing for nondecision making to deter. Unfortunately, however, Crenson knows little about public opinion regarding air pollution in his sample cities. He relies instead on fragmentary opinion data collected by others and on surveys of actual pollution levels. Therefore, he never dispels the possibility that the absence of the air pollution issue in some cities is due to citizen disinterest in the problem.

The author next describes the status of the air pollution issue in his sample cities. Of all the major political and organizational forces at work in his sample, industrial concerns, not surprisingly, turn out to be the most common opponents of air pollution regulation. Consequently, his subsequent investigation focuses on the role of industrial concerns as possible "nondecisionmakers" in cities where air pollution does not become an issue.

Does industrial influence actually deter air pollution from becoming an issue? Here Crenson encounters difficulties. His main proposition—that the greater the perceived industrial influence on the air pollution issue, the less likely the issue will emerge—is not supported by the data (p. 117). He notes, however, that in high-pollution cities there is a moderate correlation between industrial influence and the lack of air pollution's early emergence as an issue, while in low-pollution cities industrial influence retards the air pollution issue late in the emergence sequence. Censon explains this peculiar pattern by arguing that:

> In low-pollution cities the costs to industry of pollution control are likely to be small, and, as a result, perceived industrial influence does not prevent the issue from taking root. Once the pollution problem has been brought to the community's attention, however, the ability to elicit a broad response is diminished by the very fact that local pollution conditions are not especially serious, and the perceived benefits of pollution regulation are relatively small. In high-pollution cities just the opposite conditions hold. Pollution control is likely to impose relatively heavy costs upon local industry, and those costs will probably be obvious to local political actors. Perceived industrial influence will therefore be an immediate obstacle. Once the dirty air issue has become established, however, its growth prospects are enhanced by the severity of local pollution. Having once been called to the attention of the community, the issue is not so easily forgotten (pp. 120–1).

There are two main problems with this argument. First, by controlling for pollution levels, Crenson reduces the number of cases to wholly unreliable levels, thereby increasing the possibility of error. Second, and more important, his interpretation does not establish the non-decision-making argument. He attributes the major deterrent effect in low-pollution cities to a lack of public interest in air pollution, not to industrial influence. In high-pollution cities his data indicate that industry has no deterrent influence on the air pollution policies of unions or political parties, despite the association (p. 119) between high pollution and a large blue-collar work force. Put another way, "influential" industries cannot get unions or parties to resist air pollution ordinances even when such industries employ a high portion of the local work force. This does not add up to a convincing demonstration of industry's non-decision-making power.

How does non–decision making work? Industry's influence is unrelated to overt behavior, apparently. Industry is most effective when it remains mute, not when it actually tries to throw its weight around. As Crenson puts it, ". . . it is industrial inaction and not industrial action that proves to be the critical form of behavior" (p. 124). Thus, contrary to the contention of pluralists, influence can be exerted in the absence of any actual behavior. Again, however, the argument trails loose ends. As Crenson shows, industry's reputation for influence extends over several policy areas and is not confined to air pollution. Therefore, it is possible that industry's reputation in the air pollution area may derive from its actual behavior on other issues. Crenson does not investigate this possibility. His argument that influence is transferrable from issue to issue is convincing, but he does not prove that influence itself may be independent of action and therefore beyond the reach of traditional pluralist research methods.

Crenson again finds himself propping up unsupported hypotheses when he turns to the role of political parties. Once more his main proposition receives little support. He expects an inverse relationship between party influence on air pollution matters and the emergence of the air pollution issue. Instead he finds no relationship. Indeed, where industrial influence is high, the parties actually encourage the emergence of air pollution as an issue (p. 145). The author attributes this unexpected finding to party interest in distributive as opposed to collective benefits. Because the air pollution issue provides only collective benefits politicians normally have nothing to gain from it as an issue. Where industry is strong, however, the parties encourage the air pollution issue in order to blackmail industry and gain from it distributive benefits. But this argument is unconvincing. Wouldn't strong parties stand to gain most from influential industries by *quashing* air pollution regulations (for a price), rather than by encouraging such regulations? Again, in his effort to salvage an unprofitable idea the author strains the credulity of his reader.

The strength of this book lies not in its findings, but in its contributions to democratic theory. Interspersed throughout are important reformulations and modifications of pluralism. These involve, chiefly, the role of indirect influence, limitations on a community's political agenda, and the biases inherent in clusters of political issues. But nondecision making itself slips away like a thief in the night.

RICHARD M. MERELMAN
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Urban Leadership in the Sixties. By James V. Cunningham. (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1970. Pp. 92. $4.50.)

In most books on cities, not very much attention is paid to the exercise of mayoral leadership. Therefore, James V. Cunningham performs a useful task in examining how mayors in four cities (Cleveland, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and New Haven) have utilized their political resources. Although mayors and observers of city politics have often declared that massive outside aid is necessary to solve urban problems, Mr. Cunningham quite rightly points out that there are wide variations in mayors' ability to attract and productively use outside assistance.

At the outset, Cunningham draws a distinction between "entrepreneurs" and "non-entrepreneurs" in public life. Entrepreneurs, in his terms, are characterized by: originality, risk-taking, initiative, energy, openness, organizational ability, and promotional ingenuity. Nonentrepreneurs, in contrast, have the following qualities: caution, inflexibility, bureaucratic authoritarianism, physical inertness, heavy-handedness, and organizational confusion. Although Cunningham deals with certain strategies by which mayors can increase their own power, he states that he is even more interested in what such leaders do for the people living in their cities.

Using these standards of measurement, Cunningham views the careers of four mayors: Ralph Locher of Cleveland (who served from 1962 through 1967), Richard J. Daley of Chicago (1955—), Joseph Barr of Pittsburgh (1959–1970), and Richard C. Lee of New Haven (1953–1969). The author bases his descriptions and judgments on his own participation in—and observation of—urban programs in those four cities. He concentrates on the mayors' responses to federal social programs, particularly the war on poverty.

The mayors are shown to have differed widely in their approaches to their jobs. Mayor Locher is pictured as a man who hoarded his resources, rather than expanding them. Resisting new ideas, he concentrated on small physical projects and surrounded himself with tradition-bound advisers. Cunningham presents Mayor Daley as a man who increased his own political resouces and his control over events in the city, but who was insufficiently open to new ideas and to the demands by poor people for political power. Although Mayor Barr is judged by the author to have exercised little power on his own, he is given credit for appointing some aggressive staff members and then giving them fairly free rein to pursue innovative policies. But only Mayor Lee emerges from Cunningham's study as a public entrepreneur who displayed originality and a willingness to take risks. In responding to urban renewal programs and the poverty program, Lee was able to gain funds for his city and prestige for himself—though he, like the others, is chastised for failure to share political power with the poor.

Cunningham's book is most useful in showing the contrasts in the mayors' political styles and in their uses of the city hall administrative apparatus. Mayors do differ in their capacities for resource expansion, and the infusion of federal funds is unlikely to transform an inactive mayor into an active one.

The study has some important weaknesses. Little attention is given to the political environment (groups, parties, etc.) in which the mayors operated, and to the extent to which the political and governmental systems helped or hindered mayoral leadership. Furthermore, Cunningham does not present much evidence showing what effect different mayors had on poverty or unemployment, which the author identifies as critical urban problems. He does demonstrate that more entrepreneurial mayors were able to obtain more federal renewal and poverty money for their city. But, since taking advantage of such programs formed an important index of entrepreneurship, the argument is somewhat circular. (The final entrepreneurship ratings, based on numerical grades for originality, risk-taking, and so forth, do not seem adequately supported by the text and add little to the argument.)

In fairness, it must be pointed out that Cunningham admits that he is much more concerned with the personality and style of urban leaders than with the structure and process of the political system. He has produced a lively account of contrasting mayoral styles which combines a participant's feeling for the texture of city politics with an analyst's concern for the elements of successful organizational leadership.

JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN

Dartmouth College

Party Strength in the United States 1872–1970. By Paul T. David (Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Press, 1972. Pp. 310. $9.75.)

In the years since 1963 a new and huge data resource has been under construction at the University of Michigan, the computerized ICPR historical archive of electoral and ecological data. With the creation of this archive, it has become possible to realize for the first time a dream long shared by the late V. O. Key, Jr., with many of the rest of us. We can now gain effective, economical access to the vast riches of American electoral data from the county level upward, and from 1824 to the present. This has been an accomplishment of truly vast magnitude, involving ten years of labor and the conversion of literally millions of data observations into usable machine-readable form, and it is by no means completed even now.

Paul T. David's *Party Strength in the United States* is the first book-length study to come entirely from this newly available data resource. It is an independent effort, evidently based upon utilization of data provided by the Consortium's candidate name lists rather than upon its tape files. This study is organized and reported at the state level only. It contains no raw votes or totals, but only the partisan percentages and index transformations of these percentages for the four major offices found in the archive: President, Governor, U. S. Senator, and U. S. Representative. Charts of presidential and David's "Composite B" percentages are provided for each major party and each state, along with some regional groupings.

This book makes three general contributions to voting-behavior scholarship. First, as mentioned above, is the reporting in convenient form of the basic percentage data by state, year, and office. This is organized in the familiar Democratic-Republican-Other format, which has the disadvantage that separate percentages for such "major" third parties as the Populists, the Socialists, and the 1912 Progressives are not reported.

Second, the author has attempted to provide temporal comparability of time series with different spacings (e.g., presidential elections every four years, gubernatorial and congressional elections every two years). Following the index-number theory pioneered in economics half a century ago by Fisher and Mitchell, David produces a number of composite index artifacts which he then uses for his textual discussion.

Third, David provides a set of explicit rules for users of the consortium archive. In one sense, this is the most valuable part of the book. The Consortium staff very early made the decision to report the data, and especially party nomenclature, precisely as the sources did, and to refrain from any secondary classifications of party labels. The result is a confusing array of more than eleven hundred separate party names. Any individual scholar wishing to use data from the archive must make his own decisions as to the classification of votes and parties which he thinks best suited to his own research design. The David rules provide an extremely useful guide to this slippery terrain.

There are some weaknesses in this study. One encounters a few data errors which are traceable to errors or omissions in the Consortium's archive. The most conspicuous of these is the omission of the Republican vote in the 1906 Oregon gubernatorial election, which yields an implausible Democratic percentage of 86.5. But there are more serious problems. The most important of these is that the author's discussion does not have any very salient conceptual base. This has implications for the retrieval and organization of data. Nowhere is it more important to have fairly clear hypotheses to test or theories to evaluate than when one embarks on the endless sea of Consortium electoral data. Thus, David argues that his "composite B" index probably represents the most accurate general estimate of partisan strength in a given state and year, since it excludes the presumably distorting influence of presidential election outcomes. Yet it may be wondered, first, whether the construction of indices—or any other transformation of data, for that matter—is particularly useful unless it is motivated by theory; and, second, why one should leave out presidential elections in attempting to identify composite measures of competitiveness and realignment. While it is most desirable to get away at long last from the "presidential synthesis" which has dominated the political history literature, we may be much more doubtful about getting away from presidential election outcomes altogether. This is particularly doubtful at the macro-level covered by this volume.

Thus, a macro-level theory of (or hypotheses about) dynamic processes in the American electoral-politics system across time would be very likely to prod the researcher in two methodological directions not mentioned here. The first of these would involve assessment not only of the closeness of a major-party balance across time, but also of the variability in results. The second would involve an effort, through a variety of techniques, to ascertain what if any trends in partisan competition exist in the division of the partisan vote across the period between one realignment sequence and the next. Depending upon the researcher's focus of attention, this could plausibly lead, for example, to a merger of the Republican and Progressive percentages of 1912–1914 in an effort to obtain evaluation of the "normal" partisan vote in this period. One suspects that analysis along such lines would yield rather different conclusions about partisanship in the 1896–1932 period from those the author suggests.

Several issues in all this should be obvious to those who work in this field. First, party competition is not static within a block of time as much of the literature has implied; rather, it is dynamic across a number of dimensions including time. One needs to take into account not only measures of central tendency but measures of dispersion as well, and also trends in the data. Second, all classifications of data constitute arbitrary choices within a finite range of plausible options, and such choices significantly—if usually marginally—determine findings. To take a small case in point here, the period which David defines as 1896–1930 can clearly be extended back to 1894; and the behavioral evidence strongly supports doing so. Third, a number of very important political variables are left out in this study, though it must be said that this was probably inevitable given the availability of data resouces at the time it was written. The most important of these missing variables is that of turnout. It is becoming increasingly clear to analysts that the extent of nonvoting, and the interplay between the voting and nonvoting components of the total electorate across time, form among the most important dynamic properties of an aggregate voting universe. It has become vitally important to incorporate such data into one's model and findings even if, as is sadly the case in the United States, the data are somewhat weakened by the need to estimate the proportion of nonvoters.

When all this is said, we can still conclude that this study is a valuable addition to resources for workers in the field of aggregate electoral-data analysis. David quite rightly calls our attention to the complexity and heterogeneity of realignment sequences, and stresses—also rightly—the very different patterns of partisan competition which exists at different levels of election within the same time period. Moreover, the Appendix which contains his rules for the classification of party nomenclature is alone worth the price of admission for any specialist who may have occasion to use the Consortium's data resources. Finally, it seems to me that even in the age of advanced computer technology, where data banks without end are housed in tape repositories at computer centers, published compendia of reliable data remain of great use to the scholarly community. This study performs that service within the limits which the author set for himself. More than that, it raises some significant questions of substantive importance for empirical theory construction in this field. Finally, it is a good introduction to the problems, issues and choices which surround the use of large-scale aggregate data banks by political scientists.

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The Courts and the Public Schools: The Legal Basis of School Organization and Administration. (3rd edition). By Newton Edwards. (Chicago University Press, 1971. Pp. 710. $12.00.)

The late Newton Edwards first developed the structure and material for this standard work forty years ago. A revised edition appeared in 1955. Since 1955, as the jacket flap reminds us, something close to four-thousand additional decisions relating to schools and education have been handed down by this country's higher courts. Leo O. Garber of Illinois State has done a useful and competent job of interlarding the old and the new and of bringing the story of school law up to the decade of the 1970s.

Both Professor Garber and the editor of the University of Chicago Press, however, must have kicked themselves a dozen times in the past twelve months. If they had only waited a year or two. For the fact is that 1971 and 1972 turned out to be seismic years in the evolution of school law. The manuscript of the book under review went to press before such cases as *Serrano*, *Rodriguez*, *Charlotte-Mecklenberg*, the *Pontiac* case, the *Indianapolis* case, *Bradley* v. *Milliken*, the *Richmond* case, and the *Lemon* and *Early* cases.

It is a little as though a fine exposition on Newtonian Physics had appeared a few months before $E = MC^2$. The value of the work is still there, but the fundamental cosmology has shifted. In consequence, much of the table of contents in this new edition smacks of archaic minutiae (e.g., District Organization and Control, School Districts and Municipalities, School Officers, Legal Authority of Boards of Education, School Board Procedures and Records, Contractual Authority and Liability of School Boards, The School Money, The School Debt, Acquisition and Use of School Property, The Contractor's Bond, Tort Liability in School Districts, Personal Liability of School Officers, Administration of the Teaching Personnel, Teacher Pensions and Retirement Systems). Even those chapter titles that connote some of the great and divisive issues of the new age (e.g., State and Church in Relation to Education, School Attendance, Transportation of Pupils to and from School) have subheadings that suggest how deeply the decisions of the past two years have changed the whole landscape of school law.

Professor Garber has made a valient attempt to overcome some of the datedness of the Edwards structure by adding a final chaper called "Recent Changes in School Law." But, again, "recent" is before 1971–1972, and in school law much that is anterior to 1971 is of antiquarian interest only. Highly revealing is Professor Garber's judgment (p. 618) that the most important of recent changes in school law have involved (1) school district immunity from tort liability; (2) individual rights of pupils; and (3) teacher rights. If he were writing today instead of two years ago, his list would surely have to be expanded to include school finance, busing, and the State-aid aspects of Church-State relations. In these three areas, three 1971 cases have become legal watersheds: *Serrano* v. *Priest* for its insistence that the quality of education must not be a function of the wealth of a pupil's parents and neighbors; *Swann* v. *Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education* for establishing landmark principles of school desegregation (including principles on busing) which in turn have been echoed in scores of succeeding cases (in 1971–72, the 5th and 6th Circuit Courts [Georgia, Texas, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Virginia, Tennessee, Louisiana, the Carolinas] handed down 49 decisions requiring varying types and degrees of desegregation, citing *Swann* principles as precedent); and *Lemon* v. *Kurtzman* for reversing a long trend of judicial permissiveness in public grants to sectarian schools.

That these important developments were not foreseen by Professor Garber is not a matter for censure. His final chapter tackles many other important issues—issues that are still with us. In particular, his summation of the legal problems emerging from teacher collective bargaining is perceptive and informative.

What is absent from all three editions of *The Courts and the Public School,* however, is any real sense of the larger context of the Courts in their relationships to the rest of the American polity. Perhaps it is unfair to indulge in such a carper, but I think not. For the preface to the 3rd edition claims that one of the book's intentions is to "make clear the fundamental principles underlying the relation of the State to education" (p. xiii). This the book does only in the most superficial and legalistic sense.

There is no real speculation about whether or not the Courts ought to be carrying such an enormous load of school-related societal conflict. Inadequate attention is given to the growing hiatus between Court decisions, on the one hand, and their enforceability, on the other. The quasi-judicial aspects of intergovernmental regulations and guidelines are totally ignored. The very size and ponderousness of the caseload reported in this volume should raise questions in somebody's mind about the practical limits of judicial supremacy. Someone should be asking whether respect for law can long continue if the judicial conscience continues to run far ahead of public emotions and administrative practicality.

This work of reference is a place to begin such speculations. But the authors do not give evidence of concern with, or knowledge about, these larger issues. One is reminded of Sir Richard Livingston's comment that a "technician is a man who understands everything about his job except its ultimate purpose and its place in the order of the universe."

STEPHEN K. BAILEY

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Supreme Courts in State Politics: An Investigation of the Judicial Role. By Henry Robert Glick. (New York: Basic Books, 1971. Pp. 166. $6.95.)

Professor Glick's study of Supreme Courts in four states is a welcome contribution to the field of public law. In the course of presenting new material concerning state judicial systems the author attempts to synthesize the behavioral approach which has dominated legal research in political science in recent years with aspects of the more traditional concerns that have been overlooked for too long by most of those pursuing a science of judicial politics.

Supreme Courts in State Politics is a generally well-written book that examines the relationship between legal and political aspects of the roles of Supreme Court judges in New Jersey, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana. By interviewing the judges and cross-checking with some analysis of court decisions, supported by limited reference to other sources of information, the author explores the perceptions of the justices about (1) the goals and values of the judges, (2) the impact of group interactions on the courts, and (3) the effect of party and interest-group activity on decision making. The book gives a fairly good comparative view of the similarities and differences in the decision-making process on the four Supreme Courts accompanied by insights into how the political culture, judicial recruitment process, and length of term on the bench influence the way in which the members of the high courts act in each state.

The study is excellent in many respects, but it has a number of important shortcomings. In the first place, a considerable number of the categories are inadequately explained and analyzed, so that the reader is given an oversimplified impression of many of the distinctions in role perceptions and decision-making orientations. For example on page 39, where a judge is quoted as saying that his job is to interpret the law, not to legislate, the judge's conception of what it means to interpret is not discussed; it is, therefore, impossible to tell how much and what kind of discretion he exercises in interpreting the law. It is quite possible that some judges who call themselves "interpreters" define their decision-making discretion as broadly as, or even more broadly than, some who consider themselves to be "legislators." The author here appears to fall into an error that is too often made in behavioral studies. He filters his data through the logic of his categories instead of using his statistics as indicators and supports for a deep analysis.

Second, although Glick correctly surmises that interviewing alone may not be adequate to determine accurately the actual attitudes of the judges, he does not provide sufficient cross-reference to other materials. Some of this is clearly beyond his control. Because of lack of time and resources it probably was not possible to interview extensively those who deal with the courts or to develop fully all of the relevant aspects of state politics. In at least one area, however, the author should have made better use of his material. In utilizing cases Glick only uses statistical analysis of such things as the outcomes of decisions and patterns of dissents and opinion writing, never referring to the content of the opinions. This casts doubt upon the basis of some of his statements concerning the liberalism or conservatism of judges, which appear to be based entirely on Nagel's categories for classifying ideological positions by examining the percentages of victories by specified defendants in selected types of cases. This procedure may be a very good indicator of the relative positions of judges on a single court with a common set of cases, but it is questionable what this kind of analysis says by itself when applied to four different courts in as many states, unless there are supporting data from the content of the decisions to explain the statistics. We must know how similar the issues are in order to determine, for example, what difference in the decision patterns, if any, would have occurred if two courts had decided each other's cases. Granted the problem here has additional complexities. For some comparative purposes, for example, it may be useful to consider the question of the liberal-conservative position of the judges only within the context of the politics and the law of each particular state. This consideration, however, only enlarges the need to know the content of the decisions and of the law in its development if one is to understand the significance of the cases and the judicial activities being studied. The point is that a very large portion of the judicial role and function can only be illuminated by reference to the language of cases and the law.

While the behavioral emphasis of recent years has contributed a great deal to the study of public law, the virtues of alternative approaches have been too often overlooked. This book is important because it makes an effort to synthesize methods that individually address only parts of the legal process. The book could do much more, but it does make a definite contribution to our knowledge of state courts and to judicial studies in general—a contribution that ought to be followed up in future research.

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Fiscal Pressures on the Central City: The Impact of Commuters, Nonwhites and Overlapping Governments. By Werner Z. Hirsch, Phillip E. Vincent, Henry S. Terrell, Donald C. Shoup, and Arthur Rosett. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 310. $16.50.)

This is the latest in a growing literature applying welfare economics, and in particular the externality or spillover concept, to public policy questions. The volume contains the results of empirical research on the fiscal impact that commuters, nonwhites, and overlapping governments have on cities, as well as a more general introductory article which offers an analytic framework for the discussion of our cities' current fiscal plight.

Henry Terrell's study, the most provocative but least convincing of the four, uses multiple regression analysis in an attempt to produce the first quantitative estimate of "the impact of nonwhites on the urban treasury" (p. 144). Terrell's method of determining the impact of nonwhites on revenue collections is indicative of the method he also uses to determine their impact on expenditures for education, police, and public welfare. Terrell argues that if the 75 per cent of the residents of a community who are white have an average family income of $8000, whereas the 25 per cent of the residents who are nonwhite have an income of $4000, the presence of nonwhites has reduced the community's average income and thus its tax base by $1000.

Considering that nonwhite incomes in such a hypothetical community may be kept artifically low because of economic discrimination, one must doubt that an all-white community would achieve an average income of $8000 and thus that the presence of the nonwhites has as great an impact as Terrell suggests. More important, Terrell's regression equations do not include many relevant variables such as education, and thus there is no way of knowing if effects which Terrell attributes to nonwhiteness should actually be attributed to, for example, lack of a high school education. Terrell finds a tremendous variation among cities with regard to the total impact of nonwhites on the cities' fiscal situations. Thus the average loss per citizen in all cities studied is $15.61, but it ranges from $.75 in San Jose, Calif., to $42.60 in Richmond, Va. Terrell explains the variations by pointing, not to degrees of nonwhiteness, but rather to the tendency of certain cities to attract "the poorest, least educated and least skilled nonwhites" (p. 212). By emphasizing the importance of such factors in this final section of his paper, Terrell reinforces our doubts about the utility of any study which attempts to estimate the fiscal impact of nonwhites without controlling for such variables.

Phillip Vincent's study of the fiscal impact of commuters also relies heavily on regression analysis, but Vincent includes a much greater number of the relevant independent variables in his equations. Vincent's central goal is to evaluate the recurrent argument that our cities' fiscal crises are caused in part by the imposition of external costs on city residents by suburban commuters. The usual contention is that suburban workers and shoppers make use of the cities' roads, police, and other facilities and services without paying for them and thus take more from the city than they give it. After controlling for income and forty other factors, Vincent finds that large numbers of commuting workers and high quantities of sales to suburban residents do indeed seem to be associated with high city operating expenditures for highways, police, fire protection, and parks and recreation. He persuasively argues, however, that commuters also benefit cities by increasing the value of their residents' property and the total of the government's sales and property tax revenues. After quantifying such benefits and finding that on the average they more than compensate for added costs, Vincent concludes that central city residents as a whole are not being exploited by commuting workers and shoppers.

The quality of most of Vincent's analysis is excellent, but he states his conclusions more forcefully than the evidence warrants. As he notes, his quantitative analysis did not test for the effect of commuters on cities' capital expenditures or for their effect on less tangible costs of commutation such as air pollution and traffic congestion. Final conclusions on the costs and benefits of commutation will have to await a fuller consideration of these costs as well as of others such as noise and heightened tension.

Donald Shoup and Arthur Rosett are concerned about possible fiscal inequities between a central city and its suburbs when both are subordinate units of a county government that provides to suburban areas municipal-type services that the central city provides for itself. Though the authors indicate that such fiscal inequities are not uncommon in larger counties throughout the nation, their only empirical concern is with the somewhat unique police protection situation in Los Angeles County, and the bulk of their article is concerned with documenting, criticizing, and suggesting ways to eliminate various law enforcement subsidies in that county.

Werner Hirsch's introductory essay on the fiscal plight of cities tries to put into a theoretical framework the research reported in the rest of the volume as well as earlier research on similar subjects. Noting that "fiscal plight" is not an economic term, Hirsch defines it as "a large imbalance between people's aspirations for public services and their willingness and ability to pay for them—an imbalance that to some extent applies to private goods as well" (p. 4). Like most economists, Hirsch implicitly assumes that one must remedy the public service "plight" by increasing city dwellers' ability to pay, rather than by attempting to increase their willingness to do so or by attempting to moderate somewhat their aspirations. He sees three possible explanations for the cities' current lack of wherewithal: (1) they are havens for the poor; (2) they are beset by distinctive physical and organizational problems such as aging buildings and municipal union power; (3) governmental fragmentation subjects them to external costs from commutation, migration, and air, water, and noise pollution. Hirsch argues that effective policy measures depend on deciding which of these three factors best explains the city's fiscal plight, but the research he presents is not sufficient to support his conclusion that the presence of large masses of poor people is probably the principal cause of the cities' fiscal difficulties.

Hirsch's article, like Terrell's and Vincent's, attempts to do somewhat more than it accomplishes, and like the book as a whole, it does not make for easy reading. Nevertheless, together with the other studies, it clearly adds something to our understanding both of the economic problems facing the central city and of the difficulties of analyzing them with confidence on the basis of existing empirical evidence.

FREDERICK C. MOSHER AND
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Government Against Poverty. By Joseph Kershaw. (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institute, 1970. Pp. 168. $5.95.)

Professor Kershaw treats a large subject in a small compass. Central is an emphasis on the relationship between longstanding income maintenance programs developed under the Social Security Act and the new program inventions of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. To Kershaw the war on poverty is thus not new, nor has the latest action in the long battle been decisive. On balance it is Kershaw's judgment that the decline of poverty up to 1970, and particularly in the period from 1964 to 1970, may be attributed more to general economic growth than to the specific measures taken by OEO. As he is a former Assistant Director of OEO, his view has special authority. He attributes the record not to deficiency in program design but rather to the nation's unwillingness to devote the necessary resources to the task.

Manpower problems, Kershaw suggests, are central to the problem of poverty. In view of this emphasis and his expressed interest in the history of income maintenance measures, one might wish that he had analyzed the crucial decisions of the 'thirties to separate administration of unemployment insurance and employment service from administration of public assistance and other social insurances. Instead, one finds an essentially uncritical acceptance of the fact that, given the early decisions for state administration of some possible components of a manpower program, and given the resultant fragmentation, the nation until 1962 had no articulate public manpower program.

Indeed, Kershaw makes an essentially ahistorical attempt to take account of history. Failing to convey a sense of history, the book cannot fully achieve its purpose of integrating the treatment of the old and the new poverty programs. We are told, for example, that the original old-age insurance and unemployment compensations provisions were not aimed at the poor. The record of the 'thirties, however, has been otherwise interpreted in the work of the President's Cabinet Committee on Economic Security (1935). The late Arthur Altmeyer and the late Edwin Witte made available to us clues to this history even beyond the existing records. Poverty was then indeed widespread and pervasive, and old-age insurance, unemployment insurance, and public assistance were conceived of as a trio of related solutions.

In the absence of an integrated historical conception, the author treats the program of the Office of Economic Opportunity as a supplement to, rather than a corrective of the deficiencies of the first federal poverty program; he thus fails to elaborate on the theoretical critiques of existing welfare administration emanating from the legal services division of OEO—critiques which were to prove remarkably effective politically.

Particularly significant is Professor Kershaw's account of the OEO effort to find an administratively workable definition of poverty which would take into account regional differences in economic levels. Unable to support regional definitions, which would result in different subsidies in neighboring communities, OEO administrators finally abandoned the effort at regional differentiation. The lack of realism in the resulting decision to use a single national index may have accounted for much congressional skepticism about the claims of OEO administrators.

As a specialist in the economics of manpower, Professor Kershaw provides us with a substantial contribution. He synthesizes the approach of the macroanalyst with the realism of an economist sophisticated in structural analysis. Of particular significance for contemporary social policy is his treatment of the issue of inflation in the context of growth rate and unemployment rate. Professor Kershaw holds that a heated-up economy may be necessary in reducing the extent of poverty. During periods of growth, the decline of the poverty population accelerates. Kershaw argues against the position that unemployment rates under 4 per cent necessarily imply intolerable levels of inflation. From the vantage point of the poor, adoption of measures to slow economic growth to achieve even a 4 per cent rate are unfortunate. We are reminded that the Phillips curve describing the relationship between employment rates and price stability is based on the British experience and does not consistently fit the United States data.

Even given a choice between unemployment and price stability, however, Professor Kershaw argues that there is a tendency to give too much weight to price stability. Rising prices, he says, should be tolerated if they are buying jobs for the poor. Further, the poor suffer only marginally from modest inflation, while benefitting substantially from an expanding economy.

The book emphasizes the interconnections between national economic policy, public employment policy, and income maintenance programs. Professor Kershaw usefully analyzes current proposals for negative income tax and family assistance. His interest in institutional solutions to economic problems is less apparent in the treatment of income maintenance proposals than in analyses of manpower policy.

In manpower policy, he suggests that aggregate measures must be supplemented with structural devices to deal with the difficulty of the poor in adapting to the labor market. A major achievement of the war on poverty has been to focus on structural problems: lack of training, lack of mobility, lack of basic literacy. Particularly useful in Professor Kershaw's ambitious work is a sensitive analysis of the lessons in program evaluation, especially in manpower programs, which the OEO experience afforded its administrators.

REBECCA R. POLLAND

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Labor and the Left: A Study of Socialist and Radical Influences in the American Labor Movement, 1881–1924. By John Laslett. (New York: Basic Books, 1970. Pp. 323. $10.00.)

This first-rate example of careful historical scholarship tries to unravel a familiar but crucial puzzle: the relative weakness of the socialist movement among American trade unionists. Many earlier writers on both the right and the left have stressed the key role of union leaders; trade union radicals have failed, it is alleged, because they were too utopian, too impractical, or too influenced by a European intellectual style, to succeed in a pragmatic American society. Alternatively, some writers argue that the radicals were defeated by the hostility of Gompers and his conservative AFL allies. By contrast, Laslett stresses the "indigenous causes, deriving in part from economic and political developments, and in part from the native tradition of American reform" in accounting for both "the rise and fall of socialist and radical influences" (p. 5).

Laslett, a historian at UCLA, identifies several key factors influencing the six major unions he examined. Although radicalism in some unions reflected the streams of immigrant European socialists, the analysis also emphasizes the impact of technological change in reducing chances for self-employment, and eroding the position of skilled workers in several industries, the lure of radical populism, and the particularly harsh treatment of workers in some industries, including not only low wages and dangerous working conditions but violent repression by state governments. Indeed, contrary to general belief, these conditions led to the radicalization of many native-born workers and immigrants from Great Britain.

In an important theoretical contribution Laslett then shows how changes in these same factors led to the subsequent decline in union radicalism in the decades after 1900: notably the end of immigration by socialist workers, and the moderating effects of increased union member affluence. Meanwhile, participation in established American institutions became an increasingly attractive alternative to once radical union leaders. As the antisocialist AFL grew, its ability to support strikes through federation-wide boycotts mounted; as unions increased their influence on local units of the major parties, third-party ventures lost their appeal; as middle-class American reformers began to pass new legislation, socialism seemed a less exclusively desirable path to social justice. Finally, the process of enforcing collective bargaining agreements, negotiated with employers, undermined revolutionary socialist opposition to the capitalist system.

Laslett, then, has constructed an elegant causal argument: He identifies a set of factors whose change in one direction led to radicalism, and whose change in the other direction led to an acceptance of American capitalism. But why did these particular variables have this deradicalizing effect in America, when comparable developments in Europe, in the same period, left a growing socialist movement largely unscathed? As Laslett himself recognizes, the particular context of American society was crucial:

> In countries with more traditional class barriers, such as Great Britain or Germany, there was no necessary conflict between collective bargaining and the revolutionary assumptions of socialism, at least in the short run. But in the United States . . . class lines were more fluid . . . (p. 301).

Here Laslett joins his analysis to that stretching from Tocqueville to the students of Louis Hartz. But because he does not systematically address these considerations, he fails—and this to my mind is the book's chief weakness—to emphasize this connection between his own work and this earlier tradition. In fact, Laslett's analysis shows how Hartz's contextual variables such as fluid class relations, a Lockean fear of state power, and a belief in atomistic individualism operated as parameters to make American socialism so uniquely sensitive to changes in the economy, in technology, in immigration, and in political reforms. By failing to state and meditate on this point, Laslett does not bring to culmination the long debate over the failure of American socialism—to which *Labor and the Left* nevertheless makes a major contribution. My complaint, in fact, is primarily that he fails to stress adequately the virtues of his own analysis.

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White Racism and the Law. By Lois B. Moreland. (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1970. Pp. ix, 230. $3.25.)

One of the continuing topics of political debate is whether the national government should protect the civil rights of African-Americans. Those who contend that the national government should *not,* almost invariably offer the argument that the national government does not have the power to protect civil rights. They further contend that even if it did, that jurisdiction would be limited and would not apply to those forms of discrimination practiced against African-Americans by white Americans acting as private individuals, unsupported by government action.

Professor Lois Moreland's *White Racism and the Law* speaks directly to those issues. Her study is precisely about the sword which the national government possesses for the protection of the civil rights of African-Americans. However, she finds that the Supreme Court has prevented the national government from wielding its sword. Moreland also finds that white Americans earnestly believe that they have a legal right, whether as members of public groups or as private citizens, to discriminate against African-Americans. Here again, she notes that the judicial doctrine of the Supreme Court is responsible for this belief, and perpetuates it. Moreover, Moreland avers, the continued existence of this belief-system serves to deny African-Americans any relief from racial discrimination.

Professor Moreland quite convincingly shows that cases brought under the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Constitution, and under the Congressional Acts of 1866, 1867, 1870, 1871, and 1875 were decided by the Supreme Court in such a way as to guarantee the perpetuation and institutionalization of racism in the United States. Moreland also shows that the Supreme Court's *modus operandi* has worked to conceal the fact that no constitutional right exists which permits any kind of racial discrimination against African-Americans.

More specifically, Moreland's approach is to analyze the provisions of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the United States Constitution, along with the provisions of the seven Civil Rights Acts passed in the years 1866 through 1875 in order to show that these provisions are sufficient to safeguard the civil rights of African-Americans from state or individual encroachment.

After analyzing the Civil War Amendments and the Civil Rights statutes and finding them sufficient to protect African-Americans, Moreland then shows, through such cases as the *Civil Rights* cases, the *Slaughterhouse* cases, *United States* v. *Cruikshank, Strauder* v. *West Virginia, Virginia* v. *Rives, Ex Parte Virginia,* and *United States* v. *Harris,* that the Supreme Court has often been responsible for the racism practiced in America. Thereafter, her study treats events of intervening and contemporary significance ultimately arriving at the Civil Rights Acts of the 1950s and 1960s. Here she points again to the Supreme Court's refusal to declare once and for all that the national government *does* have the power to protect the civil rights of African-Americans, whether acting privately, i.e., without the assistance of the state, or whether acting publicly, i.e., with the sanction of the state.

In short, the author has laboriously reviewed many cases to point out that the laws are sufficient, and that were it not for the Supreme Court's refusal to deal honestly with the issues, civil rights would be very well protected in the United States. The truth of Moreland's assertions, from the data presented, seems hardly open to question. Her indictment of the Supreme Court seems especially appropriate in the light of that Court's most recent decision in the case of State Representative *Irvis* versus the *Harrisburg Moose Lodge 107* of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, a decision which allowed the Moose Lodge to refuse to serve Mr. Irvis. Justice Rehnquist, delivering the opinion for the majority, argued that although the state provided a liquor license for the club, that did not make the state a party to the discrimination to the extent of violating the Fourteenth Amendment. Such faulty reasoning on the part of the Supreme Court is precisely what Moreland's study is about. Namely, the 14th Amendment, if properly interpreted, protects the civil rights of blacks from the discrimination practiced by the Moose of Lodge 107 whether state action is involved or not. In short, there is no legal right for white Americans to discriminate against African-Americans. The problem, of course, is that American racial justice is not based on the *absolute mandates which Moreland finds* clearly stated in the 14th Amendment, nor for that matter is it grounded in the biblical adage "The truth shall make ye free"; rather, justice in the United States is a temporal thing, which still resides in the hands of Caesar, who, unfortunately for African-Americans, is *not* color-blind.

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The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians. By Kenneth Prewitt. (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 1970. Pp. xv, 234. $8.50.)

This book analyzes the recruitment patterns to the city council among 435 councilmen interviewed in 87 cities in the San Francisco Bay area. As part of the City Council Research project conducted by Heinz Eulau and the author, Prewitt has used the data generated by this study for a fairly extensive exploration of empirical recruitment theory and an examination of the relationship between recruitment and a responsible, if not representative, democratic government.

Prewitt's theoretical model combines the social stratification approach and role theory. Within the total population there is a "dominant social stratum" (in this case the upper two-fifths in terms of income, education and occupational status). From this stratum of "socially eligibles" emerges a much smaller group (at most 10 per cent of the citizenry), the "politically actives," defined in terms of roles which are not a simple extension of citizenship (p. 55). It is from among the actives that the "recruits and apprentices" are selected and these, in turn, constitute the source from which the "candidates" for office are chosen. Stratification and role theory are also combined in the concept of apprenticeship, which includes preparation via leadership positions in civic organizations (50 per cent of the councilmen), various community offices (54 per cent), involvement in local campaigns (20 per cent) and partisan positions (8 per cent) (p. 113); the reader is not told, however, how these percentages overlap. Thus, apprenticeship is operationally defined as a combination of structural proximity to the city council and a role in which a potential candidate acquires experience in public affairs and demonstrates his skills and value orientations. In the nonpartisan context of city politics it is the equivalent of prior experience in the organizational network of a political party (p. 88).

The dynamic dimension in Prewitt's model reflects the patterns of advancement to the upper levels in this hierarchy of recruitment-relevant roles. The data indicate three pathways leading to active roles: (1) the "politically socialized" are those who explain their active roles by preadult and early adult experiences (50 per cent); (2) the "mobilized" became political activists prior to recruitment into public office, without any premobilization exposure to politics (38 per cent); and (3) the "lateral entrants" are those directly recruited into public office (12 per cent). According to the definition of these pathways (p. 58), they appears to be mutually exclusive; however, the actual "experiences associated with initial activity" (p. 85) cannot be easily interpreted in these terms.

More important, however, is the fact that *the "politically socialized" turn out to represent a residual category*. When all the effects of preadult socialization into politics have been considered, they do not lead to any distinctive patterns of recruitment into the active stratum, and the author concludes that "the accidents of personal life experiences determine who will join the active stratum" (p. 77). Perhaps the same "accidents" would not result in the recruitment of a person not exposed to early socializing experiences; yet, if socialization is neither a sufficient, nor a necessary, condition, how relevant is it for a theory of recruitment? Among the San Francisco Bay councilmen, this residual category comprises 50 per cent of the sample! Early socialization is, no doubt, a crucial variable in the analysis of attitude formation; a recruitment theory, however, which goes back to preadult socialization is somewhat difficult to handle. Prewitt has to be credited for emphasizing that the socialization approach has not greatly enlightened his analysis of recruitment. Personality and sociopolitical orientations can be analyzed and integrated into recruitment theory through the study of *adult* prerecruitment roles. Since recollections of early socialization also present methodological problems, there seems to be sufficient justification for excluding them altogether from the already complex cluster of variables in the study of recruitment.

"Occupational ties" form the second largest category (26 per cent) of experiences leading to initial political activity. Prewitt rightly seizes the opportunity to explain the theoretical centrality of this variable, but does not present any specific empirical data. Is it the proximity of an occupation to the public sector, or rather the skills, or social ties, which are relevant in the recruitment process?

Elections, the final step in the selection process, are relegated to another volume. It is likely, as Prewitt points out, that in the nonpartisan setting of city politics "the election system sustains a type of politics which minimizes the significance of individual elections" (p. 148). Over a period of ten years, an average of 80 per cent of the 764 incumbents running for office were reelected, and 23 per cent had been originally appointed to their offices (p. 131). In this setting, office holders are drawn from a relatively homogeneous stratum, and co-optation seems to prevail: not only the appointed, but almost 60 per cent of the nonappointed councilmen report that they had been on familiar terms with incumbents before their election to office. Is recruitment from informal groups of friends characteristic only of non-partisan government? Is it a consequence of the size of the constituency? One of the merits of Prewitt's book is that through its searching questions at the city level it lays down, in fact, an entire agenda for future recruitment studies.

The second theme which pervades the analysis is the evaluation of prevailing recruitment patterns in terms of democratic theory. Not only are local elites unrepresentative, but a high rate of voluntary retirements, a 0.80 probability of gaining reelection, and a majority of councilmen who do not look upon electoral defeat as a threat to their future, combine to reduce the effectiveness of elections as a means of democratic control. Prewitt also argues that even a self-imposed responsiveness of governing elites tends to be limited to the demands of the narrow stratum of those who are politically active, whose values and interests they share and from which they take their cues. The author concludes that his study of recruitment "has not been able to answer the question of what makes representative democracy work in the face of unrepresentative governors," and that the answer must perhaps be sought in processes other than leadership selection.

This is an important conclusion, even if it applies only to local politics, since "decisions affecting the very real issues of domestic tension and social unrest are every day being made at the municipal and state levels" (p. 202). It therefore calls for some comments. Whether representative democracy "works" is an ambiguous question. How important it is to have all major interests in a given community represented depends on the extent to which the issues of city government and politics are likely to reflect or to create community cleavages along the same lines of differentiation which account for the unrepresentativeness of the governing elites. In the communities to which this study applies the scope of city government has apparently no such divisive potential.

More important, however, is a distinction between *responsibility* and *responsiveness*. What Prewitt really questions is whether responsiveness is a necessary corollary of responsibility. Responsibility can be institutionalized by means of periodical elections; responsiveness depends, to a large extent, on the party system. Moreover, responsibility depends on the inability of governing elites to pervert this democratic norm and, therefore, on the prevalence and strength of the norm in the community. Prewitt has answered the question about responsibility by demonstrating that elites and citizens alike are subject to the same pattern of socialization. One must agree with the author, though for entirely different reasons, that since socialization is not decisive in recruitment to political office, recruitment studies will shed little light on responsibility in democratic government. The question of responsiveness is more easily researchable in a partisan setting and has remained, therefore, largely unexplored in this volume.

Prewitt's *Study of Citizen-Politicians* is an original, exploratory, and therefore challenging book. No student of elites and recruitment, and no empirical theorist, can afford to ignore it.

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The Intelligence Establishment. By Harry Howe Ransom. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970. Pp. xvi, 309. $9.95.)

This is an attempt to present a scholarly, objective analysis of the work of the principal agencies that are engaged in the foreign intelligence effort of the United States. The author in the preface notes that he has not served in intelligence; that the agencies concerned issue very little in the way of public material about their work and are reticent to talk; and that the search for the truth in this area is most difficult. Why, then, did he make the attempt? Perhaps it is his conviction that there are inadequate controls over the intelligence system, particularly the CIA, or it may be his belief that "No development in American government institutions in recent years is more important than the mechanism for producing the informational foundation for national security policy" (p. 5).

The author advances four assumptions which underlie his study: (1) that intelligence and covert political action will continue to expand in scope and importance; (2) that technology will expand enormously and will cause decision makers to become increasingly the potential prisoners of the system; (3) that secret knowledge is potentially secret political power; and (4) that to neglect to discuss these matters would "add to the dangers that threaten the viability of democratic values" (p. 11). While acknowledging these assumptions at the start of his book, the author does not make any systematic effort to analyze these issues and leaves the reader to reach his own conclusions.

The stage is set in the preface for what is to come later. Two quotes suffice to illustrate: "Too little serious attention has been given to, and inadequate controls have been exerted over, the intelligence establishment since 1947" (p. xiii); and ". . . many serious students of public affairs, including most members of Congress, possess little or no accurate knowledge of the vast systems" (p. xiv). Professor Ransom devotes Chapter VII to "Surveillance By Congress," reaching the conclusion that its review of the work of the CIA and the other intelligence agencies is unsatisfactory. He uses the greater proportion of this chapter to discuss the Mansfield Resolution of 1956 for a Joint Committee on Intelligence: a resolution which was defeated on the floor of the Senate after a two-day debate. He also deals with Senate Resolution 210 sponsored by Eugene McCarthy in 1966 for an investigation of intelligence by the Foreign Relations Committee. By a vote of 61 to 28 the senate sent this resolution to the Armed Services Committee, which of course was opposed to such a proposal. McCarthy's effort, however, undoubtedly was partly responsible for Senator Russell's inviting three members of Foreign Relations to sit with the CIA subcommittee of Armed Services in January, 1967. Because the Senate did not opt for a joint committee in either instance—which Mr. Ransom attributes primarily to Armed Services concern for its jurisdiction and Executive Branch opposition—he concludes that congressional review is inadequate. I would be the last to say that those subcommittees charged with CIA matters could not spend more time on the subject or go into greater depth, but this is entirely an option the Congress can exercise. I would argue that Harry Ransom could have presented a more balanced picture if he had tried to analyze how often the CIA subcommittees had met; had interviewed their members about their attitudes on the effectiveness of the review-work; and had at least shown the magnitude of their effort.

As far as other reviews of the intelligence system are concerned, Chapter IX is devoted to "Problems of the Intelligence Bureaucracy" and lists investigations of CIA and the intelligence agencies. Professor Ransom notes that no large-scale external review has been made since the Second Hoover Commission in 1955, except for a number of studies using personnel from the system. I agree that external reviews are healthy and sometimes useful—if the right people are on the panel—but the history of our government is replete with costly and time-consuming studies that produced no results. I take strong exception to one statement in this chapter under the heading "Mistaken Estimates": "Policy planners have rarely been armed with adequate foreknowledge; they have been continually confronted with surprises" (p. 218). This sweeping generalization for which he presents little argumentation or factual support is unfortunate. If the Pentagon Papers are a reflection of the quality of intelligence estimates, his assessment is inaccurate.

One can find little to quarrel with in Ransom's opening chapters on "Intelligence in the Space Age" and "The Nature of Intelligence" except again where he is led into sweeping statements: "The spy business is booming" (p. 31) and "the classical spy on the ground is being made obsolescent by technological innovation" (p. 17). Neither comment is accurate, but rather than argue let me say these are good chapters, nevertheless.

In fairness to Professor Ransom I should say that it is natural that the chapters on CIA should raise the greatest problems. Less official information is available on CIA than on any other agency, with the possible exception of NSA. Chapter IV deals with the basic functions of CIA, while the last one is entitled "The CIA Problem: Some Conclusions." Ransom argues that CIA has taken liberties in interpreting its legally assigned functions; that Congress intended it to be *solely* an intelligence organization (not political warfare); that Congress has no voice in where and how CIA functions; that CIA is a locus of power unchecked by the normal process of democratic government; that CIA should not have released the report on the Soviet economy in January 1964. All these and many others are important points that raise both questions of fact and of opinion. Most cannot be reviewed without access to files which are still classified, and this is really the heart of the problem. How can an able scholar of the caliber of a Harry Howe Ransom write a satisfactory book on "The Intelligence Establishment" without either access to classified material or guidance from those in the know? He has certainly made a valiant effort.

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Is Law Dead? Edited by Eugene V. Rostow. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971. Pp. 416. $8.95, cloth; $3.95, paper.)

This volume is a collection of essays, each followed by a comment or two, written for a symposium conducted under the auspices of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in the spring of 1970 as part of its centenary celebration. It is divided into two parts; in the first, the essays address themselves to the question of "the citizen's moral relation to the law in a society of consent," and in the second, to the question of "the capacity of the American legal and political order to meet the felt needs of our people for social justice." As Editor Rostow points out in his graceful introduction, the Association could scarcely have chosen more timely topics to discuss. As the symposium met in New York, across the continent in Isla Vista, California, radical students, firmly convinced that they knew the answers to both questions, were setting fire to banks and fighting the police; while in New Haven, Connecticut, as C. Vann Woodward set out for the meeting in New York, shop windows were being boarded up, everything movable was being carted away, the "lids of the manholes in the streets had been welded closed to protect the city's vital communication system," and on the Green, adjacent to Yale, the crowds were assembling outside the courthouse that was the scene of the Black Panther murder trial. It was then, even as the former dean of his law school conducted the symposium in New York on the future of law, that President Kingman Brewster of Yale made his famous statement on the impossibility of justice for racial minorities in the United States, thereby endearing himself to the various elements in the country that were doing their best to destroy the conditions of justice in the United States.

The essays in the first part are more interesting. What is the "citizen's moral relation to the law in a society of consent"? Ronald Dworkin asserts that a majority of the American people subscribe to what he himself accepts and describes as the orthodox position, namely, that while "men have a duty to obey the law [they] have the right to follow their conscience when it conflicts with that duty" (p. 172). Some duty! I think it can fairly be said that law is dead to the extent that the guardians of law—and surely the academicians and practicing attorneys assembled by Rostow belong in that category—find themselves unable or unwilling to refute this bit of patent nonsense. It is certain that such a doctrine can find no support in the Constitution or in the political philosophy underlying it, despite what historian Peter Gay has to say in the lead essay. He examines briefly the famous opening statement of Rousseau's *Social Contract* to the effect that man was born free but everywhere is in chains, and correctly sees its revolutionary potentialities, but then incorrectly concludes that principles justifying revolution or rebellion justify civil disobedience as well—and as a matter of course. This is simply wrong, here and in the more familiar version—that the Declaration of Independence states a case for civil disobedience. What Jefferson and his colleagues stated was the case for revolution, not civil disobedience. They appealed, as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and others had taught them to do, to nature, and an appeal to nature is a revolutionary act, not a civil act; and, instead of burning Georgian draft cards, they killed British soldiers. Peter Gay does not see the difference, nor does the man who comments on his paper, Harris Wofford, Jr. He says that most men of law through the ages "have reserved disobedience for extreme cases where a person's religion or conscience or other claims of a higher law were so violated that the high price of anarchy, including possible violence, was worth paying." What they reserved was the natural right to take up arms, and they had no doubt what would happen to them if they were defeated, which is why, in 1776, they pledged to each other their lives, fortunes, and sacred honor. They asserted a *natural* right, not a civil right. One of the few writers in this volume who seems to understand this is the editor, who says, correctly, that to "accept civil disobedience as a [civil] right would make concord within society impossible" (p. 91).

The extent to which we have forgotten the principles underlying the Constitution is revealed, unwittingly, by Ronald Dworkin again, in what is probably the poorest essay in the book. It never occurs to him—not even in an essay entitled, "Taking Rights Seriously"—to raise the question of what the Founders understood by the rights of man and the rights of citizens. Thus, he thinks that if an individual enjoys a civil right against the government, he enjoys the civil right to define that right against the government. A Harvard law graduate and former Yale law professor (now removed to Oxford), he has apparently failed to notice that rights against the government having been set down in the Constitution, the supreme law of the land, they are elaborated or defined by courts of law, and ultimately by the highest court of law, and not by individual citizens (or, as was once insisted, by the states).

Robert Paul Wolff argues that there "are no circumstances, real or hypothetical, under which a state can validly demand the obedience of its subjects" (pp. 121–2), and, therefore, that a man, being a morally autonomous agent —which is to say, a being giving laws to himself—is never obliged to obey any law imposed on him by others. But if he does not have to respect the law, even the law of a "society of consent," it is difficult to see on what basis he is obliged to respect the independence of other men. In short, the practical consequences of Wolff's philosophical argument is, as he himself puts it, "the caprice and chaos of anarchy" (p. 123). Carl Auerbach's reponse to this is very sensible but not wholly justified. He says that "Wolff ignores the problem of how the conflicting claims of different individuals and groups . . . are to be adjusted peacefully . . . how, in short . . . any framework of social order can be established for carrying on individual and group life" (p. 133). Wolff does not *ignore* this problem, he simply does not care how it is solved. When he says his intention is "to strike at the very foundations of the myth of legitimate authority" (p. 111), while simultaneously admitting the necessity of some authority (in order to avoid the "caprice and chaos of anarchy"), he is making the case, or making a case, for illegitimate authority; and if he is content to leave it at that, I am content to leave him with it.

Hannah Arendt advances what might be called a "belling the cat" plan for dealing with civil disobedients. The difference between legal and illegal group activity is of no significance to her. Civil disobedients are "nothing but the latest form of voluntary association," and should be treated as the others are treated. This means, as a first step, allowing them to register and, through their lobbyists, to "influence and 'assist' Congress" (p. 242). Jolly good; it remains only to get the consent of the civilly disobedient to an arrangement according to which they are treated no more than equally. Unfortunately, and she has not noticed this apparently, groups adopt illegal tactics precisely because legal tactics have not given them what they want or think they deserve.

So it sadly goes in this book. Rostow himself comes closest to making the argument on behalf of obedience to law that the Founders would have made. The best essay is the late David Potter's, in which he indicates the role played historically by communities in procuring the consent of the governed (including the reluctantly governed), raising the question of whether government by consent, and the kind of law made possible by a system of consent, can survive the demise of that older community and that older America. No doubt this is a real problem, but a more evident one is suggested by the typical essay in this volume: can constitutional democracy survive the demise of an academic community capable of marshalling arguments in its favor?

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Voting for President: The Electoral College and the American Political System. By Wallace S. Sayre and Judith H. Parris. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1970. Pp. 163. $5.95.)

In analyses of alternative mechanisms for electing the president, the interests, concerns, and methodologies of both practicing politicians and professional political scientists closely converge. John F. Kennedy's 1965 speech opposing reform was strongly influenced by academicians and in turn became an important source in the scholarly literature. Until quite recently, however, it was probably true, as Robert Bendiner once said, that "only professors and cartoonists get really worked up" about the Electoral College.

To Wallace Sayre and Judith Parris, the isolated, academic, and moderate tone of the debate has been one of its "unique and perhaps more fortunate attributes" (p. 6). But *Voting for President* is published at a time when public interest in the Electoral College is relatively high. With the specter of strong third-party candidates continuing to loom on the horizon, the controversy threatens to become both more heated and more widespread. And the Sayre and Parris book, somewhat ironically, is likely to prove more useful in such widened debate than it would in more academic circles. For scholars there is nothing new or startling here; but the book is very well-written and easy to understand, and it can serve as a useful primer on the major political and constitutional issues, a guide to alternative mechanisms, and a balanced philippic against ill-considered reforms.

Sayre and Parris, like Kennedy, favor the existing system on the grounds that it works reasonably well and tends to favor the "right" kinds of political interests. Although they devote considerable attention to the technical problems of implementing proposed reforms, their central concern, quite properly, is with the political implications of each plan. "The way the American president is selected is not a minor question of mechanics" (p. 19). It is a political issue, and an important one at that. In the present debate, the issue pits the defenders of the *status quo* against the proponents of direct, popular election. And with national polls showing 70 to 75 per cent support for direct election, the burden of proof rests increasingly with the defense.

The Sayre and Parris case against direct election rests on the following arguments: First, popular vote plans are more likely to require resort to contingency procedures. Second, the existing system, having successfully "produced Presidents in forty-six elections" (p. 135) has met the test of time. Third, direct election would undermine the two-party system. Fourth, "in order to govern effectively, a President needs a strong popular mandate," and the "mandate based on consensus registered through the electoral vote system" does that best (p. 148). And finally, the present system works in favor of the authors' avowed bias toward "the interests of metropolitan areas and their residents" (p. 5).

As persuasive as these arguments may be politically, the question at issue here is the degree to which they can be supported in logic and on the basis of available data. The argument from history cannot be impeached—indeed we have elected forty-six Presidents—but it doesn't prove much either. The problem of deadlock, to which the authors give considerable attention, exists in roughly similar form with either system. Indeed much of the contemporary agitation for change stems from concern about existing mechanisms.

The "mandate" question is considerably more intriguing, though rather difficult to handle. If strong mandates are necessary they are certainly not sufficient causes of effective governance, as the cases of Grant and Harding show. One might also ask whether it was the "mandate" or the congressional majority that made presidents like Roosevelt and Johnson effective legislative leaders. And if such mandates produce effective leaders, do they also produce Viet Nams? One might also ask which numbers really count in producing mandates. Does the cumulative bias of the electoral college system enhance the mandate effect by making majorities seem bigger, or does the public's growing preference for direct election make the gerrymandered mandate of the Electoral College less effective?

Given the elusiveness of the mandate concept, Sayre and Parris can hardly be faulted for producing so little hard evidence in support of their argument. They cannot be so easily exonerated for the looseness of their arguments on the effects of alternative systems of election on patterns of party competition. Post-Duverger cross-cultural analyses (none of which are cited in *Voting for President*) have cast considerable doubt upon any assertions about the independent effects of procedural innovations upon established patterns of party competition. In the United States one might indeed use the examples of such sectionally-based candidacies as those of LaFollette, Thurmond, and George Wallace to argue that the existing system encourages rather than discourages independent candidacies in ways that direct election would not.

This leaves us with the system's urban bias and two questions about it: Does it exist? Can it be justified? There are a number of ways in which the first of these questions can be approached. Sayre and Parris use relatively simple indices to conclude that indeed there is a bias in favor of the most urban and suburban population areas. Few analyses dispute this basic conclusion, but it is curious that the authors do not cite the more statistically elegant studies of the problem. Nor do they cite the relevant finding from Stanley Kelley's contribution to the Brooking's study of the 1964 election that presidential candidates (Goldwater not excepted) do in fact "go where the ducks are" and concentrate their campaign resources on the urban, industrial states.

Perhaps the urban bias of the system is so widely acknowledged that no elaborate proof of its existence is necessary. Can such a bias, then, be justified? Sayre and Parris rather neatly destroy the oft-voiced analogy between the doctrine of one-man-one-vote and the direct-election plan. But to point out that this "familiar slogan so often used in behalf of the direct-vote plan is not conceptually appropriate even to the plans' objectives" meets only part of the argument. The Electoral College system does distort the popular will; but in the context of the system as a whole, the primary function of this distortion is to balance inequities. There are any number of ways of showing that even an equitably apportioned House of Representatives has a rural bias and "discriminates" in some sense against concentrated minority groups. And of course the Senate does too. Add to this the effects of the seniority system on the internal distribution of power in Congress, and the case for urban bias in the presidency is rather strong. One of the curious features of this book is that Sayre and Parris do not make this case.

Despite these weaknesses, *Voting for President* is a useful book. The chapters on the historical setting and on the evolution of the current debate should prove interesting even to those who have followed the current controversy closely. It can serve, moreover, as a stimulating source of arguments for classroom debates on the system, and—I would hope—for the wider public controversy on this important political issue.

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Dispassionate Justice: A Synthesis of the Judicial Opinions of Robert H. Jackson. By Glendon Schubert (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969. Pp. 342. $9.50.)

Dispassionate Justice, Glendon Schubert's synthesis of the judicial opinions of Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, is a welcome addition to the author's earlier work on this subject. Like the author's notable article entitled "Jackson's Judicial Philosophy: An Exploration in Value Analysis," *American Political Science Review,* 59 (1965), 940–963, the book reflects intensive scholarship and detailed knowledge of Jackson and his fellow justices, and of the historical period from the late 'thirties until the emergence of the Warren Court.

Unlike the earlier piece, however, *Dispassionate Justice* is explicitly nonquantitative. As the author states in Chapter 1, "I have deliberately preferred to follow humanistic rather than scientific criteria in deciding what to include here; since my objective is to encourage others to read what Jackson had to say" (p. 19). Schubert attempts to provide the reader with a picture ". . . of Jackson's style, of his best judicial writing, and of the scope and content of his thinking" (p. 19).

While the collection is presented as a synthesis of Jackson's opinions, it is consciously nonrepresentative. For example, 47 per cent of Jackson's decisions were opinions of the Court, and 35 per cent were dissenting opinions; only 8 per cent of the decisions included in the collection are opinions written by Jackson as spokesman for the majority, while 55 per cent are dissents. Similarly, the collection overstresses both Jackson's interest in and his sympathy for civil liberties as compared to other issues. Professor Schubert is aware that his selectivity, i.e., his preference for Jackson's most trenchant opinions, may leave the reader with a somewhat inaccurate impression of Jackson's views while on the Court, and he provides appropriate caveats at several points in the book.

Dispassionate Justice is a distinguished work of scholarship which should become required reading for students of the 1940–1956 period in constitutional jurisprudence. If the book were simply a pedestrian editing job, or even a literary sandwich consisting of an analytical introductory chapter and conclusion stuffed with Justice Jackson's own words, it would hardly be worthy of critical acclaim. Instead, the author's personal efforts stand out throughout the volume. *Dispassionate Justice* is decidedly not a book put together in Professor Schubert's free moments.

The introductory chapter focuses on Robert Jackson's personality and the impact of his legal and political career on his judicial decisions. Schubert urges strongly that Jackson's background as a small-town, upstate New York lawyer, as a lifelong Democrat in a Republican area, as a man who learned law in a law firm rather than going to college and law school, fashioned him into a spokesman for the virtues of the nineteenth-century liberalism and individualism. The author views Jackson's close association with Roosevelt and his identification with the economic theories and governmental policies of the New Deal as the outcome of Jackson's political aspirations, not as the result of his underlying beliefs. Regardless of the merits of this contention, subsequent chapters illustrate clearly how Jackson was torn during his tenure on the bench between the perspective of small-town individualism gained during his first 42 years and the view that federal regulation was both necessary and appropriate.

The most provocative chapters in the book are undoubtedly chapters 2 through 4, which deal with freedom of speech, establishment of religion, and procedural rights. Nineteen of Jackson's important decisions in these constitutional areas are presented here and, as is the case throughout the book, each decision is preceded by a detailed analysis by the author. Schubert gives special attention to Jackson's important decision in *West Virginia State Board of Education* v. *Barnette,* as well as to his decisions in various loudspeaker and Communist conspiracy cases; Schubert attempts to make sense out of Jackson's confusing positions in all these cases by arguing that Jackson identified strongly with freedom of belief and freedom from compulsion to speak, but *not* with free speech in the direct sense. Thus, in *Barnette,* Jackson was liberal, but in the loudspeaker cases and the Communist cases Jackson identified with the desirability of public order and safety.

As Schubert points out, Justice Jackson's position on the famous establishment clause cases of the 1940s was consistently to the left of Justices Black and Douglas. Hugo Black was Jackson's arch-enemy—a justice he had denounced publicly in violation of the norms of judicial behavior, a "liberal activist" who did not show proper respect for the words of the Constitution. Schubert suggests that Jackson's opposition to bus transportation for parochial school students and to released-time programs was consistent with his notions of the right to privacy of beliefs, and he adds that Jackson's position was probably influenced by his antipathy toward Black.

To add to the confusion, Jackson was, along with Frankfurter, a moderate on questions of criminal procedure during his years on the Supreme Court. He tended to favor federal petitioners asserting the specific provisions of the bill of rights, but to be more conservative when the question at bar involved the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Some of his comments opposing federal interference with state control of the administration of justice and, in particular, interference by Supreme Court justices in the appraisal of evidence by state and local judges, have a familiar contemporary ring. Schubert cites Jackson's famous concurrence in *Watts v. Indiana* to demonstrate Jackson's belief in the need for police interrogation and his lack of sympathy for suspects being interrogated. The author asserts that this also is consistent with the justice's small-town heritage, since he believes Jackson identified with the independent, hard-working, thrifty, upright citizens of his childhood.

The second half of *Dispassionate Justice* includes cases on property rights, the area on which Jackson concentrated while on the bench, on bureaucracy, on the role of *stare decisis* in judicial decision making, on the relationship between the federal and state judiciaries, and on the nature of advocacy. While the last two subjects are likely to interest a narrow, specialized audience, the other three chapters have broader appeal. Jackson favored claims of property rights, and distrusted bureaucracy, as is demonstrated in his opinions in *Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer* and *Korematsu v. United States.*

In my opinion, Professor Schubert is at his best when he is analyzing with the precision of a surgeon; some of his generalizations, however, appear tenous. For example, the following statements from chapter 1 are supported only thinly, if at all, by the evidence presented in the book: (1) "Jackson was straightforward in his opposition to contemporary political liberalism." (p. 4); (2) "He expressed what was surely at the time, and probably still is, the consensus of the American bar on the basic issue of social, economic, and political policy that flowed through the Court . . ." (p. 6). Was the bar ever as monolithic, or Jackson as single minded as suggested in these statements?

These generalizations, and a few comparable ones, mar what is otherwise a stimulating and detailed analysis of Jackson, his judicial opinions, and the critical period when the Court was emerging from the New Deal era and beginning to come to grips with Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment issues. Although I personally lean to Herman Pritchett's view—(in *The Roosevelt Court* and *Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court*) that Jackson's opinions were unpredictable and erratic, rather than to Schubert's view that there was a definite pattern in Jackson's values, I must admit that Schubert has fought Professor Pritchett and his adherents to a standstill in *Dispassionate Justice.*

ALAN H. SCHECHTER

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The Presidency. By Dale Vinyard. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971. Pp. x, 214. $6.95, cloth; $2.95, paper.)

As one who struggles periodically to teach a coherent course on the American presidency, I enthusiastically embrace each new text as the book which will organize and somehow integrate for my students the disparate material I assign them under the rubric of the presidency. Professor Vinyard's book is the latest candidate; and it certainly crams a considerable quantity of information into its two-hundred pages. There are chapters on the electoral process, the president and Congress, the president as an executive, the president and the courts, and the president and foreign policy. In general, the material is purveyed succinctly and synthesized carefully. The chapter on the president as an executive is especially lucid and comprehensive, and some of my professional brethren will no doubt join me in pillaging it for lecture notes.

Nonetheless, all textbooks are guilty unless proven innocent, and *The Presidency* may be guiltier than most. At the most elementary level, it is too often plagued by sloppy errors, repetition, and clichés. For example, McGinnis;

Kallenbach, and the Harold of Supreme Court nominee Carswell are all misspelled; Table 1 (p. 150) is not mentioned specifically in the text, and the quote attributed to Teddy Roosevelt is "bully good pulpit" (p. 11 and p. 12) but becomes "bully pulpit" (p. 90). Moreover, the same "belly-ache" example appears on p. 11 and p. 97; the same quote from Neustadt on p. 9 and p. 90; and the point that "our political system is not so much based on separation of powers as it is on separated institutions sharing power" is made at least on pp. 91, 109, and 134.

More important, the book is far from inclusive in its coverage of what I believe are relevant topics and of some of the most illuminating recent research. The original work of Barber and the Georges on presidential personality is missing, as is Graber on public opinion, Cronin on advisory systems, and Young on the exercise of presidential power. And, too frequently for my taste, legalistic descriptions conceal the potential political implications of presidential powers. Thus, in discussing "The Executive as a Law Enforcer" Vynard refers to President Johnson's decision to dispatch federal troops to quell civil disorder in Detroit in 1967 at the request of then Governor George Romney (p. 138). No mention is made of the behind-the-scenes maneuvering in which Johnson reportedly decided to delay sending troops until the governor, a Republican presidential aspirant, formally requested and publicly demonstrated his inability to control the situation. Similarly, the potential political use of the president's pardoning authority (p. 139) is not discussed.

Vinyard's laudable intention, as expressed in his preface (p. viii), is to render the reader "better able to understand some of the problems of the modern president and to evaluate some of the criticisms and reforms." I do not think these objectives are sufficiently realized. The reader is provided with numerous "facts" and what seem to me to be two conventional themes: first, that the powers and responsibilities of the presidency have increased greatly and that "the demands of our domestic problems and our world responsibilities require a presidency that is continuously strong" (pp. 17–18); and second, that the presidency is one of several separated institutions sharing powers. Neither theme, however, adequately substitutes for analytical principles around which the disparate data can be organized. I suspect that Vinyard understands this because his initial chapter is entitled "The Functions of the Presidency." But, after identifying these functions as symbol, policy maker, and party leader, the chapter turns to the sources of presidential power, the changing presidency, the institutionalized presidency, and the vice-presidency. Vinyard's discussion of the extent to which the functions are complementary, compatible, and conflictual, and of how the successful or unsuccessful assertion of one function impedes or reinforces or subverts a different function is at best desultory. No hierarchy of functions is suggested, and although the interrelationship of functions is asserted, it is neither demonstrated nor sufficiently explained. And too often it is not entirely clear whether functions are being defined as imputed responsibility, activity, purpose, or simply the effects of presidential decisions.

Presidents are faced with innumerable functions, mandated from disparate sources, ranging in specificity, which they undertake with varying degrees of interest and commitment. In addition, a president's perception of his future electoral needs and, on particular issues, his ideological inclinations, may determine his actions far more than constitutional generalities. In organizing the material on the presidency, however, most textbook writers and those of us trying to teach the subject, tend to adopt a schematic approach (president and Congress, president and the courts, etc.) akin to Vinyard's. Perhaps as a result, the essence of the office and the reasons for the occupant's activities seem to evaporate.

One possible alternative might be to derive functions not from the constitution but from the specific decisions and actions of the president and his closest advisors. Such an approach might enable us to examine the significance of campaign finances and interest groups (not to mention conglomerates) in White House decision making and, by comparing actual functions over several presidencies, it might also permit us to analyze the supposed "institutionalization" of the presidency and see if it means more than an increase in the staff and bureaucracy surrounding the president. Furthermore, by examining how a president communicates and defines his actions to the executive establishment and the public, we might develop greater understanding of president-mass media relationships. Once we know what functions presidents actually perform, we may then be better able to appraise proposed "reforms," perhaps using such criteria as responsiveness, rectitude, or the need for increases or decreases in presidential power.

Our fundamental need is for more empirical research on presidential decision making. Vinyard is as clearly bedeviled by this lacuna as the rest of us; this may be what permits him to refer to Robert Kennedy's *Thirteen Days* as a "graphic inside account of presidential decision-making," when the book is quiet on most of the questions beguiling political scientists. Fortunately, the presidency, although not as permeable as Congress, is vulnerable to imaginative investigation. Indeed, partly as a consequence of our grievous imbroglio in Southeast Asia, we may now be experiencing a resurgence in studies of presidential decision making and a re-evaluation of conventional assumptions about the functions of the presidency. It is a pity that the writing of Vinyard's useful volume apparently preceded this recent ferment.

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Land Subdivision Regulation: Policy and Legal Considerations for Urban Planning. By Richard M. Yearwood. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 315. $16.50.)

The Urban Mosiac: Towards a Theory of Residential Differentiation. By Duncan W. G. Timms. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. Pp. 277. $11.50.)

These works represent two very different undertakings of considerable interest to students of urban politics. The Yearwood volume deals with a critical aspect of urban planning and the Timms volume with an important element of urban social structure. In both cases, for quite different reasons, the reader is left totally to his own devices in relating the problem to the political system and to public policy. Yearwood has a somewhat naive and simplistic view of the political process, and Timms has only limited interest in relating this theory to the policy questions that it raises.

Yearwood tells us that in the United States there is a general lack of concern with urban planning. Because of this lack of concern a vital element in public planning—subdivision regulation—has not been terribly effective. The root cause of this circumstance is a continued commitment by large segments of American society to the notion that all growth and development represent progress. The author implies that most developers are greedy, that they do not know their own best interests, that community elites are supportive of such developers, and that the rank and file citizenry is too apathetic to undo the situation. Yearwood assumes that if only wise men could prevail, all elements would recognize that their interests coincided sufficiently to permit "intelligent" subdivision regulation that would lead to profits for the developer within the context of a community plan satisfactory to all. As one who has been engaged in a continuing struggle for more than a year with a "greedy, out of town" developer regarding an issue of rezoning of property for multiple dwelling units, all of my personal biases coincide with those of Mr. Yearwood. However, neither I nor my compatriots in our struggle have ever believed that our adversaries had *any* interests in common with us that were reconcilable. In effect, Yearwood fails to recognize the diversity and complexity of interests and conflict in any political system as heterogeneous as an urban community. What is more damaging is that Yearwood's study presents little illustrative or systematic empirical data to permit him to draw any meaningful conclusions about the nature of subdivision regulation in the United States. In this respect the work is entirely impressionistic.

The author on page 63 states:

> In sum, too many developers are unenlightened, short-sighted and perhaps greedy. Whatever the reasons, large numbers of developers fail to see that high-quality developments are better for them as well as for the community as a whole, including the home buyers, the lending agencies, and the mortgage guaranteeing agencies.

A reviewer must ask, "Why so?" Unfortunately, Mr. Yearwood's volume offers no answer. On page 263, the author, in drawing conclusions about the problem of effective subdivision regulation tells us:

> The solution to this problem is not difficult. It requires no breakthroughs, no new legal or administrative techniques. It does require that: (1) all cities be granted extraterritorial jurisdiction over subdivisions; (2) counties exercise subdivision control with regulations closely approximating the standards found in the city's regulations; and (3) large metropolitan areas have one governmental body with boundaries encompassing the whole area, and authority over that whole area. These measures would clear away the problems.

Yearwood, in this volume, has failed to tell us very much about why no urban place in Western industrial society has been successful in clearing away these problems. To his credit he does pinpoint an important area of concern in urban planning. He provides descriptive accounts of the major technical elements associated with subdivision regulation. In addition, he has presented a wealth of material on case law related to these elements of the subdivision regulation problem. Sadly, the author has permitted his "heart" to dominate the analytical portions of the work.

The Timms volume provides a sharp contrast in approach. In *The Urban Mosaic* the author has set out as his task the testing of a theory associated with models of residential differentiation and social change. Timms's study is not concerned primarily with urban social structure and the relationship of residential patterns to it, but with *all* social structure. Empirical examination of urban patterns simply represents a convenient analytical mechanism for the author.

It is his view that residential differentiation serves as the matrix for much of human activity. The framework of the study is based on an examination of the Shevky-Bell social area model and applications of it that are founded on two premises (p. 152): "(1) that differences in social rank, family characteristics, migration status and ethnicity provide the major axes for the residential differentiation of the modern urban population, and; (2) that the indicants and indexes outlined in the social area scheme provide valid measures of these constructs." Timms reviews the empirical literature using this approach and conducts his own studies in Australia and New Zealand. Using factor analysis he concludes that indeed the four factors cited above are positively related to residential differentiation. He quickly points out, however, that this model is only applicable to modern industrial societies and not meaningful historically or currently in preindustrial systems. He also discusses the zonal residential developmental pattern enunciated by Burgess in the 1920s in Chicago and the sectoral pattern developed by Hoyt a generation later. He points out the complementarity between the two in his Brisbane and Auckland studies. In effect, there is both a radial pattern and one that develops, for example, along major transportation routes. Throughout the volume, the author makes relevant comments about the impact of public policy upon residential development. Apartheid in South Africa and zoning restrictions in the United States, for example, have an effect on the relationship of social and economic status and ethnicity to residential differentiation.

Timms's work represents a significant contribution to the literature on residential differentiation but is somewhat disappointing to the individual interested in social policy. The author makes a few references to policy implications, but they appear to be afterthoughts. In one reference (p. 103) he says: "The greater the prestige distance between two occupational populations the less likely are they to nominate each other as friends and the more dissimilar are their residential distributions." In his concluding statement he comments (p. 250): "The increasing movement characteristic of modern society has almost certainly lessened the salience of location in the day to day lives of city dwellers but it remains the case that residence in one part of the city rather than another has implications for a wide range of behaviours and biographies."

Timms seems unwilling to speculate on what difference, if any, all of this makes with respect to social and public policy. It seems as if he is unaware of the literature beyond the narrow confines of his own discipline.

Indeed, my greatest disappointment in both the Yearwood and Timms volumes is in their apparent disciplinary myopia. I am not pressing for renaissance interdisciplinary scholarship at the expense of solid work within the confines of the fields of planning, urban sociology, or any other legitimate area of study. But if we are to understand urban phenomena, scholars must familiarize themselves with the work of their brethren in related disciplines. In Yearwood's case, failure to understand the complexities of the political process results in a severe handicap in attempting to comprehend the lack of fulfillment of normative goals. In Timms's case, disciplinary narrowness simply delimits the utility of the work and necessitates further study by other researchers.

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L'Ouvrier français en 1970. By G. Adam, F. Bon, J. Capdevielle, and R. Mourioux. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1970. Pp. 276. 38.00 francs.)

Of late the French *Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques* has found it possible to supplement the old established series of its *Cahiers*, encompassing some of the seminal works of French political science, with a collection of *Travaux et Recherches*. The new series is devoted principally to the publication of highly valuable empirical studies by associates or staff members of the *Fondation*. The present study, first of its kind, is based on answers to a comprehensive questionnaire administered (shortly after the presidential elections of 1969) to a representative sample of more than 1100 French industrial workers. A comprehensive reproduction of the statistical results (and of the questionnaire itself) is preceded by an imaginative analysis of these results, modestly entitled "first impressions."

However skeptical one might be about the validity of polls which try to determine among other things the degree of political interest and engagement, as well as attitudes toward religion, authority, and prevailing utopias, one will have to concede that both the questionnaire and the conclusions here presented indicate a high degree of sophistication and of familiarity with the mentality of the respondents and the customs of the working-class milieu. Many of the findings provide solid and indeed indispensable data which in part confirm earlier unsubstantiated hypotheses and in part invite a reconsideration of erroneous or incomplete assumptions.

The emerging image still shows an industrial working class characterized by some definite traits of a subsystem with its own traditions and unforgotten historical memories. Yet the elements common to the subculture, comprising organized as well as unorganized workers, and to the French political culture in general are numerous and may be on the increase. Among the older traditions remains a distinct distrust of political parties and of the "political class," neither of which, it is true, fare very well in the opinion of the public at large. Nonetheless the unbroken hold of the C.G.T.—recognized by most respondents as ranking low in independence from a political party—remains largely unexplained. For what the authors call *"le fait majoritaire,"* according to them characteristic of political as well as of trade-union life in the Fifth Republic, is not sufficiently analyzed.

Another, largely unshaken tradition is the continuing division of the working class not only into a minority of organized and a majority of unorganized workers, but the survival of different confederations of trade unions. The latter division remains functional as long as there are fundamental differences of attitudes and opinions among the membership of the major confederations. There is ample evidence presented to show that such differences continue to exist even if many of them are revealed as cultural rather than political or professional. The members of the CFDT, whose unions years ago broke all ties with "organized Catholicism" and shun all explicit reference to Christianity, may be more progressive than anybody else in their outlook on union policy and on some political questions as well; yet most of them are still regular churchgoers, while very few in this category will be found in other confederations.

Figures on overall union membership permit useful differentiation according to the size of the firm, and its location in city, town or countryside, and also according to age, sex, and level of education of union members. In view of the generally admitted unreliability of official trade-union statistics, these are valuable data. While density of organization and the overall orientation of the workers in the old, established industries and the modern ones are somewhat different, the degree of such differences seem to have been overrated by previous writers in the field of industrial sociology. Fairly objective standards are applied to evaluate the intensity of day-to-day activity within the trade unions—provided, or course, that the respondents have answered candidly.

An original, even if possibly somewhat contrived, method of arranging data, permits insight into the widespread, long-observed phenomenon of membership fluctuations. Guided by earlier attempts to identify major "families" within the country's political spectrum (see especially Deutsch, Linden and Weill, *Les Familles politiques*), the investigators group the respondents' answers to a fairly broad range of questions in such a way as to distinguish between the "militants," the "faithful," the "hostile," the "marginal," and the "intermittent sympathizers." The last group is by far the most numerous (about 60 per cent in almost all categories making up the sample). From this group all confederations, but especially the CGT, recruit massively at times of social upheaval or other dramatic events; once the fever recedes this group leaves the organizations, without, however, changing its major attitudes on industrial relations and on the place of unions in society.

The identification and characterization of the "militant" is equally fascinating. It shows him to be quite different from a trade-union organizer in the U.S. or even Western Germany; more committed to a working-class ideology, not free from certain anarchosyndicalist traits even if he is a communist and at the same time far more skeptical than the ordinary union member or sympathizer in regard to such concepts as "participation" or "self-management" by the workers.

As in other European countries, the electoral sympathies of the French working class are moving generally and steadily to the right, although the Communists are less affected by this trend than others. It is also likely that the law-and-order election of 1968 and the confused circumstances under which the referendum and the presidential elections were held the following year have muddled the picture so that findings based on a 1969 poll should not necessarily be taken as indicative of a permanent mutation. In several respects, however, both voting behavior and political sympathies of the working class follow general trends in the population: Actual earnings make little difference (in other words, there is no "working class aristocracy"). Not only women but also the young workers under 24 are generally the most conservative groups. Since in many respects the attitudes of the youngest age group are at variance with those of older workers, the conclusion is warranted that the factory continues to play an important role in the socialization process.

Altogether the authors conclude correctly that its electoral preferences show the working class to be singularly and increasingly divided. But, remarkably enough, there is no simple correlation between electoral orientation and other sociopolitical attitudes. Voters for the presidential candidates of the Left, Right and Center view "hard and long" strikes with almost equal favor, an opinion not shared by the population at large. On only one question the unity of the working class appears almost total: A strong xenophobia expressed in descending order by a pronounced dislike for North Africans, Spaniards, and Black Africans and a somewhat concealed anti-Semitism transcend all differences characteristic for the sample in many other respects.

Whether or not one finds all of the authors' interpretations convincing, the rich statistical indications furnished by the study will make the book a valuable "data bank" for years to come. One can only wish for comparable inquiries in other industrialized countries.

HENRY W. EHRMANN

McGill University

Religion and State in Iran: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period. By Hamid Algar. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 286. $9.50.)

This is a detailed, well-documented, and scholarly historical study of the role of the *ulama* (scholars learned in Islam) in Iran from the time the Qajars first came into power until the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–06. Special stress is given to the conflicts which developed between the *ulama,* who considered themselves to be the "de facto regents of the Imams" (p. 22) and the only legitimate authority, and the Qajar rulers, who sought to increase their own authority even at the expense of the *ulama.*

According to Algar, since the Qajars were not descendants of the Imams, the *ulama* considered them to be "illegitimate rulers"; and the refusal of the *ulama* "to share legitimate authority with the Qajars" led to "most of the friction between the secular and religious powers throughout the nineteenth century" (p. 22). To protect their position, the *ulama* not only opposed any moves, including those for governmental reforms, which might strengthen the Qajar rulers but also sought to obstruct the spread of Western influence and ideology into Iran. Thus, the *ulama* objected to foreign economic concessions and political and territorial encroachments. They also "largely inspired and directed" the "agitation leading to the Constitutional Revolution" in the hope of being able to promote "an expansion or at least perpetuation" of their powers; "but little if any thought was in fact given to their role in a constitutional system of government" (p. 255). The Constitutional Revolution and subsequent developments brought about a major decline in the influence of the *ulama.*

Although the author frequently states that some *ulama* had been corrupt and had exploited the masses for "purposes of a personal, even illegitimate," gain (p. 114), throughout most of the book he appears to sympathize with them and with their opposition to the state. He usually considers them to be associated with popular will and interests and he often refers to them as the "natural leaders of the nation," the "symbol and embodiment of national aspirations" and the "defenders of national interests" against the state and all foreigners (pp. 90, 94, 99, 203ff, 241). Algar, however, typically accuses the state of being "ruthless," "impious," and "tyrannical" (pp. 205, 244, 258). Only near the end of his study does the author briefly criticize the *ulama* for having

> failed to provide any real answer to the manifold problems—political, social, economic—facing Iran in the second half of the nineteenth century, as a result of its own stagnation and the impact of the West. Ijtihād [the right to interpret the law] was on the whole used narrowly, in a strictly legalistic sense; its genuine potentialities, much vaunted by a few reformers, were seldom activated with honesty or perceptiveness. . . . The *ulama* of Qajar Iran failed to exert the comprehensive and assured leadership thus demanded of them (p. 259).

Apparently, many *ulama* were primarily concerned with perpetuating their own influence and position even if this also meant perpetuating many grave defects still existing in Iranian society and preventing badly-needed reforms.

One could have wished, therefore, that the author had analyzed more fully and critically the role of the *ulama* in relation to real, long-term popular and national interests; had presented more comparisons with the roles of both the *ulama* in other Muslim states and also the clergy in Christian Europe in earlier centuries; and had provided more information on the part played by Iranian nationalists in the period before 1906.

This scholarly and useful book represents a welcome and important addition to the few good studies which have been written on Iran. It will, naturally, be of primary interest to the specialist, who will especially benefit from an excellent "Note on the Sources," hundreds of footnotes, and a long bibliography which contains references to a wide variety of sources in Russian and several other European languages, as well as in Persian and Arabic.

FRED J. KHOURI

Villanova University

The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries. Bela Balassa and Associates. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. Pp. 375. $12.00.)

This book is likely to have a curious reception. In private, the national ministries and the international secretariats that worry about economic policies in the developing countries will study it with care. In public, they will do their best to ignore it.

Their efforts to ignore the book may very well succeed. The book is written in the characteristically opaque style in which economists generally communicate with their professional brethren. Political scientists may have some trouble in detecting its critical central message: that the difficulties of the developing countries in increasing their exports and improving the productivity of their industrial sectors are being greatly exacerbated by their own national trade policies. The restrictions that the developing countries themselves apply to their import and export trade usually have the effect of placing a heavy handicap on exporters, especially on exporters of manufactured goods. And the restrictions permit local industries that have long since outgrown their infancy to remain inefficient, unprogressive, and monopolistic. There is evidence also that the restrictive policies of the developing countries tend to push their producers toward the use of imported machines rather than local labor, wherever a choice exists. Finally, there is a suggestion in the evidence—though not more than a suggestion—that the countries which are least addicted to restrictive trade policies have had the greatest success in their industrial development.

The book is not the last word in studies of this genre, but it is the best so far in terms of its scope and workmanship. It is based on meticulous analyses of the systems of trade restrictions in six developing countries (Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Philippines), and in one country—Norway—that has already arrived. Though the studies are done by a different author for each country, the methodology of all of them is molded on the same pattern. It is a methodology closely identified with the name of its principal author, Bela Balassa.

In brief, Balassa and others have been emphasizing for some years that the size of the tariff which a country imposes on some given product, say refrigerators, indicates very little about the level of protection that the country's refrigerator producers may be getting. Before one can draw conclusions on that score, account must be taken of the amount of protection that is being extended to all the products which the refrigerator maker must acquire, such as the steel and the motor. From the refrigerator maker's point of view, the protection afforded to these products represents a production cost, which reduces the amount of "effective protection" available to the refrigerator industry. Calculations of effective protection are not easy to make; but once made, they generate the disconcerting conclusion that the developing countries seem to be protecting the wrong industries.

From the point of view of the political scientist, the book's conclusions pose a major question. Why such seemingly perverse behavior on the part of the less developed countries? Fifteen years ago one might have been tempted to ascribe it all to incompetence or to ignorance. But if that explanation ever had much claim to validity, which I doubt, the claim has long since disappeared. Each of the six developing countries in the study is amply endowed with well-trained economists and with serious and sophisticated civil servants. Indeed, Chile—whose performance, by the way, seems among the most dismal of the lot—is outstanding for the high quality of its economic fraternity in and out of government.

It is much more plausible to assume that the performance described by Professor Balassa and his associates is the result of some sort of trade-off produced by the political process. Measures of protection usually provide a direct short-run benefit to some group or other in the economy, while the harm that such measures generate tends to be less direct and more long-run. In the calculus of politics, one can assume, short-run visible benefits are given a weight so heavy as to ignore their long-run effects or their indirect effects, even when those effects are corrosive and debilitating. But this is surmise; and it remains for political scientists with a nose for economic phenomena to tell us more about the underlying political processes.

Lest such researchers take the Balassa book at face value, let me warn that the book itself is built on some rather gross oversimplifications which economists so often find the need to employ. When economists engage in such oversimplifications, they generally know what they are doing. As a rule, however, the brief laconic asides which purport to explain and to justify the oversimplifications are not enough to forewarn those in other professions who want to build upon the economists' work.

The Balassa volume has its quota of bear traps of this sort. Perhaps the most troublesome is the implicit assumption in the calculations that business firms are free to formulate their strategies separately, industry by industry, activity by activity, and that they gravitate to the activities which bear the highest "effective" protection, while avoiding the others. Thus, no allowance is made for the possibility that the well-protected assembler of automobiles may feel compelled to produce his own components even though components are not formally protected. Nor is allowance made for the possibility that exports can be stimulated by forces other than costs and prices.

The real world provides numerous illustrations of the danger of oversimplifications of this sort. In Brazil and Mexico, for example, the impressive increases in exports of industrial goods in recent years are due mainly to the subsidiaries of foreign owned firms. These firms in many cases are responding to a fairly persuasive set of propositions put to them by the Brazilian and Mexican governments: If they wish to enjoy the continued privileges of protected, quasi-monopolist sellers in the local market, they must give back a portion of their monopoly profits by exporting some of their local production, irrespective of the high production costs. In this case, local sales are tied to export sales. The local consumer is being used to compensate the producer, so that the producer can afford to export. The higher the protection, the bigger the fund from which such export compensation can be extracted.

The political scientist who relies upon the economist's analysis of economic phenomena, therefore, courts a certain risk. But the risk of disregarding such analysis may be greater still.

RAYMOND VERNON

Harvard University

China Shakes The World. By Jack Belden. Introduction by Owen Lattimore. (New York: Monthly Review Press, first published in 1949, reissued in 1970. Pp. 534. $8.50.)

There is cause for both rejoicing and sorrow in the reissue, with a new and moving introduction by Owen Lattimore, of *China Shakes The World*. The rejoicing comes from the mere fact that this book is once again available. The sorrow is that when it was first published in 1949 it was submerged in the blind fear and hysteria culminating in the ignorant irrationality of McCarthyism, which then took twenty bleak years and two disastrous wars to ebb sufficiently so that an American president could and would journey to Peking.

If I had to recommend only one book which explains what happened in China that led up to the proclamation of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949 and why it happened, it would be *China Shakes The World*. Jack Belden, as a newspaperman, had known China well before World War II, which he spent elsewhere. Then, bemused by growing evidence that the defeat of Japan instead of bringing peace to a long-suffering China had only exchanged one kind of war for another, he returned to find out for himself what was going on. And find out he did, and with a thoroughness which no other foreigner I knew of could match. Other foreign observers for the most part got their information via the diplomatic cocktail circuit of Nanking, in the bordellos of Shanghai, in elegant gardens in Peking, or in the rather specialized if invigorating atmosphere of Yenan. Only a few made occasional and brief forays outside the protected enclaves. This is not to say that information thus obtained did not have its place and its importance; but it was only part of the picture and with few exceptions was evaluated out of context.

Belden chose to spend long periods of time traveling and living in the countryside and in the villages where the work of China was done and where the basic decisions about the future were being made. He lived with people in Communist areas, in Nationalist areas, and in the shadowy places in between, which moved uncertainly and often slowly as the civil war unfolded and moved toward the chaotic debacle of 1949. He saw in detail the unbelievable cruelty, rapaciousness, and insensitivity of returning Nationalist troops and officials with whom the landlords, who as often as not had made their accommodation with the occupying Japanese, made common cause. He saw the Communists, often stumbling, sometimes uncertain, making mistakes, but in the end moving inexorably and successfully in persuading that they had something better to offer. And he saw the fury of peasant rebellion mount, as slowly and dimly they began to perceive that the degrading and brutal place to which they had been consigned for so many centuries by the masters of that society was neither their inevitable role, nor even the Will of Heaven. He could see that an inexorable tide was flowing, as only a few other observers saw, most notably Messrs. Service and Davies in their now famous but then ignored despatches to the Department of State, which could be accelerated or decelerated, swerved a bit, but in the end could not be denied.

Superb and accurate account that it is of what he saw, Belden also had acquired a sufficient insight into Chinese history that he could put the events around him into the perspective of that history. Perhaps it was this perspective which enabled him to resist the temptation of claiming more insight into the future than he or anyone else really had. Few resisted it. It was beyond doubt that the Nationalists and Chiang Kai-shek because of their stupidities were suicidally heading into catastrophe. It was just as clear that the future belonged to the Communists. What was rather less clear was what they would make of it and how long it would belong to them. Belden avoided the euphoria of other observers who for ideological reasons or out of sheer relief over the dedicated and hygienic air of Yenan in contrast to the noxious atmosphere of Chungking reacted as did Lincoln Steffens after his return from the Soviet Union in the 1920s: "I have seen the future and it works." Belden decided to leave that judgment to history.

He did one other thing, however, for which he has every right to be pleased with himself. He listed the problems the Communists would have to face and the alternatives they would have to choose among in facing up to them. If not exactly a blueprint of the ensuing two decades, it was an astonishingly penetrating look into a very troubled future. I guess that little of what has happened since 1949 has really surprised him very much.

The sorrow I mentioned in the beginning should more accurately be called tragedy. This book is overwhelmingly about China and the Chinese; only marginally is it about American policy and then mostly by inference. Since events, either in China or in Washington, have their own inner logic, it is doubtless pure fantasy to suggest that if Americans had read and understood *China Shakes The World* the history of the last twenty years would have been very different. Indeed, it would have been, but they did not read it, because they were convinced they already understood. Ironically, the China White Paper flatly asserted that nothing the United States did or did not do in China could have changed the outcome; and then for twenty years the United States proceeded to act on a diametrically opposite assumption in Asia. With the lessons of Korea and Vietnam added to those of China, perhaps one can hope that the United States will in the future behave with more restraints if not wisdom, even if for the wrong reasons.

JOHN F. MELBY

University of Guelph, Canada

Ferment in the Ukraine: Documents by V. Chornovil, I. Kandyba, L. Lukyanenko, V. Moroz and Others. Edited by Michael Browne, Foreword by Max Hayward. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. xi, 267. $15.00.)

This book is not in any sense a social science analysis. The lengthy introduction and the editorial notes are purely historical and descriptive. The editor does not even attempt any serious examination of the materials in terms of their bearing on the evolution of legal procedures and practices as instruments of social control, although nearly all of the materials directly refer to alleged crimes and real punishments.

Nevertheless, it is important for many political scientists to know what is in this volume. In the first place, it reminds us of the immense effort necessary to establish and render intelligible even isolated circumstances and events in a political system as withdrawn from western observation as that of the Soviet Ukraine. Michael Browne has provided only a descriptive commentary, but every line of this commentary provides evidence of painstaking research in obscure sources in numerous languages, careful cross-checking, and judicious evaluation of polemic positions. Those who use these materials for broader analytic purposes should not forget that their work would have been impossible without the expertise which provided the materials.

A second value of the collection is its extension of the universe of those examining problems of social control under communism, or in a still broader range of political systems. Ukrainians constitute the third largest ethnic group (fewer only than Russians and Chinese) under Communist rule. What these documents—and other *samizdat* materials reaching Western Europe—indicate is that the currents of opposition evident in Eastern Europe and among Jews, Baltic, and Caucasian groups in the USSR are strongly present among the Ukrainians as well. Since the opposition figures who composed the Ukrainian documents and those who are mentioned in them are nearly all intellectuals, one cannot extrapolate the evidence to assert that mass opposition to Soviet-style Communism is as strong in the Ukraine as it manifestly is in Czechoslovakia or among Jews in the USSR. What the documents do establish is that Ukrainian intellectual opposition has become increasingly more articulate and daring, and that it has spread to groups which were little affected by the violent anticommunism of the World War II period. There is little doubt that these young people are sincere in claiming a Marxism-Leninism as their fundamental ideology, even though they are as selective in using it to support nationalism as their prosecutors are in using the official doctrine to maintain centralism. Given these new features, it is equally significant, however, that contemporary opposition writers admit solidarity with the older nationalist elements. Although L. H. Lukyanenko asserts that he did not know what the OUN (the principal prewar Ukrainian nationalist organization) was before he was arrested, another of the jailed oppositionists writes:

> Nor is it true that we chose former OUN members for our organization; nothing of the sort took place, and this [claim] is a fabrication. But that does not mean that they are bad men. They are, on the contrary, true patriots of the Ukraine. We have become convinced of this while in the same concentration camp with them (p. 68).

The third value of the documents is their evidence, inconclusive in itself but significant when added to other information on trends in the post-Khrushchev USSR, that the regime is gradually retreating to traditional authoritarian methods of suppression as contrasted to the ubiquitous, undefined terror of the Stalin era. Superficially, the enhanced use of pseudopsychiatric diagnoses as a ground for incarcerating Russian dissenters has appeared to point in the opposite direction. In the Ukraine, outright criminal charges appear to have been by far the dominant method of suppressing dissent under Khrushchev as well as his successors. In the short run, overt suppression of this nature is effective, but it has rarely proved a durable method of rule, particularly where heightening ethnic consciousness is at stake.

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG
University of Wisconsin

China and Russia—The Great Game. By O. Edmund Clubb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. Pp. 578. $12.95.)

Mr. Clubb, a retired Foreign Service Officer with a scholarly interest in modern China, has written this book in "an attempt to depict the nature of the relationship between the two countries, as discovered in historical context" (p. vii). As the Kiplingesque title suggests, there is considerable attention to Central Asia, an area in which the author is especially interested, beginning with the Mongol Empire.

The historical portion of the book (down to 1949), while not breaking any significant new ground in telling what is by now a fairly familiar story, and while rather too broad in scope to qualify as a monograph and yet too detailed for a textbook or a truly popular treatment, is based on good monographic (including Soviet) sources.

The sources after 1949 tend to decline in amount of detail and in general quality. Judging by the notes, little use has been made of original Chinese and Soviet sources or of the best secondary studies (notably those by Zagoria and Griffith). On the other hand, the analysis of the course of Sino-Soviet relations since 1949, although brief, is reasonably satisfactory. While conceding that it is difficult to get any two analysts to agree on the "mix" of ideological and national interest elements in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Mr. Clubb has given attention to both categories, with the emphasis on the second as I believe it should be. The analysis suffers somewhat from being the tail attached to the preceding historical dog; the discussion of the 1969 Sino-Soviet border crisis, for example, conveys the impression that the crisis grew naturally out of historic Sino-Soviet border rivalry, whereas in reality the causes were much more specific and short-term.

Mr. Clubb's final chapter reflects interestingly, but not very convincingly, on the Sino-Soviet-American triangle in Asia, with somewhat too little attention to Japan. He tentatively forecasts a détente in Sino-Soviet relations, without making his reasons for doing so very clear, except that he expects two of the three major powers to combine against the third "for reasons of self-preservation," and because he considers that "given its present strategic aims, the United States is predestined to fight counterrevolutionary wars on China's periphery—if not against China itself" (p. 520). None of this is very persuasive, and the failure to grasp the more conciliatory reorientation of American Asian policy embodied in the Nixon Doctrine is startling.

The unfortunate fact seems to be that there are really two books here, separated by the year 1949, and that each has been impaired somewhat by the labor expended on the other. The historian is not likely to be satisfied with the first, nor the political scientists with the second. A canvas that portrays Genghis Khan at one end and Mao Tse-tung at the other is too broad. The governing assumption seems to be the questionable one popular with historians, that a wealth of historical detail (and not merely major historical trends) must be known if anything of significance is to be understood about the present. In reality, the major post-1969 development relating to the Sino-Soviet-American triangle—the Nixon Doctrine and the Chinese opening to the United States, for example—grew out of origins no more distant than the escalation of the conflict in Vietnam, the Cultural Revolution and its failure, and the crisis in Sino-Soviet relations generated by the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Brezhnev Doctrine, and the determination of former Chinese Defense Minister Lin Piao to teach the Russians an exemplary lesson on the Ussuri River. It cannot be shown that, as Mr. Clubb seems to suggest, important recent events flowed inexorably from the lengthy historical panorama that he presents. It can be shown, however, that to view current trends in this light is to inhibit effective analysis of them.

Harold C. Hinton
The George Washington University

Political Terror in Communist Systems. By Alexander Dallin and George W. Breslauer. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970. Pp. ix, 172. $5.95.)

Dallin and Breslauer have constructed a classification scheme to describe the functions of "political terror," which they perceive as having performed different functions at various "stages" of development of communist political systems. These stages are rather carefully defined. The authors also seek to define, and account for, variations in the incidence and characteristics of terror among different communist regimes, with primary reference to the Soviet and Chinese cases.

The six chapters devoted to periodization or developmental sequence of the uses of terror discuss the elimination, in the "takeover stage," of those suspected of "active hostility," and the deterring of "hostile action on the part of political opponents" (p. 15); in the "mobilization stage"—in which, according to Dallin and Breslauer, a "totalitarian" pattern prevails—a variety of "control functions" and "transformation functions" are performed (pp. 24, 57). These are described and broken down into subcategories. Perhaps the most interesting chapter of the book is the one describing the final, "post-mobilization" stage—equivalent, for the USSR at least, in the authors' schema, to "post-Stalin," or "post-totalitarian." This is the stage which European—but not Asian—communist systems have reached. In this phase, "the incidence of political terror as an instrument of public policy tends to decline sharply." Stability and efficiency, rather than revolutionary transformations of society, become increasingly important goals of party policy.

Finally, in two somewhat repetitious concluding chapters, the authors assess the effects and costs of terror, in systemic and individual contexts, and list thirteen "variables and variations" that they apparently consider to have some value in explaining differences in patterns of terror among the various communist systems.

The merits of the Dallin-Breslauer study are considerable. It provides an underpinning of empirical-theoretical analysis and a summary of historical data, based on the works of leading scholars, for a comparative and developmental analysis of one of the most important aspects of the political performance of communist systems. The study should encourage other efforts at diachronic and synchronic comparison. The authors' treatment of the "post-mobilization" stage in communist development, and in general their application of a developmental approach to communist history are stimulating. Their careful use of a wide range of concepts and theories drawn from psychology, sociology, and other disciplines imparts to the study an interpretive richness that, while difficult to summarize, should be attractive to students of comparative politics, and especially of communist systems.

However, as is perhaps inevitable in cases when, perhaps prematurely, the attempt is made to resolve extraordinarily difficult tasks, the authors have encountered difficulties with which they have not always successfully coped. I found considerable evidence of conceptual and logical confusion and not a few contradictions and inconsistencies. For example, terms such as terror, coercion, intimidation, rationality, and others are—of course, this statement may reflect one reader's prejudices—either defined too precisely or not precisely enough. For example, the authors' distinction between terror, which they define as "the arbitrary use, by organs of political authority, of severe coercion . . ." (p. 1)—and other forms of coercion, is not spelled out very clearly. The distinction may in principle be valid, but, one asks, how much does it matter to victims of arrest, exile, or execution that their fate has been "arbitrarily" determined? More fundamental, perhaps, is the failure fully to reconcile or synthesize the implications of the structural-functional theories used by the authors with the developmental scheme in which most of their findings are presented.

Perhaps because of these and other conceptual problems that cannot be elaborated here, the book contains many apparently contradictory statements. Some of these are minor, semantic problems. Others are more serious. Thus the mobilization stage is defined early as involving concentration on critical goals such as industrialization, and yet somewhat later we read that in the USSR "the major terror came after the decisive breakthrough in the economy had been reached" (p. 39). Similarly, in several passages the authors appear to posit a necessary connection between terror and "communism" or "totalitarianism," but elsewhere to deny or qualify such a proposition. Particularly puzzling is the apparent contradiction between the authors' stress on the relatively sparing use of terror by the Chinese, as compared with the Soviet communists, and their proposition that the use of terror declines in the postmobilization stage, which has been reached by the latter, but not by the former. Numerous other examples might be mentioned, but instead of citing them it may suffice to say that the overall strategy of the study is superior to its expository tactics.

Despite these criticisms, however, the Dallin-Breslauer study is a very valuable contribution to the difficult but much needed and still scarce literature of critical and systematic comparative analysis of communist politics. It should both inspire and facilitate further fruitful efforts along similar lines.

Frederick C. Barghoorn

Yale University

Miracle at Joaseiro. By Ralph della Cava. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970. Pp. 324. $9.95.)

Undoubtedly the predominant characteristic of the masses in Brazil is their miserable and oppressed state. Probably the second dominant trait is their intense primitive religiosity which permits them to accept their predicament. *Miracle at Joaseiro* is the story of these people, their faith, and the priest who remains, almost forty years after his death, the greatest religious folk hero of Brazil. Individuals like this priest have perpetuated the religiosity as well as channeled it into productive economic and political activities, and the symbolism generated by religious figures of this nature may well provide the stimulus for a radical change in the conditions under which the masses survive.

The setting of the story is the backwater village of Joaseiro in the Northeastern state of Ceará, and the year is 1889—the year after slavery was abolished in Brazil. In this year the Empire was overthrown and the Republic was founded. It was clearly a time of momentous events. On March 1, the pious chaplain of Joaseiro, Padre Cícero Romão Batista, administered communion to his parishioners, and one devout young woman fell suddenly to the ground, the host she had just received turning red with blood. It was contended by pious observers (and is widely held today) that this was the blood of Jesus Christ which was again shed to redeem man. The event was repeated periodically during the next two months. These occurrences triggered a long and complex process which had religious, economic, and political significance not only for Joaseiro and the state of Ceará but also for people throughout the country.

Ralph della Cava has written a fascinating and thorough political biography of Pe. Cícero which deserves serious attention from all those interested in the Catholic Church or Latin America. The author has researched extensively and has unearthed material never before utilized in the voluminous (in Portuguese) writing on Pe. Cícero. It is to the author's credit that he cut through the sectarian debate over this event and presented a lucid account of its importance which is of interest to political scientists.

The complexity of della Cava's task was substantial, for he attempted to locate this event, and the processes which resulted from it, in the local, state, and national context: His thesis is based on the premise that the significance of the miracle lies in relationships beyond the confines of the Church and Joaseiro. A brief note on Pe. Cícero will make the point. Following the miracle, the priest seemingly unwittingly became the head of a popular movement which brought fame and prosperity to Joaseiro. From the lowly status of village, Joaseiro became a full-fledged city with a prosperous business community and a great population concentration. In political terms, Pe. Cícero did very well, for he became the prefect of the city, then the First Vice President of the State, and was finally elected to the Federal Congress although he never occupied the seat. In the midst of these developments (roughly in the period from 1889 to 1934) he was involved in a local revolution which toppled the state government. But although he became the most important political figure in the Northeast, his standing in the Church suffered since he was prohibited from preaching and celebrating mass, was almost excommunicated by Rome, and died defrocked.

The author has taken this fascinating material and used it to analyze the Catholic Church and politics from the ground level up. He provides a good case study on the operations of the institutional Church through the focus on Pe. Cícero and his relations with the bishops, the papal nuncio, and finally Rome itself. The conclusions may have to be discounted slightly since he did not have access to the archives of the nuncio or those in Rome, but even so the case study rings true. As much as anything else, this is a study of local and regional politics in an important era of change in dynasties. Taking the focal point of the achievement of city status by Joaseiro, della Cava shows the processes of local government and the importance of interaction with other levels, and it generally characterizes very well the nature of politics in Brazil during that period.

In spinning the web of relationships and in attempting to sort out the complexities, the author comes down very hard on the side of the theory of the integration of rural politics with those of the national, and even international, level. That is, he debunks the dual society thesis which enjoys considerable support from Latin Americanists. While the point is made very clearly in the case of Pe. Cícero, for the Church is indeed linked throughout all the levels, it is somewhat less clear for political operations; furthermore, Joaseiro might well be unique, since it was traditionally more closely connected to the port of Recife than to Fortaleza.

The story has particular political interest, for it is the political perspective that the author selects for the presentation of his data. In the process, however, the religious or messianic character of the event, the priest, and the movement is largely ignored. The reader almost forgets that the basis of the whole phenomenon was religious and not political, and of course this is the lasting impact—not the rise or fall of a political dynasty during the early part of the century. By taking an explicitly political perspective the author also casts the priest into a rather pathetic light, for all Pe. Cícero ever seemed to desire was the reinstatement of his priestly orders and according to della Cava was a front for subtle political manipulations. It is understandable that della Cava adopted this perspective as a welcome tonic against the accepted literature in Brazil but for the North American audience more of a balance would be welcomed. A fascinating approach would be a detailed study of the institutionalization of charisma into a political movement and the nature of the priest's influence or power. In its stead della Cava has given us a detailed account of Church and civil politics which can still stand on its merits.

THOMAS C. BRUNEAU

McGill University

The Rape of the Peasantry: Latin America's Landholding System. By Ernest Feder. (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1971. Pp. 304. $2.50, paper.)

The arguments of this book are: the land tenure system of Latin America results in economic, social and political evils; landownership is concentrated in a few owners; the system of huge estates, *latifundismo,* dooms the mass of the peasantry, whether they be sharecroppers, occupants of *minifundios,* or landless *campesinos,* to lives of poverty, underemployment, unemployment and debt; and, despite the rhetoric and pronouncements of the 1960s (except for Cuba and possibly Peru—the Allende government in Chile evidently postdated the completion of the study), the system is not changing for the better.

Since scholars, governmental officials, and others have heard this message before, they might, on a casual reading, be tempted to ask if it is indeed necessary for them to admire (or deplore) once again the discovery of the wheel—that some have a lot more land than others, that rich people have more wealth, status, and power than poor people.

At least two aspects of this study elevate it above the level of an exegesis of exploitation in the countryside and a polemic against the methods and consequences of *latifundismo.* First, the author (an agricultural economist who has worked with the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) adopts an uncompromising position on behalf of structural change in opposition to the programs of those whom he labels as the Technocrats. His perception of the emphases, support, and orientation of the Technocrats is stated at the beginning of the book:

> The Technocrats are in favor of stimulating output and the efficiency of production by channeling more resources, including (and perhaps mainly) modern machinery and innovations, into agriculture and improving farm management, but without making major changes in the agrarian structure. They are advocating dynamic changes in the production processes, but want to maintain the status quo in the economic, social and political institutions which make up the Latin American agricultural sector. . . . Since the majority of all agricultural resources are controlled by a small number of owners of large estates, it would seem obvious that such policies and programs would benefit primarily this landed elite. . . . Hence the Technocrats are consciously or unconsciously *elite-oriented* (pp. vii–viii).

In contrast, the Reformers concentrate their attack on the agrarian structure. This structure constitutes "an almost absolute barrier" to the effective use of technology, a drastic improvement in agricultural production, and the elimination of poverty. Since they seek a redistribution of land for the benefit of the poor, the landless and the small landholder, "the Reformers," the author concludes, "can be said to be *peasant-oriented*" (p. viii).

A second departure of this book from a more or less familiar analytical mode is its appraisal of prospects for change through political effort. The outlook of the author on this point, despite his evident sympathies for massive changes, is almost unqualifiedly gloomy, for the wealthy landowners remain powerful and unmotivated to initiate profound changes. The peasants lack the political resources to consummate such changes. Although Feder believes that "change in favor of progress is normally accompanied by great violence, even by revolutions" (p. 176), he offers neither strategy nor tactics for pursuing his preferred institutional transformations through violent means. In fact, apparently discounting the possibilities of a significant political realignment, he pessimistically forecasts that in the 1970s, "in the aggregate, the status of Latin America's peasants will not change for the better" (p. 270). And yet, the last lines of the book read: ". . . some day the issues of justice will force their way back into the limelight with revenge. The Reformers may still have the last word" (p. 292).

Merle Kling
Washington University, St. Louis

Water Resources Law and Policy in the Soviet Union. Edited by Irving K. Fox. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1971. Pp. 256. $8.50.)

Planning and pollution might seem to be incompatible, but Soviet experience proves they are not. Why should this be so? Both Soviet and American authors seek an answer in this symposium, but Zigurds L. Zile of Wisconsin has the most convincing suggestions. To him the major influences seem to be two: a deeply felt need for industrial development, and a doctrinal confidence that some inner logic of socialism will work to maintain a reasonable balance between development and conservation. Zile concludes that the desire for massive and speedy development is so great that high costs in terms of pollution will be tolerated for a foreseeable future. He expects in the long run a leveling off as industrialization reaches acceptable levels and conservationists are given a hearing by those who have met the first priority.

In this admirably planned and edited volume the tensions of a Soviet-type polity stand forth for those who know its fundamentals. Empiricists will gloat when they read of the scarcity of ecological facts with which Soviet leaders work, blinded as they are said to be by reliance on socialist doctrine in which they seek solutions. Group theorists will find proof of their frequently reiterated argument that Soviet society, in spite of its domination by the monopoly Communist party, harbors interest groups which exert competing pressures upon the party leaders. On the one hand are the industrial managers, judged under the cost-accounting system by the black ink in their profit and loss statements, and on the other the ecologists who point not only to deterioration of recreational areas and scientifically interesting bodies of water like Lake Baikal, but also to concrete economic losses such as those of the fisheries in a polluted and reduced Caspian Sea.

Finally, the institutionalists will find that even a relatively constitutionally blind leadership finds itself hampered in solutions because the Soviet Union is a federation. Even though there is no clear line beyond which the federal government cannot go in setting policy for Republic legislation, the Republics administer water law. In this administration they can and do lag behind the expectation of those who sit at the center.

Irving K. Fox in his introduction poses the question whether democratic or authoritarian political structures best serve the conservationist. He finds, quite expectedly, that in spite of critics to the contrary, society is not wholly dominated in the United States by grasping corporations because American politics spring from a complex pluralistic process. In comparison the objectives and priorities of society in the U.S.S.R. are dominated by the Communist party, but the process is not wholly circumscribed by the elite. He finds no objective measure of conservationist superiority in one or another system in spite of these contrasts, although subjectively he believes the more open system is more likely to lead to broader perceptions and better information which he thinks ought to provide a basis for more intelligent decisions. Further, he argues that morally he must support an open system since it can give equal opportunity to all individually to express value preferences without favoritism to one group or another.

Since the volume is devoted to water, there is much on the subject from the Soviet contributors: where it is; how it is used; what conservation problems arise; what pollutes it and what are the pollution trends; what should be the goals on investment, and what Lenin thought about water use. The book ends with an English translation of the 1970 federal fundamental principles of water law following O. S. Kolbasov's short book on water use and water law around which the symposium was constructed. All this opens doors previously closed to those limited to English language translations. While it is interesting, it is not gripping except to the specialist. The general political science reader will favor the explanatory essays by the Americans. They justify publication on this side of the Atlantic.

JOHN N. HAZARD

Columbia University

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union: A Functional Analysis. By Michael P. Gehlen. (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1969. Pp. 161. $5.95.)

The author attempts to provide a model for the study of all mass movement parties (in Robert C. Tucker's sense, *APSR,* 1961) and to test it out against some of the empirical evidence available on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). He also hopes to shed some new light on the CPSU. It is not the author's intention to provide a "definite treatment" of the CPSU. Two questions suggest themselves: (1) Does the general model lead to a fruitful approach to mass movement parties as such? (2) Will its application to the CPSU illuminate its essence? My answer to both these questions is a tentative yes—the proverbial "yes, but. . . ."

Professor Gehlen proposes the following basic framework: socialization and recruitment as the two foremost integration functions, and goal specification and goal attainment as the two goal functions. Interest aggregation is treated by him as "a primary attribute of the goal specification and political recruitment functions of political parties" (p. 15). He contends that this functional model can be usefully employed in analyzing all mass movement parties, "particularly those that have acquired power" (p. 14), not only the CPSU.

To take the larger question of the model's applicability to ruling single parties first, the great virtue of Professor Gehlen's model is its simplicity. The two functions of integration, closely linked to party maintenance, and those of specifying and attaining goals seem indeed to be common to all mass movement parties. But as Raimund E. Germann suggests, even such a strong African party as the Tunisian Neo-Destour may be yielding its dominant position to professional administrators. Henry Bienen has warned us not to overestimate the unity and power of Tanzania's TANU. It appears to this reviewer that Gehlen's model might have to be confined to the Communist states in Europe and Asia. In Africa, at least, it does not alert us to the foremost problem of ruling single parties: their relative weakness vis-à-vis bureaucrats intent on economic development. Paradoxically, though interest aggregation is best linked to established democratic parties in the West, emphasis on that function might have been useful elsewhere, too: the single mass movement party either succeeds or fails in this task. If it fails, real power passes to the leader cum technocrats, with the party being left to provide symbolic integration only.

Chapters 2–5 apply the model to the study of the CPSU in a concise and generally persuasive way. The emphasis on recruitment to the party at large and to the party elite is well taken. The chapter on political socialization is the liveliest and best documented of all: Given the decision against using terror on a large scale, the regime would like to rely on socialization, but sophisticated and tactful propagandists are not so easy to find. The author rightly criticizes the CPSU for overindoctrinating. Chapter 4 on goal specification, I thought, identified the goals at the expense of clearly showing how those goals were arrived at; I did like Chapter 5 on goal attainment, though. The Soviet specialist might quibble over details of judgment and cavil at editorial oversights.

Given recent developments in the Baltic republics and in the Ukraine the ethnic background of the party members should, in my opinion, have been considered. Rudakov was no longer a member of the Party Secretariat in 1967 (p. 56) having died in July 1966. But on the whole it is a good stimulating analysis of what the CPSU does.

In the conclusion (Chapter 6) the author wisely cautions us against expecting that material progress will soon lead to "the political and social liberalization of the regime" (p. 145). But in the distant perspective he may be overoptimistic. He writes:

> . . . it is profoundly questionable whether a leadership that seeks to promote *efficient political and economic administration, rational planning,* and thorough social integration can maintain its position without the development of a communications network so that the leaders can make the most informed decisions possible. . . . [I]n the long run the party cannot be only the integrator but must learn to bend to the economic and social demands and needs of the subjects of the integrative process (pp. 147–148, 149; emphasis added).

This conclusion, plausible as it sounds, may have been prejudged by the author's belief that Karl W. Deutsch's feedback theory would be accepted by the party leaders. It seems to me that the muddle the Soviet industry found itself in after the half-hearted reforms, necessitating in December 1969 Brezhnev's "secret speech" indicates that "efficient political and economic administration, rational planning" may not become the operative mode of the CPSU for a long time to come. The author also neglects the utopian vision of the CPSU. Khrushchev was building communism explicitly. Brezhnev is obviously consolidating the regime, but to judge by his energetic foreign policy his ambitions run higher than filling Soviet roads with Fiats. Though Gehlen's rational functional model does allow for political socialization into communism, it seems to have been inspired more by Max Weber and Robert Merton than by Karl Marx and Lenin. Perhaps the author is right, but only the future will tell.

In summary, though it may not fully succeed in building the desired bridge between Communist and non-Communist mass movement parties and though it may present the CPSU elite as too pragmatic and rational, Gehlen's functional analysis is concise, thoughtful, and thought provoking.

YAROSLAV BILINSKY

University of Delaware

Toward Restoration: The Growth of Political Consciousness in Tokugawa Japan. By H. D. Harootunian. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970. Pp. 421. $10.00.)

This is a superb book. Professor Harootunian undertakes the awesome task of untangling some very tangled lines of intellectual development in Japan in the thirty years preceding the Restoration of 1868. He succeeds with clear argument and felicitous style.

The introduction treats nativism (*kokugaku*), neo-Confucianism, and their synthesis in the Mito statement. The Mito statement was authoritative to the generation preceding the opening of Japan because of the Mito *han's* prestige, long tradition of learning, and the influence of its *daimyō,* Tokugawa Nariaki (p. 34). The crisis faced by the Tokugawa was seen as appropriately described in the Chinese saying *naiyu gaikan* (internal disaster leads to external catastrophe) and this emphasis on priority treatment of internal matters was the burden of Mito writing until 1854. Ample quotations from the works of Fujita Yūkoku and his pupil Aizawa Seishisai demonstrate clearly the predominance of internal reform. In his *Shinron,* Aizawa outlined four major proposals for the Mito domain, the most important being the limitation of economic activity of merchants and artisans. Although Aizawa repeated Fujita Yūkoku on *fukoku kyōhei* (enrichment of the domain, strong army), his purpose was internal reform of the *bakufu.* External crisis was merely the lever to force internal change. Even the advocacy of *jōi-ron* (expulsionism) was directed toward this goal.

Professor Harootunian maintains that no straight line leads from the Mito rhetoric to the Meiji Restoration. It is his purpose to show "that the intellectual sources of the Restoration did not originate in Mito" (p. xv). Sakuma Shozan (1811–1864), the central figure of the chapter titled "The Action of Culture," is said to have made his greatest contribution in "insistence on abandonment of the inherited moral standard" (p. 136). Writers from Sakuma to Ōkubo were moved from the world of abstraction to the world of fact and formulated a new political consciousness based on political realism. Despite variations in emphasis within the traditional vocabulary of *sonnō-ron* (reverence), *meibun* (designations and duties), *jōi-ron* (expulsionism) and *ōdō* (Confucian emperorism), the common efforts of the writers of the 1850s and 1860s produced an operational plan which called for the destruction of the *bakufu* and the building of a powerful and wealthy state (*fukoku kyōhei*) through modern skills and knowledge. "And this was a long way from Mito" (p. 135).

A contrasting chapter, "The Culture of Action" features Yoshida Shōin (1830–1859). It is a genuinely exciting exposition of Yoshida's thought and "action," here defined as "constant experimentation with social reality" (p. 213). Yoshida is seen not as a reformer but a revolutionary and a nihilist, one who abandoned empty theories for the investigation of reality like Sakuma, but unlike Sakuma retained expulsionism to the end. Of particular interest is the author's commentary on Yoshida's use of the metaphors of madness (*kyō*) and foolishness (*gu*). "Yoshida as *madman* was a critic who stood outside of society. As *fool,* he was completely engaged . . . a man without a shred of self-interest . . . a new kind of personality" (pp. 223–4). A paradox of Yoshida's thinking was that he called for talent and ability as criteria for official recruitment in government, but also called for a unique hero and band of followers. This program was accepted by his younger contemporaries and Professor Harootunian argues it served as a guiding principle for the Restoration (p. 227). Yoshida insisted he had no motivation other than loyalty to the Emperor, and the author agrees. Consequently, he could never go beyond the task of preventing the invasion and colonization of Japan; for this task he wished to die—and he did.

A lengthy chapter on "Rehearsal for Restoration" traces the last effort of the Mito retainers in the school of Ōhashi Totsuan, the "politicization of the nativist vision" of Maki Izumi and the "Restoration as Utopia" concerning Kusaka Genzui. Maki (1813–1864) is probably the most interesting of the group. This Shinto priest from Kurume was the "most indefatigable and original restorationist of them all" (p. 281). In a period when youthful activists attacked age and heredity, Maki served as the Kyoto ideologue although thirty years older than most.

If Maki was the most indefatigable of all, Yokoi Shōnan (1809–1869) was "at once the most realistic and the most visionary of late Tokugawa thinkers, the most original and imaginative, and also the most consistent and persuasive" (p. 325). Professor Harootunian believes the Restoration was made possible by balancing the demands of a unitary structure with domainal interests and this theory was most fully worked out by Yokoi (p. 323).

One of the most interesting short portions of the book (pp. 340–354) concerns "sincerity" (*makoto*) treated as the foundation of a new theory of action. This section illustrates clearly one of the very strong points of the entire book—the working out of the new content for the old words.

There is far more in Professor Harootunian's book than I have been able to suggest about this fascinating guided tour through the workings of the leading minds of the late Tokugawa period. The reader will be well rewarded and may agree with the author that the "Japanese restorers, regardless of their alleged reliance on traditional values were no less eager to repudiate history than French revolutionaries in 1789" (p. 307).

JAMES H. BUCK

University of Georgia

The Trucial States. By Donald Hawley. (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1971. Pp. 379. $13.00.)

A comprehensive survey of the area commonly referred to as the *Trucial States* is especially significant at the present time. Great Britain has been the predominant European power in the Lower Gulf States until the recent emergence of the United Arab Emirate comprised of six of the seven Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwan, proclaimed themselves jointly as a free and sovereign state on December 2, 1971. The area is of major significance for its strategic importance, i.e., control of the Persian gulf, and as a major oil-producing area.

Although Mr. Hawley's book is not limited to the six Trucial States which make up the United Arab Emirate, his discussion of the political and economic evolvement in that area which resulted in the subsequent establishment of the Emirate gives historical perspective to that event. There are few works, other than brief monographs dealing with specific emirates, which encompass the area as a whole. Mr. Hawley, in this work, has filled a void in Middle East area literature.

The first few chapters give historical data about the Lower Gulf States in terms of the inhabitants of the area, the impact of the Islamic expansion and resultant conflicts. This is followed by the incursion of European powers into the area, the difficult problems encountered with piracy, and the attempts to deal with that phenomenon. Britain, of course, emerges triumphant, and convenient arrangements are established through treaties which follow the traditional British colonial pattern in the Middle East. Mr. Hawley has very competently illustrated the development of British power in the area through these relationships and has given personal insight into the consequences of these events. (He served in the Trucial States for the British Diplomatic Service from 1958 to 1961.)

The book contains chapters on the economy in the area, including oil resources, and a chapter on varied development schemes. The author's objective of "recording the history of the area" has, in fact, been amplified admirably, and the work constitutes a major contribution. Mr. Hawley's book deserves to be considered essential reading for all students of the Middle East.

LORENZO K. KIMBALL

University of Utah

Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony. Edited by Keith Hopkins. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. 422. $13.50.)

This book is an anthology of essays about the British colony of Hong Kong. It develops the following three themes:

First, the book repeats the by now familiar litany about Hong Kong's miraculous economic development over the past two decades. Before the war the colony was center of trade, a great *entrepot* between the West and China; after the war, the refugee capitalists and workers from mainland China, along with local Cantonese, carried out a phenomenal industrial revolution. Together with continuing commerce and a growing tourist trade which makes Hong Kong the world's bazaar, this industrial revolution transformed Hong Kong into one of the most prosperous places in Asia—even in the face of a mass influx of refugees and a burgeoning natural growth of population from within. This economic miracle was wrought by Chinese entrepreneurs and laborers within the framework of a stable British colonial administration. Moreover, the economic development of the colony was self-generating in a classical pre-Keynesian, laissez-faire capitalist manner without government planning (except for the infrastructure), without the injection of capital by the government, and without much other government interference; this in a world where five-year plans are the order of the day.

The second theme of the book is a polemic against the Hong Kong government that will be of interest mainly to residents of Hong Kong. The authors point out that a colony is not a democratic republic and that Hong Kong is run by British administrators for the large business and commercial interests which dominate the colony's economic, social, and political life. The great mass of Chinese workers who have supplied the labor and the skills that have been the driving force for the economic development of the colony are given short shrift by the government. The authors claim that now businessmen in Hong Kong make sufficient profits to distribute more to the workers in the form of increased salaries and greater public benefits, such as increased support of housing and education, without harming their international competitive position.

The third theme is the presentation of a new style of sociological, political, and economic analysis which focuses attention on the colony as the complex urban and developed society that it really is; such analysis is a welcome supplement to the anthropological research previously carried out on Chinese rural society in the New Territories. The excellence of the essays in this respect give the book general interest and importance.

To sum up a few of the individual essays: Mr. Brown points to the flexibility and the growth potential inherent in Chinese family firms and financial institutions as a major factor in the economic success story of the colony. Mr. Podmore gives a competent and thorough analysis of Hong Kong's population structure and dynamics based upon recent censuses and compares Hong Kong's population with other countries. John Rear shows how the political institutions of the colony work and who influences political decisions.

Nicholas C. Owen argues that while the Hong Kong Government's laissez-faire policies have been responsible in large part for the prosperity of the colony, success has wedded the government to a conservative adherence to a model of the colony's society and economy no longer completely relevant or accurate and this has prevented it from acting to improve social welfare.

Joseph England's chapter on industrial relations in Hong Kong is the most original and interesting section of the book. England tells about what Hong Kong's unions are like, why they are weak, and how this has adversely affected the position of the colony's workers. Hong Kong unions resemble traditional urban Chinese associations such as surname and locality groupings in being mainly concerned with social welfare—providing schools, clinics, and funeral benefits—and people join them mainly for these reasons.

In his chapter, Mr. D. C. Chaney reports that 50 per cent of the clerks interviewed worked twelve hours per day, seven days per week, or most of their waking life, for salaries that ranged from 50 to 83 U.S. dollars per month. Working relations are of the traditional paternalistic and authoritarian type. In a survey make in Kowloon through the Sociology Department of Hong Kong University, most workers reported that they were not terribly dissatisfied with their jobs, and unionization was not recognized as an alternative to improve their conditions.

Mr. Hopkins says, in his essay on "Housing the Poor," that "Hong Kong is a cruel society in which very little assistance is given to the poor." Although one of the Hong Kong government's proudest achievements is the resettlement during the past fifteen years of one and one-half million people in giant resettlement blocks, Mr. Hopkins shows that this picture is not unblemished and he reveals a dismal family life in small cement rooms where the crowding and lack of privacy is almost unthinkable to a middle-class Westerner.

This is a good book and should be required reading for those who specialize in Hong Kong and the overseas Chinese. It will also be useful to those interested in the general problems of social and economic development and in urban Sociology and Anthropology.

JACK M. POTTER

University of California, Berkeley

Images and Issues: The Queensland State Elections of 1963 and 1966. By Colin A. Hughes. (Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1969. Pp. 364. $10.95; $7.95 in Australia.)

The distribution of the Australian population mostly in a number of discrete and distant conurbations around the southern and eastern fringes of the continent and the relative scarcity of Australian political scientists have inhibited Australian electoral research on a national scale. Only one national election, that of 1958, has been examined in any depth, and voting studies have otherwise been limited to monographs on State and individual constituency elections. *Images and Issues,* a study of aspects of the Queensland State elections of 1963 and 1966, is the most formidable—350 pages long—and methodologically the most ambitious of such monographs.

The book consists of four sections: a tightly packed introduction to Queensland politics and to the context of the two elections; an exploration of party, leader and candidate images; a discussion of election issues; and six constituency studies.

The author's intention, "to provide the flavour of Queensland state politics and electoral behaviour at two points of time rather than supply a tightly ordered account of two great debates" (p. xv), creates contextual problems which the book never overcomes. Even for the Australian, let alone the overseas reader, the dense introductory chapter, which provides in nineteen pages both a brief narrative of Queensland's political history from 1893 and an outline of the context of the two elections, is an inadequate scaffolding for the structure that Professor Hughes erects. It suffers from sins of omission and compression. Neither the geopolitics of the State, nor the socioeconomic characteristics of Queensland's population are given any attention in depth, and the consequential and unusual role of the Country Party as the major partner in the conservative coalition emerges by accident rather than by design. Thus the factors that give the politics of "Banana-land" their "unique flavour" go by default. On the other hand, for the reader unversed in the intricacies of Australian politics, references are sometimes meaningless, indeed positively confusing: for example, references to "industrial groups" and "'industrial wing'" (pp. 5–6) are not synonyms, as the uninitiated might assume, but refer to hostile forces.

We are given five pages on the immediate background of the two elections. As the rest of the book is organized on a topical basis, this is scarcely adequate. The result is that much of the material in the book is not anchored in any context, and readers unfamiliar with Queensland politics can be forgiven a sense of insecurity. Nor is passage through the later accumulation of detail facilitated by the author's preference "whenever possible [to allow] parties and candidates . . . to speak for themselves in their own words . . ." (p. xv). This is overgenerous, for little of what was said or written in Queensland in 1963 and 1966 is worthy of such embalming.

Nevertheless, there are rewards in slogging through this awesome collection of banalities. By contrast with his primary material, Professor Hughes writes with elegance and clarity. As befits Australia's leading political behavioralist, he draws upon imported methodologies, using them with discrimination to illuminate his data. This is particularly true of his work on images which compares, over time, the images consciously projected by the parties and their leaders with those held by the electorate. One can complain that he appears to have been unduly inhibited about talking to party organizers and politicians concerning what they were trying to project, for his judgments appear based entirely on published statements. Again, it is a weakness that his major survey sample is entirely metropolitan, while a supplementary mail questionnaire addressed to a sample of voters in four provincial centers has a low response rate. It is, however, characteristic of the author's sensitive methodological approach that he recognizes the difficulties, is aware of their possible implications, and is cautious in the conclusions he draws from the survey material. He has produced, as a result, the most thorough and perceptive analysis of party and leader images yet achieved by an Australian political scientist.

He is less successful in using as a basis for his analysis of the images of the candidates, the typology of legislative roles developed by John C. Wahlke and others in *The Legislative System*. Once again, however, the author's methodological awareness saves the day. The attempt itself becomes a sophisticated and instructive lesson in the different pattern of legislative roles in a "fused-powers" sysem and in a "separated-powers" system.

Unfortunately, his continuing interest in methodology is quite infertile in the chapters on issues. Indeed, the models and typologies advanced here for consideration do not act as methodological directives in the organization of the empirical evidence, but serve merely as grace-notes to the discussions. This is a pity, for the development of trivial local issues uninformed by methodology (for example, seven pages on the Jubilee Bridge on the Gold Coast), makes the going rather wearisome even for the most diligent of readers.

There is certainly a recovery of reader interest in the chapters on particular constituencies. For one thing a concern for context gives each of these studies a perspective the book as a whole too often lacks. Constituency histories, geographic and demographic factors, party organization, and local campaigns are all welded together into a series of first-rate studies. For another, names are at last fleshed out, with the portrait of Tom Aikens, the demagogic, indefatigable, populist M.P. for Townsville South emerging as the most memorable in the book.

The trouble is, Tom Aikens is a unique phenomenon in the desert of Queensland politics. The general mediocrity of political life, the parochial dullness of the election campaigns, and the fact that only four of the 153 contested seats changed hands in the two elections, render the material intrinsically uninteresting. It is a handicap that neither acute intelligence nor methodological sophistication can overcome. Professor Hughes has both; was he justified in expending them on so massive a study of Queensland elections in the middle 'sixties? It may well be that this is a classic example of misguided behavioralism—the application of considerable technical virtuosity to data not justifying the effort. In so far as the book disappoints, it is a failure of judgment, not of skill.

NEAL BLEWETT
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Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience. Edited by Goran Hyden, Robert Jackson, and John Okumu. (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. 366. $13.50.)

The editors of this book make the most serious effort so far attempted to analyze and evaluate public administration in Kenya during the postindependence period (i.e., since 1963). For reasons that will be suggested, their effort remains inadequate. Nevertheless, their book can be considered an important contribution to an understanding of public administration in the newly emerging nations.

The editors present a set of propositions which supposedly unify the various chapters and underscore the observations made by the contributors. They argue that the orientation of administration in Kenya has not changed since the colonial period. This is because the new elite seek the same objectives as their colonial predecessors: maintaining law and order and increasing national income. In pursuit of these objectives, the current Kenyan leaders have fully accepted the Weberian model of a bureaucracy—one in which the principles of impersonality, impartiality, and political neutrality are followed, achievement norms are adhered to, rules and precedents are clearly indicated and closely obeyed, and specialized or hierarchical jurisdictions are respected. At the same time, the organization of administration is highly centralized, with provincial and district commissioners, under the Office of the President, regaining the power and prestige they had during colonial times. In the process, local governments, co-operatives, unions, and other functional organizations have been carefully controlled, and politicians have lost much of their influence. Potential structures and devices for checking administration (e.g., the legislature, the judiciary, the press, and the opposition parties) have been rendered relatively ineffective either by political discouragement or by socioeconomic circumstances. In other words, nothing is allowed to interfere with the carrying out of the goals cherished by the leaders of Kenya.

Insofar as Kenya has achieved a respectable G.N.P. annual growth rate since 1963 of about 6½ per cent in real terms (without sacrificing her level of foreign exchange reserve holdings) and has continued to be politically stable, her administration might be considered successful. Moreover, this success has been achieved during a process of almost complete personnel turnover, with more than 75 per cent of higher level posts having been Africanized by 1967. Yet the editors question whether the emerging pattern of administration in Kenya is really appropriate for present development needs. "In other words," to quote Robert J. Ouko, "development in the civil service has not matched development in other areas of social and political life and consequently has not coped as well as it might have with problems arising from rapid socio-economic change" (p. 157).

Because, according to the authors, Kenyan administration is more concerned with control than with change, it exhibits certain weaknesses. Administrators are so indoctrinated with the need to obey superiors and to follow regulations that they are discouraged from exercising discretion and initiative. Superiors, on the other hand, are so fearful of corruption, incompetence, or insubordination at the lower levels of the hierarchy that they are unwilling to delegate authority to subordinates. Decision making thereby becomes retarded, inflexible, and impervious to local conditions and changing circumstances. Likewise, the financial and administrative weaknesses of local government in Kenya have led to the transfer of basic services to central government ministries. The result, however, is likely to be increasing public apathy and, to quote Thomas Mulusa, "lower responsiveness by government to public needs and demands in these critical service areas, since problems of communication between the place of felt need and the locus of decision-making authority will most likely increase" (p. 251).

The inertia of Kenyan administration, the authors conclude, has meant a failure to realize many of the promises made by the leaders at the time of independence. The economy continues to be dominated by foreigners who control the plantations, large industries, and trading firms. Even in the public sector, expatriates remain very influential. The regional inequalities stemming from the colonial period persist, giving rise to interethnic conflict when some ethnic groups are more advantaged than others. Unemployment in the urban areas is growing. At the same time, the majority of Africans in the rural areas, producing an estimated 25 per cent of the total gross domestic product, cannot escape a subsistence economy. Under these circumstances, those who feel that they are not benefiting from the growth of the economy are likely to challenge the control exercised by the elite. Thus, in the words of Robert Jackson, "the current strategy of development may eventually prove counter-productive to the growth targets themselves" (p. 182). The apparent objectives of the Kenyan elite—control and growth—would thereby become incompatible.

It is unfortunate that this book does not really give us an adequate basis for determining the validity of its very interesting theme. What the authors seem to be suggesting is: (1) that in Kenya there has been a serious discrepancy between economic growth and development; (2) that this growth has been the product of a centralized "Weberian-type" bureaucracy, with a "control" orientation; and (3) that "real" development necessitates a new type of bureaucracy dedicated to change rather than control. Yet, we need more information than is given to substantiate each of these propositions. Indeed, the authors themselves at times seem unclear about their assertions. What adds to the confusion is the inevitable tendency in an edited book for the authors to contradict one another.

In his chapter, "Planning, Politics and Administration," Jackson emphasizes "the unfortunate and politically explosive perpetuation of existing distribution inequities" in Kenya (p. 181). In the concluding chapter, however, he notes that "the government is coping with the endemic problems of Kenya's society and economy and the achievements registered so far have been substantial" (p. 333). Here and elsewhere, the reader emerges perplexed about what achievements have really taken place in Kenya, and how to balance them against the remaining problems. Likewise, the authors fail to clarify the relationship of administrative development in Kenya to the economic progress that has been made. According to Jackson, "the civil service has accomplished many of its development aims" (p. 333). Yet, in regard to agricultural services, Henry Bienen points out that "it is impossible to know exactly how much production gain was brought about by civil service inputs proper" (p. 52). How meaningful, then, is Colin Leys's statement emphasizing the "relatively high quality of Kenyan administration" (p. 142).

The efforts of the authors to describe Kenya's administration seem no more helpful than their efforts to evaluate it. We are repeatedly reminded that government administration here is highly centralized, with little scope for independent local government or deconcentration (delegation of authority to subordinate officials). David K. Leonard suggests, however, that "many officers make decisions where they lack authority because they either are unaware of the exact formal limits to their discretion or are willing to risk the disapproval of their superiors in order to get prompt decisions attuned to local circumstances" (p. 105). Indeed, Jackson notes the weakness of government—its inability to generate action at the grassroots level—which accounts for the ineffectiveness of planning in Kenya (p. 199). This difficulty would indicate the inappropriateness of the term "centralization" in reference to Kenyan administration.

Like most edited books, this one suffers from the frequent failure of the authors to interrelate their observations. We are informed at different places in the book: that the officials of cooperative societies have limited command of English; that committee members of Kenyan cooperatives frequently interfere with the operational management of the organization; that the ordinary members of cooperative societies lack the experience and education necessary to understand what is going on; that the staff available to the Department of Cooperatives tend to be inadequately trained and corruption-prone; and that district cooperative officers are delegated little formal authority. But the connection among these points is left unclear. Also, there are not enough case studies to illustrate properly the generalizations that are made. Where case studies are effectively used—e.g., the chapter by Frank Holmquist—the result is particularly enlightening. One hopes that the other authors will similarly follow up the stimulating—if incomplete—work presented in this volume.

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Urbanization and National Development, Volume I in **South and Southeast Asia Urban Affairs Annuals.** Edited by Leo Jakobson and Ved Prakash. (Beverley Hills: Sage Publications, 1971. Pp. 320. $15.00.)

This series of studies, full of both facts and analysis, contains nine loosely connected essays: Leo Jakobson and Ved Prakash, "Urbanization and Urban Developments: Proposals for an Integrated Policy Base"; Stanislaw H. Wellisz, "Economic Development and Urbanization"; Gerald M. Desmond, "The Impact of National and Regional Development Policies on Urbanization"; Ashish Bose, "The Urbanization Process in South and Southeast Asia"; Brian J. L. Berry, "City Size and economic Development: Conceptual Synthesis and Policy Problems, with Special Reference to South and Southeast Asia"; T. G. McGee, "Catalysts or Cancers? The Role of Cities in Asian Society"; Aprodicio A. Laquian, "Slums and Squatters in South and Southeast Asia"; Ved Prakash, "Land Policies for Urban Development"; and Tarlok Singh, "Urban Development Policy and the Role of Governments and Public Authorities."

In the first chapter (Jakobson and Prakash), the book takes as one of its points of departure the United Nations 1966 urbanization seminar's recommendation for the "development of a comprehensive approach to urbanization . . . and thorough and systematic interrelation of diverse economic, social, and physical planning policies" (p. 19).

Tarlok Singh, who worked for so many years at the very core of the planning effort in India, somberly reports that in the light of recent surveys of Indian urban conditions, "The picture is increasingly one of inequalities and contrasts which hurt, of . . . callousness and exploitation . . . and . . . evils such as beggary, prostitution, and crime . . ." (p. 231).

Ved Prakash itemizes possible elements of planning rational urban land development: 1) surveys and preparation of sites; 2) roads and streets; 3) water supply; 4) sewerage and storm water drainage; 5) electricity distribution and street lighting; and 6) landscaping (p. 213). To illustrate this thesis, that lack of adequate planning and haphazard development is resulting in inefficient uses of urban land, Prakash notes that within Bangkok municipal boundaries, "about a third of the area is under agricultural use and another 12 per cent is underdeveloped" (p. 206).

Ashish Bose convincingly argues, "Urbanization is an essential element in the process of economic growth and social change in South and Southeast Asia, in the transformation of rural, agricultural economies into industrial, urban economies, and in the transition from tradition to modernity" (p. 81).

The authors propound, thoughtfully strive to elucidate, but do not claim wholly to anwer, many penetrating, provocative, and relevant questions. Some examples:

Are Asian cities catalysts or cancers (T. G. McGee)? Are slums and squatters, those characteristic eyesores of so many Asian cities, really the unhealthy phenomena they seem, or do they provide opportunities for cultural enrichment, communication, productive economic activity, saving, capital mobilization, and economic and social mobility (Aprodicio A. Laquian)?

Should we always welcome the formation of attractively planned new towns, or should we beware of premature development leading to excessive costs, waste of scarce capital, and failure to achieve anticipated social returns (Leo Jakobson and Ved Prakash)?

How can we bridge the gap between economists blind to problems of space, and city planners blind to problems of economics (Stanislaw H. Wellisz)? How can we reduce the gulf separating analysis and action (Tarlok Singh)?

Why is it that in the developed Western countries, cities tend to stop growing when they reach a certain size with suburbs and rural shopping and service centers then springing up, while in Asia the proliferation of urban problems does not so far appear to limit urban immigration and growth (Mr. Singh)?

How can one cope with the seeming dilemma that when greater expenditure is sought for urban improvements to abate deterioration rising from excessive growth, such urban improvements then serve to attract even more people to the cities (Mr. Wellisz)?

I have worked and moved about in every large city mentioned in this book—and a good many more in Asia, Europe, and North America. For a third of a century I have been committed to the necessity for economic and social planning. Against this background I add a further paradoxical question to those raised by the authors of these essays: Do the well-planned cities—Chandigarh and Islamabad, say, or from an older day, Phnom Penh and Colombo—contribute as much to their national economies, or provide as fertile a background for individual growth and happiness as do unplanned, sprawling, chaotic, lusty, dynamic cities like Bangkok and Tokyo?

The book contains a teutonic bibliography modestly labeled "selective," but at 69 pages long, it might perhaps more accurately be termed "definitive."

Two additional volumes in this series are planned for publication in the coming two years, to focus respectively on problems created by rapid urbanization; and on the impact of urbanization on social, economic, legal, administrative, and political institutions.

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The French Communist Party Versus the Students: Revolutionary Politics in May-June 1968. By Richard Johnson (Yale University Press, 1972. Pp. 215. $1.95.)

The French Student Uprising, November 1967—June 1968: An Analytical Documentary. By Alain Schnapp and Pierre Vidal-Naquet. (Beacon Press, 1971. Pp. 654. $17.50.)

These are two very different books, both stimulated directly by the events of May, 1968 in France. The first, Richard Johnson's *The French Communist Party Versus the Students* was begun as an on-site senior thesis for Mr. Johnson's BA at Yale only days after the French student revolt peaked in June, 1968. It was subsequently revised as part of the Yale University Press's novel Yale College Series. Its virtue is to focus on the relation between the French Communist Party and the movement of May in the framework of the larger problem of the Party's relation with intellectuals and student groups over the years. Although Mr. Johnson occasionally provides some feeling for the color and tone of those days, rather than an empirical analysis, the book is really an essay based upon secondary sources—sources as diverse as Marx's writings on the intellectuals, Lenin on organization, Crozier on French national character, and Sartre on individual freedom. As a result, the reader emerges with an abstract picture of a lot of intellectual trends and social forces intersecting rather than the lively image of struggle and conflict suggested by the title.

This is unfortunate, first, because the book is too short to do adequate justice to such disparate elements as the role of existentialism and of the struggle against the Algerian war in the intellectual history of the French student movement, the organizational principles of Leninism and the historical attitude of Communist parties towards the intellectuals, the bureaucratic problems of the French educational system, the psychocultural bases of French political behavior, and the political situation in France in 1968. Second, while Mr. Johnson has a gift for lucid expression, he lacks a talent for synthesis, and readers who are not *au courant* with all these problems and many others will find more loose ends in this book than clear intellectual trends. The stylistic model of the book is the woven tapestry, but the materials are too disparate and the treatment too compressed to deal adequately with the complexities of the problem.

Alain Schnapp and Pierre Vidal-Naquet's *The French Student Uprising* is an abridgement (but still 634 pages long!) and an updating of their *Journal de la commune étudiante,* published in French by Le Seuil in 1969. It is a surprisingly well-organized culling of the mountain of texts and commentaries spewed out by the Revolution of May, and includes some significant documents that preceded the uprising, and help to explain it, as well as a selection of materials intended to reveal its later impact, for example in the secondary schools. Best of all are the spirited Introduction by Vidal-Naquet, which tries to place in historical and international perspective the Events of May, and the excellent bibliographic essay he has updated for the American edition, which contains many references to the international student movement as well as the French one.

More disappointing is the eight-page Postface written specially for the American edition, which gives no picture at all of the important political changes in France since the crises of 1968 and 1969, but loses the reader in a swamp of abbreviated *groupuscules* much resembling alphabet soup. There is even a list of abbreviations that recalls the earnest ardor for political jargon spawned by the movement. It seems important to know that CRS means "National Security Police," but one is permitted to wonder how relevant is the fact that IBM stands for "International Business Machines," that LSD means "The hallucinatory drug," or that GDF means the "Gas Company of France." Is it possible that behind the encyclopedic urge to record for posterity the movements, the factions, the slogans, and the epithets of those few weeks in May there lies nothing more than the narcissism of the students and their temporary illusion of power? If nothing else, such self-reification reveals the lack of a sense of humor.

This consideration raises a more important point! How can we justify the publication of two more books, one of them gargantuan in size, on what is already the most overwritten student rebellion in history? During the late 1960s, there was greater violence in Tokyo than in France, there were more deaths at Kent State, more classdays of teaching lost at Berkeley, and more buildings occupied in Italy. Why then take the time to review—nay, to publish—two new arrivals four years after the glory and the tragedy of May, 1968?

The question can be answered in several different ways. First, we tend to look more attentively at events of this sort in France than in any other country. In the great revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries. Paris lit the spark that ignited all of Europe. From this point of view, Paris, and more precisely the circle of *arrondissements* around the Place de la Concorde, gets more intellectual attention than other centers of revolt because it is the place from which revolutionary energy and new revolutionary ideas are supposed to emanate.

It does not negate the importance of this view to point out that, at least in regard to May, 1968, it is incorrect. One of the virtues of Richard Johnson's book is to show that many of the ideas, no matter how novel or bizarre, that emanated from the Sorbonne in May, 1968, had antecedents either in the existentialist movement of the '50s, in the struggle against the Algerian war and American involvement in Vietnam, or in the waves of intellectual dissidence that have for years troubled the equanimity of the French Communist Party. What he fails to stress is that many of the antecedents of the May revolt were not French at all: they came from sources as diverse and as international as the Italian Communist influence on the Communist student movement (UEC), Maoist influence on dissident young Communist movements (PCMLF) and German and other influences on Cohn-Bendit's Movement of the 22nd of March. These influences, and the important role played by the example of the American student movement in the thinking of the French student leaders, are well documented in Vidal-Naquet's Introduction to *The French Student Uprising*. Here it also becomes clear that the Paris student movement itself was only dimly aware of its intellectual dependence upon other countries and on the ideas of the 1950s and 1960s in France—a blindness that may have contributed to the autointoxication that helped to bring about its failure.

Thus the originality of the French student movement is partly specious and partly to be found in the political pretensions of its leaders. But some of the predictions of these leaders came remarkably close to being fulfilled, and that is the major reason so many books have immortalized them. How can we explain the discharge of a working-class revolution in response to the trigger of a student rebellion? The answers that may be offered are many, problematical, and too well-known to need repeating. At the one extreme, the PCF and the CGT seemed to be saying that the student rebellion and the general strike were only coincidentally related to each other; at the other, we have the exaggerated claims of the Trotskyists and other left-wing "groupuscules" that the responsibility for the strike lay with the students, and that the only role played by the traditional parties and unions was to attempt to defuse the workers' revolutionary ardor.

This is very close to the view taken by Johnson in *The French Communist Party Versus the Students,* and one which has a great deal of force, when we take into account the traditional anti-intellectualism of the party, the "bread-and-butter" unionism of the CGT and the hostility with which militant student groups were met at the factory gate. But it is also somewhat deceptive, to the extent that it ignores the deeper linkage between the student revolt and a working-class subculture, which in its volatility and power is (along with Italy) almost unique to France. Can the existence of this subculture be dissociated from the presence in each country of large well-organized Communist parties which, however unrevolutionary, keep alive in the working class a certain hostility to the State and a certain revolutionary potential? As Vidal-Naquet writes, "In France and in Italy the very fact that there exist large workers' parties . . . gives the student movement extraordinary confidence in the capacity for action of a working class 'betrayed' by the unions and political parties, and allows it to present itself as the University detachment of a revolutionary workers' party that does not exist" (p. 17).

The anti-intellectuality of the PCF does not negate its responsibility for a volatile political climate that can be susceptible to the influence of the intellectuals, who encounter in it a tradition of revolt and solidarity upon which they can freely draw. That is why one may respond with impatience to the assurance of the young intellectual Left in France that it represents "progress" while the traditional parties of the Left represent only "order"; that it brings out the sense of outrage in the working class, while the CGT brings out only its base instinct for consumer goods.

This assurance which Johnson, in *The French Communist Party Versus the Students,* apparently shares, is both unempirical and nondialectical. It is nondialectical because it ignores the symbiotic relationship between Communist politics and left-wing intellectual revolt in France and, as is richly documented in Schnapp and Vidal-Naquet's *The French Student Uprising,* it is unempirical because it ignores the elitism and traditionalism that soon surfaced in the heart of the student revolution. The "movement" neither avoided the chauvinism of "la grande nation" in its interpretation of itself, nor could it even "avoid the male chauvinism that is characteristic of French society" (p. 41). As for its vaunted emphasis on spontaneity, "the spontaneousness of the movement made it suspicious of any form or organization, with the result that organization took place just the same, but by little groups or little feudal systems—about which, as was evident at the Sorbonne, there was nothing 'spontaneous' " (p. 46).

In summary, there are useful elements in both these books—the one intensive and the other extensive—for both the francophile and for the hagiographer of the international student movement. In neither book, however, is the really interesting problem—that of the relationship between what was only one of many student rebellions in the 1960s and the absolutely unique industrial seizure that electrified the world in its wake—dealt with at all satisfactorily. And given the bulk of largely repetitive anthologies and interpretations that already weigh down library shelves on this subject, this is one review that cannot end on the note: "More research is needed in this interesting area."

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The Lysenko Affair. By David Joravsky. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970. Pp. 459. $13.95.)

Two or three generations hence, when the definitive history of the Lysenko episode is written, a very important source will be the work of David Joravsky. His earlier book, *Soviet Marxism and Natural Science,* contains data of real value, and in *The Lysenko Affair,* he goes into great detail, in his account of how a group of ignorant agronomists, ostensibly serving as leaders, were used to outlaw genetics from the Soviet Union. His work is well-documented, and his references, except for those in Russian, are easy for us to check. His numerous footnotes (83 pages of them) should furnish the future historians with an abundance of pay-dirt. The factual contents are generally accurate, carefully assembled and well organized. An occasional needless belligerence, however, somewhat mars the work's objectivity.

In brief, Joravsky traces the history of the Lysenko affair through the statements and published work of the Russians themselves. Thus he gives us data that those who do not read Russian and have never visited the Soviet Union would have difficulty in collecting. But such data, voluminous and valuable as they are, are bound to be incomplete, for when the attack on modern biology was gathering steam, back in the early 1920s, many relevant facts were not preserved. We have had, however, a few pertinent glimpses into the disputes in Russian science so we are not entirely ignorant as to what was going on.

The book opens with a chapter on the problem of Soviet ideology, followed by one on the backwardness of prerevolutionary Russian science, together with a treatment of the lack of critical scientific standards of those who seized power after the revolution. The third chapter, entitled "Harmless Cranks," deals with Michurin, Lysenko et al. Since these quacks were used later as the spearhead that attacked Mendelian genetics, it would be nice to discover in what sense they were "harmless." Several chapters are devoted to the sins of Stalin and Stalinism, and the final portion discusses the academic standards of science itself, Marxism, and the practicality of applied science in the Soviet Union. The appendices list 105 repressed scientists and 85 of the bad political bosses who dominated science and the entire nation.

At the very beginning, in the preface, the author states his thesis. In giving the cause of the scientific debacle he states, "The Marxist theoretical heritage has usually been pictured as the cause. According to this myth, genetics was denounced because it subverted faith in the malleability of human nature, and the dying Lamarckist tradition in biology was revived to prove that new conditions will create new men." Later this denounced explanation is referred to as a "fable."

Joravsky's easy dismissal of the conclusion of the western biologists as a myth also depends on his overlooking direct contradictory evidence, such as the testimony of the Nobel Laureate, H. J. Muller, who was in Russia at the time (see Muller, *Sat. Rev. Lit.*, Dec. 11, 1948; and Muller's presidential address at the Eighth International Congress of Genetics).

Actually the Communists' Lamarckian orientation preceded the emergence both of the "harmless" cranks and of the "ignorant brutes" who bossed them. One example may be cited. From 1919 to 1926, Paul Kammerer's Lamarckism had made him a joke in the western biological world, but he was endorsed by the Communists. In 1926 he was offered and accepted a post in the Communist Academy of Moscow. But before he left for his new home, his preserved specimens, on which he had based his conclusions, were finally examined and were found to have been faked. Kammerer admitted the fake but claimed to have been personally innocent. He killed himself, and even in the Soviet Union Lamarckism had to go underground for a time—in fact, until Kammerer could be "rehabilitated." This the Russians started immediately, and by 1929, incredibly enough, they began his rehabilitation with a motion picture. This screen masterpiece has been described in detail by R. Goldschmidt (*Science* 109:219–27, 1949). For other details of the rehabilitation of Kammerer, see *Science* 120:189, 1954. The agronomists, the cranks, and their bosses do not seem to have been involved in any of this. They came later.

Any professional biologist reviewing *The Lysenko Affair* would be tempted to point out the numerous biological inaccuracies, some arising primarily from translation difficulties. Any emphasis on these inaccuracies, however, would give an overall false impression by diverting attention to the less important aspects of the work. It would de-emphasize the book's real importance. The inaccuracies in the treatment of hybrid corn (pp. 282, 283), however, are more than this reviewer can resist. The following statements can be taken as direct contradictions to what the author has written. (1) A cross-pollinated plant does not have to produce a hybrid if it and its neighbors are relatively homozygous. (2) The 20th century geneticists did not create "inbred hybrids." Only the parental stocks were inbred; when hybrid corn is inbred it loses its hybrid vigor. (3). Inbreeding *can* damage the genotype especially if the genotype has recessive lethals or semi-lethals. (4) Geneticists have long been in agreement on an explanation of hybrid vigor. As early as 1915 the explanation was included in their elementary textbooks. (5). The geneticists also know why some of the extra vigor is lost if the hybrid corn itself is planted for the next crop. There is no mystery here. Joravsky cites as the source of his information a book, *Heterosis* edited by John W. Gowen, which contains the papers given at a symposium held at Iowa State University in 1950. Here I must become personal, since I was at this symposium; in fact, I gave the first paper. There was no "grumbling and headshaking" at this meeting as Joravsky states. Nor was there any need for puzzlement as the explanation of heterosis was well known. (See paper by Th. Dobzhansky in *Heterosis*, pp. 218–223.) The symposiasts enjoyed the local hospitality—we were in fact a jolly lot! Nor was there any need for them to discard ancient and well-loved notions, as the vigor of cross bred plants had been a recognized commonplace ever since Koeheuter's work of 1761. Darwin discussed it and Mendel himself observed it. Since 1911 the biologists were not depending on "dumb luck." They knew what they were doing. East, Shull and Jones had made the exploitation of heterosis practical. To repeat: the explanation had long been known. Finally: the widespread planting of hybrid corn did not necessitate a reorganization of agriculture. All that was needed were seed companies to furnish the hybrid strains and more fertilizer to balance the larger crops.

The preceding paragraph would indicate that the author does not belong to any reactionary biological establishment. This, of course, does not detract from the value of the data he has assembled. in fact, it adds to it. When the history of our gaudy times is finally written, his interpretations and his orientation may well become valuable data in their own right. Meanwhile his book is well worth preserving.

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Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development. The Case of Romania, 1944–1965. By Kenneth Jowitt. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971. Pp. 317. $12.00.)

When Romania's national self-assertion within the Communist world first became evident a decade ago, Western observers were taken by surprise. As was only to be expected, however, they soon conjured up a variety of explanations for Romania's unanticipated conduct. Some attributed it to a novel international factor, the Sino-Soviet dispute, and stressed the Romanian leadership's consummate skill in probing and exploiting the margin of maneuverability opened up for Bucharest by virtue of Peking's quarrel with Moscow. Others interpreted it as only an updated version of traditional Romanian behavior, i.e., the expression of a certain inbred cunning developed in the course of a long historical experience of having to cope with foreign subjugation in order to survive as a nation. A few specialists on Romania (notably, Professor Fischer-Galati) purported to adduce evidence suggesting that Communist Romania's independent course was really not so unexpected after all but rather could be traced back to 1955, if not indeed to 1945. Unlike all these earlier treatments, Professor Jowitt's present study has the special merit of offering a much broader and more comprehensive approach. By linking the Communist regime's domestic "revolutionary breakthrough" to Romania's "national development" and scrutinizing both processes in the light of social science (especially, but not exclusively organization theory), Jowitt provides a multifaceted analysis that is at once provocative, powerful, and, best of all, in the proper perspective. His case study therefore also serves as a timely reminder that the right social science techniques, employed by an imaginative intellect, can shed important light on complex and baffling historical phenomena.

Jowitt's study consists of four separate parts. In the first of these, he contrasts reformist and revolutionary ideologies and strategies with respect to nation building. His pointed discussion of the pros and cons of each heavily emphasizes the shortcomings of reformism, and this discussion in turn, is illustrated by a comparative survey which touches, all too briefly and quite schematically, on the experience of the Soviet Union, China, Yugoslavia, Cuba, India, Mexico, Turkey, Ghana, and Egypt. Nonetheless, the basic point emerges forcefully enough: While not oblivious of its drawbacks, Jowitt is at pains to stress the advantages of a "revolutionary breakthrough" along the lines of the Leninist model, and this he does in terms that have much in common with the challenging perspectives on political development and political decay set forth several years ago by Samuel P. Huntington.

The second part of the book deals with priorities and strategies of nation building according to the Leninist model as actually applied in Romania in the period 1944–55. It examines the "breaking through" process in each of its several domestic settings and adumbrates the "organizational and situational characteristics of the Romanian elite" during the formative period. The third part of the study focuses on the emergence and assertion of Romania's national autonomy and offers fresh insights into the crucial decade running from the mid-'fifties to the mid-'sixties. This time span is subdivided chronologically and analytically into a period of "latent learning and docility" up to 1957, a period of "emulation," 1958–61, and a period of "initiation," 1962–1965. (Those who may find these designations somewhat esoteric can do no better than to read with care these three chapters and see for themselves to what imaginative use Jowitt has put each of these social psychological concepts.) The fourth and final part of the book extends the chronological account to mid-1969. It includes a chapter on the relationship between the Romanian Communist Party and the international Communist movement, which is more nearly conventional in coverage and interpretation than most of the others in the book, and one on the relationship between the Party and the nation which raises but perhaps understandably does not quite answer some basic questions concerning the post-"breakthrough," post-"system-building" phase of national development in Romania.

A brief review cannot possibly do justice to the richness of Jowitt's overall analysis. Suffice it to note that despite, or rather in large measure because of its social scientific approach, the study has succeeded in clarifying the historical record in one basic respect: Romania's independent course began in 1962, not earlier, as, for example, Fischer-Galati has suggested. Although the domestic preconditions of Romania's autonomy had been established before, the process of asserting that autonomy was gradual and contradictory. Jowitt's brilliant interpretation of why this was the case should now stand as the definitive treatment of the origins and timing of the Romanian Communist elite's defiance of the Soviet Union. On several other points, however, the study must be considered far less definitive. The first of these concerns the character of Romanian Communist nationalism. Without exploring the matter any further, Jowitt simply dismisses the label "social fascist" and the analogy with interwar Romanian experience on which it is based as misleading (p. 286). Instead, he ventures a distinction between the nationalism of Gheorghiu-Dej which he designates as "integral" and that of Ceausescu which he characterizes as "romantic (liberal)." Not everyone will agree with so sharp a dichotomy or necessarily be inclined to accept the second of these two designations, both gleaned from C. J. H. Hayes's classification of nationalisms, as appropriate to the actual situation. Much the same is true of Jowitt's assessment of the political leadership afforded by each of these two successive Romanian strongmen. While convincingly critical of Gheorghiu-Dej's limitations as an "institutional leader," Jowitt awards extraordinarily high marks to Ceausescu as a genuine "statesman" (pp. 225 ff.). It scarcely needs to be said that the evidence necessary for a definitive judgment is, even now, far from fully in.

In view of these and many other challenging interpretations presented by Jowitt, it may seem somewhat uncharitable to close on a note of minor criticism. Yet, if this important study fails to receive the attention that it deserves, that will probably be because it reads too much like a freshly completed doctoral dissertation rather than the polished and even elegant book that it might well have become. On matters of style and even organization the author could have been much better served by his editors than apparently was the case. That quibble aside, one looks forward with keen anticipation to the completion of the "agenda" that Jowitt sets for himself at the conclusion of the present study, namely, a second study analyzing the process of "community building" as distinct from "system building" in Romania's national development. In it, he may wish to revisit such issues as the character of Romanian Communist nationalism and the quality of Ceausescu's political leadership. Whatever his ultimate judgment on these matters, if the sequel is marked by anything like the high level of analytical sophistication that characterizes the present study, the results are bound to be stimulating.

MELVIN CROAN
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Geschichte und Struktur des deutschen Parteiensystems. By Heino Kaack. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1971. Pp. 699. DM 33. Approx. $10.00.)

The current stalemate in the Bundestag, where the governing coalition has lost its majority through defections and faces an opposition of exactly equal size, again raises questions about the effectiveness and viability of the West German political system. New elections may produce a stable governing majority for one party or coalition, but in any case, the period since 1966 has been fascinating for the student of party systems. The long era of CDU-dominated "bourgeois" coalition governments yielded first to a Grand Coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats and then, in 1969, to a socialist-led coalition. Bonn has demonstrated that it can survive a transfer of power, and the next elections could bring back the CDU or even produce an absolute majority for the SPD (especially if the FDP fails to overcome the 55 percent hurdle). In this period of transition, therefore, interest should naturally focus on the West German party system.

Heino Kaack has written a voluminous study of the history and structure of the German party system since its origins before 1848. It incorporates a wealth of primary and secondary sources and data, much of it difficult to obtain elsewhere and never before brought together in a single work. Divided into historical and systematic/analytic sections, the primary focus is on changes and trends in the structure of the West German party system from 1945 until shortly after the 1969 elections. Perhaps most important, it is written by a political scientist well versed in the most recent theoretical developments on both sides of the Atlantic. It constitutes, therefore, a major contribution to the continuing discussion of party systems, electoral behavior, and the structuring of mass politics. Although some of the details and conclusions may be challenged, it is certain to be the definitive work on the West German party system for quite a few years.

Employing as his central ordering concept the party *system,* Kaack has re-examined German political history of the past century and restored some balance to the historical literature on parties, with its customary preoccupation with individual parties, their more colorful leaders, and their ideological programs and internal squabbles. His focus on structure leads Kaack away from emphasis on sheer numbers and strength of parties (which has dominated discussion of party systems since Duverger) and toward a concentration on the changing internal structures of the two major parties and the links between these changes and changes in the social stratification and economic development of West Germany.

Apparently, the supreme value for Kaack, in considering the party system, is stability. The ghost of Weimar still haunts German political science. Thus, Kaack approves strongly of the emergence of two *Volksparteien* in West Germany and, especially, of the de-ideologization of the SPD, which was largely a response to CDU success. For Kaack, the SPD Godesberg Program of 1959 was a watershed for the party system, since it signified the (necessary) adjustment of the SPD to strong social trends, such as the breakdown of traditional class lines, and permitted the SPD to appeal to a large middle group of (mainly white collar) voters subject to sociocultural cross-pressures. And the decision of the FDP to form a coalition with the SPD in 1969 represents the final breakdown of "bourgeois" and "socialist" camps as meaningful concepts in German political life.

Rather than testing any specific hypotheses, Kaack sets out to discover which functions are actually performed by the parties in the existing West German political system. His major finding, implicit from the outset in the organization of the book, is that the main function of parties is the recruitment and selection of political leadership elites. This conclusion reflects Kaack's own earlier scholarly interests, which have focused on candidate selection and regionalism in party electoral strength. Unfortunately, Kaack is persuaded that political recruitment is diametrically opposed to providing coherent policy programs. This latter function he considers an outdated and hopelessly ideological concern of those attached to the "doctrine" of responsible party government. As a result of this view, a thread of complacency about developments in the German party system runs through most of the book, up to the thoughtful final chapter. Here, Kaack reveals his diagnosis of the most serious threat to the effectiveness of the party system: the increasing independence of the top party organs from the lower ones and the corresponding decrease in responsibility of each level of party leaders to its membership base. This growing gap is encouraged by public financing of the federal-level activities of the parties (election campaigns) and by a declining quantity and quality of internal party communications. Abandoning his earlier chiding of the party "ideologues," in this final assessment Kaack concedes that a major barrier to total bureaucratic petrifaction has been the challenges of younger "radicals" (at least in the SPD and FDP) and policy-based opposition by such radical regional party groups as the South-Hesse SPD organization.

The most original contribution of the book is found in the carefully reasoned analysis of trends in regional party strength. Kaack casts doubt, for example, on the thesis that the "strongholds" of the two major parties are breaking down. About two-thirds of all election districts remain "safe" for one party or the other, but Kaack presents a more sophisticated set of categories for regions and districts. He also speculates on the possible effects of various proposals for a new electoral system.

A weakness of this volume is its attempt to treat all aspects of the relationship between party system and political system. This leads to a fragmentation of the book, with some sections so brief and schematic that they are dissatisfying to those seeking more than a perfunctory overview. For example, Kaack insists on discussing the relations between specific categories of interest groups and the parties. This permits him to spend only a page on the organized expellees, the research for which, judging by the footnotes, ended in 1965. He correctly notes the declining influence of the expellees in all parties, but he fails to note the nearly total abandonment of the SPD by the expellee organizations since that party's *Ostpolitik* emerged with full clarity in 1966–67.

Such weaknesses are minor, however, when judged against the scope of the undertaking. The encyclopedic style does make the book a first-class reference work and a useful complement to Loewenberg's study of the Bundestag. Just as that was translated from English into German, all students of party systems should hope that this book will find a publisher for an English edition.

THOMAS P. KOPPEL

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French Nuclear Diplomacy. By Wilfrid L. Kohl. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. Pp. 412. $12.50.)

"Hurrah for France!" These enthusiastic words opened President Charles de Gaulle's public statement upon the successful testing of France's first atomic bomb in 1960. De Gaulle's words make transparently clear his ardent emotional attachment to France. And, perhaps unwittingly, they make equally clear the *political* importance of France's attaining nuclear status, both for de Gaulle and therefore, of necessity, for the world. Wilfrid Kohl's new book, *French Nuclear Diplomacy,* is largely an analysis of the Gaullist application of nuclear power for political ends.

It should be emphasized that Kohl's book is not limited just to de Gaulle's term of office. For instance, he stresses the fact that the order actually to test the weapon was issued by the last Fourth Republic Government, immediately *before* de Gaulle came back to office.

The heart of the book, however, is the analysis of de Gaulle's brilliant politico-psychological use of nuclear arms. Himself psychologically addicted to "a certain idea of France" (one of the opening lines of his *Memoirs of the War*), he was well aware of the role of psychology in politics—perhaps even to the detriment of a proper feel for the other elements of national power, such as a strong economic base. At any rate, he played his nuclear card with the same finesse with which he played all of France's hand and as part of an integrated strategy.

One proof of the political, as opposed to the military, importance to de Gaulle of the French deterrent was his attitude toward the development of an appropriate strategy. Former Army General de Gaulle (who in his day had written a classic on military strategy) and his government leaders "confined themselves to a few rather vague strategic notions in defending the *force de frappe*—notions which tended to be *ex post facto* explanations in military terms of earlier political choices" (p. 150).

If then, the French nuclear arm was meant by de Gaulle to win diplomatic rather than military encounters, against whom and to what purpose? Kohl's account leaves little doubt that the deterrent as a political weapon was mainly aimed at France's own Western allies—symbolized, perhaps, by the adoption for a time of a deterrence strategy of *tous azimuts,* in "all directions," instead of only toward the East. It was useful vis-à-vis both West Germany and Great Britain. But it was most important to France in its diplomatic conflict with the United States. Pre-Gaullist France had intended the nuclear deterrent then under study to be "coordinated closely in NATO with other allied nuclear forces" (p. 47). In sharp contrast, de Gaulle wished to be entirely free of the "subordination called integration" (de Gaulle) to which he felt France was subjected in NATO, and to regain its independence—particularly from the United States. Kohl shows that de Gaulle's 1958 proposal for a three-power Western world affairs directorate of the United States, Great Britain, and France was almost certainly never meant seriously. Once the United States made clear its rejection of the proposal, however, de Gaulle used this and the often tactless American diplomacy of the day as an excuse for withdrawing from the NATO command structure (though not from the North Atlantic treaty).

His real reason for doing so, however, was that he believed that all great powers, including the United States (and France?) automatically strive for hegemony. De Gaulle believed, or at least claimed, that the Cold War was over. It was therefore time for the United States to curtail its presence in Europe sharply, and for France, leading a Western Europe now independent of both East and West, once again to assert itself as a great world power. Nuclear weapons were indispensable to de Gaulle's ambitious programs. This was true politically, to lend France credibility as a great power. It was also true militarily, to enable France to maintain a kind of armed neutrality between East and West: Even without America's protection, it could still "tear off an arm" of any aggressor, as de Gaulle once colorfully put it. But such a grand strategy was too much for France, as Kohl points out: "In his last year in office the general was compelled to recognize the lack of realism of his foreign policy designs and his nuclear-political aspirations" (p. 360).

Wilfrid Kohl has done an excellent job of weaving together the multiple threads of this story—military, diplomatic, economic, and, with a man like de Gaulle, ideological and psychological, as well. Although entitled *French Nuclear Diplomacy,* his book is really a discussion of Gaullist foreign policy in general. It is scholarly and objective in a field where it is not always possible for an American to be so, even though there are occasional interpretations which could be disputed, such as that the "final burial" of the NATO multilateral force (MLF) took place as early as December, 1964 (p. 242). Kohl's book deserves to be on the shelf of everyone interested in French or European affairs, not only—perhaps not even so much—as a case study on French nuclear policy, but also as a reference book on Gaullism and on European international politics in the 1960s.

PATRICK W. MURPHY
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The Soviet Union and Arms Control: A Superpower Dilemma. By Roman Kolkowicz, Matthew P. Gallagher, Benjamin S. Lambeth, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., and Peter W. Colm. (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1970. Pp. 212. $9.00.)

The tendency of much literature in the field of arms control is to deal with the subject in a technical-strategic framework divorced from the larger context of internal and external politics and institutional considerations which in the real world help to shape the kinds of arms control policies pursued by the superpowers. The collective authors of this volume on the Soviet Union and Arms Control have taken pains to avoid this tendency. The result is a highly useful and informative analysis of the composite influences bearing on the Soviet approach to arms control in general, and especially to the negotiations with the United States on strategic arms limitations, which had just gotten under way in late 1969, a few months before the book appeared.

Among the various domestic and external considerations that led the Soviet Union to engage in the SALT talks, three, in the authors' view, stand out. First, the attainment by the beginning of the 'seventies of virtual strategic parity with the United States, which bred new confidence in Moscow in the deterrent effect of the Soviet military posture. Second, economic pressures growing in part out of the military drain on resources, making it desirable to curb a fresh round of the strategic arms race which could interfere with economic modernization. Third, the growing dimensions of the China problem, diverting both Soviet political attention and military preparations to Asia and making it expedient to seek détente in Europe and to stabilize Soviet relations with the West.

In addition to the essentially defensive or holding functions of a SALT agreement that would help to stabilize the Soviet Union's Western flank and head off the costs and uncertainties of a new strategic arms race, the authors suggest that the Soviet leadership probably also sensed positive political advantages in validation through SALT of strategic equality with the United States. Such advantages might have included not only the rather obvious one of weakening West European confidence in American commitments to NATO, but also that of giving Soviet diplomacy a somewhat freer hand to explore policy opportunities in the Middle East-Mediterranean arena and in the areas of Asia to the South of Russia.

Despite the weight of the various considerations in favor of Soviet entry into strategic negotiations with the United States, the Kremlin's decision to engage in the SALT talks did not come easily. Rather, according to the picture of internal Soviet politics presented in this study, there was strenuous opposition to the idea of linking Soviet security to strategic arms limitation agreements with the United States—opposition seated both institutionally in the Soviet equivalent of the military-industrial complex and arising from Party ideologues habitually suspicious of Western intentions. Although internal contradictions were by no means finally resolved by Soviet entry into the SALT talks, the decision to enter them is regarded by the authors—in what is probably the central judgment of their study—as evidence that the Soviet Union was prepared to make significant accommodations with its superpower rival on strategic arms control.

Given the course of the SALT talks, which went into their seventh round in March, 1972, how well does this judgment now stack up? The answer is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the Soviet side has kept polemics in connection with the talks at a minimum and has persistently avowed its serious interest in reaching "equitable" agreements. It also has altered its stance on certain issues, most notably with regard to ABM, indicating a willingness to place strict limits on deployment of antimissile defenses. In view of the traditional Soviet emphasis on strategic defense, and the headstart achieved in actual deployment of an ABM system around Moscow, this shift of attitude could be interpreted as a "significant accommodation" for the sake of agreement.

On the other hand, however, the Soviet negotiators have shown little readiness to come to terms on limitation of strategic offensive systems; and their reported insistence on treating forward-based tactical delivery systems in the NATO area as strategic items to be dealt with in SALT has seemed more of a roadblock to an initial agreement than a move to expedite progress in the negotiations. Moreover, during the course of the talks, over the past two-and-a-half years, the Soviet Union has continued to bolster its strategic posture with such programs as rapid buildup of a missile-launching submarine fleet and construction of superhardened silos for land-based ICBMs. Though these measures can be construed as products of interaction with the United States, which for its part has gone ahead with MIRV deployment plans during the talks, the dynamics of strategic competition still seem at least as operative in the Soviet case as do any impulses toward accommodation.

The possibility that an initial agreement on at least the strategic defense limitation problem may emerge in connection with President Nixon's visit to Moscow in May 1972 is one which could inspire the SALT negotiators on both sides to try harder to deal with the apparent standoff between them on the other strategic issues. However, at the present writing (April

1972), the net outcome of the SALT effort to limit strategic competition between the superpowers remains, in short, uncertain. Thus, one must defer judgment about the authors' view that the Soviet Union's "superpower dilemma" is likely to be resolved through an arrangement of mutual accommodation with the United States. At this juncture, one can only hope that events will vindicate their assessment.

THOMAS W. WOLFE

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City Politics: A Study of Leopoldville, 1962–63. By J. S. La Fontaine. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. Pp. 247. $13.50.)

This book is about a city that no longer exists. It existed very briefly during a chaotic moment of transition between the tightly administered and authoritarian Leopoldville of the Belgians and the sprawling vibrant Kinshasa of today's Zaire. In any period, it was and is a fascinating subject of research. The pop music capital of Africa, a major capital, a major center of transportation and light industry, it is ethnically and socially a very heterogeneous city.

During the period of La Fontaine's research, it was an island of ordered anarchy in the maelstrom that tore up so much of Zaire. Old institutions had broken down and new ones were being fashioned gradually, some to be discarded soon afterward. Rural people were flocking to the city in increased numbers, hoping either to tap its wealth or simply to enjoy the security afforded by General Mobutu's "paras."

Essentially, La Fontaine's monograph is a sociological description of the city during a period of less than nine months. It deals with two communes and completely ignores the vast squatting zones which were then developing on the edges of the city. La Fontaine seems to have met some resistance from people who did not want to answer his questions and seems never to have learned Lingala. As a general sociological description, the book is competent and will prove useful for comparative purposes. It has, however, two major deficiencies.

First, the title is misleading. The book is not really about "city politics." It deals with a wide range of phenomena from voluntary associations to magic and witchcraft. It is most interesting on social relationships, particularly settlement patterns and the transition from kinship to nonkinship links. The section (one fifth of the book) explicitly dealing with politics focuses primarily on national politics and the way in which it manifests itself in the communes studied. There are throughout the book suggestive but unexplored remarks about patron-client relations. Had the book really been about city politics, it would have focused on conflict resolution and on the ways in which power is obtained and used within the communes. In other words, it would have focused on the political problems that most influenced the people being studied and it would have gone beyond the institutional framework, which was being sorely tried.

Second, La Fontaine makes little effort to deal with process. Although he includes a section on "historical background" and remarks several times that the city was rapidly changing, he makes little attempt to explore these processes of change, even though it is the very rapidity of change that makes cities like "Leo" fascinating subjects of inquiry. The author has also not made any effort to keep up with changes in the city since his departure; thus he refers only once in the bibliography to anything published between 1963 and the completion of the manuscript in 1968.

I can also quibble over some minor points: Lumumba's MNC was not simply "the following of a messianic figure." Though Lumumba ably articulated the strivings and passions of the MNC, it was not his creation and it contained many of the ablest leaders in the country, including Zaire's present President. Nor was it remarkable, as La Fontaine says it was, that half of the top leadership in the nation was under 40 years old. Given the distribution of education, it was more remarkable that half was over 40.

As a monograph, *City Politics* has the virtue of conciseness and includes many data and observations that will interest other social scientists. Zaire's capital is, however, a subject that merits further and more comprehensive study.

MARTIN A. KLEIN

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The Cameroon Federal Republic. By Victor T. Le Vine. (Ithaca London: Cornell University Press, 1971. Pp. 205. $8.50.)

Cameroon: An African Federation. By Neville Rubin. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 272. $8.50.)

The Federal Republic of Cameroon changed its name to the United Republic of Cameroon in June of last year, and combined its three legislative assemblies, that of the federal and the two state governments, into one. These actions reflect the culmination of carefully designed processes begun with the inauguration of the Federation in 1961, and do not represent any drastic shift in the direction of the integrative advance in the Republic, as my own work has shown (*The Cameroon Federation*, Princeton University Press, 1970). Of the two well-written and researched books reviewed here, that of Rubin better prepares us to understand this fact.

Observers have thought for some time that because President Ahidjo designed into the system in its earliest days several of the institutional procedures that sapped federalism of its substance, he would discard its formal trappings as soon as he felt it could be done with a minimum of resistance and disruption. As Le Vine notes, there has been a widespread suspicion "that the East wants to absorb the West into a unitary state." But many of Le Vine's comments about institutional structures, as well as the practice of politics in Cameroon, suggest that the union was less than real. "Federal institutions appeared to have something of an *ad hoc* character," he states (p. 159), at least until 1965, and the system seemed to him not to have consolidated until perhaps 1969. His book is substantially revised from the 1963 chapter in Carter's *Five African States*, and it also reflects some modification of his assessment of the federal arrangements as loose and as a mixture of the visions of former Western premier John Foncha and of Ahidjo. Some of these misconceptions remain, however, in his assertions that the first federal constitution bore "the imprint of a series of political compromises" between them (p. 81), or that a national set of institutions and organizations was slow to emerge. None of the changes made in Ahidjo's constitutional designs compromised his plan for the federation, and often they strengthened it.

It is Rubin's work which better reveals the essential reality of the Cameroon system, i.e., that a coherent grid of power was organized into a singular hierarchy led by the President, despite the trappings of federalism, and that Ahidjo animated this centralized structure in order to guide the development of Cameroon in a determined way. According to Rubin, Ahidjo and the ruling Union Camerounaise had "well defined political objectives as well as a clear underlying concept of the state which they were in the process of constructing." Rubin correctly surmises that the system was "no loose framework, superimposed on existing patterns of social, political and economic organizations, but a solid foundaton for their amalgamation into a single unit" (p. 143).

I stress the matter of the character of the system not because a just description of it is an important achievement of scholarship in itself, but rather because this aspect of the experience may have been crucially important to the Cameroon success. Both Le Vine and Rubin are more descriptive than they are analytical, perhaps because of the desire of each to provide an introductory, readable overview for college classes in African politics and government. They each tell us more about what the Cameroon experience has been than about what it means. Without recognition of the tightly structured, essentially coercive framework that was established for politics from the start, one might be tempted to overemphasize another of the important and somewhat distinctive aspects of Cameroon political life, the pragmatic and basically relaxed approach Ahidjo has taken to matters involving ideological difference, linguistic and cultural expression, and recognition for the spokesmen of established political and ethnic factions. He succeeded in his desire to group them all into one unified national political party that never sought to mobilize mass action.

Both authors note that the process of molding a nation of the spirit has been slow to develop in Cameroon. Both equip us to understand how and why the Ahidjo government has emphasized smoothly functioning and technically competent administration led from the top, with determination, fairness, and pragmatism. Politics in Cameroon is not a matter of organizing a mass following behind debated policy alternatives. The politics of patronage is the rule, by which political groups acquire a presence in government. Few of the occupants of positions, however, exert personal influence in the society. The fairly extensive shifting and replacement of people in ministerial and parliamentary positions has had little policy or national meaning. The federal forms, the inclusion in the national party of so many former opponents, the tolerance of various relics from disparate colonial legacies all signal a certain deference to difference, but these have all occurred within a context of potential surveillance and coercive control that has been used with ruthless effectiveness when needed. In all probability the relaxed ideological atmosphere could exist without generating turmoil only because of this fact.

Cameroon's ability to contain incredible political and social diversity and maintain political stability has benefited greatly from significant economic success, as both authors note. Overall the Cameroon economy has grown at an average annual rate, in current monetary units, of nearly 9 per cent, with a net per capita rate of about 4 per cent. This economic advance has been spurred by substantial foreign investment, together with external exploitation, growth in the significant industrial sector, some agricultural diversification and strength, and greater benefits from the Economic and Customs Union of Central Africa than most of its other members enjoy, (because of its more extensive industrial sector). No doubt, continued favorable conditions and access for Cameroon products in France and the European Common Market will affect its future progress.

Neither author gives us much sense of the other factors that might upset Cameroon's future. They both sense that the next phase of political development in the country centers on nation building, but they fail to draw conclusions from their substantial and useful expositions of the historical and social context. Both books rely extensively on previously published works, and although Rubin expands the literature on Cameroon with discussion of foreign relations, Le Vine's work reflects the richer contribution of several years of original research. Le Vine is particularly good in depicting developments in education, the labor unions, press and communications media, religious bodies and traditions, and the important ethnic factors. He does not speculate on what the opening of the North to economic, social, and inevitably political mobilization of the pagan majority population may mean, or what impact the rapidly growing body of unemployed urban youth may have. Continued economic growth is no doubt a key to the solution of these foreseeable problems, as well as to the concern frequently expressed now about a successor to Ahidjo's leadership. Otherwise, unlike the remarkably troubleless first decade of the Federation, that of the United Republic may be more typically African.

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Revolution and Counterrevolution: Change and Persistence in Social Structures. By Seymour Martin Lipset. (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Revised and Updated Edition, 1970. Pp. 414. $1.95, paper.)

These richly illuminating essays—a revision of the 1968 hardcover edition—constitute an important and substantial sequel to Lipset's *Political Man* and his *The First New Nation.*

This edition gains from the exclusion of three chapters on Martineau, Ostrogorski, and Michels, and the single chapter on the Right Wing in the 1964 and 1966 American elections; and from the inclusion of two new chapters—"The American Jewish Community in a Comparative Context" (Chapter 4), and "The Left, the Jews and Israel" (Chapter 10). These changes make this book a more genuine follow-up of Lipset's earlier studies.

Lipset's new Preface is a helpful contribution to the "End of Ideology" debate. In the light of this Preface, Lipset's critics may take more seriously his contention that the battle for greater equality continues, fed by achievements and rising expectations. They may also take more seriously Lipset's argument that what is involved is not the end of ideology, but the emergence of a new ideology—"conservative socialism" (p. 303).

Chapter 4 emphasizes the "Americanism of the American Jewish Community" (p. 142). The congregational and liberal principles of American Judaism parallel these features of the dominant American Christian community. Similarly, the Jewish passion for higher education reflects, again, "predominant national value patterns" (p. 146). By way of contrast, Lipset notes the organizational resemblance between the Jewish community in France and the Catholic church; and the similarity between the religious behavior of French Jews and the rest of the "non-Catholic half of France." He also observes that English Jews reflect in a significant way dominant English patterns. American egalitarianism and the existence of many ethnic religious groups have enhanced access for Jews in America; and such undreamed of access—combined with Jewish sensitivity to minority problems—makes the Jew the most American of Americans (p. 152). This vantage point serves to illuminate the behavior of Jews, and of Americans, Frenchmen, and Englishmen. It provides a refreshing contrast to the view that Jews are to be understood only in terms of their unique culture.

Chapter 10 is must reading for those who believe that the Jewish-Left alliance is permanent, and for those who maintain that such an alliance always has been, and is now, an unmixed blessing. They will be reminded that the Left has often assumed the disappearance of Jews as a price of its support of freedom for Jews! They will also be reminded of the "socialism of fools"—anti-Semitism! They will be forced to confront the fact of leftist—including Jewish leftist—hostility to Israel. They will be required to acknowledge a blind spot among some leftists—their inability to see the kibbutz as "the only viable example of a decentralized anarchist-socialist society" and as a genuine "participatory democracy" (pp. 394–395). It will be most interesting to note how Lipset's analysis of cleavage within the Jewish community and his prognosis of Jewish political behavior will hold up. He maintains that the "rise of the New Left, the shift in the international position of Israel, and the tensions between sections of the Jewish and Negro communities, have all contributed to breaking the relations between the left and Jewry" (pp. 399–400).

In one significant sense, Lipset's analysis and prognosis in Chapter 10 are in accord with his thesis about the "Americanism of the American Jewish Community" in Chapter 4, and with his thesis about the "conservative socialist" character of modern politics. Yet, in another significant sense, and pursuant to Lipset's own argument, the American Revolutionary spirit, American egalitarianism, and ethnic and religious pluralism, may serve (in conjunction with a traditional Jewish commitment to learning, social justice, and the good life) to reinforce the Jewish orientation to genuinely radical—but sane—prophetic politics.

This stimulating series of essays encourages this reviewer to ask if Professor Lipset will, in a future book, articulate his own more systematic and coherent theory of revolution and social change. Such a theory could build on Lipset's fruitful "comparative analysis of political behavior" within an historical context (p. v). Such a theory might address itself more fully to the origin, evolution, present status, and future development of major revolutionary movements. Such a theory, moreover, would permit Lipset to state explicitly the values and behavior-patterns he deems necessary and sufficient for survival, growth, and more humane fulfillment as we look forward to 2000 and beyond.

NEAL RIEMER

Drew University

Politik in einer deutschen Kleinstadt. By Benita Luckmann. (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1970. Pp. 286. Approx. $11.00.)

This study of Bretten, a German town of 10,000 some 25 miles east of Karlsruhe is a well-researched piece of work on a German "small town in a mass society" by a German political sociologist. Using participant observation, survey data, and elite interviews, Luckmann examines institutions, political decision making, and political attitudes on a passivity–activism scale. The approach, although pluralistic, is rather descriptive and lacks a clear-cut analytical focus, probably because the author has no German precedent to work with. Nevertheless, the results will be of considerable interest to scholars working on German politics.

American observers will find many similarities with American small towns: The dependence on national institutions, the proliferation of clubs and organizations (there are 70 in Bretten with a total membership of 6000), the importance of the business elite, and the slowness with which social change affects ideology and myth can all be observed in the United States.

This reviewer finds confirmation in this study that what is different in Germany is the relation of the past to the present. The past in Germany is largely personal and is not rooted in the official ideology of the Federal Republic. Indeed, the FRG receives its legitimacy (despite occasional official disclaimers) from the *tabula rasa* situation of the 1945 period and from the hostility to the Ulbricht/Honecker dictatorship. For the individual, the avoidance of the past, most especially of the Nazi period, results in a complex of public and private insecurity which the interviews bring out. It also accentuates the generational cleavage in Germany.

Luckmann overestimates the local elements in relation to the centrifugal elements in Germany, and she also overestimates the classlessness of its society to which almost all citizens pay lip-service. Even the local elections in Bretten frequently exhibit party-ideological strains, and Bretten shares in the problem of assimilating marginal groups, especially the 600 foreign workers who create considerable social problems. These "gastarbeiter" (guestworkers), some with families, keep to themselves and are isolated by the local population.

Political participation, despite an 80 per cent voting turnout in local elections, is minimal. The frequent resorting of the town council to closed sessions, as well as the general political apathy, makes the actual level of political involvement low. The local political leadership is closely related to the leadership of the clubs and associations and to personal popularity. Luckmann tends to minimize the importance of the economic power elite in contrast to the findings of American community power studies, and tends to overemphasize the egalitarianism resulting from the localism of Bretten.

To sum up, except for the lack of an index, this is a useful, if at times somewhat loosely tied together, picture of Germany in microcosm. Bretten is not simply a small town in Germany. To understand it is to gain a perceptive view of German political life in 1968.

CHARLES R. FOSTER

Washington, D.C.

A Federation of Southern Africa. By Leo Marquard. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. 142. $6.50.)

Leo Marquard has educated so many of us about South Africa that it is only common courtesy to allow him to describe the purpose, theme, and scope of this small, very interesting volume:

> The argument of this book has been that present policies in the RSA [Republic of South Africa] and South-West Africa can lead only to stagnation or to racial conflict which would be difficult to contain. It was suggested that a federation of southern Africa might provide a way that would avoid both stagnation and conflict, and that such a federation could consist of some fifteen autonomous regions comprising the eleven into which the RSA would be partitioned together with Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, and Namibia. The advantages and disadvantages of this have been discussed in relation to the different regions and to different racial groups (p. 124).

Marquard shares the assumption with other experienced observers that the restrictive character of apartheid must necessarily lead to stagnation, since many rewarding economic opportunities are left unexplored or unexploited because of racial considerations. He also assumes that apartheid will result in violence, almost certain to attract the direct attention of other African states and the great powers. For southern Africa this would be a disaster, and thus it is imperative to search for alternatives, as Mr. Marquard has skillfully done.

The approach embodied in this treatise is strictly logical, and the analysis rests heavily on rationality of the type traditionally invoked by economists and more recently by other social scientists as well. Gains and losses are calculated, with risks and externalities also being taken into account. As Marquard adds up the pluses and minuses, federation wins by almost a mile. Perhaps the outcome would have been all the more evident had the volume not sacrificed to brevity relevant detailed data illuminating the state of affairs of the peoples in southern Africa.

What Marquard is proposing is to convert the Republic of South Africa from a unitary state of four provinces, including African "homelands," into a federation of eleven provinces, some predominantly "white," some predominantly African. He also recommends creating a regionwide federation in southern Africa. A basic requirement would be a constitution guaranteeing civil rights and liberties, with a supreme court to sustain them. Moreover, a workable federal system would need suitable machinery to arrange for an equitable distribution of revenue. Marquard advocates for the time being a common voting roll as a precondition of participation, but with a qualified franchise. Aware of how the qualified franchise has been manipulated to disenfranchise Africans in South Africa and other countries, he argues for constitutional protection in this respect, protection which he anticipates will suffice as long as the peoples wish the federation to continue.

The case for such federation rests on interests, and Mr. Marquard outlines the net advantages that will accrue to all southern Africans. He asserts that federation promises the possibility of attaining a coalition made up of participants who previously perceived one another as opponents.

Political progress not only depends on common sense and moderation, but it also involves sentiments. In the spirit of Bryce, Marquard aptly recognizes this dimension of political relations and thus attaches considerable weight to the fear now prevalent among Africans, whites, and others. He contends that, since the likelihood of violence under apartheid is great and the fear it breeds is debilitating, the people are necessarily compelled to respond to workable alternatives.

The depth of resentment and antagonism, however, tends to be underplayed in this volume. It is questionable that southern Africans are willing to compromise and accept the accommodation that federation signifies. After all, eighteen million nonwhites live under apartheid, eight million having been added since 1948, when the Malan Government commenced official apartheid. Moreover, a very substantial number of urbanized, educated, middle-class Africans, Asians, and Coloured have been uprooted and humiliated in so disgusting a manner as to leave them with permanent emotional scars.

Can apartheid, as Marquard claims, be dismantled through a federal system? If it were simply a matter of repealing legislation and carving out new jurisdictions, his approach might hold promise. That is far from the situation today, however. Apartheid is a deeply entrenched system of racial containment built on a combination of racial prejudice and discrimination, racial separation and segregation, economic exploitation, and terror. It is an order managed, as Heribert Adam points out, (*Modernizing Racial Domination*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), by a "pragmatic oligarchy" that is tenaciously intent on ruling over the nonwhites indefinitely. Bantustans are official homelands only by virtue of imposition and coercion, not by choice of the Africans. The recent "liberalizing" steps evidence merely the adaptability of apartheid as South African whites change from a rural to an urban society and the economy becomes more heavily industrialized, not the end of it. Today the apartheidist order is fundamentally expansionist—if not for ideological reasons then by dint of economic design. As dominant as is the white population in its southern African environment, its influence, like its high standard of living, depends heavily on foreign investment and the opportunities opened by foreign industries that seek expanding markets on the African continent. Apartheid may continually change its stripes but is not likely to fade away.

As persuasive as Marquard's argument for federation is, what appears rational to him may not strike another observer as equally rational —a common flaw in rationality as a basis for action. By no means does this soft spot in the book lessen its value for readers who follow closely the affairs of southern Africa or the resolution of conflict in "racial" relations.

Julian R. Friedman

Syracuse University

The History of the Nazi Party: 1919–1933. By Dietrich Orlow. (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969. Pp. xi, 338. $11.95.)

The immediate problem facing a reviewer in a work of this nature is the extent to which the history of the Nazi Party can be separated from the history of Nazism as an ideology. Orlow has clearly established strict guidelines and boundaries in his treatment of the NSDAP; and by limiting himself to the mechanics of the Party, he has admirably circumscribed his work, allowing a range of detail any other treatment would not have permitted. But if the purpose of this book is to supplement our understanding of the success of the Nazi Party, one must not forget that ideology—or perhaps better, myth—also played a significant role in the rise of the NSDAP. Any separation of Party and myth may therefore often be artificial. Orlow is apparently aware of this. By his own admission, Hitler embodied the Party in the sense that he was the sole source of its ideology and myth. Yet by merely hinting at Hitler's charismatic appeal, Orlow fails to develop the implications of this dichotomy between ideology and Party. Indeed, it would seem that Hitler himself was more important to the success and unity of the NSDAP than were the nature of its structure, its mechanical operation, and its functionaries.

Orlow's criterion would seem to be an analysis of how the Nazis saw themselves—i.e., whether as "another" Weimar party, or as something entirely apart from the Republic. He suggests that they believed they were different, and to support this assumption he presents a plethora of minutiae. In particular, he examines the intraparty struggles which have hitherto been largely glossed over by other historians, either because they felt them to be of little importance, or because to emphasize them detracted from the accepted, traditional picture of the Nazi monolith. Yet this meticulous attention to detail also undermines Orlow's own case that the Nazis were different. In fact, it would appear that Orlow has gone out of his way to illustrate the "commonness" of the NSDAP, rather than its uniqueness. It is at this point that one misses some basis of comparison for Orlow's analysis of the Nazi Party. His treatment of the subject gives the impression that the Nazis operated in a vacuum, yet this was obviously not the case. Thus it would have been helpful for Orlow to have described for the reader some of the parallel developments of the other parties, especially the extremist groups, to see how they fared under similar pressures and setbacks, and how they coped with intraparty strife. Similarly, the book fails to provide the reader with a basic outline of the parliamentary and constitutional structure of Weimar. Why, for example, did Hitler seek the presidency, since this involved an implicit neutrality "above politics"? To the uninitiated this poses a perplexing problem, since it is entirely dependent on that "most perfect" of all constitutions, that of Weimar. The problem, of course, is always one of selectivity, but one cannot possibly cope with the politics of Weimar without understanding at least the basis of its parliamentary process.

As to Orlow's use of material, though the structural development of the Party is presented in abundant detail, the often uncritical use of the *Völkischer Beobachter* or Goebbels's diaries as well as other Nazi propaganda organs is disconcerting and questionable. This holds true for Orlow's use of statistics and analyses of election results. There is no question that the NSDAP made "impressive gains" in the elections of 1932, but the KPD proportionally made even greater gains. To mention this would not have weakened the approach of the book, but would rather have underscored the political polarization of the times. Moreover, the stated reluctance of Hitler to "test his myth against Hindenburg's name" (p. 244) in the presidential elections of that same year does not weaken the author's assertion that Hitler was a "myth person," but it does fail to illustrate that Weimar was beset by other, greater myth persons, notably Hindenburg.

Undoubtedly the most valuable section of the book is the final chapter on the Strasser and Schleicher interlude. This period is generally little understood and rarely examined in depth in most works because it turned out to be a transitional period prior to the seizure of power. By synthesizing the many factors that led to Hitler's elevation to the chancellorship, Orlow has valuably contributed to the historiography of the period. Yet even here, as in the rest of the book, the reader's knowledge of background data is taken for granted. My overall criticism of Orlow's history of the Nazi Party is that it leaves too much unsaid about the Weimar constitution, the development of political parties in Weimar, and the men who led them. Deficient in such respects, this book is something less than the average man's guide to the Nazi Party.

ANNELISE THIMME

University of Alberta

Uses and Abuses of Political Power: A Case Study of Continuity and Change in the Politics of Ghana. By Maxwell Owusu. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1970. $10.00.)

Professor Owusu's book is doubly welcome. First, this fine and vivid piece of scholarship comes to blow away the cobwebs from Ghanaian political studies just at a time when it appeared that no one could write about Ghanaian politics without being dreary. Second, this work, which is certainly the best piece of analysis since Dennis Austin's authoritative political history *Politics in Ghana: 1946–60* (OUP for the RIIA. 1964), is by a Ghanaian. The author thus can and does involve his readers deeply and intimately in the totality of what he studies in a way no outsider could. He is dismissive of romance and mystification and never claims more than he can prove.

Basically the book is a study of "how traditional political institutions . . . have adapted or failed to adapt to the changing environment of Eurocolonial domination, decolonization, and the one-party state and society under the CPP" (p. 3). Owusu deals with only one town, Swedru in southern Ghana. Swedru is obviously not all of Ghana but this local study gets to grips with the essentials of political process in a way no national study ever appears likely to be able to do. Certainly the author implicitly feels that what is true of Swedru is often true of Ghana, although such extrapolation is never taken too far.

Owusu's politics are Lasswellian. For him political relations are "extensions or primary dimensions of economic relations" (p. 3). In Ghana politics is about wealth and power, "related means to the supreme social values-high status, social recognition and social dignity" (p. 5). Such a situation did not merely emerge from the imposition of alien domination and all that that implied. On the contrary its roots lie far deeper. After all, as Owusu argues, chieftaincy always depended upon the chief's achievement of "power and authority over his people by his ability to maintain and expand the economic resources . . . he controlled" (p. 80).

The considerable duration of European commercial contact with West Africa and the failure of colonial government "to prepare the people for civic responsibility, founded on democratic or any overarching political values" (p. 91) ensured the perpetuation of the primacy of profit. Only when colonial administration or expatriate capital threatened the pursuit of wealth was there protest. "Both the colonizer and the colonized developed a vested interest . . . in the colonial situation" (p. 121). In a situation of mutual maneuver for advantage the relationships were never simple. Rather than the "naturalness" of the nationalist response, Owusu suggests "an undulating pattern of cooperation and resistance" (p. 121).

All political parties and protest groups were, therefore, essentially concerned with economic grievances rather than idealistic political change. Of such parties the CPP comes in for some particularly close analysis. While Owusu's claim for the essentially petty bourgeois nature of the party echoes Austin's earlier assertions, he makes his substantiation a good deal more meaty. Ideology is the victim of the analysis; for the supporters of the CPP "political parties and political ideologies were meaningful primarily to the extent that membership conferred economic and social advantages . . . It is an irony of history that when Nkrumah was establishing his political kingdom . . . his followers and henchmen were mostly interested in building an economic paradise for themselves in their local constituencies" (p. 146).

Nor was the CPP necessarily anti-traditionalist any more than it was the revolutionary party of the workers and the peasants of Ghana. The party was happy and able "to incorporate traditional leaders and other local influentials through a combination of cooperation, persuasion, bribery, coercion and selective appeals to traditional symbols, rituals and values within the new national institutions" (p. 248).

This is strong stuff and, despite David Apter's introductory note, runs strongly counter to the received wisdom from Apter onward. The inside job clearly has mammoth advantages. First, Owusu does not walk abroad in respectful, awed silence seeing in "tradition" something immutable and worthy of reverence. He knows that all laws can be trimmed and even broken. Unlike the old administrators and the newer analysts, he is not guilty of false analogies or the erection of ring-fences of mystification around that which is difficult to understand. Second, he is not theorizing in a dark made all the dimmer by peering through the political elite's rose-tinted spectacles. He supports his contentions with data so hard that they are sometimes unsavory. As a polemic the book succeeds marvelously and Ghanaian studies will never be quite the same again. As scholarship it is a new departure in positive, local studies, unafraid of comparison and generalization.

While there is much to argue about, and much to disagree with, Owusu has made a considerable contribution to our knowledge in this book. Professor Owusu fails only after his apparent acceptance of Dr. Leavis's view that great literature needs a moral. Owusu understandably needs one after such a depressing tour. "What Africa needs then is a new ideology of sacrifice. The present generation of Africans . . . will have to make sacrifices, however painful, to insure economic abundance and political stability for future generations" (p. 329). After such an exciting read, it is perhaps churlish to suggest that this strategy, carried out without fundamental alterations to the structures which support the values he so naturally despises, would be irrelevant.

Richard Rathbone

University of London

Class Inequality and Political Order: Social Stratification in Capitalist and Communist Societies. By Frank Parkin. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 205. $7.00.)

Despite the subtitle, which seems to promise a systematic comparative investigation, this book is essentially an essay. Unlike other contemporary English scholars—notably Thomas Bottomore—preoccupied with inequality in modern societies, Parkin does not employ a refined methodology nor does he generate new data. He does assemble a fairly wide range of data from secondary sources, although his information on Eastern Europe could be much improved by resort to such recent, systematic examinations as Robert Osborne's and David Lane's.

Because the work is essentially an interpretation, it is important to begin by considering Parkin's argument. He is concerned with egalitarianism in the strict sense of the term, rather than with equality of opportunity. Indeed, he regards recent European socialist emphasis on social mobility rather than equality as a regression toward the emphasis on achievement which, he thinks, is the cause of many social problems in the United States. Pursuing this analysis, Parkin contends that Western societies are essentially divided into two classes: the white-collar occupations and the manual occupations:

> The backbone of the class structure, and indeed of the entire reward system of modern Western society, is the occupational order. Other sources of economic and symbolic advantage do coexist alongside the occupational order, but for the vast majority of the population these tend, at best, to be secondary to those deriving from the division of labour (p. 18).

But a market economy (including those where public *ownership* prevails) will reward occupations which are in scarce supply because they require greater natural or acquired abilities—"technical expertise, skill, or responsibility" (p. 42). There is nothing inevitable about reliance on market criteria; instead, rewards might be allocated in proportion to the physical effort, the dirtiness, or the dangers attached to various occupations. In fact, however, higher occupational groups dominate the political and social order. They are therefore able to utilize socialization mechanisms to inculcate the values of the market system and the occupational hierarchy which it produces. As long as the social order is pluralist—i.e., as long as free play is permitted to the superior resources in organization and indoctrination which the upper occupational groups possess—the lower class will not be able to perceive its real interests.

In developing this class conflict model, Parkin obviously draws on the Marxist tradition. He devotes much of his analysis to a trenchant criticism of the consensus model of "neo-Weberians" (especially Parsonians, although most schools of American sociology fall within his target). Utilizing the concept of false consciousness (as suggested at the close of the preceding paragraph), Parkin attacks the underlying assumptions of survey research which suggest broad societal consensus on occupational status. In addition, he assails the multifactor models of social cleavage common in contemporary sociology. Parkin admits the significance of ethnic cleavage, though he does not seem to realize how few societies other than those of Western Europe are ethnically homogeneous; but he sharply rejects sex or generational cleavages as comparably important to occupation. More significant, by ascribing fundamental significance to occupation rather than to property, he has turned Marx on his head. Now, this would be fair enough if Parkin recognized that class division, for Marx, is not primarily a question of inequality but an aspect of the motive force of history. In other words, in the Marxist dialectic, class is not, primarily, a stratification concept at all, but a relationship to the production process. No doubt Parkin is fully acquainted with this aspect of Marxist theory. At one point, in fact, he refers to the "productive base" in terms which suggest that he is attached to the Marxist analysis; but in the same sentence he concedes—as indeed the facts seem to require—that a manual-labor force may well almost disappear as a result of technological changes. From the theoretical standpoint at least, this development need not trouble the orthodox Marxist unduly. Since, however, Parkin has explicitly rejected ownership of the means of production as the class criterion, his analysis falters at the prospect of a universal white-collar society.

Parkin's explicitly dichotomized class structure is poorly substantiated empirically as well as theoretically. His analysis (almost exclusively drawn from English experience) depends on the assertion that movement within a large "inter-class" of lower white-collar and skilled manual occupations accounts for much of the social mobility apparent in statistics. Yet, he asserts that the boundary between white-collar and manual occupations is crucial. In my opinion, this is only a seeming paradox, for the psychological distance between members of these occupational categories *in Western Europe* is great. The reasons, I should contend, are not sharp distinctions in rewards, however defined, but historical—the lingering result of a complex of factors associated with the pre-modern class divisions of Europe. Because Parkin sharply rejects historical considerations, his analysis of class differentiation is, I think, impoverished. Its poverty becomes particularly noticeable in his treatment of the Eastern European communist societies, where traditional, rural forces are stronger than in Western Europe or the United States. For example, he barely mentions the peasantry, despite the fact that the transformation, within a generation, of essentially agrarian social orders has been by far the most significant aspect of mobility in Eastern Europe.

Parkin's approach also suffers from his failure to define "rewards" clearly. Apparently he considers inequality to arise only from distinction in material rewards, although he interprets these broadly to include such elements as taxes, sick pay, pensions, and continuity of employment. He fails, however, to provide empirical evidence on the extent to which white- and blue-collar strata in European welfare states continue to remain unequal on these dimensions as well as in direct wage receipts. Only at the very end of the book (p. 179) does Parkin acknowledge a "whole range of satisfactions and gratifications" of a nonmaterial nature "associated with creative and professional tasks" and then only to bolster his argument that market criteria are not essential for recruitment of scarce talent. What he wholly fails to consider is the possibility that these less tangible inequalities among occupations may, in the long run, be the most invidious. One does not have to be an expert on English society to notice how postwar leveling of material rewards has been accompanied by upper middle-class efforts to maintain a distinctive life style and a quasi-monopoly of access to "gentlemanly" occupations. Acceptance of genteel poverty as the cost of sending boys to their father's public school is notorious. Perhaps such phenomena are merely quaint efforts to cling to the past. Many observers see them, however, as quite rational efforts to maintain both social power and psychic satisfaction at the cost of material deprivation. If the latter interpretation is true, Parkin's emphasis on material equality, as contrasted to equality of opportunity, may constitute, at least for England, one more example of the harmless assault on long-abandoned outworks of class privilege which has so often characterized the would-be radical.

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG
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The Spanish Revolution. By Stanley G. Payne. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1970. Pp. 398. $3.25, paper.)

A prolific historian of the Spanish right who has competently dealt with the role of the military in Spanish politics and with the Falange party, now turns his attention to the left. Though this book is part of a textbook series on "Revolutions in the Modern World," it presents new material and new ideas. A small section is devoted to the Revolution of 1936, the rest being taken up by a history of the political left from the beginning of this century and by an account of the Republican military effort in the Civil War. The anarchosyndicalist Revolution of 1936 would deserve a book of its own, but readers interested in the topic should rather turn to C. Lorenzo's *Les anarchistes espagnols et le pouvoir* (Paris: Seuil, 1969), or to J. Peirats' *La C.N.T. en la revolución española* (3 vols., recently republished by Ruedo Ibérico, Paris). Payne does not address himself to the issue that writers sympathetic to the Revolution have taken as the basic question; did the subordination of the revolutionary goals to the Republican military effort dampen the enthusiasm of the working class, thus undermining the military effort itself? His basic thesis is that Franco succeeded not only in a military sense but also morally; indeed, Payne believes that military defeat was not in the least a result of the workers' disenchantment with the ascendancy of the Communist party after 1936 (bent on a policy of supporting Republican legality) but, quite the contrary, it was mainly a result of the workers' disillusion with the revolutionary experiment of 1936 and of their feelings of guilt over the ferocity shown toward their class enemies: "The tone of religious exaltation and the emphasis of traditional moral values in the Nationalist zone provided an easily understood and accepted credo that helped to maintain psychic and emotional stability. The revolutionary morality inculcated in the leftist zone may not have taken root so easily, to which was added the moral conflict engendered by the great blasphemy, sacrilege, church-burning, and priest-murder that had swept the leftist zone during the first year of the war" (pp. 357–8). The working class's loss of nerve was also helped by the poor economic performance of collectivized industry—though one might read Bricall's figures (p. 257) somewhat differently, since there appears to have been a creditable maintenance of industrial output in Catalonia until August 1937 (i.e., even beyond the period of anarchosyndicalist predominance), taking into account that a number of industries, from cosmetics to fashionable clothing and hats, were in the nature of things discontinued. Also, an index of industrial output tells us very little about income distribution.

Since the question of the Nationalists' "moral superiority" is given much importance, the figures on executions on both sides may be thought to become important. Payne is, in my view, less than straight when he quotes Hugh Thomas (p. 225) without informing the reader that such figures have been contested by Gabriel Jackson (and by Payne himself in Chapter 21 of his book on the Spanish military). Payne should have explained why he prefers Hugh Thomas's figures to Jackson's. The criterion, of course, should not be "impartiality" but objectivity. (Ian Gibson's *La Represión nacionalista en Granada y la muerte de Federico García Lorca,* Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, 1971, is a reminder that the topic is amenable to research, against Payne's convenient belief to the contrary.) Furthermore, the historian's standards of morality should not be attributed to the actors. Perhaps this point will come across more clearly if one considers that for Franco—and also for many military men, landowners, industrialists, and priests of that generation—had there been a need to kill two or three times as many people as they did, the game would have been still worth the candle. No qualms would have been entertained about the morality of their "Crusade." This applies to those troubled times, though undoubtedly such events are embarrassing to some of them, in retrospect. Similarly, for many people on the left the mistake presumably was to treat their enemies so leniently; priests, for instance, belonged after all to an organization, the Catholic Church, which was actively supporting France with the explicit blessing of its foreign head in the Vatican. Nevertheless, there was not even a policy of internment of priests in camps. Payne provides figures on the number of priests killed by the people (over 6,000, p. 226) but not on the number of people killed by the priests. One is therefore not convinced by the argument that Franco's moral superiority was an important factor in the loss of temper in the leftist zone, however much liberals might wish that Spaniards were ashamed what they were doing to each other. There seems to be good reason to believe not that they were equally ashamed, but, alas, that they were rather proud, probably in larger numbers in the leftist zone than in the Nationalist zone, if only because there were more non-Catholic, poor people in Spain than Catholic, middle-class people. This is not to deny, and Payne pays due attention to this, that in the leftist zone there were social groups (the Catalan petty bourgeoisie, the Catalan peasantry, to give only two instances) who were committed to Republicanism but not in the least to Revolution. Factors of social structure, plus the role of the Communist party and of Soviet advisors (which became very important mainly because of the need to have arms from the Soviet Union), have been emphasized by other interpreters. Payne's specific contribution is the "morality" argument.

A major strength of the book is the chapter on the Republican army, where Payne uses Russian sources. A major weakness is the failure to study at all the Revolution in the latifundist region. There is scarce bibliography on this topic, and also the experiment was largely over shortly after it began, since Franco's crack Army of Africa rapidly conquered most of Andalusia and Estremadura. This, however, was an important aspect of the Spanish Revolution. Furthermore, peasant unrest in the South was probably one of the main reasons for the military rising of July 18, 1936 which in turn provoked the workers' Revolution in Catalonia, Asturias, etc. After the Popular Front government was elected in February 1936, the situation was relatively peaceful in Catalonia. Many of the incidents of violence in the rest of the country were the deed of Falangist provocateurs. But the fact remains that in March 1936 there was a mass invasion of estates in Estremadura, and also many instances of this kind in the rest of the latifundist region, probably a prelude to imminent mass invasions. Payne takes a different line on the immediate reasons for the military rising, a line consistent with his view that the Revolution somehow conflicted with authentic Spanish values. Payne's insistence on Communist plotting for revolution (scarcely credible after the International's change of line) and on the "bolshevization" of the Socialist party under Largo Caballero in the 1930s, looks a bit one-sided, if meant to explain and justify Franco's rising. A student of the Spanish right and of the Spanish military should have understood that the military had, in their own view, perfectly valid law-and-order reasons to attempt a coup, and even to start a Civil War should the coup fail as it did. The question of a Communist plot which had to be stopped, a specialty of right-wing historians, is something of a red herring brought up by those who wish to make the Spanish war the first hot war of the Cold War, and who are keen on denying the (to them) un-Spanish fact that in large areas of the country there was a prerevolutionary situation in the Spring of 1936, a situation which came into full bloom on July 19. Payne's prefatory excuses for the scant attention paid to the Revolution in the Southern countryside looks a bit thin (the wish to de-emphasize the romantic appeal of peasant anarchism for readers in the English-speaking world is commendable, but irrelevant to the hard facts of anarchosyndicalist and socialist collectivization in Estremadura, Western Andalusia, and New Castile).

J. MARTINEZ-ALIER

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The Czechoslovak Political Trials 1950–1954. The Suppressed Report of the Dubcek Government's Commission of Inquiry, 1968. Edited by Jiří Pelikán. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1971. Pp. 360. $10.95.)

The Moscow trials of the 'thirties were a watershed in the development of the Communist movement and a shocking surprise for the world. When they were repeated in Central Europe during the 'fifties, they still represented a horrible experience with methodical sadism, but the repetition of Stalinism did not cause a shock any more. Finally, East was East. It was enough to declare Central Europe to be Eastern Europe and the problem disappeared. What a triumph for political science when a recent conference of experts discovered that Central Europe is in Central Europe!

Khrushchev's famous secret speech (1956) revealed that the reality of Stalinist purges was worse than all the "anticommunist propaganda." But the Central European purges remained an unsolved puzzle until the unusual Prague Spring of 1968 shed some light on the most cruel of these ordeals, the so-called Slánský trial. Richard Slánský, General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, was sentenced to capital punishment for high treason, along with ten other victims. Three survivors got away with life imprisonment. Two of them, Eugen Loebl and Artur London, published their personal accounts during the short Prague Spring (Eugen Loebl, *Stalinism in Prague,* New York: Grove Press Inc., 1969—with the original text of the trial's proceedings; Arthur London, *The Confession,* New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1970—filmed by Costas Gavros). Some family members of the executed also wrote their recollections about the human tragedy of the victims. (See Josefa Slánská, *Report on My Husband,* New York: Atheneum, 1969; Mariam Šlingová, *Truth Will Prevail,* London: Merlin, 1968. Two other books, by Heda Margolius and Hana Clementis, are not yet available in English. For a very different approach to the same problem, see a relevant book by Jaroslav Brodský, *Solution Gamma,* Toronto: Gamma Print, 1971.) Finally, the survivors of parallel trials reappeared on the political stage, as protagonists of the democratization movement: Josef Smrkovský, Gustáv Husák, Josef Pavel, and Eduard Goldštücker.

Even that was not enough. In the critical year, 1968, the secret archives of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party were used for an inquiry, resulting in an official document, the so-called Piller's report. After the Russian occupation, Jiří Pelikán, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Czechoslovak Parliament, published this secret report in several languages. (Jiří Pelikán has also published the second most important document, the protocol of the XIVth Congress of the Communist Party [XIV. Mimořádný sjezd KSČ. Protokol a dokumenty. Roma: Europa Verlag, 1970]. Lately he has become the leader of the socialist opposition among the new wave of Czech and Slovak emigres. He is the publisher of *Listy,* Rome, a journal maintaining the spiritual continuity of the Czechoslovak experiment with socialist democracy.) Pelikán's publication is the number one document for any historical study about Central Europe in the 'fifties and it is undeniably the most important book of the twelve dozen published on Prague's stormy year 1968. (The best bibliography so far, listing 146 books and numerous particles, is Michael Parrish, *The 1968 Czechoslovak Crisis: A Bibliography, 1968–70,* Santa Barbara, California: American Bibliographical Center: Clio Press, 1971.)

Piller's report was originally prepared for the 14th Party Congress, and it is therefore a sort of "immanent criticism"—an official document placing the experience in a broad historical context. We should *a priori* stress the paradox that the institution which introduced the reign of terror also claims to be an impartial judge over itself. In any case, in Amalrik's words, such a document has the same relevance as a talking fish for an ichthyologist. The report tries to solve three problems: (1) the international circumstances and the engineering of the trials—the most important general part, (2) the rehabilitations—with historically significant documents, and (3) political responsibility of persons and institutions. The conclusions of this report had such an explosive effect that the armored divisions of five countries took an active part in the solution of this delicate question.

The report does not analyze the decisive structural problems of the economic and political development in a totalitarian system. Thus the trials appear, in the last instance, as the regrettable mistakes of persons and institutions, but not as the organic, structural, built-in, logical consequences of a faulty system, which they really were. This interpretation of documents and facts ignores the main wave of terror (1948–1951) which did not start with, but ended with, the trials; it creates the impression that the moral minimum in politics is violated only when the heads of leading communists begin to roll. Understandably, the key question had to remain unasked in Prague, but outside Prague we can inquire if the book really reveals the truth, or whether it is a continuation of an ideological fraud.

To understand the development of views regarding the Central European trials means to understand the chain of deceptions perpetrated by the local Stalinist power elites. The first link in this chain is the Slánský trial itself (1952), a first-class fraud, despised by the non-communist majority of the nation as intensively as it was feared by the members of the *apparat.* The main illusion, created successfully for the apathetic masses and for the waning enthusiasm of the Party members, was the fabricated belief that the executed were the true culprits of the economic troubles. Antisemitic overtones helped to project the real guilt of the whole Politburo onto the eleven Jews who served as scapegoats. Here lay the rationale of the trial, its political logic, and ultimately a sort of cruel justice, because it was proved—for the first time—that the members of the power elite are not immune to the "blessing" of their own system.

In the second phase (1956–1963), the impact of Soviet liberalization made it necessary to revise this fiction and to replace it with a more acceptable one—the so-called "theory of the mill." Simply stated: Slánský created the mechanism of terror ("the mill") and then became its victim. This view, so close to Soviet denunciations of Stalin and Berija, was closer to the truth, but was not true, because even after a few rehabilitations, the trial did not cease to be a hot political issue. What was at stake was nothing less than the responsibility for at least eleven corpses, unfortunately corpses too prominent to be forgotten as victims of historical necessity, which would otherwise be the normal fate for less prominent non-Communist corpses. Such non-Communist figures would be eligible for political murder, but not for subsequent rehabilitation. The "theory of the mill" was based on the fiction of a nonpersonal terrorist power structure which liquidated itself and thus permitted avoiding the question of whether *other* people had participated in the mill as conscientiously as Slánský and the ten other Jews.

The critical year 1968 offered only a dubious way out of this blind alley. In a sudden migraine of "reason and conscience," the Central Committee of the Communist Party decorated the previous traitors, reinstated the corpses in the Party, absolved them of any guilt, and created mythical "martyrs" from previous "criminals." The same corpses who were posing on the historical stage as arch-villains, as malicious millmen, and finally as heroes, were subjected to the final act of a historical fraud. This was, of course, politically as useful for the new leadership as the fiction of high treason had been in 1952. Enlivened by the macabre spirit of corpses, the leadership was ready to play dead when the tanks were coming. For this particular reason, Piller's report does not tell us the whole truth, but only creates a new stage in the development of a myth; it offers an ideological model, so dear to the self-deception of the bureaucracy. Piller's report is an exculpation of the power elite confronted with its own "reason and conscience" (if any), not confronted with the nation's consciousness; it is a new ideological interpretation (false consciousness) of history, which is no better than it was twenty years ago. But the full circle is closed, and a possibility for the truth appears—along with the possibility of the downfall of the whole ideology which presented quite logically different perspectives, because this trick of polymorphous meaning is the essence of every false consciousness, of every ideology.

The report is much closer to the truth than any previous interpretation of the trials and is a tremendous step forward in explaining totalitarian dictatorship; it is an undeniable success of the representatives of the Czechoslovak Communist Party on the way toward *their own* self-understanding as criminals. This unpleasant knowledge is a good reason for the remaining collaborators under the current Husák leadership to refuse to play such a dangerous game with the falsified falsifications and to keep quiet. This is correct, because behind the seeming puzzles of the trials, the key question emerges—the meaning and aims of the Soviet occupation of Central Europe. And this is *the* puzzle—not only for Central Europeans. After so many modifications of Stalinist frauds, do we—Central Europeans, occupied by the Soviets and enjoying the complete apathy of the world—do we need a democratic, socialist revolution to know the truth about the trials, about ourselves, and about Europe? Does the truth prevail?

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Alienation and the Soviet Economy. Toward a General Theory of Marxian Alienation, Organizational Principles, and the Soviet Economy. By Paul Craig Roberts. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1971. Pp. x, 121. $6.00.)

His dislike of Marxism has not led Professor Roberts to take its doctrines lightly. If anything, he treats them *too* seriously. For Roberts, as for some others today, Marxism is primarily about alienation. But unlike those (most recently, e.g., Ollman and Weiskopf) who sympathetically explain Marxian *entfremdung* in philosophic categories, the author—quotations from "young Marx" notwithstanding—leans toward the more prosaic *Das Kapital.* In this polemic interpretation, estrangement (in its several aspects: man from product, labor, himself, and others) is simply epiphenomenal to commodity production. Probably only true *cognoscenti* can fully appreciate such subtleties, occupying nearly one-fourth of the book; however, the corollaries that follow are more mundane.

Socialism, Roberts insists, was to overcome alienation by producing for use rather than for markets. Capital and exploitation were of course to disappear as well, he concedes, but the freedom from "commodity fetishism" was to be at the heart of the better order envisaged by Marx. By the same token, Roberts says, socialist planning was to dispense with all paraphernalia of a commodity-producing economy: prices, money and the like.

As the author construes it (mainly through "textual exegesis" of assorted statements by Lenin et al.), the so-called War Communism in Russia of 1919–21 was a deliberate attempt to carry out such a design. That fascinating post-revolutionary episode, and its catastrophic finale in Kronstadt, is thus perceived as a mere "product of Marxian ideas." Rival views (of Carr, Dobb, etc.) emphasizing improvisation under the dictates of a civil war are dismissed as *ex post* rationalization.

Furthermore, Roberts contends that the collapse of early communistic experiments has once and for all demonstrated the utopian impracticality of Marxist aspirations and has put an end to attempts to abolish commodity production in the Soviet Union. Despite appearances and equivocations, the Soviet economy —just like our own—has been commodity-producing, according to the author. And organizationally, it has remained polycentric. Hence, Roberts stresses time and again that the Soviet economy *is not* and *cannot be* planned, even though, obviously and to its detriment, it can be deprived of the advantages of a price system and a suitable legal (property rights) framework.

This point is cardinal, and Roberts bolsters it theoretically. Direct planning of production-for-use, he argues, requires a hierarchical organization. But the informational and decisional capacity of a hierarchy has limits that render it impracticable in complex economies. In consequence, a pseudo-hierarchy that can hardly conceal the polycentric reality of the Soviet economy provides the organizational setting for Soviet pseudo-planning. Inefficiencies and other irrationalities are the price of this sham that has been superimposed on commodity production.

The "organizational theorem" about the impossibility of (true) socialist planning is original with Michael Polanyi, to whom the book is duly dedicated. The restatement by Roberts serves as a postscript to historic controversies—an intended Q.E.D. for the Mises-Hayek thesis of four decades ago. The conclusion is that the old doubts about the economics of socialism have after all been correct, and are vindicated by *theory* as well as practice.

It is at this juncture that the "economic theory of socialism" of Lange comes into play. Roberts maintains that the celebrated contribution has only obfuscated the original problem by shifting attention from traditional socialist goals—production-for-use—to efficiency and equilibrium. Yet, since the latter goals were to be attained through simulation of the market process, Lange too, far from disproving the doubters, had in effect confirmed the impracticability of planning, emphasizes Roberts. Naturally, the recent market-oriented reforms in Eastern Europe are adduced as additional historical support for this thesis.

Wide in thematic range and diverse in epistemological stances, this book defies classification. It is not so much "interdisciplinary" as "transdisciplinary"—that is above, and even *beyond* academic specialization. This quality is refreshing but may also explain the "wall of dogmatism" that Roberts reportedly encountered when he "first expressed interest in the ideas developed in this book" (p. viii).

In spite of a little mathematics and a few diagrams, the intellectual genre of *Alienation and the Soviet Economy* can perhaps be best described as "idealistic historiosophy." As Roberts himself puts it, his "book traces the development and unfolding of a germinal idea as it moves from an abstract category into the consciousness of men and culminates in history" (p. ix).

Ideas alone, however, even when held by dictators can hardly explain history. To maintain—as Roberts does in reinterpreting War Communism—that "consciousness" determines "material conditions" is no more tenable than the opposite belief of historical materialism. More probably, as Nove suggests (*An Economic History of the USSR,* p. 48) "there was a process of *interaction* between circumstances and ideas." Unfortunately, the author is so hypnotized by Marxian doctrine that he cannot even conceive of such eclectic notions.

A proclivity toward pure doctrine and "speculative excess" lead the author astray in other matters too. Only obsessive preoccupation with universals—Marxian and other—could have prevented him from seeing the Soviet economy as hierarchically organized and planned. Clearly, in denying this, Roberts is fighting (definitional) windmills instead of coping with the realities of an *incomplete* hierarchy and *bad* planning.

In general, the empirico-factual content of the book is quite thin, presumably reflecting the intellectual bent of the author. It is regrettable that the self-imposed doctrinal blinders so narrow Roberts' vision that he pays very little attention to such fundamental problems of the Soviet economy as the lopsided priorities, the inadequate pricing, and the perverse incentives. Likewise, he has nothing to say about the Soviet bureaucracy. That omission is especially baneful for a book on *Alienation and the Soviet Economy.*

Yet, despite the book's many deficiencies (only the most important are mentioned here), Roberts *is* right in some most important respects. For one thing, nowhere in the Soviet Union and countries of the Soviet bloc have the regimes lived up to the loftier socialist aspirations. Indeed, absorbed in power politics and the first-things-first of industrialization, they have all but given up the pretense of even trying. Imponderables are out, it seems. On a less elevated plane, economic shortcomings (allocative inefficiency, technological lag, inadequate consumption, etc.) are manifest too, and, just as Roberts points out, apparently cannot be overcome within the system. Thus are vindicated the skeptics and pessimists of various hues—Mises-Hayek, Polanyi, Popper, and others.

Roberts may be wrong in believing that the socialist movement historically concerned itself above all with the abolition of commodity production; as a matter of fact, the socialist creed always stressed struggle against "exploitation" and "injustice." He nevertheless correctly appraises the present situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe where "even the simulacrums of socialism vanish" (p. 107).

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The Cultural Revolution in China. Edited by Thomas W. Robinson. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. Pp. 525. $13.50.)

Those who followed the unfolding events of the Cultural Revolution in China will find this book informative. Originally, these studies were independently conducted without a common theme by five young staff members and consultants of the Rand Corporation, yet as the editor notes in his introductory chapter, they make coherent reading and shed much light on the Cultural Revolution.

In Chapter 2, "Power, Policy, and Ideology in the Making of the Chinese Cultural Revolution," William F. Dorrill traces the seeds, the precipitating factors, and the development of the conflict. In a most readable style, Dorrill documents the historical sequence of important intra-Party debates and conflicts in 1956–66, covering such events as the industrialization and collectivization debate of 1956, the Hundred Flowers campaign of 1957, the Great Leap Forward of 1958, the adjustments in 1959–62, the Socialist Education Movement and other campaigns in 1963–65, and finally, the initial phase of the Cultural Revolution. Despite some disagreements over these vital issues, the leadership, by and large, went along with Mao before 1959. It was at the 1959 Lushan Conference where P'eng Teh-huai challenged Mao's leadership that the Party faced a serious crisis. After this Conference, Mao gradually stepped down from the first line of policy operation. From the Tenth Plenum in 1962, however, he reasserted his authority through a series of campaigns. But the more he tried to revive ideological fervor, the more he ran into clashes with the Party leadership; at last he confronted the whole Party apparatus in the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, the author concludes that the Cultural Revolution was a conflict over ideology and basic behavioral orientation (p. 111).

In Chapter 3, "Maoist Theories of Policy Making and Organization," Harry Harding, Jr. looks upon the Cultural Revolution as a conflict of two different conceptions of policy making and organization. This is a new attempt in Chinese studies in that it conceptualizes two normative models of policy making. Harding classifies policy making into four categories, depending on the degree of mass participation and the relative use of pragmatic and dogmatic criteria: pragmatic mass line-dogmatic mass line; pragmatic elitist-dogmatic elitist. The dogmatic mass line holds that every problem has a single "correct" solution; policy making here is less a choice than a diagnosis of the correct solution. By contrast, the pragmatic mass line holds that there are several solutions for every problem; policy making here involves choice and compromise. For "questions of principle" such as ideology and the Party line, both Mao and Liu adhere to the dogmatic mass line; but for "questions of purely practical matter," Liu advocates the pragmatic mass line. Mao insists on applying the mass line to all issues and rejects any elitist approach; Mao "post-selects the model after the results of the competition are in" whereas Liu "preselects the model as the locus of planned experimentation" (p. 133). Mao sees no goal of the Party other than what he authorizes as its leader; Liu believes all leaders should operate within the Party. For control, Mao resorts to ideological campaigns and Liu to organizational instruments. For recruitment, Mao stresses class background and Liu technical skills. Maoist organizational principles were reflected in the Revolutionary Committees and the 1969 Party Constitution both of which stressed simplified structures and the merger of state, Party and military functions into one organization.

Thomas Robinson focuses on one man and his "political style" in Chapter 4, "Chou En-lai and the Cultural Revolution in China." This is a biographical study of Chou En-lai's leadership during the Cultural Revolution. Chou took a cautious attitude toward conflicts attendant on the Cultural Revolution by waiting until Mao eventually emerged triumphant. His style was always to secure his political position and then to face the issues before him, yet he was not a fence-sitter but an active "go-between." Chou first endorsed Red Guard activities and then attempted to restrain their excesses. After the January Revolution engulfed the country, his influence in supervising the power-seizure struggles rapidly grew. Through speeches and meetings, he urged the Red Guards and the Rebels to carry out revolution and production simultaneously; in the meantime, he also tried to keep the State Council from collapsing. After the military was actively involved, Chou mediated many conflicts between regional military commands and Red Guards, most conspicuously in the Wuhan incident (the portion of the chapter dealing with this incident has been previously published in the *China Quarterly*). After this incident, Chou's attention gradually shifted to foreign affairs. In comparison to Mao and Lin Piao, Chou is more persuasive, gradualist and conformist, always moving with the political tide. He lacks Mao's charisma, but in the author's view, his stature will rise even after Mao dies.

Melvin Gurtov discusses one particular bureaucracy, the foreign ministry, in Chapter 5, "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs in the Chinese Cultural Revolution" (this chapter also has been published in the *China Quarterly*). Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi was much more outspoken and straightforward than Chou; he defended his ministry and its professional staff by supporting work teams against the rising Red Guard groups. When he came under violent attack, however, he needed Chou's protection, though he did engage in self-criticism. Most revealing in this chapter is the analysis of the take-over of the ministry by a radical group under Wang Li and Yao Tengshan in August, 1967. Gurtov suggests that Cultural Revolution activities in Burma and Cambodia were largely initiated by local embassy personnel over whom Peking lost control at one time. What was at issue in the Cultural Revolution, then, was the implementation of foreign policy rather than the onset of a new revolutionary policy; hence the period under study represented an aberration.

In the last Chapter, "The Cultural Revolution in the Coutryside: Anatomy of Limited Rebellion," Richard Baum describes the Red Guard and Rebel movements in the countryside. It is a detailed statement of the interactions between the Center's policies and the local responses. Initially, the Center relied upon provincial and local authorities for leading the Revolution and for keeping rural production going; Party officials then mobilized Red Guards from suburban areas to counter those from urban areas. Despite the repeated warnings from the Center, many latent rural discontents found their outlets in the struggle against local power-holders. The Army's intervention in the internecine conflicts aggravated factional strife, for the Army usually supported conservative groups. To cope with this situation, the Center allowed the Army to use force, and Mao also championed worker-peasant-soldier supervision of the Red Guards. Finally, Baum presents a quantitative analysis of Red Guard movements in about three hundred communes and brigades. These units were affected by the Cultural Revolution at a relatively early stage, and the proximity to urban centers and to transportation was the most crucial factor in determining the effects of the Revolution.

Not only for the new facts but also for some fresh approaches it provides, this book is a significant contribution to the study of Chinese politics. The five chapters are all perceptively written. One common thread is their dynamic explanation of political process; this emphasis represents a departure from the concern with doctrines, structures, and local cases which characterized previous studies. Another virtue of the book is that each chapter reveals an increasing degree of sophistication and specialization in methodology and areas which will be of special interests to students of China.

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Australian Federalism in the Courts. By Geoffrey Sawer. (Melbourne: University Press, 1968. Pp. 262. $7.30.)

Professor Geoffrey Sawer is a consummately skilled expositor, and this, indubitably, is quite the best introduction to the judicial interpretation of the Australian federal constitution that has been written. Whether he is discussing the logical style of the High Court (Supreme Court in the U.S.), or the techniques and impact of judicial review, or federalism as a legal principle, he has a remarkable capacity to demystify the mystical and to illuminate the esoteric without recourse to esoteric language. His preferred taste is to call a spade a bloody spade instead of an agricultural implement, yet he does this in a manner that is graced with wit and wisdom. He believes that "this account of Australian constitutional law will serve the general reader and the non-legal student of Australian government, as well as providing an introduction to the subject for the law student and a refresher course for the practitioner" (p. v). This is certainly correct. But if it is either modesty or deference that forbids Professor Sawer from extending his claim, then let it be plainly said that the members of the High Court will profit no less from the reading of this excellent study.

A federal constitution, whatever else it is about, is singularly about political power. It is born out of the needs of mortal men, and the smell of their predicaments and their aspirations fills every word of their deed. The problem for all western constitutional systems which seek to insulate judicial from political practice in the settlement of disputes is how to exorcise *homo politicus* from *homo juridicus?*

Doubtless some constitutional systems do this better than others. In Australia, two preventive devices are used. In the first place, its judiciary is socialized in the aseptic style of common law jurisprudence. Its apprentices like Platonic guardians are nurtured in the discipline of logic, inference, conceptual analysis and the holy virtues of *stare decisis*. Above all its rules of construction are designed to draw meaning from the black letter of the law rather than the socially relevant and the politically expeditious. "The barristers' tradition," writes Sawer

> includes a strong belief in the possibility of legal interpretation and development by logical inference

> from principles and rules, a jurisprudence of concepts, and in the existence of a sharp distinction between legal methods of thought on the one hand and those associated with politics and government administration on the other . . . (p. 52).

A second method of prophylaxis is obtained through the absence of constitutional guarantees comparable with those in the first ten and the fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution. By removing the Australian judiciary from the temptation, indeed necessity, of baring their ideological souls on issues of civil liberties, it is far easier for the High Court to retain its juridical purity and political virginity. Indeed, Sawer's chapter on "The Freedoms" is mostly preoccupied with the interpretation of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of interstate trade; but this piece of human freedom, however precious to the national corporation, can hardly excite the latter-day civil libertarians.

How effective is the depoliticization of the High Court? Obviously men cannot be totally divorced from their values, and High Court judgments abound in judicial parapraxes. However complex the insulation, a little politics seeps through. The principal escape outlets are the plasticity of the constitutional language and the limitations of formal logic. They operate in tandem. To begin with "Powers given to governments" as Sawer notes (p. 199) "have a low degree of identity and identifiability; they are abstractions denoted by general, vague, often ambiguous and obscure phrases which have a wide range of possible meanings." The result is that where there is ambiguity, logic can neither force meaning nor arbitrate between different premises. This the whole man must do, and in this process *homo politicus* emerges. As Sawer points out (p. 196) ". . . courts concerned with constitutional review internalize, and turn into legal doctrine, the broad social assumptions which the judges, or the more aggressive and influential judges, use as express or tacit premises for their reasoning."

Even so, the Court's record in holding politics at arms length is impressive. So much so that it matters little, according to Sawer (p. 74), whether a judicial appointee is the nominee of party A or party B, for the ideological difference between all or nearly all the High Court justices is in practice immaterial. There have been, 'tis true, a few transparent political appointments to the Court, but the few have not worshipped at one altar. Conservatives have behaved as socialists and socialists as conservatives. Federalists have behaved as centralists and centralists as federalists. For a former Attorney-General strong in his federal beliefs and conservative attachments to pronounce as a High Court Judge that the federal power to tax cannot be limited even though it might destroy the states is objectivity indeed.

Does this situation content all spectators and players? Hardly! There are divers malcontents, and they complain of divers things. Some complain that the Court is excessively depoliticized, some that it is excessively politicized; some that it is excessively rigid, some that it is excessively flexible. They complain at times of want of principled decisions in the Court, or of want of consistency; they accuse the Court of compounding ambiguity and of entertaining false values. Sawer himself, a self-confessed centralist (p. 197) is critical of the Court in many of these directions. But in his concluding chapter, "Evaluation" he displays the wisdom of Tevye, who defined his world through the dialectic of two hands: On the one hand there is a group of experienced jurists who seek to keep faith with their juridical vows, and on the other hand there is the ceaseless pressure of competing policies and changing times. That the Court takes refuge in conventional legal reasoning is as Tevye would say "not a shame," for as Sawer points out, ". . . no legal system can operate without a considerable body of concepts, rules and standards having a fair degree of rigidity, and it is a mistake to imagine that any legal tribunals in the world, even constitutional tribunals manage to operate without them" (p. 197). And certainly the Court need feel no guilt if it sometimes displeases Caesar. What is notable in Sawer's eyes (p. 89) is that "there has never been a time in Australian federalism when the outlook of the High Court was in full accord with the prevailing political trend." Thus when the political trend has been centralist, the Court has been federalist, and when the Court has been centralist, the political trend has been federalist. In the view of some this is a regrettable tendency, and I suspect that Sawer is in this camp. However, if one holds faith, as I do, with a system of complex checks and balances then, in Eddie Cantor's language, it is a perfect combination.

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Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil. By Philippe C. Schmitter. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1971. Pp. 499. $15.00.)

During the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, comparative politics of the developing areas was considered one of the most dynamic areas of political science. In this period, empirical data and theoretical considerations based on the Latin American experience, however, were only marginally integrated into the core body of the literature. This was unfortunate, because Latin America, as the most developed part of the underdeveloped world, often presents the only area where longitudinal, quantitative data are available to test and refine many of the hypotheses concerning the relationship between socioeconomic mobilization and political change. Just as important, the "autarchic" bias found in so many of the studies of Afro-Asian countries would have been mitigated by greater consideration of the problems of the "penetrated" political system and "delayed-dependent" development that have evolved in Latin America.

It is true that area studies are on the wane, owing to the largely valid assessment that they are theoretically impoverished. I am making no brief for parochial area studies when I assert, however, that the knowledge about new and complex systems that has been generated in the last decade now presents a great opportunity for a much-needed comparative analysis of different patterns of development sequences. Professor Schmitter's *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil* is an important book that begins to grasp this opportunity. It is one of the handful of methodologically and conceptually sophisticated books to have been written about Latin American politics. More important, it represents a genuine contribution to comparative politics.

The intellectual starting point of his work is the attempt to assess the different types of possible relationships that exist between societal development and interest groups. Much of the literature on interest groups implicitly follows the classic liberal-pluralist model, which assumes that as a society becomes more complex, interest groups will grow both horizontally and vertically, and in the process of differentiation will become increasingly autonomous, assertive, and powerful in the policy-making process. Schmitter set out to evaluate whether this model accurately described the process in Brazil, or whether it would be useful to conceptualize and document the dynamics of alternative interest group patterns.

The author's imaginative and resourceful research strategy for studying this problem was richly, and I think rightly, eclectic. Schmitter compiled extensive qualitative and aggregate data on the historical pattern of emergence of interest groups in Brazil, culled the increasingly rich social science literature written by Brazilians for relevant interpretations, carried out a standard interview schedule of 53 items with key leaders of more than a quarter of the national representative associations, and administered a pretested political-culture questionnaire to interest representatives and to three important control groups—namely, higher civil servants, university students, and trade-union leader trainees.

The interest group pattern that emerged from these rich data did not conform to the classic model. The 1930–1965 period of economic growth did see a growth of interest groups, but the survey data from two of the presumed "targets" of demands—congressmen and civil servants—indicate that neither group perceived interest groups as either assertive or powerful in policy making. Schmitter's independent examination of policy outcomes supports this assessment. Data from the political culture survey administered to employers and interest group leaders reveal that these groups, which most interest-group theorists, whether Marxist or liberal-pluralists, would assume to be sharply differentiated, in fact had remarkably similar political and economic attitudes. Instead of development producing interest groups that were autonomous and assertive, Schmitter's data indicate that in Brazil, despite substantial development, interest groups are dependent, co-opted, and weak.

One of the key variables examined by Schmitter to explain the evolution of this semicorporatist pattern is the *sequence* of development. In the liberal-pluralist model, economic differentiation occurs first, and voluntary interest groups arise to organize and finance themselves autonomously in order to assert their claims against other groups and against the government. In Brazil, before substantial economic development took place, the government peremptorily co-opted latent interest groups by granting them special financial, legal, and consultation "privileges," which later inhibited the evolution toward political autonomy. The dynamics of this co-option process are particularly well documented by Schmitter. The second key explanatory variable analyzed by the author is political culture. He has employed an array of historical, interview, and survey data in an attempt to demonstrate that the compromising style of interest group development was congruent with the "operational code" with which aspirant political actors were "encultured" as they learned how to participate in the Brazilian political system.

A work as rich, long, and ambitious as this almost always opens itself up to some criticism.

In his effort to demonstrate comprehensively that Brazilian interest groups do not conform to the liberal-pluralist pattern, Schmitter overwhelms the reader with detail, and his prose at times is dense. His 45-page chapter on the emergence of interest groups is truly, in Schmitter's own words, an "annotated directory," and might well have been condensed.

The author's comparative and bibliographic frame of reference is impressively broad when he is considering the traditional literature on pluralist interest groups. However since one of the most original and important aspects of the book is his analysis of neocorporatism in Brazil, I would have welcomed a more extended discussion of important documents and theoretical analyses of corporatism as a generic political system. More comparative material drawn from other important late-industrializing systems, such as Mexico's, which also has a neocorporatist interest-group structure, would have been rewarding. Indeed, reading Schmitter's work on the neocorporatist style of a late-developing country made this reader speculate about whether the emerging interest-group style in the postindustrial, managed economies, such as in England, will not tend also towards the neocorporatist model. Certainly, this is the thrust of Samuel H. Beer's excellent study *British Politics in the Collectivist Age.*

To conclude, Professor Schmitter has written a stimulating book that will be read with profit by scholars interested in political culture, interest group theory, and neocorporatism.

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Interest Groups in Soviet Politics. Edited by H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. Pp. 433. $12.50.)

This important book is the first major attempt to assess whether interest group approaches can contribute to our understanding of Soviet politics. The coeditors do not agree in their evaluations, and each defends his views in light of the other's criticisms.

Franklyn Griffiths, in a stimulating theoretical essay, insists that group politics cannot be fruitfully studied in isolation from the larger policy-making processes of which they are a part. The focus on policy making leads Griffiths to reject Truman's subsystem-dominant view of group politics, to distinguish sharply between similar behavior and reified interest groups, and to come very close to discarding the concept of "interest." Unlike those who move easily from the term "opinion grouping" to "political *interest*-grouping," Griffiths seems to sense the important conceptual differences between "opinions" and "interests," and the vagueness and variability of the terms "self-interest" and "group interest." Griffiths analyzes instead "tendencies of articulation," "political expectations," and "information communicated." These he considers vital elements of the policy-making process, and, following Bentley, concludes that "issues rather than groups, the process of tendency conflict on these issues rather than the conflict of structures invested with purposes and power of their own" (p. 372) are the most fruitful focus for study.

Gordon Skilling acknowledges the cogency of some of Griffiths's arguments, but rejects the implication that approaches other than Griffiths's are likely to prove unprofitable or misdirected. For Skilling an "interest" or a "demand" group exists when *common expressed attitudes lead to common expressed claims,* most probably by "loose associations of individuals" rather than by organized aggregates (pp. 27–30). Interest group approaches can add to our understanding of Soviet politics, Skilling believes, because broad occupational categories "*may* have certain common interests . . . and *may* press upon the top rulers demands consonant with these interests," and because "opinion groups" within these occupational categories "*may* be identified" (p. 25). Skilling suggests that study of "demand" groups and "groups in strategic location" may be a good way to learn more about policy making. Skilling stresses that interest group activity is not the only or even the most important aspect of Soviet politics, but contends that group approaches are of considerable heuristic value, and that Soviet experience may "eventually contribute to a more solidly based general theory of group politics" (pp. 23, 413).

The seven case studies clarify but do not resolve these questions. Because the contributors employ the term "interest group" in various ways, Skilling's hypotheses are only moderately confirmed. Because none of the authors systematically utilizes Griffiths's "tendency analysis," the fruitfulness of his approach is not convincingly demonstrated. And because important kinds of data were simply not available, this entire project is a pioneering rather than a definitive study.

Jerry Hough's first-rate essay judiciously uses some of Bentley's ideas to illuminate the behavior of regional and national party *apparatchiki.* Hough's data and arguments forcefully refute many assertions by Almond and Powell, and seriously challenge the views of leading Soviet specialists who have tended to reify "the party" and its apparatus officials. By carefully distinguishing among different issues and by focusing on the appropriations process, Hough also gives substance to the concept of "interest." He stresses the real and potential cleavages among regional and central party *apparatchiki,* and concludes that Sovietologists should study closely relationships and coalition building among political interest groups. Because group theorists have not focused on political initiatives emanating from within party and state bureaucracies, or on one-party systems where elite officials generating policy recommendations often can be removed from their positions by those upon whom they make "demands" and "claims," Hough's conscious effort to relate his findings to a comparative theory of interest groups is most welcome.

Richard Judy's chapter on Soviet economists is also impressive. The focus is on policy making and issues, the data are fresh, and the term "interest" is avoided. Indeed, Judy presents a vivid illustration of political leaders making demands on an "interest group," not vice versa. Since 1955 CPSU leaders have sought greater practical assistance and advice from economists with different mathematical training and institutional ties. Scientists, engineers, and technologists—not economists—prodded party leaders into initiating revolutionary reforms in Soviet economics and economic policy making. This not only points to the importance of relationships among interest groups, but to the key role of the President of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences and others who filter and channel major research proposals from top policy-making bodies to the scientific and economic communities, and vice versa. Judy's evidence underscores the significance of "invited opinion group activity," and suggests that some policy recommendations may indeed be motivated by what T. H. Rigby terms "a more or less *disinterested* concern for the national interest." In short, Judy informs us about the nature of the "groups" involved, their access to and relations with decision makers, and their power vis-à-vis the political elite.

The essays by Barry and Berman on the jurists, Kolkowicz on the military, Hardt and the late Theodore Frankel on the industrial managers, Barghoorn on the security police, and the late Ernest Simmons on the writers are all solid contributions, although they vary considerably in the extent to which they attempt to utilize interest group approaches. Barry and Berman stress intergroup rather than intragroup conflict, and the reader may be left with the impression that the "psychological and sociological cohesion" of Soviet jurists extends into the realm of policy preferences more than it does. Hardt and Frankel emphasize both the cohesiveness and potential divisions among industrial managers, but tend, like several authors, to equate greater intragroup communication and interaction with greater articulation of common interests. Kolkowicz is keenly aware that group solidarity and conflict depend on the issue, yet, with a Bentleyan or policy-making approach, he might have assessed more fully the military's important role in strategic and foreign policy formulation. Barghoorn's assignment was especially difficult because of the paucity of information about the security police, and, even with fresh *samizdat* sources, it is doubtful that he could have answered the many questions he would have liked to. Simmons, a distinguished literary scholar, does not analyze thoroughly many topics of interest to political scientists.

In short, Soviet leaders in recent years have invited more constructive criticism and more has been offered, solicited and unsolicited, from within the party and state bureaucracies, and from established professional, military, technical, scientific, and academic institutions and groups. How, why, and to what extent these articulations influence policy decisions are of course the important questions, and ones we do not know much about.

To date interest group approaches have added little to our understanding of these phenomena. With the possible exception of the Hough and Judy essays, it is not readily apparent that a group approach helped any of the distinguished contributors to organize data more "usefully" or to acquire new insights into Soviet politics. Since interest group analysis is nothing new in political science and has many critics, one may wonder whether Soviet specialists are not once again a decade or so behind their discipline.

But, as Hough has emphasized elsewhere, the Brezhnev-Kosygin era has brought significant changes in relations between the top party leaders and the major institutions in Soviet society. Though it is perhaps an exaggeration to speak of the policy makers' "deference to the top specialized officials," "the devolution of power to the major institutional centers," and the leadership's role as "a broker mediating the competing claims of powerful interests" (Hough, "The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism?" *Problems of Communism,* March-April 1972, pp. 32, 33, 37 ff.), the Soviet political system is clearly evolving in this direction. Indeed, Barry and Berman assert that "the leadership has recognized that its own authority can best be maintained if various groups are given more leeway to pursue independently the general interests of society" (p. 293).

What this suggests is significant: Because of the changing nature of the Soviet polity, interest group approaches may increasingly help us to understand the Soviet political system of the mid- and late 1970s, and Sovietologists may find it less and less difficult to contribute to comparative interest group theory. Policy-making approahces may also become increasingly valuable. This too may result largely from changes in the Soviet polity—particularly the gradual decentralization of decision making and initiative, the greater availability of information about certain kinds of policy making, and the many different viewpoints publicly expressed about national policy issues.

In sum, Skilling and Griffiths have conceived a book that every serious student of Soviet politics should read and reflect upon.

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Gewaltlose Politik und kulturelle Vielfalt: Hypothesen entwickelt am Beispiel der Schweiz. By Jürg Steiner. (Bern and Stuttgart: Verlag Paul Haupt, 1970. Pp. 365. 48 Swiss Francs.)

Switzerland: From Roman Times to the Present. By William Martin. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 335. $10.00.)

For comparative theorists, Switzerland is a fascinating deviant case which is not easily pigeonholed into neat, classificatory schemes, nor readily analyzed, for want of accessible data. According to most contemporary theory, it is a country which, by virtue of its multiple cleavages along linguistic, religious, and regional dimensions and its luxuriant multipartyism, ought to show signs of considerable instability; yet, in defiance of these empirical postulates, it has one of the longest histories of internal peace among Western European polities. Thus, these two recent publications are welcome additions to the scant literature on Switzerland, not only because both bring new data to bear on old theories (or old data to bear on new theories), but also because both seem animated by a healthy, iconoclastic spirit.

Steiner directs his analysis to the elaboration of a set of hypotheses intended to explain the relatively high level of nonviolent conflict resolution practised at nearly all levels of Swiss political life. His work is inspired by Lijphart's concept of "consociational" democracy and Lembruch's notions of *proporz* democracy, and it tries to define these concepts operationally. The explicit aim is to construct a systematic empirical theory, to the extent that Steiner advances 149 "observational propositions" (*Beobachtungssätze*) as evidence for hypotheses stipulated a priori. The evidence mustered in support of these hypotheses is derived not only from a critical examination of the literature and hitherto relatively inaccessible survey findings, but also from the author's participant observations of decision making within the Swiss radical party. On the basis of this necessarily spotty, heteroclite collection of "observational" data, Steiner is led to conclude that the low level of manifest violence (and conflict) in Swiss political life is "explained" by: (1) a pronounced tendency among Swiss elites to make unanimous, collegial decisions (*amicabilis compositio*), to shun public visibility, and to avoid direct conflict; (2) a high density of intermediate, overlapping groups which tie citizens into the body politic; and (3) a number of institutional mechanisms, in particular referenda and initiatives, which allow for the expression of political discontent. The analysis is concluded with the elaboration of a model which tries to tie these hypotheses together into a single theory.

Steiner's work is thus a laudable departure from conventional comparative series. In placing a single case within the context of a larger body of disparate, theoretical speculation, the study is truly comparative. Yet this attention to verification of a general theory (applicable, so it seems, only to this single case) runs a two fold risk in treating the data—over-interpretation, on the one hand, and cursory examination, on the other. An excellent chapter on interest articulation through the political parties, for example, is marred by a predilection to conclude that voters for the major parties overlap in social characteristics (occupation, language, religion, and professional affiliations), whereas, in fact, the evidence presented shows strong differences by religiosity, urban-rural splits, and (to a lesser extent) occupation. Case studies of two decisions taken by the radical party add some insight into party decision-making processes, but scarcely constitute hard evidence for subsequent generalizations made in the conclusion and certainly do not merit the enumeration of 41 propositions. For a general theory that puts much stock in Kornhauser's hypotheses about the importance of intermediary groups to stable democratic societies, thirteen pages on Swiss interest and professional groups and on the mass media are clearly inadequate, even if these cursory observations are raised to the level of scientific findings in 32 concluding propositions. While, in his position as a full-time civil servant, the author took considerable pains to study two decisions on federal aid to higher education, it is questionable whether this (unavoidable) choice of policy domains is strong support for hypotheses about "noncompetitive" patterns of Swiss political decision making. More controversial issues such as social security benefit programs, conscientious objection, or the Jura question would probably reveal a very different pattern. Finally, to observe that the electorate appears to be poorly informed about political life is scarcely appropriate evidence to support the proposition that decision-making processes are hidden from public view.

In short, the theoretical whole is much greater than the sum of its empirical parts. Indeed, the general model offered in guise of a conclusion comprises several variables for which neither operational definitions, nor empirical data, were presented earlier in the text. It is nonetheless much to Steiner's credit and to the benefit of comparative scholars that by making a virtue of scientific formulation, he has made available for verification a number of new, testable hypotheses.

Whereas Steiner highlights the self-regulating, homeostatic properties of contemporary Swiss political processes to the extent that they almost appear as self-encapsulating, William Martin's short, iconoclastic history of Switzerland shows the flip side of a political development ridden by conflict from within and without. It is iconoclastic precisely because it casts considerable doubt on the national myth which portrays at once the cooperative pattern of internal politics and the venerable principle of Swiss neutrality as enduring qualities of Swiss political leadership. What is seen instead is a quarrelsome people strongly divided along religious and town-country lines and prone to internal strife. Moreover, it is Martin's opinion that the Swiss did not consciously, nor willingly, move toward political unification, but rather that they had unification, as well as neutrality, thrust upon them by the major powers, notably at the Congress of Vienna. It was as much a question of "either we hang together, or we hang separately" as it was of being "condemned to live together."

In particular, Martin shows how the mutual alliance pacts contracted among the early separate states grew into closer political bonds in response to the continuously shifting power relations within the Austrian Empire. The continuous effect of French influence and later interference in Swiss political development is also clearly shown, especially through the liberalizing impact of the French Revolution. The surge of protest by peasants and urban workers against the patriciate in mid-eighteenth century is seen as culminating, under the combined effect of internal social change and French influence, in the cantonal constitutional reforms adopted in 1830–1832. These reforms ultimately led to the federal constitutional convention of 1848. There is also a remarkable chaper on the Reformation which shows the social origins of present-day religious borders as rooted in town-country conflicts, conflicts which persisted through the ninteenth century and threatened national unity in the Sonderbund civil war of 1847.

It is against this background of internal discord and constant external interference that Martin develops his last chapter on modern Switzerland for the period 1848–1914. In a final chapter, Pierre Béguin brings Martin's work up to 1970. These last two chapters are the most disappointing. Both author and rewrite man lapse into generalities of little use to social scientists in search of theoretical hunches or historical evidence. It is notably the origins of the party system which gets short shrift. The absence of citations and the inclusion of a wholly inadequate bibliography are also unforgivable editorial lapses.

Thus the narrow end in a historical "funnel of causality" suitable for interpreting Swiss political development is absent from both these works. It apparently is in the period from 1850 to 1950 that the origins of today's high level of political cooperation and stability in Switzerland are yet to be found. Since the pattern of noncompetitive politics observed by Steiner is not evident in preceding periods, this chapter of Swiss history deserves careful empirical examination.

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The Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Kosygin: The Transition Years. Edited by John W. Strong. (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1971. Pp. x, 277. $5.95, cloth; $3.95, paper.)

A product of a lecture series at Carleton University of Ottawa, this collection of fifteen essays on recent Soviet trends has little or no distinctively Canadian flavor. Eleven of the contributors are from the United States, three from Canada (all of Carleton), and the peripatetic Richard Lowenthal is here called on to represent Europe. Robert V. Daniels and Yaroslav Bilinsky in separate essays treat Soviet political affairs, mainly Party leadership. Khrushchev's fall is discussed by Abraham Brumberg, John N. Hazard surveys legal trends, and Frederick C. Barghoorn speculates on future political developments. Lowenthal's piece is on Soviet foreign policy, the subject also of Samuel L. Sharp's essay. Alexander Dallin traces developments in the world Communist movement. Joseph S. Berliner and Milton Kovner write on Soviet economic reform and foreign economic assistance, respectively. Thomas W. Wolfe discusses military policy, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone examines policies and problems regarding nationalities, and Bohdan Bociurkiw does the same on religion. Finally, there are two essays on Soviet literary politics, by Gleb Struve and George Roseme.

Since the book is not likely to have much appeal to other publics, it must be judged on its merits as a reader for college courses on Soviet politics or history. It could be used, for example, as a supplement to more general treatments which cannot go into detail on brief periods, such as the first three post-Khrushchev years treated in this volume. But the lag in publication detracts from the utility of the book: appearing in 1971, it has little material on events after mid-1968, and even references to the intervention in Czechoslovakia are not fully integrated into the text. Books such as this have a transient importance, and fully to earn their keep must follow close on the headlines. This one does not.

Nevertheless, the authors are well-known experts on Soviet affairs and experienced practitioners of the art of the survey. Most of them write clearly and succinctly, and thus provide students with a handy compilation of the views of leading North American specialists on recent Soviet developments. Happily, all but one of the authors focus on what has been happening in the USSR rather than on elaborating grandiose theoretical structures.

The volume suffers from a certain imbalance. Some of the essays are journalistic, others severely academic. Some are documented heavily, some not at all. Some (such as Gleb Struve's) are polemical, some bland. Variations in the kind and style of coverage seem to have been dictated more by the authors' preferences than by any editorial plan. The treatment of the Soviet economy illustrates the point. Joseph Berliner has a ten-page essay on Soviet economic reform, mostly very general. Even if the remarks are apt, they are not particularly concerned with the period 1965–68. In contrast, Milton Kovner has a rather detailed survey of Soviet economic aid to developing countries in the same period, replete with statistics and footnotes. Why the disparity? And why almost nothing on the Soviet economic policies, problems, and performance in the period? The latter omission is not easily forgivable if one believes that it was dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's economic management which was mainly responsible for the 1964 overturn. Nor is this the only section of the book where a potential student reader will find himself at one moment mired in detail and the next moment floating free of any anchor to concrete facts.

With fifteen authors there are certain to be variations of viewpoint, though these (with a few exceptions, e.g., Sharp's) fall well within the range of the orthodoxy established in the "Cold War" years. Prof. Strong asserts (pp. iii–v) that the writers avoid any national "bias," approach their topics "with an open mind," and are unhampered by ideological commitments." Perhaps, but only if one excludes from the notion of ideology the beliefs and values established in the United States and allied countries, including those dominating the corps of American Sovietologists.

One theme runs through a great majority of the contributions: the infamy, inefficiency, difficulties, and failures of the USSR and its leaders. The student reader may be persuaded that the USSR stumbles from crisis to failure with no successes on the scoreboard, just one fat zero after another. There is something wrong with this picture, even if all the details are correct. The fault stems from a failure to keep a sense of proportion about Soviet difficulties. While real enough, these have to be measured in some kind of comparative perspective (even in a study of the USSR alone) and by standards appropriate to the real world, not to a Utopian or heavenly state in which virtue, wisdom, and efficiency reign supreme. Compared with rival states and statesmen of the same period, did the USSR under the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership do so badly? If not paragons of wisdom and virtue on any absolute scale, their real-world rivals were LBJ and HHH in the U.S., Harold Wilson in the U.K., and Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao in China.

An excessive emphasis on difficulties affects even one of the best contributions to the volume, Alexander Dallin's solid account of the USSR's activities in the world Communist movement. Wittily averring (p. 194) that "one problem in discussing 'world communism' is that there is no such thing: the internationalism is specious and the communism undefined," Dallin proceeds to a perceptive discussion of the movement. One might quibble here and there with his version of events and trends, but the persistent conflict which he highlights cannot be denied. In terms of expectations of "proletarian solidarity," the Communist movement is a failure, and the failure has not been overcome under B and K. But the post-Khrushchev leaders had some successes as well, particularly in relationship to the Chinese. Moreover, Moscow could benefit from the activities of refractory CPs in other places, at least to the extent that these Parties succeeded in lessening American power and influence. The emphasis on difficulties is not, however, as detrimental to Dallin's essay as to some others in the book, which would have been a good deal better for students if more balanced on Soviet achievements and failures.

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African Elite: The Big Men of a Small Town. By Joan Vincent. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. Pp. 309. $11.00.)

Professor Vincent's study of Gondo, a small parish on the shores of Lake Kojweri in Teso, north of Lake Victoria in Uganda, extends anthropological field method to a polyethnic setting, and focuses on a small town (with a population, including periurban area, of 819 in 1966), not a rural area proper. It describes how a township of twenty different ethnic backgrounds was formed in the first two decades of the century when communications in the area were primarily by lake steamer, and Gondo's port seemed destined to be a center of government and trade; how the township was selected to be, in effect, one of the earliest exercises in colonial town planning, at last in East Africa, with the familiar racial segregation pattern; and then how the extension of the railway line to the north destroyed its strategic importance and left it to stagnate. Racial segregation disappeared because in the end there were practically no different races to segregate; instead there emerged a typical market center of sub-Saharan Africa, but one with the unusually diverse ethnic background created by its colonial origins.

In this situation, ethnic divisions were not compatible with tolerable community living, based utlimately on agricultural cooperation, and one of Dr. Vincent's main theses is that "tribalism" or "ethnicity," concepts which have played so large a part in the modern social science literature on Africa, can clearly be seen in such a context as Gondo for what they really are: i.e., just one among many possible statuses which an individual may select and activate or play down and ignore according to the demands of his situation. The low saliency of ethnicity in Gondo life is related to cooperation in farming, though also to the need for harmonious living generally in such a diverse community. The connection with land is basic, however, and a second theme of the book is the unhelpfulness of the "urban-rural" distinction in settings such as these, which are typical of most of those that can be called "urban" in Africa in this respect: only 12 per cent of Gondo's population are "non-users" of land and most of these "have kin or affines with land on whom they can rely" (p. 97) and so are not wholly dependent on nonfarm income. Professor Vincent remarks that her study supports the contention that land alone offers security in the present labor conditions of tropical Africa and this is indeed true. In Gondo very few of the wage-paid jobs provide all the necessities of local life, still fewer provide a living which by itself would yield prestige, and none afford long-term security. Even the Chief (incidentally not an "intermediary" figure but a frankly feared and hated representative of higher, outside authority) does not aim for status through his office but aims to "retire to his natal parish to play *there* the part of Big Man" (italics added, p. 54).

The first part of the book describes the historical/ecological/economic basis of Gondo, and the second describes the social structure and networks within the parish. Part 3 deals with the way Big Men convert status and influence into economic advantage through the cooperative farm system, and vice versa, and the nature and function of the elite which they represent. They are not office-holders in any formal administrative-political hierarchy, except in traditional and elective mediating and representational roles. They are rather a "strategic elite" (p. 1). Professor Vincent found that the citizens had little difficulty in agreeing on "the ten Big Men in Gondo," who had varying mixtures of economic resources and other sources of status which entitled them to deference and authority in the area, supported by a "satellite elite" (p. 251) of influentials within subareas of the parish. The elite is strategic in the sense that it makes decisions, both individually and collectively, which determine the way the local community will accommodate "outside" pressures for change. Professor Vincent sees them as the "cutting edge of societal change" (p. 254), being the first to take advantage of new opportunities for making money or for self-advancement (e.g., by fishing, taking government jobs, trading, etc.) and then cashing this in for local status; she also sees them as a group who act together vis-à-vis the local community of which they are the elite, to preserve its inner cohesion and stability in face of the very changes which their individual behavior facilitates.

The book is unquestionably important as a case study of great elegance which shifts the focus of attention much closer to the real "grassroots" of African politics and which decisively disposes of some unsuitable conceptualization (especially tribalism) long in vogue in African studies. Two reservations might be expressed. One is that while the book is precise to a fault in its microanalysis of the mechanisms at work within Gondo society, it seems less precise on aspects which may be important, at least for political scientists, in trying to fit these findings into the "macro" picture. For instance a "laboring class" is mentioned (p. 71), but there seems little other evidence of "class-ness" elsewhere in the text. Similarly it does not seem entirely clear why land is unevenly distributed, i.e., how far individual, cultural, or structural factors account for it, though the data on this question are exceedingly interesting and full. The chapter on Violence, Crisis, and Arbitration explores the role of Big Men in maintaining social control but does not disclose any conflict patterns which might be structurally interpreted to tie up with political cleavage on a wider basis; probably because there are none, but this in itself would be a significant point. This reservation connects with a second one. Since Gondo is not a growing township, it does not clearly show how the strategic elite do transmit or absorb external forces of the kind political scientists must be interested in. It is clear how members of the elite have individually turned external change to their personal advantage; it is less clear what impact they in turn have collectively had on the structure of local life over the years, mainly, one feels, because it has been largely a history of local economic decline.

These, however, are reservations, not fundamental criticisms. The book is a distinguished addition to the still modest body of really reliable, authentic analyses of East African grassroots society at the point where it connects with the macro-world of the nonanthropologist, and the Big Men it brings to life will play an increasingly important part in any future representation of that macro-world that is true to life.

COLIN LEYS

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The Rise of African Nationalism: The African National Congress, 1912–1952. By Peter Walshe. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univ. of Calif. Press, 1971. Pp. 480. $13.50.)

The Autobiography of an Unknown South African. By Naboth Mokgatle. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univ. of Calif. Press, 1971. Pp. 358. $7.95.)

Urban Revolt in South Africa, 1960–1964: A Case Study. By Edward Feit. (Evanston, Northwestern Univ. Press, 1971. Pp. 365. $10.75.)

Modernizing Racial Domination: The Dynamics of South African Politics. By Heribert Adam. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univ. of Calif. Press, 1971. Pp. 203. $8.00.)

These four books add much to the rapidly growing literature on the politics of South Africa. For obvious reasons, little that is authoritative has been written about the politics of the Bantu, as the Africans are most frequently called in South Africa. Peter Walshe has successfully achieved the enormous task of writing a concise and comprehensive history of the African National Congress to 1952. He examines the origin of African political consciousness, the ideological influences on the movement, the organizational development of Congress, and the issues on which Congress concentrated. Vital issues there were in abundance: land, the urban freehold, segregation, the franchise, the color bar (job reservations for whites), the pass laws, taxation, education, social welfare, and the right of Bantu laborers to organize and strike. It is the record of a long, anguishing, losing struggle for basic human rights. That in spite of bitter adversities Congress clung to the ideal of a nonracial state, is truly amazing.

The scope of Walshe's valuable book is rather narrow. He is not much given to speculation. He is a historian and not a prophet. His assumption is that the Africans of South Africa are, or are becoming, a nation, while the racial policy of the government is based on the assumption that the various African tribes are nations. Neither Walshe nor the white political leaders seek to prove or even to probe their basic assumptions.

More interpretation and generalization would have made a more interesting book. For example, the tantalizing and enigmatic Jan C. Smuts receives only passing and factual treatment. Furthermore, Walshe does not examine whether in the face of South Africa's amazing industrial development apartheid must not break down. Since he concludes his story before the advent of Verwoerd and the adoption of the policy of separate development, the book ends in a "pre-climax." Walshe adheres strictly to the task he set himself; within these limits he has produced a very good and useful volume. The book contains an extensive bibliography.

Whereas the volumes by Adam, Feit, and Walshe are by outsiders looking in, the autobiography by Mokgatle is by an insider who relates what he experienced as a member of the largest but most voiceless depressed community of this strange society. The author was not as unknown as the title of the book suggests, since he played a minor but not insignificant role in the Bantu politics of his day. Mokgatle tells a fascinating story and reveals what is happening to many African families in South Africa. He was born in a tribal village in Transvaal the year after the Union was formed. His mother was a Christian but his father was not. They were married in a Christian ceremony and also according to the traditional tribal custom at a time when tribal life and customs were being eroded by Christianity and the impact of Western ideas and practices. The son for a while took care of the cattle, but after graduation from a mission preparatory school he left his parental home and tribe to make his way in the white man's city of Pretoria.

In Pretoria, Mokgatle encountered the galling restrictions which hedge in the life of non-whites, and especially of the Africans, in the white towns and cities of South Africa. He had chafed under his father's mild tribal authoritarianism; he now found himself under the tyranny of pass laws, petty apartheid, and the Urban Areas Act, imposed by whites. He was not one to take it submissively. At first he thought of going back to his tribe and thus escaping curfews and pass laws, but when Hertzog and Smuts, the leaders of the two rival European "tribes," as Mokgatle calls them, first formed a coalition government and then merged their two parties, he turned political. He had observed that when the white "tribes" dropped their differences and came together it meant "more restrictions and denials to the Africans." He became involved in trade union organization and politics but the activities of Africans in this field were so narrowly circumscribed that he soon ran into trouble with the police. Thanks to the aid of very competent white legal counsel and an independent judiciary, he escaped imprisonment, only to fall under the ban—a form of legal death imposed without trial. In 1954 he managed to get out of the country without a passport. He now lives in London.

Mokgatle's book bears directly on the policy of apartheid, for the South African government's racial policy of separate development is based on the assumption that the numerous African tribes within its borders constitute nations. If the African tribes are nations, then a good case could be made for the proposition that the Afrikaners, the English, the Jews, the coloreds and the Indians are tribes and the same policy should be applied to them. But such separate development of white groups would lead to the complete disintegration of the Republic and so is not entertained. While Mokgatle did not write his autobiography for this purpose, he does, in his life's story, reveal how the African tribes are merging into one nation and tends to disprove the theoretical foundation on which the draconian policy of separate development is based. The tribes were already dissolving when Mokgatle was born, and the process accelerated as South Africa's industrialization speeded up.

This autobiography, rich in human interest, is an important document of South African social and political life. Fascinating, moving, and revealing, it is a great autobiography.

Urban Revolt in South Africa, 1960–1964 is an analytical account of the African resort to violence after the Sharpeville disturbances in March, 1960. It is more a study of revolution, or insurgency as the author prefers to call it, than of politics. The aim of the violence was not the overthrow of the government by frontal attack but by "bringing disorder to an unbearable level" (p. 301). The study is largely based on the court records of the trial of the leaders of *Umkonto we Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation) for organizing and participating in an attempted revolt against the South African government. This source is not as limited as may be thought since the court records are voluminous: 173 witnesses were called by the prosecution, and six of the accused gave evidence under oath. Nor is the source unreliable; the South African courts are remarkably independent, though at times they must apply poor law.

In this study Professor Feit seeks to explain how the attempt at revolt was organized, why its initial success was limited, and why it failed in the end. He has concentrated his attention on the workings of the insurgent organization at its lowest levels. By 1960 the leaders of A.N.C. (African National Congress) had abandoned hope that peaceful methods would induce the whites to make political concessions. Fifty years of peaceful methods had brought only the loss of rights and more repression. Many African leaders were ready for sabotage and guerrilla actions. *Umkonto* was formed for this purpose. Its membership was drawn from the Communist party, whose leaders were white, and the A.N.C., which was wholly composed of blacks but, as in South African society generally, the organization's menial work in the field was left to the blacks. Feit concludes that the movement failed for a number of reasons: the relative ease with which the privileged can organize quickly and effectively; the difficulty of the unprivileged to develop an ideology counter to that of the holders of power; the distrust of the rank and file of the blacks of the white communists; and the efficiency of the South African police. But the great strength of the forces of white South Africa, Feit concludes, was that the government was able to act effectively against the incipient insurgency because whatever other issues divided white South Africans, there was one issue on which all were united: white rule. This has enabled the government to build a defensive system that restricts the freedom of whites as well as blacks (though not proportionately) and still to maintain economic progress. The spillover of this progress, which is improving the lot of Africans in the towns, has dampened revolutionary ardor. Feit says that South Africa has, "in the process of defense, become a police state" (p. 324). He makes it abundantly clear that a revolt with any chance of success is a dim prospect in the foreseeable future.

Feit states that the South African whites have made their choice and only time can tell whether they chose wisely. He ignores forces at work in South African society which may lead the whites gradually to change their course.

Heribert Adam in his book presents a challenging hypothesis. Most students of South Africa and its racial policies are certain that the end can only be revolution—indeed, that it is overdue, but Adam suggests that the system of pragmatic apartheid "is one of the most advanced and effective patterns of rational, oligarchic domination" (p. 16) and that, as such, it may continue indefinitely. He sees apartheid "as the systematic attempt to reverse economic integration as much as possible by legislating social barriers in order to channel the inevitable political consequences of African economic advancement in the interest of the privileged whites" (p. 8). He characterizes South Africa as a democratic police state. Adam argues that the active, mass resistance to apartheid is paralyzed not only by police repression, but also by the program of "separate development" and its partial, initial successes. This program weakens political demands by offering political rights in the Bantustans and advisory bodies and increasingly fragments the nonwhites by herding them into separate political units.

Adam discredits the possibility of change through outside intervention. Black Africa's weakness is South Africa's strength. The Western powers probably could make military sanctions against South Africa effective, but they would not support them themselves. Adam does not summarily dismiss the possibility of change from the inside, though he seems to think it slight. Apartheid may not be as incompatible with industrialization as a number of specialists have assumed, for South Africa has experienced a lusty economic boom during the Nationalist period. Adam may be right but increasing strains are visible and changes, even if minor, are taking place. It is by no means certain that the policy of separate development can be carried out, or if carried out, that it will not create a set of conditions which South Africa may be unable to control. Nor does Adam take seriously enough the problem of fitting the coloreds and the Indians into the apartheid scheme. It is true that these two racial groups fear African domination more than they chafe under white rule, but this is not the end of the matter.

Any analysis of so complicated a situation can easily be criticized on various points. Adam, so it seems to the reviewer, does not give an adequate explanation of why apartheid exists and flourishes and why there is so wide a basis of agreement on the policy. The author does state a few times that the English-speaking South Africans basically support the policy, but the general impression conveyed is that apartheid is a peculiarly, almost solely, Afrikaner institution. However far off Adam may be on this point or that, his study as a whole is an excellent piece of work. It behooves every serious student of South African politics to consider his analysis carefully.

In summary, although South African racial policy is not always examined dispassionately, the works by Walshe, Feit, and Adam are free of the bitter denunciation which so often characterizes writing on apartheid. Mokgatle's autobiography is written with deep feeling, and in places with bitter resentment, but his emotions are kept under control. Thus the literature on the problems of this troubled country has been greatly enriched by these four books.

AMRY VANDENBOSCH
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The Other Side of Coexistence: An Analysis of Russian Foreign Policy. By Albert L. Weeks. (New York: Pitman Publishing Co. 1970. Pp. 304. $7.50.)

Since we know little in detail of how Soviet foreign policy has been made and have only limited and external insights into its implementation, the literature of the subject tends to concentrate on interpretation. Professor Weeks is legitimately concerned to dispel the illusion always likely to emerge in periods of apparent détente that there is a natural convergence of interests and hence of attitudes between the Soviet Union and the United States. He is also desirous of showing that "co-existence" by no means implies an abandonment of the fundamentally expansionist impulses of the Soviet regime and to deny the possibility of drawing a sharp line between ideological and material aims.

If Professor Weeks had confined himself to an analysis of what we know about Soviet policy along these lines, he might not have produced anything very original, but at least the book would have fallen into a recognizable category. In fact he has tried to do something more complicated: to tell the story of Soviet foreign policy and in particular of Soviet expansion with particular reference to relations with the United States; to give a good deal of information, some of it quite illuminating on the economic relations of the two countries; to support his view that the Krushchev era represented an attempt by the Russians at a serious détente which Khrushchev's successors abandoned in favour of a more militarist posture, and to speculate on the Soviet Union's future policies in the light of the growing prominence of the split with China.

The book was completed some time in 1969, apart from a brief epilogue apparently written early in 1970; and already (reading it in May 1972) it sounds very dated; much has happened since the book was written, and although some of what happened was predictable from Mr. Weeks's book, a good deal was not. In particular his contention that the Russians' fear of Germany is such that they only pretend to wish for the break-up of NATO and would prefer the Americans to remain in Europe and four-power control to persist over Germany, in however shadowy a form, does not look at all plausible now.

What Mr. Weeks has done is to mingle two perfectly proper kinds of writing—scholarly analysis and day-to-day journalism—in an amalgam which meets the criteria of neither. Indeed one suspects that much of the book has been the result of a weaving together of articles on the successive events and publications that have attracted Mr. Week's notice.

The weakness is particularly marked in the treatment of the Khrushchev period, for which some analysis both of the Khrushchev-Kennedy confrontation at Vienna and of the Cuban missile crisis is essential if one is putting forward a theory of Soviet motives; Mr. Graham Allison in his book *The Essence of Decision* has shown that one can make some useful assertions about the Cuban crisis at least. But Mr. Weeks passes over the events themselves as though they did not need to be explained. Similarly for the post-Brezhnev period, Mr. Weeks never seriously deals with the intervention in Czechoslovakia nor with the circumstances surrounding the armed clashes with China.

What Mr. Weeks is good at is quotation, wresting meanings out of Soviet texts; and one admires his stamina and patience in dealing so lovingly with material so essentially rebarbative. He is also not above a little kremlinology in dealing with the Soviet Union's internal governmental structure.

The book is poorly written with an irritating admixture of colloquialisms out of place in a serious work. There are also some quite extraordinary errors of fact. He describes Bainbridge Colby as "Ambassador to Russia" at a time when Colby was Secretary of State and the United States had no Ambassador to Russia (p. 46); he gives the impression (p. 81) that Port Arthur was part of the territories acquired by Russia from China in 1860 (the lack of any maps does not help the reader). Whatever kind of socialist Stafford Cripps was he was certainly not a "Fabian Socialist" (p. 91). And even if Clausewitz's ancestry was Polish, this hardly makes the most famous of all German writers on strategy a Russian (p. 262).

Perhaps a British reviewer may be forgiven for pointing out that the rules governing the use of titles are not very difficult to learn and that to ignore them is discourteous; C. P. Snow if one thinks of the novelist or Lord Snow if one thinks of the public figure, but never "Lord C. P. Snow" (p. 135). As for "Lord William M. A. Beaverbrook" (p. 91) for a self-made man raised to the peerage (and one who used Max for his given name) why, the mind boggles.

MAX BELOFF

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From Peasant to Farmer: A Revolutionary Strategy for Development. By Raanan Weitz. (New York: Columbia University Press, Twentieth Century Fund Study, 1971. Pp. 292. $10.00.)

Several years ago a friend of mine was advised to meet the author of this book, but in vain, because Mr. Weitz was not to be found. It was explained later that Raanan Weitz had three offices, and that is how he managed to escape interruptions and produce as much as he did. Having read this book, I can easily understand, for how else could he have accumulated such wide experience at home and abroad as he demonstrates in his case examples? Unfortunately, in the process of drawing on such wide experience, the author has tended to rely very little on empirical evidence. Individual experiences are used to suggest success or failure of agricultural policies, but no systematic evaluation is carried out. He also makes little effort to synthesize the results and reach conclusions regarding these policies. Apparently the synthesis is implicit in the experience of Israel, on which the author draws heavily. Actually the author would have delivered his message more effectively had he limited his case study to the experience of Israel as an illustration of his "revolutionary strategy for development" (title), rather than by trying to derive it from a global survey, as he has done.

Mr. Weitz presents a program presumably based on historical experience, as befits scientific inference, though at the cost of oversimplification and sometimes contradiction. For example, he questions the value of past trends in suggesting solutions applicable to developing countries (p. 1), and yet he appeals to the history of Europe to support the hypothesis that agriculture must develop before industry (p. 3); (incidentally, this conclusion is not actually borne out by Europe's experience). In another place he refers to the farm family in America as being "still the cornerstone of American agriculture" (p. 31). Yet, about 80 per cent of America's food products is produced by large, concentrated farms and farm corporations, or by about 20 per cent of the farm units; furthermore, about two-thirds of the farmers in America earn more from nonfarm sources than from the land. The farm family in America, thus, cannot be used to illustrate the success of that institution.

The author has, nevertheless, presented a strategy for agricultural development which deserves consideration for selective adaptation of the relevant measures for development. According to Weitz, agriculture develops in stages, from subsistence to diversified or mixed farming, to the stage of specialization. Each of these three stages is associated with certain characteristics, ranging from composition of the crop and work schedule to the percentage of labor force still occupied in agriculture (pp. 20–21). For example, in subsistence agriculture one staple crop will be dominant, while in specialization, one cash crop will dominate; in subsistence, a high percentage of the labor force will be in agriculture, while, during specialization, a much smaller percentage will be occupied in that sector and, accordingly, a higher per capita income can be earned in the later than in the earlier stage. The problem, then, is to develop agriculture toward the stage of specialization, but without sacrificing some of the more precious values of the subsistence stage. Hence, the author warns against imposing innovations on the peasants; they should be guided and helped to hope, as was done in the Israeli *moshav*.

To succeed, the farmers require a support system, or a "system of services that directly supports production and helps to improve the farmer's living conditions" (p. 111). This system can be created within the framework of farm communities by means of the "Quiet Center," which is a "physical unit containing only industrial and service installations without living quarters—the rural 'business district'" (p. 119). This type of resource allocation also is illustrated by the pattern of regional cooperation in Israel. The farmers' fields and living quarters are distributed around the quiet center. A similar approach can be applied to the establishment of industry in rural areas through regional cooperation, as has been done in Israel (p. 132). The author, extending his conception of regional planning, proposes the establishment of a system of "rural towns, based on a hierarchy of functions," which would avoid urban concentration, and still provide the rural people with the benefits of urban and larger communities (p. 147). How long these rural towns can be kept at a relatively small size is not certain, nor is it shown how the experience of a newly settled country can be applied to an already crowded country in which the man/land ratio is dangerously high.

The author deals with implementation of the program by sketchy illustration and in an imprecise form. He correctly questions the success of certain traditional agrarian reform programs. Except, however, for the need for more flexibility in reform legislation, which he emphasizes, there is little new in his presentation. In fact, Weitz seems to have ignored much literature which deals with issues of reform more clearly and critically than he does.

Part II of the book deals with planning and implementation, although his chapters on planning (chapters 12 and 13) are rather superficial, the concepts of regional planning and cross-function notwithstanding. (Cross-function "implies a full scale merger of the vertical and horizontal functions" in the region, p. 182.) The methods of planning proposed are neither new nor revolutionary, as selectively illustrated by the author himself, drawing on examples from Italy, France, Ceylon, Holland, and the Sudan, as well as Israel. The main value of this part lies in the personal touch stemming from the author's deep involvement and experience in land and with farmers. His emphasis on personal communication, on the human element, and on guidance through demonstration are commendable. They would have been even more commendable had the author stayed on the level of guidance and avoided extensive use of such terms as "must," "should," and "ought to" in proposing policies. Indeed, the normative tone of this part seems to reflect the attitude of the settlement agencies toward the new farmers in Israel who, in most cases, have no say in what to grow or how to allocate the land among various crops: it is all planned for them; if they do not conform, they lose support, fail, and leave the farm; the statistics will not even show it. One hopes that this is not what Raanan Weitz had intended in his strategy for development. In conclusion, while the book tends to oversimplify, these criticisms should not detract from the value of this provocative work, especially for those who are groping for ways by which to develop agriculture and raise the living standards of the peasants.

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Soldier and State in Africa. Edited by Claude E. Welch, Jr. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970. Pp. 320. $9.00.)

Soldier and State in Africa is a collection of essays edited by Professor Claude E. Welch, Jr. Two of the essays, those by Welch and Professor Perre Van den Berghe, have appeared elsewhere in somewhat different form, but the remaining four are original to this volume. The opening contribution is that of the editor. It is a general analytic overview of the political role of the military in Africa, attempting to encompass most of the aspects of military involvement in African politics through a classification of types of military involvement, a comprehensive list of factors that have led to or "caused" intervention, and some suggestions on a number of probable consequences of intervention and military rule. While this is an interesting and high quality piece of work, one would like to have seen a greater effort made toward developing a theoretical framework within which types of interventions could be linked up with their causes and consequences. *Soldier and State* also ends with an analytic essay. Here, Professor Van den Berghe develops a taxonomy of armies existing on the African continent—raiding citizen-army, palace army, putsch army, revolutionary citizen-army, herrenvolk army, colonial army, and national army—and all too briefly discusses the political significance of each type. Since this essay was first published in 1965, one would have thought a substantial updating, taking advantage of the much augmented case material, would have been in order before republication.

Between the two general essays with which the volume begins and ends are four case studies—W. E. A. Skurnik writes on Dahomey and Upper Volta, Jean-Claude Williame discusses Zaire (Congo-Kinshasa), Jon Kraus deals with Ghana, and I. William Zartman provides an essay on Algeria. The caliber of all of these is very high. In his contribution on Dahomey and Upper Volta, Skurnik manages in lucid and interesting fashion to unravel the confused and confusing series of political events that has characterized these two states since their military first became directly involved in politics. In addition he clearly shows how, in at least these two states, the predominantly instrumental rather than expressive character of regime support, coupled with an economic situation requiring measures of governmentally imposed austerity, has led to widespread popular support for the dismantling by the military of civilian controlled political structures. Unfortunately Skurnik does not attempt to broaden his analysis beyond the two empirical cases. For example, on the basis of the cases of Upper Volta and Dahomey, it might be interesting to speculate on the consequences for military regimes when they too are compelled by economic circumstance to enforce policies of austerity. This, of course, has significance beyond the two cases studied by Skurnik, since military regimes have been brought to power by a similar dynamic in other African states (e.g., in Ghana in both 1966 and 1972).

Jean-Claude Williame's contribution is a concise summary of his very original analysis of post-independence politics in Zaire. The thesis has been presented elsewhere, and is the central theme of his recently published monograph. Basically Williame views the political system of Congo-Kinshasa (now named Zaire) as having experienced since independence a significant change in political generations, and a fundamental shift in the "type" and character of political rule—from professional politicians to "technocrats," and from "patrimonialism" to

"Caesarist Bureaucracy." The catalyst for this interrelated change is shown to be the military coup of 1965. The particular Weber-derived typology systematically utilized by Williame is new to the study of African politics, and his effort holds great promise for Africanists studying other states of the continent.

Professor Kraus's contribution to the volume is not only an essay dealing with the role of the military in Ghanaian politics, but also an analysis of the political history of Ghana from 1948 to 1969. Slightly more than a third of the essay is an analysis of politics in the Nkrumah period. Although the author claims that this presentation of the "generic" aspects of the premilitary Ghanaian political system will account for the coup and provide insight into the politics and prospects of the successor military regime, I feel that the linkage of pre- and post-coup politics was never really carried out. Nevertheless, this analysis of the Nkrumah period is a worthwhile contribution in its own right and a fine companion piece to the other excellent essays Professor Kraus has given us on the same subject. The latter two-thirds of the Kraus contribution deals exclusively with the immediate causes of military intervention in Ghana in 1966 and the performance of the National Liberation Council once it assumed power. We have here a concise, comprehensive, and largely accurate description of Ghana's first experience with military rule, a period not as yet extensively described elsewhere. Kraus provides a balanced evaluation of the National Liberation Council's contribution to political, economic, and social development in Ghana, which on the whole he sees as decidedly favorable. I differ from Kraus, however, in the interpretation of key NLC actions, and would come up with a much less favorable balance sheet. For example, Kraus suggests the NLC's introduction of charges for previously free social services—medical care, school and text book fees—is "an indication of self-discipline which distinguished the NLC from the Nkrumah regime" (p. 199). I view this policy as rather an indication of the military regime's basic orientation toward the upper portions of the Ghanaian social strata. While introducing service charges that hit hard at the less well-off sections of the population, the government was increasing spending for the army fourfold, and providing substantial salary increases for government-employed professionals and high-level civil servants—hardly policies that indicate a serious concern with introducing "self-discipline" to society.

The contribution of I. William Zartman is primarily an historical analysis of organizational and political change within the Algerian military. Zartman recounts in some detail the political infighting between senior officers that culminated in the ultimate strengthening of Boumedienne's position, and shows that intra-army conflicts had consequences not only for the personal power of one or another military figure, but also for basic political and organizational choices—involving the issues of professionalism, and the dominance of central over local authority.

Although on the whole the case studies found in *Soldier and State in Africa* are valuable contributions to the literature, this reviewer would have preferred it if the authors had made a more concerted effort to relate their substantive concerns to the theoretical issues raised in the comparative literature on the role of the military in the process of modernization. It ought to be noted that the publisher's advertising claim that the case studies "are set . . . within a general analytic framework" bears little relationship to reality. Nevertheless, Professor Welch has accomplished something rather rare among edited collections: he has managed to bring together a group of essays of uniformly high quality. As an added bonus he provides a useful bibliography, and an appendix that extensively catalogues acts of political violence and military involvement in independent African countries through 1968.

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The Ayub Khan Era; Politics in Pakistan, 1958–1969. By Lawrence Ziring. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971. Pp. xiv, 234. $10.00.)

Why are so many of the books about Pakistan disappointing? While much of the literature that comes out of Pakistan is polemical, so many of the works of foreigners are superficial, or just miss the point. Professor Ziring has been visiting Pakistan between 1957 and 1966; he had a responsible advisory job in the country. He is well acquainted with many of the elite, especially the administrators. He has produced a book which carries a lot of reliable information. But I would not recommend this to anyone trying to understand this perplexing country, and the forces which first, improbably, put it together and finally tore it apart. What has politics in Pakistan been all about since partition? Mainly it has been about a struggle for power among a small crowd of competitors—politicians, bureaucrats, military officers, and businessmen. This naked power struggle has been legitimized by invoking a series of issues—Kashmir, parity for Bengal, national security, parity with India—which although genuine have been employed in a cynical and sometimes bogus fashion to boost persons and parties. The underlying forces which created Pakistan—the deep sense of frustration over the role of Islam in the modern world, the memory of historic dominance and grandeur, the protest of peasants against their exploitation by alien landlords, the search by an alienated intelligentsia for a place in society and government—these forces have never been able to realize their hopes and fears through the political process. Hence Pakistan has gone from one dead end to another, and it is probable that it will soon arrive at a further dead end. A few writers have succeeded in explaining aspects of this complex and convoluted black comedy to us: Khalid Bin Sayeed, Leonard Binder, Aziz Ahmad, and—in a different style—Ian Stephens. But, for most observers, the essence of Pakistan proves too elusive: and this is the case with Professor Ziring, though there are interesting and instructive passages in his book.

Was Field Marshal Ayub Khan nothing more than an operator, whose shrewdness and sense of timing became progressively less sure, until he committed himself to a throw which he could not win—the 1965 Kashmir adventure—and thereafter did little more than wait around for the inevitable end? Perhaps this is so: Professor Ziring thinks that "The Ayub Era, with the passage of time, eventually may be known as an interregnum . . . or, more likely, a lost opportunity" (p. ix). What opportunity was lost, though? The Field Marshall began with a few excursions into modernization (best described in Herbert Feldman's *Revolution in Pakistan,* 1967), but he very rapidly reached the limits which his control system would allow.

The feature of this control system which Lawrence Ziring understands most thoroughly is the higher civil service, and this he describes, with attention to detail, in relation to personalities and trends. He knows nothing of the main bulwark of Ayub's system, the armed forces, and the few scattered references to the Pakistan Army are illuminating in their inadequacy. Ayub's principal innovation was the creation of a rural-based political system, the Basic Democracies, through which economic inputs and political outputs could be regulated to serve his purposes. The Basic Democracies are treated adequately in this study, but we are not offered insights which add to previous accounts.

Ayub Khan's era was not a lost opportunity—he had nothing much to lose—it was indeed an interregnum. And now the emergence of President Bhutto (once Ayub's Sorcerer's Apprentice) looks like providing another interregnum. Professor Ziring's treatment of Zulfikar Bhutto shows him at his best—and also illustrates rather well the extent of his limitations. His character sketch of the rising politician (pp. 48–9) is lifelike, but Bhutto's fatal tendency to substitute rhetoric for reality never comes across. When Ziring gets to the key episode in the Ayub-Zulfi relationship—the conning of the President into the Kashmir adventure, which was a dead duck from the outset—his analysis fragments, even though he was actually in Lahore, close to the scene, at that time. Ziring has virtually nothing to say about this three-weeks war in which the Pakistan Army (or its high command) totally lost its elan, reputation, ethos, and Pakistan lost its foreign policy, perhaps for a decade to come. In muffing his analysis of the Indo-Pakistan war, Professor Ziring misses the clue to the whole Ayub story.

The difficulties of trying to construct a rigorous analysis of politics in Pakistan from an ethnocentric, North American standpoint, are illustrated in the Epilogue, in which Ziring discusses once again the conception of political development as his *terminus ad quem.* Although he expresses reservations about "system capabilities," and other mechanical formulae, he does not deviate very far from the conventionalities of American political science, allowing himself an opinion such as "The 1962 presidential constitution could be salvaged. . . . It would be preferable to resurrecting the 1956 parliamentary constitution or even drafting an entirely new one along similar lines. Parliamentary experiments remain inconsistent with Pakistan's political culture" (p. 194). Well, yes; there is a lot of evidence to prove this; but where is the evidence that an American presidential executive is going to provide the answers? Three Pakistani Presidents in a row—Mirza, Ayub, and Yahya—have found this no solution. It is high time we tried to find a more satisfactory model than political development, though admittedly the non-Marxist alternatives are few and foreboding. Pakistan would seem to suggest a cyclical model; or else yet another example of my rather amateurish conception, the Broken-Backed State (*Reorientations,* 1965). When military Government began to set the fashion in Afro-Asian countries in 1958, political scientists proved quite incapable of understanding its meaning, coming up with conventionalities about elites and modernization. Now that Burma, Ghana, Sudan, and other countries have taken the process a stage further—creating something we may call "postmilitary government" (which may still lead to a return to military government) we are even more lost. Political sociology may provide answers where government specialists have none: but maybe my optimism arises only from the fact that I am not a political sociologist.

HUGH TINKER

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UN Protection of Civil and Political Rights. By John Carey. (Syracuse University Press for the Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute, Inc., New York, N.Y. 1970. Pp. 205. $7.50.)

The rhetoric of our times leaves little doubt that the protection of human rights by international means is on the minds of many people and even preoccupies a few governments. Evidence of such concern is all around us. Greeks attack the regime of the colonels in the UN and in the Council of Europe; African and Asian governments aided by scores of nongovernmental groups in many UN organs continue to attack apartheid in South Africa and Rhodesia; Black Panthers petition the UN to end racist oppression in the United States. For many years, but especially since 1960, the UN and several specialized agencies have developed techniques and institutions for hearing such complaints. John Carey, a prominent attorney, has set himself the task of evaluating the effectiveness of these techniques and of making suggestions for their improvement. The evaluation is careful, systematic, and judicious. It brings together a great deal of important and elusive information. But since it is offered in a spirit of legal reform, his treatment slights the political context of global and regional conflict (of which human rights activity is merely a vocal part). His suggestions for improvement, therefore, seem oddly out of tune with the bulk of the description. They are based on faith and hope while the bulk of the work is solidly analytical.

I shall summarize the treatment of the techniques by classifying them in terms of the effectiveness Carey discerns, judgments with which I am in general agreement. He concludes that the enforcement of UN resolutions finding states in violation of human rights agreements, whether through force or economic and diplomatic sanctions, is ineffective. In the wake of the 1966 ICJ decision on Southwest Africa he also finds noncriminal adjudication to be wanting. He maintains that UN educational activities seeking to foster respect for human rights cannot do any harm, but their usefulness remains unknown. International legislation (through comprehensive or specialized conventions and declarations) is helpful for setting minimum standards, but we probably have enough such texts now. The investigation of complaints by UN standing organs and ad hoc commissions, a technique almost exclusively used on behalf of the opponents of apartheid and colonialism, is marred, he feels, by important procedural defects, and its effectiveness remains in doubt; hence the extension of the technique in the new procedure of ECOSOC for dealing with individual complaints is treated with cautious reserve by Carey.

This leaves us with a few additional techniques which the author considers moderately useful. They include a procedure used by United States courts but not yet applied by UN organs in human rights disputes: an invitation extended by the court to the "guilty" party to aid in the implementation of an adverse award and thus remedy the situation. Carey cautiously approves of criminal "adjudication" without full trial—through such devices as international "grand juries" and "trials" in which the defendant is absent—when dealing with war crimes and crimes against humanity, though he remains uneasy about the acceptability of such innovations. He asserts that the most important technique—widely used in fact and most appropriate in the world political setting—is international negotiation designed to help the victims of human rights violations, through such devices as standing investigative machinery (as in the ILO), permanent high commissioners (as for refugees), mediation commissions (as in the UN convention against racial discrimination), and secretaries-general (as in the case of U Thant's personal representative in the Biafra war). Carey argues rightly that this "works" when used in conjunction with general world concern and a UN political determination to deal with the human rights issue in the context of other and broader concerns of peace and welfare.

No technique is very successful or useful, singly or in combination with others. Why? Carey gives a few hints which he then tends to neglect in offering his suggestions. Success is impeded because the sources of information on which international action is based are often biased, suspect, and deliberately manipulated by UN commissions to highlight the assumed guilt of the defendant government. This happens because of one-sided testimony at hearings, neglect of contrary evidence, and domination of such bodies by African, Asian, and European socialist governments. The adverse publicity which such investigative organs can marshal tends to be ineffective because of the slanted quality of its content, catering as it does only to the anti-Western strands of world opinion. In short, there is a double standard built into contemporary international law and procedure governing human rights which favors Third World positions quite consistently, a condition which Carey acknowledges and deplores. He neglects to mention that this condition is made worse by the growing international practice of labeling anything as a "human rights issue"—pollution, poverty, birth control, and arms race—as long as the West can be pictured as the guilty party and the Third World as the victim.

Carey advocates more comprehensive and specialized conventions even though he also suggested that the existing ones were adequate. He wants more investigations, more petitions, more standing commissions. He approves of increased recourse to adverse publicity by such organs, and he favors increasing reliance on quasi-trial techniques mounted over the dissent of the defendant state. He also favors the early creation of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, even though this post—since it tends to correct the double standard by removing some human rights implementation measures from the political organs of the UN—is understandably opposed by the socialist and many Afro-Asian governments. To argue for more of what has been shown to be wanting is to believe that the wave of decolonization which has triggered and motivated the intensive international activity of the last decade can somehow be transformed into a more detached concern for the protection of anybody's rights anywhere. The limited success of some techniques legitimated by a unique set of international forces and confluences, by virtue of faith, hope, and legal legerdemain, is considered capable of expansion to new fields and a broader set of clients. To believe this is to ignore the qualities of the international system which gave birth to these techniques. It sidesteps the growing evidence that the world, in terms of fundamental values, is growing more diverse. Hence the commitments of liberal American lawyers are unlikely to vanquish the lively desire of governments to embarrass their opponents by using human rights issues and successfully to oppose the same weapons when the same governments are made the subject of similar attacks. In such a setting, UN techniques for the protection of human rights continue to be part of the armory of propaganda, but their contribution to a different world order remains in doubt. Treatments such as Carey's do little to throw this situation into relief, they obfuscate it by pretending that in the long run everything works out for the best.

ERNST B. HAAS
University of California, Berkeley

Human Rights and International Action: The Case of Freedom of Association. By Ernst B. Haas. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970. Pp. 184. $6.50.)

The dominant concern of this book is the relationship between international action on human rights and progress toward a global community with shared values. That the book exists is a notable fact, for action at the international level concerning human rights is a relatively new development, and few political scientists have given attention to it. Of course, natural rights and the rights of man have long been with us, but they were essentially of domestic concern. The term *human rights* implies international concern and potential international action. The Charter of the United Nations binds the organization and its members to promote human rights without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and in conformity with the obligation, the General Assembly has adopted a series of declarations and conventions specifying what the rights are. On a regional basis the OAS and the Council of Europe manifest similar concerns, and the International Labor Organization has promoted the rights of labor since its establishment. Charges that human rights are being violated in Southern Africa through racial discrimination and colonialism come close to being front and center at the UN. The only "threat to the peace" that the Security Council has found to exist, and thus the only application of sanctions that it has made mandatory, relate to human rights in Southern Rhodesia. The only states drummed out of international organizations (South Africa from various organizations and agencies, and Greece from the Council of Europe) were drummed out because of their violations of human rights. The subject has burgeoned in importance at the international level, and deserves far more attention from political scientists than it has received.

Haas does a service in calling attention to the subject. Far more than that, his treatment of the aspect on which he focuses is admirable. The perspective that he takes and the inferences he draws from his findings, however, are open to differing judgments.

At heart, the book is a case study. It focuses on efforts of the International Labor Organization to protect the right of freedom of association (the right of workers to organize and to engage in collective bargaining, and related rights). These rights are provided for in the ILO's constitution and in two conventions that it sponsors, and complaints concerning their violation are lodged with the ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association. Focusing almost exclusively on the complaints and on the efforts of the Committee to give protection, Haas arrives at what he himself describes as a "somber" conclusion (p. 115). A summary finding suggests the reason: Out of 486 complaints studied, only 117 led to "convictions." "Great" change in law or practice followed in only 13 cases, "some" change in 36, and none in 68. Reconciliation regimes in the "growing, developed" category were most responsive; faced with 22 "convictions," they made "great" change in 5 cases, "some" in 9 cases, and none in 8. Mobilization regimes were least responsive, making no change at all after 13 of their 14 convictions. Moreover, in a number of the instances in which change occurred, special circumstances are held to reduce the significance of the fact as an indicator of progress toward greater value sharing.

Haas's conclusion relates to the strategy of promoting global value sharing through "positive law of the functional kind," illustrated by the ILO conventions on which he focuses and by the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. He is even more pessimistic in his *obiter dicta* about other strategies. Thus he thinks that "positive enactments of a general kind," illustrated by the UN Covenants on human rights, "are at best self-defeating with respect to universal value sharing" (p. 127). And he is skeptical of the approach of what he calls the New Haven School, believing that the authors in this school pin too much hope on the intellectual formulation of a basis for a "world order of human dignity" (p. 131) and give too little emphasis to the problem of the consent of states.

Whether Haas's somberness is justified is a matter of perspective. It depends on the goal one has in mind and on one's assumptions or hopes about the speed with which the goal can be reached. The UN Charter binds members to *promote* human rights. The obligation is obviously vague in terms of the precise nature of the goal, the kinds of activities to be undertaken in pursuing it, and in the rate of progress required. Given the fact that what are now called human rights have historically been within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of states, and given the historic jealousy of states about their domestic jurisdiction, those concerned with the development of a community of mankind have a right to be pleased with almost any small amount of progress toward making states internationally accountable. Moreover, what we know of the conditions under which civil and political rights are respected within countries makes it clear that rapid change is scarcely to be expected and that one should not expect a great deal simply from law and accompanying institutional arrangements. Haas's book, however, reflects a somewhat different perspective. It is concerned with a much more formidable requirement than the one in the UN Charter, a requirement that a specific right be *protected* forthwith, and in many different kinds of societies. It is no wonder that, instead of finding it a marvel that states have begun in principle to accept some degree of international accountability for the treatment of their citizens, Haas reaches conclusions that are sober and tempered.

On an impressionistic basis one can be disposed to accept the inferences that Haas draws from his findings and still wonder whether, in a logical sense, they are entirely supported. Is compliance with an international obligation (or value sharing) to be measured solely in terms of complaints, convictions and subsequent reform? How can one give credit for full compliance, and how can one take into account the probability that the lodging of complaints may not correlate fully with violations? How can one tell to what extent eighteen years' experience with one restricted set of obligations is a reliable indicator of probable success with other sets of obligations over different periods of time?

Those concerned with global value sharing are entitled to be at least as much disturbed by a paradox that Haas describes very briefly as by the problem on which he dwells. Though human rights are, in the main, individual rights, the activity conducted in their name relates very largely to groups, and to rather restricted groups at that. In the United Nations, at least, action in the name of human rights tends to mean action to promote self-determination for colonial peoples and action to free the blacks in southern Africa from white racism; and many of those who press these issues do not seem to have a concern for human rights that goes much farther. Moreover, even those with a broader concern tend to find that it leads directly to the problem of ethnic and other groups that do not want to lose their identity in an atomized world of individuals. Thus the dual question arises whether there is a way to make concern for human rights genuine and general and whether there is a way to reconcile nondiscriminatory individual human rights with differentiations that safeguard the cherished identity and interests of groups.

Haas has contributed significantly toward realistic inquiry into such problems.

VERNON VAN DYKE

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International Legislation by the United Nations: Legal Provisions, Practice and Prospects. By Henry H. Han. (New York: Exposition Press, 1971. Pp. 221. $9.50.)

This very useful monograph examines the United Nations' involvement in the initiation, drafting, and bringing into force of multilateral treaties during the first 24 years of its life. Thinking primarily of the first two of these processes, Professor Han argues that the UN already demonstrates a number of the "essential attributes" (p. 116) of national legislation, and even with regard to effectuation he claims that an instrument concluded under UN auspices carries "a distinct command, or at least a measure of moral command" (p. 129). Thus, while such instruments may not yet amount to international legislation in the strict sense of the term, they "may be designated as 'international legislation' *sui generis*" (p. 134). And Han anticipates that if present trends continue, the UN or some other international body "will certainly develop into a true 'legislative body' " (p. 134), with "the Secretary-General or some other institutional arrangement [being given] the power to 'ratify' or 'approve' the instruments equivalently to the executive ratification of the bills passed by the domestic legislatures" (p. 135).

These conclusions are based on a thorough, if sometimes rather awkwardly written, study of the UN's treaty-making activity. Han identifies 148 instruments with which the UN has been directly associated, of which 83 are original and 65 supplement an existing treaty. About 80 per cent of each group were in force when the book was concluded. They are analysed in a number of interesting ways, one of which is designed to ascertain whether in this sphere the Communist states live up to their reputation for uncooperativeness. Professor Han concludes that they do not, since at least one of them has adhered to 80 per cent of the treaties he covers, with the more independently minded showing, not surprisingly, the highest degree of participation. In this respect, however, as in others, UN treaty making must be kept in perspective, and Han rightly emphasizes that the number of treaties emerging from the UN comes to less than 1 per cent of the total of international treaties. Moreover, while what may be called the UN list contains some very important entries, such as the 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea, the 1961 Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and that of 1969 on the Law of Treaties (not to mention the Charter itself), those concluded without UN help are by no means limited to insignificant matters. The 1959 Antarctica Treaty and the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963 are but two instances of this point. Nonetheless, Han considers that the UN should be regarded as *the* source of multilateral treaties. To facilitate this end he puts forward certain suggestions for the Organization's improvement, not all of which are likely to seem as "modest" (p. 71) to its members as they appear to their author.

Whatever the size and significance of the UN's treaty output, an issue which remains is whether it is best referred to as "international legislation." The term does not have a universally acknowledged meaning, so there is no question of Han's usage being declared incorrect. Nor is it at all likely that the words by which his subject matter is described will influence its qualitative or quantitative extent. But the choice of phrase is not an indifferent matter. For to very many minds the essential element of legislation lies not in its being initiated by or drafted in a particular body but in its obligatory effect: once passed, it binds all those who fall within the jurisdiction of the legislature. At the international level, on the other hand, whatever the strength with which the UN commends a treaty, it binds only those who explicitly agree to be bound. In the domestic sense of the word, there is no international legislature and, indeed, there cannot be one, for such a phenomenon would imply the ending of international relations and their replacement by a global government. No doubt this is perfectly clear to virtually all those who speak of some multilateral treaties as international legislation. But it may not always be equally clear to their audiences, and the capacity of words to carry their own meaning and exert their own influence is perhaps even illustrated by the book under review. For one cannot help wondering whether the learned author would have pitched his expectations regarding the future of UN treaty making so remarkably high had he not described it by such an evocative word as "legislation."

ALAN JAMES

London Schools of Economics

America Encounters India: 1941–1947. By Gary R. Hess. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1972. Pp. xi, 187. $9.50.)

Professor Hess has produced a relatively brief chronicle of an America awakening to an emergent India. From the point of view of general histories, he has opened the way to virgin territory. His straightforward narrative should be welcomed by students interested in the foundations of contemporary Indo-American relations.

Attempting to provide counterpoint in his narrative, Hess emphasizes American public and press reactions at various stages while basing the structure of his story upon the actions and reactions of FDR, a variety of State Department officials such as Cordell Hull, Sumner Welles, A. A. Berle, etc., and giving special attention to FDR's two special emissaries, Louis Johnson and William Phillips. Indeed, one of the major theses argued in this book is that the Johnson mission raised false hopes among Indian nationalists that America would intervene on their behalf. FDR's decision to guide policy making on India personally and—against the advice first of Johnson, then of Phillips—to avoid a clear commitment to India's independence raises questions about his motives that cannot be fully answered.

Given Roosevelt's vaunted anti-imperialist bias, one is tantalized by his failure to press the British on India, particularly prior to the turning of the war to the Allies' advantage during the winter of 1942–43, when such pressure would have been hard for even Churchill to resist. Hess suggests that FDR seemed to believe that pursing the Indian case was so repellant to Churchill that Allied unity might have been endangered had he done so. Perhaps FDR was inclined to forget about India, at least until more important matters were resolved. Equivocation partly explains why Phillips remained "special representative" to India for nearly 21 months after he left Delhi.

Clearly, any nationalist expectations aroused by the Atlantic Charter and hopes for a matching Pacific Charter were doomed to frustration since they may have been based upon a mistaken hope for ideological consistency from the Americans. Hess suggests three reasons why the Roosevelt government did not actively intervene on behalf of the Indians: (1) the intransigence of the Churchill government on India; (2) the U.S. leadership's belief that all its influence was for naught if the British remained immovable; and, (3) the U.S. conviction that maintaining the integrity of the United Nations alliance against the Axis overrode all possible advantages to tbe derived from backing an independent India, despite arguments by Nehru and other nationalist leaders that independence would promote Indian assistance to the Allied cause.

As Hess puts it, "India seemed unimportant when contrasted with the questions of the future of Eastern Europe, the establishment of the United Nations Organization, and the securing of Allied assistance against Japan" (p. 149). Because of its equivocation in responding to the Asian nationalist challenge to its European allies the United States lost standing in Asia, appearing to be an ideologically inconsistent partner to imperialism. Failure to respond effectively to the Indian situation weakened the potential for a long-term coincidence of American idealism and self-interest in South Asia. Perhaps, as Hess suggests, if the United States had intervened to alter the results of the Cripps mission in 1942 the positions of Indian groups might have been more responsible and less extreme than they eventually became by 1947.

An important effort in a neglected area, this book does not pretend to be definitive but offers a very useful general foundation for understanding contemporary Indo-American relations. It is presently one of a kind and should certainly find its way into general use.

David R. Weaver

Saginaw Valley College

Revolution and the International System: A Study in the Breakdown of International Stability. By Kyung-Won Kim. (New York: New York University Press, 1970. Pp. 166. $6.95.)

What Professor Kim sets out to do in this book is to examine specific and recorded incidents of a particular period of history, in order to illuminate some general contentions about the nature of international relations; he is, he says, "concerned with the impact of the French Revolution on the international relations of the time only insofar as such impact may be analyzed to reveal the nature of the interaction process between a major political revolution and the existing international system in general" (p. xii). His method is to take discrete stages in the progression of the French Revolution and to point up issues of international, and domestic, importance with reference to theoretical constructs. In a final chapter he comments on these findings, first in relation to other theories concerned with breakdown in international systems, and then by developing hypotheses that deal with the major questions to which he has addressed himself in the general analysis.

The theories he specifically comments upon are Kaplan's "System and Process in International Politics" and Rosecrance's "Action and Reaction in World Politics." The questions to which the hypotheses relate are: What brings about drastic changes within a given international system; how and why does a state discard traditional limitations on objectives and instruments and what factors seem to be responsible for raising the stakes in international conflicts. The schematic form of the hypotheses obscures the build-up of Professor Kim's argument, but offers a brief summary of the nature of the argument; the first hypothesis is that a heterogeneous ideology tends to reduce international stability by sharply increasing the probability of distortion in perception. The second is that the emergence of an antisystemic foreign policy in a revolutionary state is a function of interaction between the revolutionary domestic condition of the state and its international predicament; the third, that the response of conservative states to an emergent revolutionary state is a function of the nature of the existing international system. The fourth hypothesis is a composite proposition that identifies the factors making for breakdown of the system.

The book therefore offers an unusual, but not unprecedented, way of looking at theoretical postulates about international relations. Professor Kim is aware of the pitfalls involved in the approach, not least those which suspicious historians and disdainful political scientists might jointly feel he may experience. In the extended introduction, he picks his way carefully through a number of important reservations and qualifications, and makes a measured defense of his chosen method. He has previously written on "The Limits of Behavioral Explanation in Politics" (*Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science,* [August 1965]), and the article, which is referred to in the introduction, is worth looking at as an amplification of some of the more interesting points of debate in this book.

To a certain extent, the dichotomy which Professor Kim finds in international relations writings between general theory and diplomatic history is an artificial hiatus, emphasized at least as much by publishing or lecturing constraints as by individual scholars' inclinations. But it is a persistent hiatus, artificial or not, and Professor Kim has tried to bridge it. He admonishes as well as analyzes, thus: "No longer passionately involved in the realist-idealist controversy, most of us tend to throw out the basic data on which the debate rested as well as rejecting its mode of analysis. This is why, despite the lip service paid to history as the great laboratory of international relations, many theorists have yet to get inside the lab and work in it" (p. xi). Rousing stuff; by which of course I mean that instinctively I agree with him. This sort of exhortation needs to be uttered occasionally, and Professor Kim would not be without either support or example. But, in the same way that the original hiatus is in part artificial, the judicious midpoint is neither fixed nor clear. Professor Kim warns us: "What a careful and detailed analysis of a given historical case can yield is a set of insights which in principle can be turned into meaningful generalizations through subsequent studies of analogous historical situations" (p. xii). The road ahead is long and hard, oh my brothers! Analogous situations may be difficult to come by, and many of the likely ones are not as well documented as the French Revolution. Professor Kim refers to two reasons why there has been a tendency to depreciate history in international relations theory by American scholars: the contemporary, policy-oriented preoccupations they have had, and the unusual nature of United States historical experience. The wide disparity of reliable evidence is surely another cause, which affects ancient, recent and contemporary situations alike; and sheer drudgery may be another.

PETER NAILOR

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Japan and a Pacific Free Trade Area. By Kiyoshi Kojima. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971. Pp. 195. $10.00.)

This is a collection of essays prepared by Professor Kojima of Hitotsubashi University during the years 1965–1969. Professor Kojima believes that a Pacific Free Trade Area is an attractive alternative to multilateral tariff and quota reduction, whose prospects he feels are not bright. He also believes that it would encourage the economic development of advanced and developing countries along the Pacific basin. It is the concept of such an area which provides the focus for the book, each essay dealing with particular aspects or questions.

The book consists of seven chapters. The first discusses the impact on Japan of world trade liberalization. The perspective is that of the mid-1960s. Chapter 2 outlines the gains which might be realized if countries agreed to specialize in the production of different commodities; most of the gains would result from economies of scale in production and distribution. The benefits which might accrue to the five advanced Pacific nations, Japan, United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are presented in Chapter 3; the chief beneficiary, measured by trade balances, would be Japan.

One of the author's principal concerns is the impact of freer trade upon the developing nations of the Pacific. The source of the concern is that trade today, unlike 19th-century trade, tends to be horizontal rather than vertical, advanced nations trading mostly with advanced nations even for many primary products. Chapter 4 discusses these issues, particularly the possible impact upon Japan of special low tariffs on imports from developing countries. Chapter 5 continues the emphasis upon developing countries by examining the potential usefulness of various methods of aid. One of the more interesting suggestions, not treated in detail, is the establishment of a fund to assist workers and companies to move out of inefficient industries whose output would then be replaced by imports from the developing world.

Trade involves monetary settlement of trade balances, a subject of many problems and newspaper headlines in the postwar years. One possible improvement examined in Chapter 6 is the establishment of a Pacific currency. The base of the new currency unit would be dollars. Professor Kojima concludes that a completely new currency would not be helpful but that formal recognition of some de facto arrangements would be advantageous. In particular he would avoid attempts at institutional integration. The 7th and final chapter discusses some of the difficulties associated with bringing his ideas into reality. The principal difficulty that he saw in 1969, when the initial paper was written, was the attitude of the United States, an attitude which he felt placed world trade before regional association, and Europe before Asia.

A number of interesting political questions are associated with the issue of a free trade zone in the Pacific. They involve not only the international relations among countries, but the internal questions of giving up national sovereignty, protectionism, job retraining and regional balance in situations where the growing export and the sacrificed import substitution sectors are located in different geographical areas. Professor Kojima is aware of these issues and touches briefly upon some of them, especially in Chapter 7. They are not accorded as prominent a place in the analysis as might have been desired, particularly by readers of this *Review*.

The book deals with an important subject. Its ideas are presented clearly and interestingly. The formal tools of economics are used to shape the presentation, to illustrate the arguments and to provide the key empirical facts, yet Kojima does not allow himself to be carried away with techniques for their own sake. In this way the book represents economics at its very best. Additionally the economically literate layman will be able to follow and appreciate Kojima's arguments with relative ease. Readers of this *Review* with interests in international trade, multinational units, economic development, and Japan will find the book useful.

Any book of essays, even one by a single author, tends to have certain weaknesses of context, direction, and timeliness. Direction here is not an issue because all of the chapters contribute in some way to an analysis of the single concept of a Pacific Free Trade Area, but the continuity is disrupted somewhat because the various chapters were originally prepared for specific conferences or volumes. In addition, a book planned as a book from the outset would probably have treated the material with a different emphasis and in a different order. Any study of an economy which has been growing and changing as rapidly as Japan's presents certain problems of timeliness. It is unfortunate, however, for Professor Kojima that Japan's trade balance has so drastically improved in the last year and that the events of August 1971 occurred just prior to publication.

At worst, these are minor distractions. The basic analysis, the insights into issues of Pacific Basin Trade, the proposed solutions, etc., which are contained in the book are still valid. In summary, the book is a well-written analysis of a number of issues which would be associated with the introduction of a Pacific Free Trade Area. As such, readers interested in that or closely related topics would profit by reading Professor Kojima's book.

ROBERT EVANS, JR.

Brandeis University

Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia. Edited by Theodore Morgan and Nyle Spoelstra. Published for the Center for International Economics and Economic Development. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969. Pp. xvii, 424. $12.50.)

This book represents the proceedings of a Conference held at Bangkok in 1967, which was sponsored by the University of Wisconsin Research Project on Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia and financially supported by the United States Agency for International Development. Its subject matter ranges from the possibility of economic co-operation, a consideration of trade policy and economic development, export performance, and the impact of inflation on Asian trade. The discussion comprehends more than Southeast Asia as such, and there are also chapters on Pakistan, India and Ceylon, which one would generally define as South Asia. Nevertheless, they provide useful comparative material.

As this book makes clear, economic cooperation and the development of interdependence in Southeast Asia can only be based ultimately on the emergence of common interests. So far, there has been little evidence that common interests exist. There is much useful analysis of the relevant problems in South and Southeast Asia, and some of these are similar from one country to another. But despite an early enthusiasm, there seems in fact to have been only limited scope for economic cooperation and little interdependence. The reason is simple: These economies (whether they produce primary products or industrial goods) are largely competitive. Even what were the rice-deficit countries are now attempting to achieve self-sufficiency. In other words, one cannot expect very much evidence of interdependence until a degree of complementarity develops. Nor are there large markets in Southeast Asia for the industrial products of Hongkong and Taiwan, since living standards are not yet sufficiently high on the average to provide adequate markets. Moreover, as the book again makes clear, economic complementarities are not likely to become at all marked unless there is either (a) a deliberate policy of specializing within particular economies on certain specific industrial products that complement those produced elsewhere, or (b) the persistent pursuit of industrialization within the region until the range of activity itself provides the basis for a developing trade in industrial products. In this context, it should be remembered that a very significant proportion of total world trade is represented by trade in industrial products between industrialized countries. The former could be attempted by "the co-ordination and harmonization of development plans" (p. 24) or by joint ventures (pp. 27 ff.); the latter is a much more long-term goal. Meanwhile, we are told, some attempt might be made to harmonize national development plans (pp. 45 ff.) and to liberalize trading arrangements (pp. 48 ff.), which by widening the market might help to create increased opportunities for specialization. All this however represents very generalized argument, and it is difficult to come to grips with specific problems. The discussion in Part I is contributed by Wu Ta-Yeh, Hiroshi Kitamura and A. N. Bhagat.

The consideration of specific problems is more particularly the role of the country-by-country studies (in Parts II and III), which deal with topics like "Tariff Protection, Comparative Costs and Industrialization in Pakistan" (Nurul Islam); "Trade Policies and Economic Development in Taiwan" (I-Shuan Sun); "Some Salient Aspects of Thailand's Trade, 1955–64" (Suparb Yossundara and Yune Huntrakoon); "Hong Kong's Changing Pattern of Trade and Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia" (K. R. Chou); "Philippine Export Development, 1950–65" (Amado A. Castro); "West Malaysian External Trade, 1947–65" (Lim Chong Yah); and "Prospects of India's Trade with ECAFE Countries" (D. T. Lakdawala and R. H. Patil). The essays in Part IV concern inflation and Asian trade and include: "The Impact of Import and Exchange Controls and Bilateral Trade Agreements on Trade and Production in Ceylon" (H. N. S. Karunatilake); "Deficit Financing and Import Substitution: India, 1951–65" (D. V. Ramana); and "Indonesian Exports: Performance and Prospects" (J. Panglaykim and Kenneth D. Thomas). But the studies in Parts II, III and IV do not really fit into any obvious logical pattern, and their chief value is in defining some of the problems that face developing countries whether they are in Southeast Asia or not.

The main contribution made by this volume is to raise questions. In particular, one is left to wonder how nations of such diverse economic, historic, political, and cultural characteristics can find a common ground on which to build an integrated economic effort. About the prospects of economic cooperation among the nations of Southeast Asia, one is therefore inclined to remain pessimistic.

J. S. G. Wilson

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Diplomacy for Victory: FDR and Unconditional Surrender. By Raymond G. O'Connor. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1971. Pp. xiii, 143. $6.50.)

Raymond O'Connor, a retired professional naval officer now following an academic career, has written a brief survey of President Franklin Roosevelt's diplomacy during the Second World War. He demonstrates his military training in the clarity and economy of his style. He has produced a literate and succinct account of the background, the goals, and the immediate achievements of President Roosevelt's policy of unconditional surrender.

In spite of this, the book is disappointing. Perhaps it is too brief to provide any discussion of alternatives and consequences in the depth demanded by serious scholarship. Although Mr. O'Connor has conscienciously examined new data, he has not presented any exciting new information, any dramatic new insights. Essentially the book merely repeats the traditional arguments of the defenders of the policy of unconditional surrender. He dismisses the arguments of the policy's critics almost cavalierly.

For example, he deals with the views of those historians and analysts who have deplored Allied, especially American, indifference to the German anti-Nazi resistance groups and to their plans in approximately two pages and a footnote. He contends that any Allied agreement with the resistance leaders would have necessitated acceptance of their peace terms, which included the 1939 German borders, and concludes that it is "inconceivable that any of the Allied war leaders would have seriously considered such a proposal" (p. 88). This is a good indication of the author's failure to understand the nature of negotiation. The resistance scholars have not suggested that the Allies should have surrendered unconditionally.

Mr. O'Connor has made one interesting contribution to the continuing discussion of the conduct of wartime diplomacy in suggesting that had the Allies decided in favor of the U.S. plan to launch the cross-Channel invasion in 1943 rather than accepting the more cautious British plan to secure the Mediterranean first, the war might have ended as much as a year earlier, thereby avoiding the economic, social and political ills which resulted from the prolongation of the war. He suggests that the 1943 invasion of France would have pacified the Soviets by relieving German pressure at a time when the Red Army was in urgent need of Allied help and rendered them less suspicious of western political motives, less hostile and hence more cooperative. He also points out that the Red Army would not have penetrated as deeply into Eastern Europe at the war's end and that the western powers would have been in a far stronger position both geographically and morally to influence the political future of central and eastern Europe.

These are interesting contentions but the military question alone—the question of whether a cross-Channel invasion could have succeeded in 1943 and if so at what comparable cost—would require a discussion as long as the book's 107-page text. Mr. O'Connor does not attempt an exhaustive discussion. He merely suggests the possibility, sweeps aside the contention of the British chiefs, and drops the subject.

A critic of President Roosevelt's wartime policy might have anticipated a re-evaluation of the 1943 demand for total war waged to total victory in terms of the Korean and Vietnamese encounters. Conceivably a convincing case would be made for the view that recent history has demonstrated that the peculiarly American form of democracy cannot successfully wage limited wars for limited objectives, at least not when they are prolonged. Such a contention would demand serious appraisal, but Mr. O'Connor has not presented it.

Indeed he seems to present no further defense of unconditional surrender beyond those conceded by its severest critics. He endorses the policy largely because it resulted in military victory and because it fulfilled President Roosevelt's major political goals. "Probably the most vital of Roosevelt's war aims," he states, was the establishment of "a world organization to preserve peace" and to "curtail international anarchy" (p. 81). In the final paragraph of the book he concludes: that Roosevelt ". . . did adhere to his two major goals: the elimination of the Axis peril and the creation of a framework for a new international order. Both of the objectives were realized, and the unconditional surrender doctrine was instrumental in the achievement of this grand design" (p. 104).

No serious scholar has denied that World War II ended in an Allied military victory, in the defeat of the Axis powers. Whether military victory occurred because of, in spite of, or with no relation whatever to the demand for unconditional surrender is still open to debate. No one has attempted to show that the Casablanca formula made victory impossible, only that it made it costly, and that whatever resulted after 1945 it has not been peace and the curtailment of international anarchy. Undoubtedly it could be demonstrated that it is possible to make an omelet by smashing eggs against a wall and catching the drippings in a bowl, but such a demonstration would not constitute proof that this method was the most efficient or hygienic. Both political and military analysis require the examination of alternatives, of comparative cost.

Mr. O'Connor has stated his viewpoint, namely that unconditional surrender was the only realistic policy and that it was successful. He deals with opposing views by simply rejecting them, quite often by means of a footnote. Unfortunately he has contributed no new data to compel such a conclusion, no new argument. A scholar who has learned about war in the library, the drawing room, or even in the staff room must respect the views of a man who has spent twenty years on active duty, but even the most modest scholar cannot accept assertion as analysis, denial as refutation. The book is undoubtedly well written, the author sincere, but the work falls short of contributing vitally to the still stimulating debate about the efficacy and wisdom of unconditional surrender.

ANNE ARMSTRONG
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Economic Regulation of the World's Airlines: A Political Analysis. By William E. O'Connor. (New York, Washington, London: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 220. $15.00.)

One of the least studied areas of international relations is the political and legal framework within which international air transport operates. Straszheim's excellent study, *The International Airline Industry* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1969), is written by an economist, and some political scientists may find it too technical for ready understanding. In contrast, Dr. O'Connor's book is written simply and lucidly. It combines an interdisciplinary perspective with an accurate description of the historical process which has produced the present international regulatory system, an incisive critique of this system as unduly restrictive, and suggestions for improvement.

In analyzing the present system, the reasons for its existence, and some of its consequences, the author rightly criticizes the influence of narrow conceptions of national interests and the tenuous nature of some of them. He calls for a reorientation in philosophy "such that the world network of airlines would be seen less in terms of national advantage and more as a public trust for the peoples of the world" (p. vi). He gives sympathetic attention to the special problems and interests of the less developed countries. The restrictionist character of policies reflected in and made possible by the present system is seen as impeding the development of truly adequate low-cost world air transport carrying many more people at considerably lower fares.

Dr. O'Connor's analysis of the present system contains a puzzling omission. He fails to discuss adequately the role of public aid which many of the world's airlines still need and receive in many forms from their governments. More important is the questionable character of some of his basic assumptions. He adopts the view that maximum development of international air travel, particularly that of tourists, is a virtually unmixed blessing for a variety of reasons, including personal satisfaction and the promotion of the growth of "world community" and therefore of peace. Aside from the question whether increased tourist travel is on balance productive of greater goodwill and mutual understanding, which the author briefly touches upon but does not really attempt to answer, this view ignores the growing social costs of air transportation, including its environmental effects.

Even less convincing is Dr. O'Connor's attempted justification of the operation of inefficient but numerous airlines by the less developed nations. Official statistics, as reported in the annual *Digests of Statistics (Financial Data)* published by the International Civil Aviation Organization, contain many examples of large financial losses, made up by public aid, from such operations. The author's discussion of the possible benefits of these airlines to their nations in terms of contribution to technological advancement and the performance of fairly simple functions comparable to running hotels is cast in empirically untested generalities and underestimates the currency outflows from the less developed countries required for the purchase of very expensive aircraft, the hiring of foreign crews and other technicians, and the payments for maintenance work on aircraft in the developed countries. At best, the author's generalities can serve as hypotheses still to be tested.

The author's recommendations for improvements in the system rest largely on the belief that air transport is an activity which, like most other modes of transportation and public utilities, simply has to be regulated and that it should be regulated, in part, by an international agency. It may be argued, however, that in many respects air transport is more like shipping, bus lines, and, indeed, the hotel industry, which from an economic point of view and for a variety of reasons require less regulation than railroads, telecommunications, and electric power. The author is on firmer ground in pointing out that governments generally do insist on a high degree of economic regulation of air transport. They do so, however, partly for non-economic national interest reasons and partly in response to the existence of a multitude of inefficient and subsidized airlines. Dr. O'Connor offers a "second best" solution not involving an international regulatory agency but merely a set of agreed standards to be applied in the granting of traffic rights to foreign airlines. But neither of these solutions is likely to be acceptable to the more protectionist governments in a world in which airlines continue to have a high degree of symbolic and other identification with their nations.

Dr. O'Connor fails to consider the possibility that the goals he recommends can best be attained, in the very long run, not by layers of national and international regulatory agencies, but by the gradual development of a number of strong and truly transnational airlines, each of which would be owned by governments and investors of many different countries and not closely identified with any one nation, as previously suggested by the reviewer ("Freedom of the Air: Scheduled and Non-Scheduled Services" in *The Freedom of the Air*, ed. Edward McWhinney and Martin Bradley [Leyden: Sijthoff, and Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1968], ch. 7).

OLIVER J. LISSITZYN

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America and the World: From the Truman Doctrine to Vietnam. By Robert E. Osgood, Robert W. Tucker, Herbert S. Dinerstein, Francis E. Rourke, Isaiah Frank, Laurence W. Martin, George Liska, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. Pp. ix, 434. $15.00.

Conceived as the first in a series of studies to be published by the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research after each presidential election, the Osgood volume provides a competent, if largely conventional, assessment of major foreign policy issues confronting American decision makers in the present decade. The book is primarily policy-oriented and eminently respectable, consisting of essays by Osgood, Robert E. Tucker, Herbert S. Dinerstein, Francis E. Rourke, Isaiah Frank, Laurence W. Martin, and George Liska. Each of the authors eschews critical argumentation about basic assumptions and goals of American foreign policy in favor of a cautious reappraisal of specialized aspects of America's engagement in world affairs—"looking forward," in Osgood's words, "in the perspective of the past." This approach defines both the major strength and weakness of the essays as a whole.

In the first place, the various selections comprise a convenient analytical summary of the postwar period. Particularly noteworthy are Tucker's intelligent if ponderous assessment of the general outlines of American policy since 1945, Osgood's review of the strategic balance and the doctrines and practice of limited war, Frank's analysis of the trend toward greater economic interdependence, and Rourke's treatment of the interaction between executive action and the opinions of various publics in the decision process. In the concluding section on the principal arenas of American foreign policy, Martin usefully recapitulates the course of military and political initiatives in Western Europe, and Liska appraises the role of the United States in seeking to reconcile the diverse policy requirements of advanced and modernizing nations. Least satisfactory is Dinerstein's chapter on Soviet foreign policy, which is an exercise in criticism wholly from a Western viewpoint with little sensitivity to policy perceptions from within the system.

As historical-analytical treatises, the essays are fully in the mainstream of American consensus politics and its "responsible" critics. Thus Tucker emphasizes continuity in American policies from the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine to massive intervention in Southeast Asia: "Then as now American power and leadership were to be employed to create and maintain a stable world order, an order which would enable peoples to work out their destinies in their own way and, by enabling them to do so, thereby ensure American security" (p. 36). To the extent that Vietnam raises anew the issues originally posed by the Truman Doctrine, the war reflects (in Tucker's judgment) the changing circumstances of national security in a world in which restraints on the exercise of power have become greater and the stakes of foreign policy appear increasingly elusive. In a complementary vein Osgood reviews in his chapter on military issues the shift from a doctrine of massive retaliation to one of "flexible and controlled response," and argues that the failure of "controlled escalation" in Vietnam has qualified the acceptance of limited war doctrines within the administration. He concludes that the prospect of enhanced national security through an effective program of arms control—under international conditions characterized by the persistence of Cold-War era power relations—is dependent "much less on a treaty than on reciprocal unilateral limitations, motivated principally by domestic economic and political constraints, and sustained by mutual assurance that neither side intends major extensions of its control and influence to the disadvantage of the other" (p. 235).

A careful extrapolation from the historical record distinguishes the other essays as well. Rourke foresees little possibility of a return to isolationism, and Frank notes the emergence of an "evolving pragmatism" among the advanced nations in managing international economic problems as they arise. Martin emphasizes obstacles to European unity and the continued dominance of the United States in European security affairs, while Liska advocates sustained American involvement in the Third World to promote the development of relatively autonomous regional systems in a "global concert of powers" (p. 434). From the experience of the Soviet Union in Cuba and Czechoslovakia, Dinerstein concludes that Soviet leaders are excessively burdened by the self-imposed task of insuring political conformity within the Socialist bloc.

Each essay invites criticism on explicit points. To cite one example, Rourke's treatment of presidential-congressional relations is excessively mechanistic. In a broader context, the authors' deliberate decision to exclude the viewpoints of all but the "significant critics" of postwar administrations unfortunately limits the scope of their appraisal of the policy record. (Incidentally, Osgood dismisses as insignificant critics "the pacifists, xenophobes, or utopians who reject the involvement of the United States in the central stream of power politics.") But then, the contributors did not intend to apostolize. Viewed in their own terms, the essays share the positive achievement of sound, reasoned disputation on the basis of a consensus interpretation of American policy.

At the same time preoccupation with the "perspective of the past" has inhibited innovative analysis by most of the authors about the future. Cognizant that Vietnam and growing economic interdependence mark major watersheds in international relations, Osgood and others communicate more a sense of unease in the face of change than reasoned speculation about what may lie ahead. Osgood frets in the introduction that established patterns of international relations may be eroding with no promising alternatives on the horizon to take their place: "In [the contemporary transition] the policy designs of the past seem dead or at least drained of hopeful expectations" (p. 20). He restates this theme in his chapter on strategy when he observes that "an era has ended, but one has little intimation of the era that may replace it" (pp. 215–216). Similarly Frank writes about evolving economic relations that "we have reached the end of a cycle, and are not quite sure where we go from here" (p. 237). Nearly as circumspect is Martin's assertion that "it has become a commonplace that, general though a premonition of change is, no one can perceive the future shape of Europe. Those who boldly sketch a new design do so only at the price of departing from plausibility in prediction or wisdom in prescription" (p. 291).

While Martin's cautionary injunction is well-founded in the sense that detailed futuristic blueprints are hardly worth the risk of rapid obsolescence, there is still place in a book such as this for an intelligent appraisal of alternative directions of future policy. Are the goals of foreign policy really so elusive that policy analysts cannot countenance new departures in the realm of environment control or in response to domestic forces of postindustrial transformation? One hopes that the next volume in the projected series can move beyond short-term projections from Cold War relations to a more comprehensive consideration of the multiple forces of change that may characterize the future international system.

M. Donald Hancock

University of Texas, Austin

Racial Influence on American Foreign Policy. Edited by George W. Shepherd, Jr. (New York, London: Basic Books, Inc., 1970. Pp. x, 238. $6.95.)

This series of essays, deriving from conferences held between 1967 and 1969 at the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver, represents a variety of approaches to the basic theme of race and American foreign policy. The theme is treated both from the point of view of race as a factor in domestic decisions on foreign policy and as a factor in the application of policy to particular areas of the world. In his introduction Professor Shepherd argues that racial loyalties have taken on new importance in foreign policy since, along with ethnic loyalties, they provide a basis for transnational linkages which have their effect on foreign policy decisions. The authors illustrate this point with reference to specific world areas and to the American domestic scene.

Perhaps the most provocative essay in the collection is that by James A. Moss, who argues that American foreign policy is essentially racist: "We do, indeed, have a bipartisan racial and ethnic foreign policy, one which operates positively towards countries more similar to us—predominantly white, and another which operates negatively for countries whose inhabitants are predominantly non-white." He documents his argument by citing cases where the United States has reacted strongly against the establishment of nonwhite dictatorships while tolerating white dictatorships, particularly in Latin America. Moss asserts that what happens in Africa is of constantly growing importance to American blacks who identify with pan-Negroism more than they do with specific national interests of the United States and that therefore the black community is all the more conscious of the innate racial bias of the white policy makers.

In a preceding essay, Paul Seabury cogently asserts that the period of white ethnic group influence on American policy has, for all practical purposes, ended. We are, he says, no longer a nation of immigrants and the foreign policy establishment in Washington is no longer based on an Eastern, white Protestant minority but on "a complex ethnic melange more distinguishable by its expertise than simply by its growing diversity." The American black community, he maintains, is more concerned with domestic equality of opportunity than with issues of foreign policy unless the resolution of these issues can be seen to have a demonstrable effect on the quality of life of the black American at home.

The contrasting viewpoints on the effect of race on American foreign policy expressed in these two essays illustrate, perhaps more than anything else, that it is possible to derive determinants (or lack of them) of foreign policy from any given interpretation of the domestic scene. It is clearly excessive to argue that racial attitudes determined the American position on Castro's Cuba; to do so is merely to ignore the realities of international politics. On the other hand, Seabury's contention that American integration has proceeded to a point where ethnic group interest plays little or no role in foreign policy is to ignore pressures of the type, for example, which have surfaced in recent months seeking active interference by the United States in the situation in Northern Ireland.

It is not surprising that three of the chapters deal with American policy in Africa. It is in this area that race becomes clearly a factor in American policy making, particularly toward South Africa, where attitudes toward race dominate external as well as internal policies. John Marcum's excellent summary of racial discrimination in the Republic of South Africa is buttressed by a factual report on American military and economic involvement in Southern Africa. Marcum concludes that if the United States is serious in its public condemnation of apartheid and of Portuguese overseas policy, a program of selective disengagement is the only course open. Otherwise, the growing resentment of U.S. policy in Africa can only force ultimately the choice between supporting antidemocratic but pro-American leaders or making peace with regimes whose ideological orientation is unacceptable to us. His position is unassailable; the difficulty is that to the great majority of Americans, our policy toward South Africa is simply not an issue, whether it is motivated by racial considerations or not.

In two other areas, the Far East and Latin America, racial considerations in foreign policy are more difficult to isolate. Robert Scalapino argues that our stereotypes of the Asian have changed substantially and the complex subtleties of American Asian policy are no longer concerned in any real degree with racial differentiation. In Latin America, Kalman Silvert points out, "race is usually a function of class and culture." The lack of national cohesion resulting from racial inequalities has prevented effective defense of their national interests by the Latin American countries and consequently has made our relations with them all the more difficult.

Collectively, the essays validate the point that race plays a role in the making of foreign policy both here and abroad. But, like many other factors underlying policy decision, there is rarely any satisfactory way of isolating and measuring the force of racial considerations in any single policy decision or even for policy made over a period of time. Day-to-day policy decisions are frequently made as a result of short-term political pressures; to assume that racial considerations necessarily play a role (except perhaps as part of the psyche of the decision makers), is to attribute an unjustifiable degree of bias to all foreign policy action. Nevertheless, it is important that we be aware that racial discrimination can play an undetected part in our policy decisions; by drawing attention forcefully to this possibility, these essays do a service both to those who set foreign policy and to those responsible for its execution.

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

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

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

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
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

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

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

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
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
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

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